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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines political mobilization and protests in Kroonstad’s black townships, in the  
northern Free State Province, South Africa, from 1976 to 1995. It attempts to explain the  
reason(s) why these townships lagged behind when it came to mobilizing and protesting. It also  
explores the various entry points employed by some of the residents of these townships to  
politics; and how they in turn assisted in mobilizing other residents. Furthermore, it shows that  
local community politics in these townships did not follow the common pattern as in other  
townships and because of this the residents reacted differently. It demonstrates that until the  
early 1980s political restraint in these areas existed because of the influential role of the  
“respectables” or elders in politics. From the mid-1980s the situation changed after students and  
young people assumed leadership role in local politics. This caused generational tensions,  
particularly between teachers and students. Furthermore, the thesis examines the divisions  
between the progressive’ activists in the townships, leading to the formation of the Maokeng  
Democratic Crisis Committee and Activists’ Forum, and political violence between the Three  
Million Gang and the “community”, which disrupted the momentum of political mobilization  
and protests. Finally, the thesis explores the tensions between the provincial leadership of the  
ANC, supported by the national leadership, and the local branch of the South African National  
Civic Organisation, which cost the ANC in the first democratic local government elections. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The primary aim of this thesis is to attempt to investigate black
1
politics in Kroonstad, in the 
northern Free State Province, South Africa. To achieve this, it will examine two related issues: 
political mobilisation and protests (or collective action). For the purpose of manageability, the 
thesis will focus on Kroonstad’s black townships: Maokeng and Brentpark. However, more 
attention will be on Maokeng, seeing that it is where political mobilisation and protests were 
predominant. The thesis will try to illustrate that the “community”2 of Maokeng in particular, 
like many other “communities” in different townships in South Africa, participated in political 
mobilisation and protests, albeit lagging behind, especially in the 1980s.
3
  
The thesis will address the reason(s) the “community” of Maokeng, and to a lesser extent of 
Brentpark, mobilised and protested, and second, how it mobilised and protested. And, perhaps 
most importantly, who within these communities mobilised (or were mobilised) and protested. 
On the surface responses to these questions may seem obvious. For example, Jeremy Seekings, 
in his D. Phil thesis, argues that communities residing in some parts of the then Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vaal (P.W.V.) areas in the late 1970s and early 1980s mobilised and protested 
against rent increases.
4
 Similarly, Kehla Shubane notes that civic associations which started 
emerging in various townships in the late 1970s mobilised increasing numbers of people in 
                                                          
1
 For the purpose of this study the term ‘Black’ will include both members of the African and Coloured 
communities. During the period under review the Indian community was not present in Kroonstad. 
2
 The term ‘community’ is referenced in this thesis as a whole in quotations to show that the ‘community’ of 
Kroonstad’s black townships was not homogenous. It differed in terms of political ideology, class, and even 
generation. It was for this reason that a certain section of the ‘community’, for example the elderly and especially 
women,  at a particular political period such as the early 1980s supported the Town Council of Maokeng led by 
Caswell Koekoe, whereas the younger generation, particularly the politically conscientised opposed the this 
Council. Towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s a section amongst the elderly had changed its position and 
opposed the Council under Koekoe. In contrast, during the same period some within the generation that initially 
opposed Koekoe and his Council had altered their attitude and were then accepting that the ‘community’ could 
benefit from Koekoe’s experience in building the ‘new’ South Africa.    
3
 Maokeng Township was not peculiar in this regard. There were other townships which were quiescent. For 
example, in 1984 whilst there was escalating protest and confrontation elsewhere in the P.W.V. region Kagiso and 
Mohlakeng in the West Rand were such townships, and Soweto to a lesser extent. In Kagiso and Mohlakeng there 
were no rent increases or … township-wide civic grievances to focus discontent on township councillors. In Soweto, 
on the other hand, rents were subsidized and incomes were comparatively higher. See Seekings, J.  ‘Quiescence 
and the Transition to Confrontation: South African Townships, 1978-1984’ (University of Oxford, Nuffield College, 
D. Phil, 1990), pp.253-4.  The thesis will demonstrate that the “community” of Maokeng lagged behind particularly 
in the 1980s because there were no rent increases and similar civic grievances raised in other parts of the country, 
but most importantly it will contend that it was because of the role played by the charismatic mayor of the 
township and its council.  
4
 Seekings ‘Quiescence’  
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opposition to the introduction of Black Local Authorities (BLA’s).5 In Maokeng, as will be seen 
below, the situation was different and therefore grievances raised in other townships to mobilise 
the residents were never raised, at least until 1989.  
The argument advanced in this thesis is that in Maokeng, in particular, unlike other townships, 
political mobilisation and protests by the “community” were not necessarily directed against the 
local council but rather took national form at least until 1989. In other words, members of the 
“community” of Maokeng who actively participated in political mobilisation and protest in the 
period 1985-1988 strongly believed that their main objective in the struggle for liberation was to 
dismantle the apartheid state. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, in the period from 
1977 to the late-1980s the community’s grievances against, first, the Community Council were 
channelled through the opposition party within the council
6
, and then later during the BLA, the 
Town Councillors mediated on behalf of the members of the community. Because of this the 
Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) enjoyed support within the “community”, especially amongst 
the adult residents. In turn, this made it difficult for local activists to mobilise against the 
Council. Seekings, writing about the Community Councils in the mid-1970s, correctly notes that 
because of this “... then residents did not become hostile to the councils per se, remaining largely 
indifferent and sometimes even supportive”.7 In Maokeng, interestingly this accommodative 
behaviour by the residents prevailed even during the early years of the township’s council under 
the BLA.  
The second reason is that between 1984 (the year of transition from quiescence to generalised 
confrontation in many townships
8
) and 1989 in Maokeng there was no concerted effort by the 
“community” to force the TCM to resign because it did not meet its needs; that is, it did not 
provide the necessary services, and/or because it constantly increased rent and service charges – 
the common complaints against Town and Village Councils elsewhere. On the contrary, the 
TCM, or at least its chairman, Caswell Koekoe, enjoyed some considerable support from a 
certain section of the “community”. However, this does not imply that the TCM and its 
councillors were embraced by all. Political activists, particularly those who supported the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) were hostile to the Council, but were unsuccessful in forcing it to 
dissolve. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, adult political activists, student and youth organisations protested 
against the TCM (then renamed the City Council of Maokeng) and, indeed, called for its 
dissolution. This shift in attitude should be understood within the national political events taking 
                                                          
5
 Shubane, K. ‘Black local authorities: a contraption of control’ in Apartheid City in Transition (eds.) Mark Swilling 
Richard Humphries, and Kehla Shubane (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1991) 
6
 See Post, 19 August 1980 
7
 Seekings ‘Quiescence’, p.110 
8
 Ibid., Abstract 
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place at the time. In February 1988 the government banned the UDF, its key affiliates and other 
organisations [and placed] new restrictions on the Front’s leaders.9  The UDF responded by 
formalising its alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) into a 
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The MDM opposed the BLA’s local government elections 
which were held in October 1988, but also organised the defiance campaign “... of civil 
disobedience to challenge segregated, government-controlled facilities such as hospitals and 
schools”.10 Political activists across the country took up the MDM’s call and opposed all the 
structures linked to the government. It was on the basis of national politics as espoused by the 
MDM and the then banned African National Congress (ANC) that political activists in Maokeng 
called for the resignation of the councillors and the dissolution of the City Council of Maokeng 
(CCM).  
And thirdly, when the “community” of Maokeng began to mobilise and staged mass protests it 
was after the ANC’s January 8th 1985 Statement made by Oliver Tambo, then president of the 
ANC, to make the country ‘ungovernable’, “by which” Gregory Ruiters writes, “the ANC meant 
using revolutionary violence against the regime and driving out the BLA and councillors from 
the townships ...”11 The “community”, especially the ‘radical’ section, took this statement 
seriously and used every method available to destroy and oppose anything and anyone seen to be 
obstructing the fight for liberation. Because of this, the thesis contends that black politics in 
Maokeng were largely influenced by national political events rather than local. Of course, as will 
be shown in the course of the thesis, in the mid-1980s local councillors and their properties were 
attacked and damaged. But this was because these were the immediate representatives of the 
central government; by destroying them, some sections within the community thought they 
would bring the central government to “its knees”. The attack on the councillors’ properties was 
not related to lack of service delivery or rent and service charge increases.    
And the final reason the local political activists in Maokeng did not focus their energies on the 
TCM was because the mass detention of political activists during the national state of 
emergency, the deployment of experienced political activists to regional or national structures, 
and the split within the Charterist-aligned structure into two factions disrupted political 
mobilisation and protests in the township.
12
 Moreover, the situation was worsened at the 
beginning of the 1990s by the emergence of the Three Million Gang, which terrorised the 
                                                          
9
 Seekings, J. The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa 1983-1991 (Claremont, David Philip 
Publishers, 2000), p.228 
10
 Lodge, T. and Nasson, B. All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (Claremont, David Philip 
Publishers, 1991), p.110 
11
 Ruiters ‘South African Liberation Politics: A case of collective action and leadership in Katorus, 1980-1989 
‘(University of the Witwatersrand, M.A. Dissertation, 1995) , p.99 
12
 Charterist-aligned organisations were all those organisations which supported the Freedom Charter, adopted by 
the ANC and its allies in June 1955 at Kliptown. See Lodge, T. Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1983), pp.71-4 
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“community”. More attention and efforts were spent fighting this gang and mass political 
mobilisation suffered.   
The introduction of young people to politics was perceived by most adults in different townships 
across the country as the source of generational tensions between them and the younger 
generation. For example, in Lingelihle Township, Cradock, in the Eastern Cape, one resident 
lamented”: “I think after 1976 that’s when it started because I used to remember whenever I see 
a young boy doing anything wrong as his elder you stop him doing that thing and he listens. 
Thereafter ... you discover politics have changed our children”.13 Because of the mass political 
mobilisation and protests in Maokeng from 1985, generational struggle (or tension) became 
another significant element in the politics of Maokeng. As in many townships, the removal of 
leadership through detention and constant harassment by the police produced a leadership 
vacuum, which was closed by the inexperienced and politically naive leaders who made bad 
judgments and called for controversial campaigns. This inevitably caused generational struggle 
in the township, particularly with the adult generation which opposed this leadership. However, 
in Maokeng generational struggle was particularly evident in schools when students disrespected 
and clashed with their teachers. But, unlike in other townships, the struggle between the adult 
generation and the younger generation in Maokeng did not cause a backlash by teachers (or 
adults), which in some areas resulted in adults forming vigilante groups, aimed at “disciplining” 
the younger generation.
14
  
This chapter is divided into four sections: A case for Maokeng, Literature Review, Methodology 
and Research Processes, and Chapter outline            
1.1 A Case for Maokeng 
Several factors motivate the choice of Maokeng Township as a case study. Firstly, a survey of 
the existing literature on Maokeng does not go beyond 1976,
15
 and has largely ignored the 
history of the township. What consideration has been given by Antjie Krog,16 Jeremy Seekings,17 
                                                          
13
 Tetelman, M.S. ‘We Can: Black Politics in Cradock, South Africa, 1948-85’, (Evanston, Illinois, Ph. D thesis, 
Northwestern University, 1997), p.143 
14
 In Thabong, Welkom, in Jan 1986 parents/adults forced pupils back to school. See Haysom, N. Mabangalala: The 
Rise of Rightwing Vigilantes in South Africa. Occasional Paper, No.10, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 
(Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986),p.23 
15
 Serfontein, D. Keurskrif Vir Kroonstad: ‘N Kroniek Van Die Ontstaan, Groei En Vooruitsigte Van ‘N Vrystaatse 
Plattelandse Dorp (Johannesburg, Persko-Boekdrukkery, 1990); JSM The History of Black Education in Maokeng, 
Kroonstad (Pretoria, HSRC, 1997); Kay, P. SND de N.  Notre Dame: Under the Southern Cross (Johannesburg, Ravan 
Press, 1984); Ntantala, P. A Life’s Mosaic: The Autobiography of Phyllis Ntantala (University of the Western Cape 
Mayibuye History Series No.6, Mayibuye Centre: Bellville. David Phillip, Cape Town, 1992); Bradford, H. A Taste of 
Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924-1930 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987) 
16
 Krog, A. A Change of Tongue (Johannesburg, Random House, 2003); Krog, A. Begging to be Black (Cape Town, 
Random House Struik, 2009) 
5 
 
Matthew Chaskalson and Jeremy Seekings,
18
 and finally Chitja Twala and Jeremy Seekings, in 
their recent chapter in the South African Democracy Education Trust’s (SADET’s) volume 
four,
19
 is only an allusion, and little attention has been paid to the township’s political history.   
Secondly, Maokeng has a distinctive feature of consisting of a relatively permanent African 
population. A survey conducted by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) into 
housing issues in Maokeng found that 68% out of a stratified sample of 293 respondents “had 
lived in Maokeng all their lives.”20 Although the survey targeted a very small number of 
respondents, taking into account that the Transitional Local Council for the greater Kroonstad, 
Department of Community Services in 1996 placed the population of Maokeng at 99 585
21
, it 
nevertheless demonstrates that the township has had a stable community. This contrasted with 
some of the African townships like in the East Rand, which had a mass population of migrants. 
Despite this stability, the “community” of Maokeng was divided, although not along the “insider 
and outsider” dichotomy, but along political approach. And this proved to be problematic when it 
came to mobilizing and protesting (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five).    
Thirdly, ethnic divisions prevalent in other African townships were not present in Maokeng. The 
township is inhabited mainly by the Southern SeSotho-speaking group. There were other ethnic 
groupings like AmaXhosa and AmaZulu, which once settled in Maokeng, especially in the 
township’s early days. These settled in the old locations. The majority of these had come to 
Kroonstad in search of employment opportunities and ended up living in Maokeng. After their 
employment contracts had expired, or after they had been retrenched, or for other various 
reasons, many left Maokeng. For example, Archibald Campbell Jordan and his wife, Phyllis 
Ntantala, who had come to Maokeng from the Eastern Cape Province to teach, left in the mid-
1940s to pursue their teaching careers in Cape Town.
22
 However, those who opted to remain 
were assimilated into the Basotho culture. This also applied to the Coloured people who refused 
to relocate to Brentpark, either because they resisted or they were in inter-racial marriages, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17
 Seekings, J. ‘Political Mobilisation in Tumahole, 1984-1985’, in Africa Perspective: Agrarian Struggle in South 
Africa – The Debate Continue, Vol.1, Nos. 7 & 8, 1989 
18
 Chaskalson, M. and Seekings, J. ‘The Awakening: Desparation and Defiance’, in Mark Bennett and Deborah Quin 
(Research Co-ordinators) Political Conflict in South Africa: Data Trends, 1984-88 (An Indicator South Africa Issue 
Focus, December 1988)  
19
 Twala, C. and Seekings, J. ‘Activist networks and Political Protest in the Free State, 1983-1990’, in The Road to 
Democracy in South Africa, VOL. 4, 1980-1990, South African Education Democracy Trust (Pretoria, UNISA Press, 
2010) 
20
 ‘Bringing houses to Maokeng’: A community-based Approach. Research Report for CASE and Maokeng 
Community Development Trust (MCDT) by Samuels Tanya et al. of CASE, July 1996, p.3; also see, Life History 
Interviews conducted by T.C. Challa and A.H. Mosoeu of the Free State Provincial Archives for the Department of 
Sport, Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Library and Archives Directorate, Tsewelopelo Library, Maokeng, 15 
June 2005. These interviews reveal that a significant number of people interviewed had arrived in Maokeng in the 
1940s. 
21
 Bringing houses to Maokeng’,p.5.  
22
 Ntantala, P. A Life’s Mosaic 
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following the forced removals of the 1950s. Most significantly, when political violence erupted 
in the township at the beginning of the 1990s this was not ethnically-driven as was the case in 
places like Alexandra Township,
23
 Kathorus
24
 and Soweto
25. The ‘system’ was, therefore, unable 
to use ethnic divisions to foster political violence in the township, but it promoted it through the 
Three Million Gang (discussed in detail in chapter six).  
The fourth reason for examining Maokeng is that because of the key role education played in the 
development of the township, community matters had always been led (or influenced) by the 
“respectables” or the learned elders, at least until in the late 1970s.26 This helps explain the 
constraint on mass political mobilization, especially violent protests which only became the 
norm from the mid-1980s in the township – because students and youth were in the forefront. 
These “respectables” believed in resolving the issues through dialogue – which involved few 
people. There is evidence illustrating that on numerous occasions the latter preferred to negotiate 
with the authorities. During the height of political struggle in the mid-1980s, local clergies and 
the ‘learned’ or teachers, involved in political struggle in Maokeng, continued the trend. 
However, during this period the balance of power (or influence) was heavily tilted in favour of 
the radicals, who used confrontational methods.  
Fifthly, the political culture in the township has always been diverse, dating back to the 1940s. 
The numerous political organizations which existed in the township at different periods included 
the African National Congress (ANC), the Non-European Unity Movement’s youth wing, SOYA 
(Society of Young Africans),
27
 Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM), and the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO). The degree of their 
support and influence varied. Notwithstanding, in the early 1970s the BCM was very influential, 
at least until the late 1970s when it was banned in 1977. Some of the proponents of the BC 
philosophy continued their involvement in the struggle for liberation but had shifted their 
political affiliation to the ‘Charterist’ camp.28 In the mid-1980s the different political approaches 
adopted by the historically-BC aligned activists and those who from the onset followed the 
‘Charterist’ line caused tension within the ‘Charterist’ structure, leading to a split between the 
Maokeng Democratic Crisis Committee (‘radicals’) and the Activists’ Forum (‘moderates’).  
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And finally, Kroonstad town unlike other towns, particularly in the East Rand and the Reef in 
general, has never been a mass industrial area, agglomerated by diverse “manufacturing clusters: 
metal industry, chemicals and food”.29 Although Twala and Seekings note that “both population 
and industry are concentrated in the north-west corner, which includes the goldfields around 
Welkom as well as Sasolburg, Parys and Kroonstad”30, comparatively, Kroonstad had far fewer 
industries, particularly manufacturing industries, than the other towns in the north-west corner of 
the Orange Free State (O.F.S.). Its economy is largely based on service industries. In the 1970s, 
for example, although a considerable number of people worked for the railways (in the mid-
1980s the railways had ceased operating in Kroonstad), and the Milling Company, a significant 
number of people were employed by the state as police officers, prison warders, teachers, with 
some working for the municipality and small stores in the area. For this reason the town did not 
experience active trade unionism until the mid-1980s – which even then they operated under 
stringent conditions. As will be seen in the thesis that trade unionism was introduced in 
Kroonstad in the early 1980s by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC’s military wing, cadres 
who had been infiltrated back into the country. 
The more industrialized towns in the northern O.F.S. such as Sasolburg, because of Sasol’s oil-
from-coal refineries had a mass concentration of workers in a single factory or plant.  Despite the 
company’s preference of employing migrants31, trade unions were able to organize and wage 
strike actions against the company. In early 1983 members of the South African Chemical 
Workers’ Union (SACWU) in Sasolburg went on strike in support of their colleagues whose 
employment was summarily terminated by the management of the African Explosives and 
Chemical Industries (AECI).
32
 These workers were relieved of their duties after they had 
demanded the removal of an acting supervisor. When management refused to accede to their 
demand, the workers embarked in a series of work stoppages until they were dismissed.
33
 In July 
of the same year, 251 workers, also members of SACWU, downed tools, refusing to work 
fearing for their safety. This was after a gas blowout had killed two workers.
34
 This never 
touched Kroonstad until 1985.     
Before the chapter shifts its focus to literature review, it is important to note that the case study 
of Kroonstad’s black locations it is a significant contribution to trying to understand black 
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people’s experiences and responses to apartheid from a local perspective. This is in view of the 
fact that black people’s histories, not only in Kroonstad but in general, have been previously 
neglected. Noor Nieftagodien argues  
the publication of popular local histories was typically undertaken by municipalities  
to celebrate the histories and development of white towns. In the latter genre of local 
(urban) history, as was the custom in official histories in general, black people appeared 
as only peripheral actors and were often completely excised from these racially biased 
versions of the past
35
   
 
Through this local study, emphasizing ‘history from below’ and “foregrounding the lived 
experiences and struggles of ‘ordinary people’, an attempt has been made to give attention to 
“local leaders of popular movements, teachers, home-owners, former gangsters, and young 
people, who “… invariably would  appear as no more than footnotes in conventional 
narratives”.36 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Although there is sizeable literature focusing specifically on Kroonstad and Maokeng, as already 
noted above, this literature however does not transcend the 1976 period. There are a few 
exceptions, of course. The few books that solely focus on the histories of Kroonstad and (and to 
a lesser extent) Maokeng one is the massive 645-page book written by Dot Serfontein (Antjie 
Krog’s mother) about the history of Kroonstad from 1854 to 1953. In 1985 the City Council of 
Kroonstad requested Serfontein to write a book to celebrate Kroonstad’s 99 years of existence. 
This book provides useful information about the establishment of Kroonstad, the shaping of the 
town and the role of the (white) city council. However, it specifically deals with the history of 
the whites and the town.
37
Apart from alluding to few incidents like the role played by the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU’s) and the boycotts against increased rates and 
service charges led by some of the leading figures in the ICU such as Keable ’Mote, this book is 
absolutely silent on political activism in the black townships.  
Paul Rich’s article on Maokeng deals with the role of the Joint Council of European and Native, 
Native Advisory Boards, and the earlier period of political mobilization and organization in 
Kroonstad. Interestingly, he demonstrates the changing role of the Advisory Board in Kroonstad: 
how in 1934 it begun to press for minimum wages for local African workers, as opposed to being 
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a timid and pro-segregationist organization.
38
 This article is an invaluable contribution in 
understanding black leadership in Kroonstad before the 1970s, particularly amongst the elite 
group.  
Notre Dame by Patricia Kay, as well as Phyllis Ntantala’s A Life’s Mosaic has each dedicated a 
chapter to the history of Kroonstad. Kay’s chapter focuses on the important role played by the 
Roman Catholic Church in introducing education in the black township in 1907. Apart from this, 
the chapter does not provide any significant information. Ntantala’s chapter, on the other hand, 
sheds light on the daily living conditions of the residents in Maokeng in the late 1930s and 1940s 
(Ntantala arrived in Maokeng in 1937 to take up a teaching post at Bantu High School), the types 
of work people did, the presence of the ICU and ANC in Maokeng, and on economic 
development of the area. Just like Jonah Steele Moeng Setiloane, Ntantala reconstructs the brief 
history of Maokeng from memory of lived experiences. Ntantala’s chapter is useful because it 
deals specifically with ordinary peoples’ everyday life’s experiences, showing the everyday 
socio-economic struggles people endured. She also, briefly, demonstrates the role played by 
teachers in teacher-associations and in politics in Maokeng.
39
 In this thesis I draw from this 
chapter to compare the community’s grievances in the 1930s/40s and those in the early 1990s. 
This helps to articulate the intensity of violent protests in the latter period.      
JSM Setiloane’s The Black History of Education in Maokeng provides a first-hand account about 
the history of education in Maokeng. Setiloane attended school at Bantu High in the 1930s (the 
school was renamed Bodibeng High in 1967), and in 1962 was employed as the principal in the 
same school. He also draws heavily on the school’s logbooks and other primary materials, like 
the principal’s reports. In this book Setiloane demonstrates how education evolved in Maokeng, 
from church schools to Bantu education. He further shows the significant role education played 
in Kroonstad within the black community. For instance, he notes that in the 1960s the degree of 
illiteracy among the people had decreased tremendously and this made it possible for many 
people to find employment in the prison department, police force and in the municipal office.
40
 
Moreover, he provides a brief account of the socio-economic and political life in Maokeng, 
especially from the 1930s to the 1970s. In conclusion, he mentions, in passing, the negative 
impact of the intermittent student unrests had in the school from the mid-70s.
41
  
The thesis draws heavily from this book, especially the educational background. Although the 
book is both a personal and communal eulogy of the significant role education played in 
developing the township and its inhabitants it, nevertheless, also implicitly supports the argument 
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that Maokeng prior to 1976 did not experience violent protests, because politics were led by the 
elderly and the “respectables”. Among the notable “respectables” actively involved in politics in 
Maokeng in the 1930s were Reginald Cingo, Joe Kokozela (second principal of Bantu High, then 
called Bantu United School in 1928), and Reverend Z.R. Mahabane (President-General of the 
ANC in 1924-27 and 1937-40).
42
 In the 1950s SOYA dominated politics in the township, 
followed by the elderly women like Majoro Matseki, who led the women’s march against the 
pass laws.
43
 
In A Change of Tongue, Antjie Krog deals with certain important political events which took 
place in Kroonstad, especially from the mid-80s to the early 1990s. Like Setiloane and Ntantala, 
she also writes from a personal experience. Writing about Kroonstad in the post-independence 
period, Krog demonstrates the conservative nature and the unwillingness of the many Afrikaners 
living in town to accept the political changes in the country. Furthermore, she recalls the “first 
and only truly inclusive” march organized from the Coloured area (Brentpark) to the centre of 
town to say: “this is our town too and we demand equal rights here.”44 Although, this march was 
ruthlessly suppressed by the police, Krog, asserts that it bridged the gap between the residents of 
Maokeng and those of Brentpark. This event sheds light on the uneasy relationship between the 
two communities. Although there were a handful of activists from Brentpark, notably amongst 
these were Dennis Bloem and Isaac “Sakkie” Oliphant, the majority of the residents of Brentpark 
avoided becoming involved in the struggle for liberation. This was evident when an attempt to 
mobilize and organize the residents of Brentpark to join the UDF in 1983 failed.   
Krog’s recently published book Begging to be Black, an extended edition of Account of a 
Murder, tells a story of the murder of the leader of the Three Million Gang in 1992. Even though 
the book is about this murder and Krog’s account about how she was drawn into it, it provides 
glimpses of politics in Maokeng in the mid-1980s. For example, she alludes to the competing 
political factions, the AF and MDCC, in the township and relates how these divided the 
“community”.45 From the oral interviews I conducted in Maokeng it is clear that the 
“community” was divided between the two factions and that this had serious political 
ramifications. These books are helpful because they also shed light on the uneasy relationship 
between the communities of Maokeng and Brentpark. 
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Chitja Twala and Jeremy Seekings’ work focus on the construction and activities of networks of 
activists in the Orange Free State (OFS) in the 1980s. They contend that these networks 
“contributed to the unfolding pattern of political organization and protest in the diverse towns of 
the OFS”.46 Twala and Seekings also demonstrate the important role played by the veterans of 
struggle like Winnie Mandela (Madikizela), who in 1977 was banished to Brandfort, in the OFS, 
and ‘Commandant’ Caleb Motshabi, who had joined the ANC in 1949 and in 1961 became the 
OFS commander of MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe, or the Spear of the Nation), ANC’s military 
wing, in “educating” the younger generation in the OFS politically.47 This helps explain why 
political mobilization and organization was easy to achieve in the early 1980s in other parts of 
the OFS such as Bloemfontein. Although, the Kroonstad’s black locations lacked veterans of the 
struggle to take up this role, Twala and Seekings show that some of the young people in 
Maokeng, in particular, were conscientised by what they witnessed in townships like Sebokeng, 
in the Vaal Triangle, and Duduza, in the East Rand.
48
  Most significantly, the authors also 
discuss, in detail, the numerous unsuccessful attempts by the UDF leadership to build 
organizations in the OFS.
49
 This, they note also affected Kroonstad. They write “… An ad hoc 
UDF committee was formed on 31 August 1985 … comprised essentially Dennis Bloem 
(chairperson) and “Bizzah” Makhathe … met several times, but made no real progress towards a 
permanent structure”.50 Although, Twala and Seekings’ work does not provide a detailed account 
about black politics in Kroonstad, it, however, sheds light on the difficulties activists experienced 
in organizing in Kroonstad. Furthermore, they allude to the split between activists in Maokeng, 
which not only disrupted political mobilization in the township but also divided the 
“community”.   
Finally, having dealt with the literature on Maokeng and Kroonstad, the chapter will now turn to 
review literature on political mobilization and protests, and generational struggles.       
Literature on political mobilization and protests in South Africa is relatively abundant. Most of 
the literature on this issue focuses on youth politics. However, this should not be construed to 
mean that there were no adult-led politics (or organizations). Civic and council politics were very 
much part of black politics in townships. These will be briefly discussed below. First, let us 
focus on the literature on youth politics. Shaun Johnson’s work provides an interesting review of 
the emergence of the “youth component of resistance”.51 He traces the development of youth 
politics from the late 1960s, with the formation of the South African Student Organization 
(SASO) to the eruption of youth revolts in the 1980s. This work is a valuable contribution in 
                                                          
46
 Twala and Seekings ‘Activist networks’, p.767 
47
 Ibid., p.770 
48
 Ibid., p.774 
49
 Ibid., pp.777-8 
50
 Ibid., p.793 
51
 Johnson, ‘Soldiers of Luthuli’, in S. Johnson (ed.) No Turning Back (Bloomington: Indiana press. 1989) pp.94-143 
12 
 
providing the historical background to the emergence of youth organizations and their role in the 
politics of resistance. 
In similar vein, Seekings in his book Heroes or Villains provides an illuminating account of the 
emergence of youth organizations in the country from the mid-1970s. He also discusses their 
activities in detail. His work is helpful in differentiating between the youth who were involved in 
the struggle in the 1970s and those involved in the struggle in the 1980s. He illustrates that in the 
1970s it was young people or students (and not the youth) who were in the forefront of the 
struggle because of their specific focus on school politics. Then in the 1980s youth took the lead 
because of their involvement in the broader politics. The thesis draws from both Johnson and 
Seekings’ studies to show how youth organizations were established in Maokeng, and their 
activities.  
 
Kumi Naidoo and Ari Sitas’ work focus on the politics of youth resistance in Durban.52 Sitas’ 
work looks at the ‘making of the comrades movement’ and Naidoo deals with ‘major difficulties 
encountered by youth organizations and activists’ [in trying to organize themselves into a united 
youth organization]. The two scholars provide similar views about the factors which drew the 
youth (in Durban) to the struggle for liberation: mainly defending the “community” against 
Inkatha and KwaZulu Police (which were aligned to Inkatha).  Both refute the argument that 
youth movements (or comrades) emerged because of the social indicators such as “black 
unemployment and anomic behaviour”.  They, instead, contend that youth induction into the 
politics of resistance was influenced by various factors. This point is of particular interest 
because when researching youth activists in Maokeng it became clear that many of them 
received their first political lessons not in youth organizations but from youth groups in church 
and at home, for example. This was particularly the case in the Roman Catholic Church.  
Naidoo, in his study, further provides an illuminating account about the socio-cultural and 
political differences between the Indian and Coloured and African youth.  He asserts that these 
differences were the main reasons why the youth in Durban could not organize themselves into a 
united youth movement.  
 
However, in both scholars’ work there are silences about the life histories of the youth, which 
would have enabled the studies to throw light on the socio-economic factors that encouraged the 
youth to join the struggle. What is valuable about these scholars’ work is that they provide a 
valuable account about the emergence of youth organizations; the different characteristics of 
youth organizations; and the internal functioning of youth organizations. 
 
Monique Marks’ work has made a valuable contribution towards the illumination of the socio-
economic and political factors which prompted youth to become involved in the politics of 
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resistance.  In her study of youth politics she focuses on a particular youth organization in a 
specific area – Diepkloof, in Soweto in the 1980s and early 1990s. In her paper titled ‘Youth and 
Political Violence’ she provides an interesting analysis of the factors that contributed to the 
youths’ involvement in immoral activities (for example, gangs).  She attributes this to moral 
degeneration, because of lack of moral authority. She grounded her work on the Durkheimian 
theory of anomie. For her, this could only be curbed with the “formation of youth organizations 
led by mature and respected leadership”.53 This work throws light on the important role played 
by youth organizations and mature and disciplined leadership in the struggle for liberation. She 
notes that the latter were instrumental in leading and guiding youths’ involvement in the struggle 
in a constructive manner and in instilling discipline in them. In Maokeng, as will be shown in the 
thesis, the leadership of youth organization was mainly made up of students, with few non-going 
school youth. The leadership tried to maintain discipline amongst its members and non-members. 
However, as more young people joined the ranks of the youth organization, and some of the 
leadership went into detention while others operated underground, problems of ill-discipline 
arose. The situation became worse when some of the ill-disciplined youth joined the Three 
Million Gang.  Marks’ paper aids in an analysis of youth leadership in the struggle. 
 
Again, in her paper titled ‘We are fighting for the liberation of our people…’ Marks illustrates 
how the youth involved in the struggle justified their use of political violence. She notes they did 
this by stating that they were “responding to the ANC’s call to take up the armed struggle as a 
strategy for change”; and that “bloodshed [was] necessary for liberation”.  She concludes that the 
“key to understanding the willingness of the (Diepkloof) youths’ participation in political 
violence is their identity as ‘comrades’ whose role was to protect the community from physical 
and moral threat”.54 This paper is critical when looking at the role of youth organization in 
Maokeng during the fight with the Three Million Gang (TMG). Like the youth in Diepkloof, 
youth in Maokeng also perceived themselves as the protectors of the community. Youth activists 
formed themselves into defense units and led the ‘war’ against the TMG.  
 
Although Marks’ work focuses solely on the youth organization in Diepkloof, it sheds light in 
the understanding why youth in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s engaged in political 
violence, and how they interpreted their involvement in it. This is particularly helpful when 
analyzing the youth’s involvement in politics in Maokeng, moreover because they lagged behind.   
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In another paper titled ‘Onward Marching Comrades’, Marks provides an invaluable account of 
the youths’ response to the changing nature of politics in the 1990s precipitated by the unbanning 
of the liberation movements, particularly the ANC.  She argues that the 1990s saw the role of the 
youth organizations in the struggle becoming unclear. This was because, she contends, this 
period ushered in the politics of negotiations, which resulted in the ANC assuming a leading role 
in the transition period.  This left the youth confused and uncertain about their role. Reflecting on 
this view, Ashwell Zwane, a member of the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO), cited by Marks 
asked “What is the role of the youth now? Even the ANC has not defined a role for us …”55 In 
Maokeng the youth’s role was further complicated by their involvement in the fight against the 
Three Million Gang. This limited the youth’s active participation in the negotiations for the 
Transitional Local Council (TLC), for example.  
 
Charles Carter’s Ph.D. thesis on the political role of the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO) in 
the struggle for liberation is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the character of a 
youth organization determined to “construct its uniform identity”.56 He argues that AYCO in 
trying to achieve this became dominant and coercive. He also explores the socio-economic 
factors that caused most of the youth in Alexandra Township to become involved in the struggle.  
At some point in his work, Carter reveals the link between members of AYCO and the ANC’s 
underground operatives, particularly the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), or MK 
operatives, in the 1980s. And he shows that this link exposed the youth activists often to their 
own significant harm. He cites Vincent Tshabalala as example. Tshabalala was recruited by Sam 
Ndaba, an Askari, to leave the country and join MK in exile. When Tshabalala returned to the 
country he was killed in a shootout with the police. Ndaba was suspected to have sold-out 
Tshabalala.
57
 However, there is otherwise a silence about these MK operatives, even though one 
acknowledges that during the period in which Carter undertook this research it could have been 
difficult to locate such operatives – for security reasons, a shortcoming which Carter 
acknowledges.
58
  Nevertheless, Carter’s work sheds light on underground political work, and 
links between the exiled ANC and the youth organizations operating inside the country. In 
contrast, evidence to suggest the presence of underground political work and/or links with MK in 
Maokeng and Brentpark in the 1980s is non-existent.  
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School-going young people have also played an important role in the struggle. Regrettably there 
are no comprehensive studies on secondary and high school student politics, especially in the 
1980s, except for Tshediso Matona’s honours essay on the Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS).
59
 The role of students and their organizations such as COSAS, and the Azanian 
Student Movement (AZASM), BC-aligned, have in many instances been lumped with youth 
politics.
60
 Although these studies and others make notable contributions in the study of student 
politics, there is still room for further research. By contrast, studies on student politics in the 
1970s are abundant. Some of these studies focus on the establishment of student organizations 
following the 1960s severe repression of African politics. For example, Nozipho J. Diseko’s 
work on the South African Student Movement (SASM) illustrates the role the BC-aligned 
student formation played in conscientizing school-going students, especially in Soweto in the 
early 1970s. Among the notable members of SASM, Tsietsi Mashinini, Tebello Motapanyane, 
David Kutumela, and Sibongile Mkhabela (formerly Mthembu), were in the forefront of the 
student uprisings in 1976.
61
  
Similarly, Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu provides an illuminating account of the role of students, 
especially leading to the uprisings in 1976. For Ndlovu, who in 1976 was a Form 2 student in 
Soweto, students in junior standards (Standard 5 to Form 2)
62
 were the major force in the cause 
of the revolts, because they were directly affected by the Department of Bantu Education’s 
(DBE) directive for the compulsory use of Afrikaans in half of the subjects.
63
 He asserts that 
students in senior standards were not affected by the government’s directive. Drawing from 
personal experience, he notes that his former school Phefeni Junior Secondary was the first to 
primary and junior secondary school in Soweto to boycott classes protesting the use of Afrikaans 
as the medium of instruction.
64
 He argues “I do not remember any liberation movement, such as 
the BCM or the South African Student Movement (SASM) contributing to our daily meetings 
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and discussions”.65 Furthermore, to support his argument Ndlovu, in a chapter in the second 
volume of The Road to Democracy in South Africa, observes that SASM took a decision at its 
conference in Roodepoort (West of Johannesburg) to support schools affected by the Afrikaans 
directive well after his school had been on a go-slow before the official class boycott on 17 May 
1976.
66
  
Sekibakiba Lekgoathi, focusing on rural areas in the former northern Transvaal (today’s 
Limpopo Province), emphasizes the role of the urban students who were studying in schools in 
Lebowa as the driving force behind the uprising in that area. According to him “… the most 
pivotal role in the disturbances at Matladi Secondary School in Zebediela was played by urban 
students – mostly boarders, particularly those from the townships around Pretoria”.67Other 
authors whose work looks at the role of students in the uprisings include Alan Brooks and 
Jeremy Brickhill
68
; Baruch Hirson
69
; and John Kane-Berman
70
, for example.    
In spite of the valuable contribution that these scholars have made in the study of student 
uprisings in 1976, they however downplay the role of the teachers, particularly the BC-
influenced teachers, in the uprisings. The thesis will demonstrate that the appointment of the 
younger and BC-influenced teachers to the teaching staff of Bodibeng High School in the early 
1970s opened space for some of these teachers to introduce students at the school to the BC 
philosophy and ideas. This caused behavioural change of some of the students and in August 
1976 the latter took to the streets in solidarity with their counterparts in Soweto.
71
  
 
Generational struggles 
Mamphela Ramphele, writing about the effect of politics on generational relations, noted 
Once children were thrust ‘onto the frontline’, it became difficult to sustain 
traditional social relations between adults and children, and this had serious 
implications for family life. Children became used to power and control, and 
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refused to yield to the authority of adults whom they despised – their parents and 
teachers. Conflict became inevitable
72
 
Numerous studies on generational struggle (or some elements related to it) have already been 
undertaken.
73
  This study builds on such studies. But it has also attempted to demonstrate that, 
unlike in other areas, in Maokeng generational struggle was concentrated in schools (and not in 
homes or the township in general). This, the thesis contends, it was because young people, 
particularly high and secondary school students were thrust into the forefront of the struggle 
from the mid-1980s (there was no civic structure until 1990/91). This caused young people to 
undermine the authority of adults, in this case the teachers.  
Various scholars have emphasised different factors as the main cause of generational struggle in 
black townships. These range from dysfunctional families, unemployment, and mass education, 
to the dearth of traditional forms of control previously used by adults. However, they downplay 
the impact politics had on young people. True, there are some scholars who allude to this but 
their focus is on the impact this has had on the relations between adults and the youth in 
townships broadly. The intention of this thesis is to illustrate the effect of youth/student politics 
on the relations between students and teachers at Bodibeng High – once a model school in the 
Orange Free State.  
Different definitions have been provided for generation. First, though, Clive Glaser notes that 
“generation as an analytical tool emerged in the discipline of social anthropology rather than 
history. Social anthropologists have shown that generational hierarchy is a key concept in 
understanding the power structure of ‘pre-capitalist’ societies”. Furthermore, according to him, 
social anthropologists pointed out that “age hierarchies were based on elders controlling the 
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system of bride-wealth and, by extension, the point of marriage and labour reproduction”.74 
However, this power structure changed over a period of time as the country ‘modernised’ and 
young people began to be absorbed into a capitalist system, which gave them a sense of 
independence.
75
  
In defining generation, Karl Mannheim introduced the concept of generational unit. 
“Generational units”, he notes, “share an identity of responses and views about events”.76 
Furthermore, he argues “by grappling with a distinct set of social and historical problems they 
develop an awareness and common identity – generational consciousness, analogous to class 
consciousness and national consciousness”.77 And Belinda Bozzoli, drawing from Abrams, sees 
generation as a ‘sociological generation’ rather than a biological one. According to her this is 
“that span of time within which identity is assembled on the basis of an unchanged system of 
meanings and possibilities”.78  
For convenience, in analyzing generational struggle in Maokeng, the thesis argues that the 
younger generation was made up of youth – politically active youth. This category included 
young people still at school (particularly high and secondary schools). Seekings, in his work on 
‘youth politics’, contends that “the category youth in South Africa is a political rather than a 
sociological or demographic construction”. “Being young”, he continues, “is generally seen as 
necessary but not sufficient condition for inclusion in the youth; young people must also be 
involved in political activity to count as youth”.79 And the older generation, on the other hand, 
contends the thesis that it comprised of teachers.
80
 
Now the chapter will briefly summarise some of the factors perceived as the main cause of 
generational struggles.  
Dysfunctional family life 
Philip Bonner’s work based in an urban setting of Benoni, an East Rand township, between 1939 
to 1955 deals with various socio-economic and political factors that led to generational conflict, 
but clearly shows how dysfunctional family life contributed more to this. He notes that the 
changing patterns of migrancy saw single women flocking into the urban areas without any 
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support, financially or otherwise, and that some of these women found themselves forced to 
engage in formally illicit activities in order to survive like running shebeens. Moreover, others, 
because of precarious living conditions in the urban areas, found themselves in “loose family 
units” with “unattached men”.  There are two reasons for this. First, single women needed men 
for protection and accommodation. Second, for these women “unattached men” were a source of 
financial support. This resulted in an increasing number of illegitimate children, who, in most 
cases, were brought up under unstable family units. Because of this, and grinding poverty and 
lack of privacy (because of the shortage of housing), young people found solace in the streets, 
where they associated themselves with hardened criminals, learned survival methods in the 
streets, and ended up engaging in criminal activities.  
Unemployment (and crime) 
Unemployment inexorably pushed the younger generation into gangsterism. It also contributed 
its fair share to the problem of generational struggles in the urban setting. Lack of skills and the 
employers’ preference of rural youth over urban youth pushed the latter into the world of 
crime.
81
 Furthermore, the failure by school-leavers to secure jobs also did not help. It is 
important to note that this problem was not only experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, but was 
also prevalent in the 1980s. Steve Mokwena relates a story of a school-leaver who saw crime as 
his only way out of poverty:  
 Gavin Sello, 25 years old, was a matric student in 1986. He did not write 
 his exams in 1986. The following year he went to school and failed his  
 matric because of the sporadic disruption of classes. He made a third attempt 
 in 1988 but gave up. He has been without work since the day he left school.  
He hopes that one day he will meet someone who will offer him a job. If not, 
he confesses, the only remaining avenue is crime.
82
  
 
The younger generations’ wayward ways or anti-social activities caused tensions between them 
and the older generation. In the 1970s the older generation in trying to quell gangsterism and 
criminal activities formed themselves into makgotla (traditional courts) where delinquent youths 
were severely dealt with – sjambokked.83 According to Glaser, some of the notable figures in 
Soweto who led makgotla were Mrs Sinah Madipere Makume, usually known as “Madipere” 
from Meadowlands Zone 1, and Sigfried Manthata from Naledi.
84
 Seekings, in his D. Phil thesis, 
demonstrating mechanisms adopted by the community councillors (solely made up of adults) in 
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Soweto in the 1970s in settling family and communal disputes, particularly regarding 
disrespectful or delinquent youth, formed themselves into makgotla. Regarding the role of 
makgotla, one councillor had this to say    
  
I believe naughty children should be sjambokked. So if children under eighteen are 
 brought to us for disciplining, we sit as a lekgotla … If the kid is found guilty, we  
 let the parents lash him in front of us so the kid cannot fight back …85 
 
Similarly, in other areas such as Cradock, in the Eastern Cape, generational struggle was caused 
by juvenile delinquency. Adults, who felt that their authority was being threatened by juvenile 
delinquents, “exercised their authority by using physical force”.86   Adults, mainly men, 
concluded that young men who committed crime and threatened their authority were 
uncircumcised boys. So, for them to eradicate criminal activities in the location and to retain 
their authority “… in 1975, with the municipality’s approval, staged a ritualized beating of 
uncircumcised boys”.87 The beatings lasted for two months, causing all the uncircumcised young 
males to flee the location to the mountains. Although, this assuaged the insecurities of the older 
men temporarily, it nevertheless demonstrated that collection action taken by adults against the 
younger generation could yield results.  
 
Adults used various forms of traditional methods to control young people. In addition to 
indigenous practices like circumcision school and physical forms of punishment, adults in 
Cradock, for example, also used youth clubs. Tetelman writes “from the early 1930s many older 
black elites and Canon J.A. Calata, an Anglican Clergyman, were deeply concerned over what 
they perceived as pervasive generational conflict in Cradock’s so-called “Old Location”. “To 
control this”, he continues, “they formed a rich variety of youth clubs fashioned on British lines”. 
“These organizations”, he notes, “included scouting movements for boys and girls, church 
choirs, drama groups, and active school sporting teams”.88  
 
In Maokeng such apolitical youth clubs existed in the 1960s – and were able to keep young 
people in check. But the 1970s and 1980s saw the development of youth clubs intended to 
politicize young people. For instance, in the early 1970s Tsiu Vincent Matsepe and Pule 
Mokuane were instrumental in the establishment of the Maokeng Student Art Club (MASAC), a 
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Black Consciousness orientated club, to conscientise students from Bodibeng High School,
89
 and 
in the 1980s the Maokeng Drama Association (MADRA) was formed for the same purpose. 
Seele Sekonyela, who from the mid-1980s became actively involved in student and youth 
politics in Maokeng, recalls that in the early 1980s he participated in a musical play ‘Abortion’ 
written by Mphotlhe. The play, according him highlighted sexual abuse at school against female 
students by male teachers. After this play, the group was formally constituted and MADRA was 
launched. MADRA performed politically-inclined plays. Sekonyela remembers     
 
Yes, ‘Abortion’. And it was a musical play, which we played with people like Mr. 
Mphotlhe, who is currently in London working as a nurse, and people like Advocate 
Tshogela Malakwane, who is in now in the [Free State] Legislature. It was about sexual 
harassment encountered by female students at the hands of their male teachers. It was 
about what we were experiencing in our schools then. When it (the play) started it was 
performed by pupils and the youth club. Those who were fully committed were chosen to 
carry on with the show. And we then came up with the name MADRA. We performed in 
schools and halls. After performing one used to feel that at least I’ve sent the message 
across. Tsietsi wrote another play titled ‘Bayakhala’ (‘They Are Crying’), which was 
about the plight of the parents whose children had skipped the country and no one knew 
what had happened to them. It was specifically based on Mbuyisa Makhubu’s story, the 
boy who carried Hector Petersen. Because nobody knew what had happened to him
90
 
 
Some of the young people who were politicized in this club collided with their teachers at 
school, because they felt that the teachers were ‘sell-outs’.     
 
Mass education 
 
The National Party (NP) government’s decision to establish mass education in the form of Bantu 
Education in 1955 as a response to the urban crisis
91
 had devastating consequences not only for 
the government but also for generational relations in the urban areas. The government’s rigidly 
limited financial support for Bantu Education could not match the increasing number of African 
pupils’ enrolment in schools.92 Bonner and Nieftagodien note “a massive 500% increase in the 
number of African pupils between 1970 and 1974”.93 Similarly Hyslop points out that “by 1971 
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there were only twenty schools for Africans in urban areas that went up to Matric level, and only 
seventy-four that went up to Junior Certificate level”. “It was estimated”, he writes “that this 
represented only one high school for every 80 000 urban African families”.94 This inevitably 
caused overcrowding in schools, which made it more difficult for the teachers to teach, or even 
control the pupils. This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that most of the teachers, 
particularly in the 1980s with the development of teacher training colleges, were poorly trained 
and this caused teaching standards to drop and failure rates to increase.
95
 Furthermore, there was 
a dearth of educational facilities in schools such as science laboratories. It was against this 
backdrop that dissatisfaction amongst the African pupils developed. Because of these conditions, 
on the one hand, and with the political influence of the rising Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM), on the other hand, schools were, first, turned into a hub of political debates, and later, a 
space where pupils were politically conscientized and mobilized. This resulted in pupils, 
believing that their parents were too scared to confront the government, taking to the streets to 
challenge the educational policy, initially in 1976,
96
 but largely in the 1980s. The conditions 
prevailing in school thrust students to the position of decision making and authority – and the 
older generation trailed behind. Teachers at Bodibeng High felt that some of the activities (and 
decisions taken) by some of the students were regressive and obstructive and when they 
attempted to punish the students the latter retaliated. This caused serious tensions between the 
teachers and students in Maokeng.  
 
Political mobilization 
 
Following the 1976 student uprisings, young people, together with some adults, in the 1980s 
mobilized around a variety of socio-economic and political issues ranging from rent, bus and 
consumer and school boycotts, to local authorities, to protesting against the presence of the army 
in the townships. Political mobilization raised the issue of leadership. In 1976 and in the earlier 
part of the 1980s young people’s resistance was led by experienced leaders. These were people 
who had been influenced by the BCM politics. Some were active members of the South African 
Student Movement (SASM), whereas, others were regular attendants in the clandestine political 
classes which were run in the townships.  
 
Following the government’s brutal clampdown, firstly, on the student uprisings in 1976 and, 
secondly, student protests in the mid-1980s, many of the leaders were arrested or detained for 
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long periods, especially during the national state of emergency. Others decided to flee the 
country into exile. This created a leadership vacuum and, thus, opened space for the less-
politicised elements amongst the younger generation to assume leadership positions. As Monique 
Marks illustrates that the state’s repressive measures in quelling political violence and the 
detentions of experienced and respected leadership caused significant problems in the township. 
She observes 
  
Core youth leadership could guide the youth because they were so in touch  
with the issues of the day. As activists, their entire existence was dedicated  
to the liberation movement. They were concerned that the comrade youth  
should set an example as truly ‘patriotic’ citizens so that the liberation move- 
ment would be seen as a preferable alternative. Within the community, they  
made every effort to form positive and constructive relationships with commu- 
nity members. They commanded respect 
 
But, she continues: 
 
When leaders went into hiding or were detained, new and less experienced activists 
assumed leadership roles. This often led to misguided campaigns, diminished control 
over membership and a decrease in support from the community
97
 
 
Because of the leadership vacuum, the rank and file members of youth organizations assumed 
the responsibility of calling for campaigns like stayaways and consumer boycotts without 
rigorous debate and consultation with community members. When the rank and file felt their call 
for campaigns were not heeded they resorted to force to implement them.
98
 Marks points out that 
in 1987 a ‘pass one, pass all’ campaign was taken up when the majority of key leadership was in 
detention’. “This campaign”, she writes, “was viewed as problematic by teachers and parents. 
They did not believe that students had an automatic right to be condoned to a higher standard in 
school”.99 In Maokeng, as will be shown in the thesis, following the detention of student leaders, 
students who assumed leadership disrupted schooling and some frequented the recently 
established taverns to drink liquor during learning hours. This created tensions between teachers 
and students at Bodibeng High. 
 
The consumer boycott campaign also caused strained relations between the younger generation 
and the older generation. There is evidence of young people forcing adults to drink cooking oil 
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and destroying their groceries bought in boycotted shops. Recalling the consumer boycott, an 
Alexandra resident remarked: 
 
 They took my groceries and a boy of about fifteen years of age walloped  
me with a sjambok and said I do not want to listen … They trampled the  
articles that I had bought, spilt out the cooking [oil], as well as soap powder 
and meat.
100
 
 
Interestingly this kind of punishment was also meted out to the adult struggle leaders in 
Alexandra. Paul Tshabalala, an executive committee member of the Alexandra Action 
Committee, remembered how the youth destroyed his goods. In his words 
 
 Children were misbehaving. When you come from Oks (OK Bazaar) for 
 instance, with your parcels, they would take them and destroy them. I 
 personally bought a Sowetan [newspaper] one time and it was destroyed in 
 my hand.
101
 
 
According to Bozzoli such experiences “… augured the beginnings of adult disillusionment with 
youth behaviour, and signalled the emergence of a distinctively adult political stance”.102 Indeed, 
in some areas like Thabong, Welkom, for example, adults formed themselves into a vigilante 
group to fight the younger generation. 
The chapter will now, briefly, turn to the adult-led politics. These involved mainly civic 
organizations (or associations) and the local governments.  
 
In the aftermath of the student uprisings, which erupted in Soweto in 1976 and spread to other 
townships across the country, the government introduced reforms aimed at arresting further 
protests by black people in the townships. One of these involved the promulgation of the 
Community Council Act of 1977, which allowed the devolution of specific powers from the 
Administration Boards to the new councils, subject to ministerial approval.
103
 In 1982 the 
government enacted the Black Local Authorities Act, devolving more powers to the Town and 
Villages Councils without ministerial approval. The latter, unlike the Community Councils 
before them, were given greater responsibility for housing provision and settling and 
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implementing rent increases – “… this was a responsibility that put them on a collision course 
with residents
104
.      
 
Simon Bekker and Richard Humphries’ work sheds light on the role of local government in 
South Africa during the apartheid years. They discuss, among other issues, the origins of the 
Community Councils in 1977 – which replaced the Urban Bantu Councils (UBCs) and the 
Advisory Boards before them. Furthermore, they discuss the establishment and the role of the 
Town Councils under the BLA Act of 1982. Crucially, they note that the National Party 
government’s intention to establish the Community Councils was to create a link between the 
homeland governments and the urban blacks deemed to be homeland citizens.
105
 In Maokeng, as 
in many other townships, this link was encouraged by the government by having homeland 
representatives residing in the township. In my informal conversation with Botiki Oliphant, a 
resident of Maokeng, he claimed that there were different representatives from various 
homelands residing in Maokeng who assisted their followers to gain citizenship rights in their 
homelands. According to him, after he was granted the citizenship of QwaQwa, he left Maokeng 
to stay and work in Witzieshoek for two years.
106
 In similar vein, David Lebethe noted in our 
interview that his father, Daniel Motlogelwa Lebethe, represented the Bophuthatswana 
homeland.
107
 Furthermore, homelands were also used by local councillors as dumping grounds 
for politically troublesome residents in the townships.  
 
Seekings in his D. Phil thesis demonstrates the changing role of the councillors in township 
politics. He shows that, before the promulgation of the BLA Act, councillors enjoyed popular 
support and thus acceptable in their communities. This is because, according to him, during this 
period councillors “served as arbiters in township disputes, mediators for residents with the 
authorities, and dispensers of limited forms of patronage.”108  One of Seekings’ interviewees 
described community councillors as follows 
  
The councillors were people who were just going to help with family disputes. 
 Our people didn’t think of them playing any active political role whatsoever, 
 they were just like social workers, or marriage counsellors
109
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The councillors’ role during this period helps explain the non-confrontational (or non-violent) 
tactics used by the recently established civic organizations in different townships in response to 
rent increases. According to Seekings, civics during this period resorted to legal action, or 
refused to meet with local state officials or councillors, or called public meetings, or called a 
stayaway.
110
   
Most significantly, Seekings notes that after the 1983 BLA elections which ushered in the new 
Town Councils, the situation changed and the tactics used by residents to protest against the 
councillors also altered. When the new Town Councillors took over the management of the 
townships they did not have financial support from the national government. In fact, they were 
left to devise their own methods of raising revenue. For them, the easy and quick method of 
achieving this was to increase rent and service charges. This was the beginning of violent 
protests in many townships.  
Bonner and Nieftagodien list and discuss some of the grievances raised by residents of Kathorus 
against the councillors. These included the deteriorating social conditions, rent increases, 
corruption by councillors. But, perhaps, most importantly they discuss the role played by 
opposition councillors, or the group Seekings calls dissident councillors. They demonstrate that 
within the councils there were divisions, with some of the councillors opposing some of the 
resolutions adopted by other councillors. The issue of rent and lack of real power seem to have 
been the main cause.  
One such figure in the Katlehong Council, according to Bonner and Nieftagodien, was Jacob 
Khoali. In 1982 he was elected a councillor … And in 1984 Khoali and fellow councillor, EA 
Sukazi, boycotted the inauguration of the newly elected Black Local Authority because they 
believed that it was as useless as the community councils. They asserted “Until such time we are 
given real powers to govern ourselves we feel that at the present moment we are still working in 
the dark.”111  Again in 1985, Khoali threatened to resign if the council implemented rent 
increases.”112  
Seekings’, and Bonner and Nieftagodien’s work counters the myth that councillors in the 
apartheid-created structures were homogenous. On the contrary, their studies demonstrate that 
there were councillors who opposed these structures – albeit from within. It is not the intention 
of this thesis to counter the work by these scholars, but to add another dimension to the study of 
council politics. 
Maokeng Township, particularly from 1983 until 1989, did not experience protest against the 
council administering the township. There are two reasons for this. First, the Town Council was 
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led by a charismatic chairman and mayor, Caswell Koekoe. Koekoe, for example, operated in the 
same way as the community councillors in the late 1970s: arbitrated on behalf of the residents 
and resolved the residents’ personal matters. And second, the Council under Koekoe’s leadership 
did not only resist raising rent and service charges, but was also able to provide the necessary 
services to the residents of the township. And this, did not only “shut down the space for civic 
opposition for several years”, as Twala and Seekings conclude,113 but it also made it very 
difficult for activists aligned to the UDF to organize against the Council. Furthermore, the 
Maokeng Town Council’s case is important because it demonstrates that the governing 
councillors and not the dissident or opposition councillors mounted opposition against 
government policies which they deemed contentious, which as a result could lead to a collision 
course with residents. In other areas this role, as evident in the studies by Seekings, and Bonner 
and Nieftagodien, was played by either the dissident councillors or opposition councillors.   
     
1.3 Methodology and Research Process   
1.4.1 Methodology 
This study takes an approach grounded in social history, or ‘history from below’. Social history 
has as its main focus the response by ordinary people to their daily experiences.
114
 By using this 
methodology, social historians aim to democratize history by recovering what they perceive as 
“hidden histories” (i.e. histories that have not been documented). Through this, they encourage 
especially ordinary people’s involvement in the documentation of their own history. Social 
history’s most distinct methodological orientation has been the emphasis on oral history (or oral 
sources). Allessandro Portelli reminds us: “oral sources give us information about illiterate 
people or social groups whose history is either missing or distorted”.115   
Although oral history provides invaluable accounts which would otherwise not have been 
brought to public attention, John Tosh cautions that it should be “heard alongside the careful 
marshalling of social facts in the written record”.116 This is mainly for verifying the authenticity 
of information. Tosh explains that there are two main reasons why oral history should be 
practiced. First, because personal reminiscences should be viewed as an effective instrument for 
revisiting the past, and second, because many historians see oral history as a democratic 
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alternative.
117
 In South Africa, oral history assists in documenting histories of the previously 
marginalized communities. For instance, history of black people, generally, but Africans in 
particular is either not documented or, if documented, it is distorted or marginalised. Through the 
use of oral history we are able to uncover their histories and document them.  
According to Luli Callinicos cited by Phillipe Denis “in South Africa oral history is a 
particularly necessary medium because of our dearth of documents written by ordinary 
people”.118 This is especially the case when researching the country’s political history of the 
1980s, and even early 1990s. In the 1980s political activists were forbidden to take notes during 
meetings or to [tape] record the meetings. This was for security reasons. Activists were cautious 
that if such information could end up in the hands of the security personnel it could lead to mass 
detentions, and in turn it could be used against them in court. The non-existence of primary 
political documents like the minutes and letters is largely as a result of police actions. When the 
police raided political activists’ homes or offices, they confiscated everything, with the objective 
of incriminating political activists. In Maokeng, for example, police are alleged to have 
confiscated some of the primary sources such as the letters which were written by some of the 
political activists to the leader of the Three Million Gang, George “Diwiti” Ramasimong (and 
vice versa) in the early 1990s. In the letters the two parties explained the futility of the “war” and 
called for a truce. Unfortunately, these are nowhere to be found. They could have shed light on 
the numerous attempts by both parties for a truce. It is for this reason, therefore, that to 
reconstruct the history of political mobilization and protests in Maokeng I, as a researcher, 
heavily relies on oral history.  
Through oral history, Monique Marks in her study of Youth Politics was able to trace the socio-
economic factors which caused the youth of Diepkloof, Soweto, to participate actively in the 
struggle. In her interviews she focused on the youths’ family background, upbringing, education, 
and political mobilization. Through the life histories of the youth she managed to uncover the 
turning points in their political careers. For instance, some of Marks’ interviewees claim that 
their political awareness was raised by the “effect of the poor Bantu Education system on their 
future life chances”. Xorile, cited by Marks, described the education system as follows  
 Personally, I don’t see that we have any future as students or people, because what 
 we learn under this education system is that we as blacks are inferior and the whites are
 superior. This is what we are taught. I don’t see a future under such a system …119  
 
Due to this feeling of relative deprivation, to change the situation, the students had to destroy the 
inferior education system. In similar vein, it is evident from the interviews I conducted with 
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some of the former students at Bodibeng High in the 1970s that the turning point in their political 
careers was because of the teachings of the BC philosophy they received from some of their 
teachers, who were politically conscious. 
This kind of history is hardly known, because it is not documented. And one way of obtaining it 
is through the use of oral history.   
However, this does not mean that oral history is not without its limitations. One of the major 
limitations of oral history is flawed (or selective) memory. Tosh acknowledges this and warns 
that “testimonies which can be gleaned from surviving members … of groups, like the memories 
of old people about their youth, is often confused as regards specific events and the sequence in 
which they occurred”.120 This could be caused, first, by loss of memory and, second, sometimes 
informants deliberately “block” their memory because of brutal past experiences. Louisa 
Passerini in her book Memory and Totalitarianism writes that certain interviewees during her 
research tended to confuse either names of mass organizations or significant events because of 
the brutal past they experienced under the Nazi period or Stallinist reign.
121
 Tsepo Oliphant, who 
was born in 1958 and in 1976 was doing Junior Certificate (JC or today’s Grade 10), for 
example, confused the date when the students at Bodibeng demonstrated in 1976. He 
remembered the demonstration taking place on the 15
th
 of June – a day before the Soweto 
uprisings.
122
 However, going through the interview transcripts I realized that this could not have 
been the case, because, first, there is no evidence to suggest that students’ demonstrations in 
1976 were organized anywhere else before Soweto and, second when the students at Bodibeng 
took to the streets it was in solidarity with students in Soweto. Therefore, the student 
demonstration at Bodibeng could not have taken place on the 15
th
 of June but after the Soweto 
student uprising had started. To verify this information, as Tosh cautions above, I felt that I had 
to conduct more interviews with other former students at Bodibeng during this period, and also 
do archival research. What I found was that the actual day of the demonstration was the 24
th
 of 
August 1976.
123
 An unsuspecting researcher could have accepted the information given without 
verifying it. Verification is very important.      
Relatedly, another concern is chronology. Most of the interviewees, especially older 
interviewees, tend to confuse dates and events. For instance, in my first interview with Simon 
Ramogale, an ex-Robben Island prisoner released in 1969 after spending three years for the 
PAC’s activities, he confused the meetings he claimed to have held with students in Tembisa in 
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the early 1970s with those he organized in the 1980s. During our interview he mentioned that he 
used to hold meetings in the 1970s with youth like Simon Mashishi. However, this could not be 
possible because Simon Mashishi in 1975 was only 10 years old, and furthermore in 1976 his 
family had relocated to Maboloka, Brits. So he could not have been present in those meetings. It 
was in our second interview that he realized that it was in the 1980s that he organized meetings 
with Simon Mashishi and others – Mashishi returned to stay in Tembisa in 1982.124 It is therefore 
important to make follow up interviews with interviewees in order to verify their information.   
Still on the issue of flawed or selective memory, Portelli notes that “an informant may recount in 
a few words experiences which lasted a long time, or dwell at length on brief episodes. Dwelling 
on an episode may be a way of stressing its importance, but also a strategy to distract attention 
from other delicate points”.125 The last point is important to take into account when using oral 
history methodology. Because interviewees (or informants) in most cases are cautious about 
what they say to the interviewer; they tend to speak at length and eloquently about subjects that 
are close to their hearts and make them seem important, but speak less about issues that 
embarrass or make them feel ashamed. For example, when I was conducting interviews for my 
M.A. (Master of Arts) research report with the former members of the Azanian National Youth 
Unity (AZANYU) in Tembisa Township, in the East of Johannesburg, between 2003 and 2004 it 
became clear to me that some of my interviewees, especially those who had later joined the 
Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army (APLA), PAC’s military wing, were reluctant to discuss in 
detail their military activities. When I probed them to speak more about these, they instead 
preferred to speak about APLA’s activities in general terms, particularly referring to military 
activities involving other members of APLA. And these military activities in most cases were 
already in the public domain, either having been reported on in the local newspapers or in the 
PAC’s mouthpiece, Azania Combat. The classic example they referred to is the battle involving 
George Nyanga, one of the founding members of AZANYU in Tembisa, and the 
Bophuthatswana Defence Force. They remembered: 
 George Nyanga left the country in 1988 to join APLA in exile. He was killed 
 in 1990 at the Ramatlabama border … in gun battle with the Bophuthatswana 
  Defence Force Patrol.
126
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My interviewees’ reluctance to discuss their involvement in the APLA military operations could 
be explained in two ways. It might be because of the bad memories this issue evokes or, perhaps, 
they have not, as individuals, adequately dealt with this issue. Denis warns us that inasmuch as 
the “sharing of memories provides interviewees with an opportunity to deal with unfinished 
business; memories do not always have a healing effect”.127 Another reason, some of my 
interviewees claimed, was that they could not speak about their role in the APLA activities in 
which they were directly involved, because they had not disclosed their role before the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to qualify for amnesty. Therefore, speaking about this issue, 
they believed could incriminate them.
128
  
Another limitation of oral history relates to language. This is especially so when the researcher is 
not conversant with the interviewee’s spoken language. Sello Mathabatha, former researcher 
with the Wits History Workshop, argues in his M.A. dissertation that this “is a particular problem 
in cases where older African people are interviewed because their language includes maxims, 
figures of speech and idioms”. “The transcriber or researcher [not conversant with this 
language]”, he continues, “sometimes fell into trap of misinterpretation and 
misrepresentation”.129 In my interview with Modki Maseko, born in 1926 in Driefontein, 
Mpumalanga Province, conducted in Isizulu (and translated into English), I asked him about the 
whereabouts of his father. In his response he said: “Ubaba was sishiya”. Direct translation would 
be “Our father abandoned us”. But, in fact, what he meant was that his father had passed 
away.
130
 Thus, for someone who is not familiar with Maseko’s language would have 
misinterpreted what he had said. However, this limitation could easily be overcome by 
requesting the interviewee to explain what he had said, or to provide examples. 
Researchers should also be aware that sometimes interviewees tend to use township-developed 
‘lingo’ (language) when they speak. For example, in my interview with Nkapi Mokuwe, former 
political activist, in Munsieville, in the West of Johannesburg, when she was explaining the 
method they used to bomb the house belonging to an alleged impimpi (sell-out) in Munsieville 
said “We would sit here in my house on the stoep and pretend to be chatting and when no one 
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was looking, we would then throw an “egg”, and that is how we bombed that house”.131 When I 
enquired how they bombed the house using an egg. She told me that they did not use the real 
egg, but a hand-grenade. Had I not enquired about the “egg”, I would have misrepresented part 
of the political history of Munsieville.  
In my recent interviews with some of the former members of the Self-Defence Units (SDUs) in 
Maokeng, the latter claimed that when the police and the Three Million Gang were looking for 
them in the township, they would run to Ha mangoane (“Aunt’s Place”), where they would hide 
and sleep.  When I probed what they meant by this, I was informed that Ha mangoane was 
actually in the open veld, in the outskirts of the township.
132
  
Another limitation has to do with age and gender. These, particularly age, create an unequal 
relationship between the interviewee and interviewer. An adult interviewee may decide to 
withhold information, which he or she considers to be sensitive or “delicate” for a younger 
interviewer. For example, he or she may feel embarrassed to speak to a “child” about his or her 
love life, rape, or criminal activities. And this may hamper the research particularly if such 
information is pertinent to it. In a similar vein, a female interviewee may be more reluctant to 
speak about her life’s experiences to a young male researcher than to a young female researcher. 
And it becomes much easier if the young female researcher is ‘one of the members’ of the 
community being researched.
133
    
Although oral history has its limitations it is, however, a capable methodology to discover 
“hidden histories” or undocumented histories of ordinary people. Hence, Tosh asserts that 
“problems in [oral history] should not be grounds for having nothing to do with oral history. And 
Marks asserts that notwithstanding the limitations [oral history] “is a satisfactory source”.134 
What is critical when using the oral history methodology, like written sources, requires careful 
evaluation and must be deployed in conjunction with all the other available sources”.135 This 
view is enhanced by the keen interest shown by various scholars in oral history despite its 
limitations. Paul la Hausse writes “the value of oral history has been most clearly demonstrated 
in historical research on the South African countryside, an area in which conventional archival 
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records reveal little about the nature of social relations”.136 Some of the notable scholars that 
have employed oral history in the South Africa context include, Charles van Onselen in his work 
The seed is mine: The life of Kas Maine … 137, Bozzoli in Women of Phokeng, Bonner in 
‘Family, Crime and Political Consciousness in the East Rand138, Marks Young Warriors, Carter 
in Comrades and Community,
139
 Delius in Migrants, Comrades and Rural Revolt: 
Sekhukhuneland 1950 – 1987.140 And recently, Bonner and Nieftagodien in Alexandra: A 
History; and the South African Democracy Education Trust’s The Road to Democracy in South 
Africa, a presidential project aimed at rewriting the liberation history from 1960 to the mid-
1990s.
141
  
1.4.2 Research process  
To achieve the primary objective of this thesis I felt it was important for me to gain a thorough 
understanding of the socio-economic and political experiences of the members of the community 
of Maokeng, especially those who participated in the political mobilization and protests from the 
mid-1970s to 1990s. To do this, I used the life history interview technique. Through the life 
history interview technique, social historians focus on the interviewee’s life holistically. The 
interview covers the interviewee’s early childhood, family’s history (i.e. grandparents’ and 
parents’, and siblings’ background, for instance), education, employment, social life, religion, 
and political activities. The idea is to have a deeper understanding of the individual’s life 
chronologically. Through the life histories of my interviewees I was able to gain an 
understanding of the factors – from an individual’s perspective – that caused them to be part of 
the political processes in Maokeng in the period under review. In addition, this technique also 
helps explain my interviewees’ actions.  
My first contact with Kroonstad dates back to 2006. I was employed as an Oral Historian for the 
South Africa History Archives (SAHA) and Sunday Times Oral History project.
142
Part of the 
project was to introduce oral history in schools, with the objective of training students to research 
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the history of their local communities, write a report and present it. The report that came first 
was to be used in the creation of a memorial in the locality of the winning school. Two schools 
were identified in each of the four provincial towns where the project was to take place.
143
 
Amongst these were Bodibeng High and Brentpark Secondary Schools in Kroonstad, Free State 
Province. After contacting the schools and presenting the project, I began with preliminary 
research. I interviewed a substantial number of people in each town. These included former 
teachers, religious leaders, members of youth and students’ congresses, adult political activists, 
“ordinary” members of the communities, and many more.144 From these interviews (and archival 
research) it became clear to me that Kroonstad, particularly its black townships, had interesting 
histories, which surprisingly had not been adequately documented. My interest in researching 
these townships was aroused.  
Towards the end of 2007 I registered for my doctoral studies in the “Local Histories and Present 
Realities” Programme, headed by Professor Philip Bonner at Wits University, and I chose 
Kroonstad as my case study. Conducting research in a “foreign” township (i.e. township that is 
not your birth place or a place you have spent most of your life) has its challenges. But it also has 
its advantages. To my interviewees in Maokeng I was an ‘outsider’ and I was constantly 
reminded of this – even though not in a malicious manner. For instance, some of my 
interviewees when trying to relate to me what they considered an important incident which had 
taken place in Maokeng previously, tended to take it for granted that I knew Maokeng very well 
– after all I spoke the same language as them: SeSotho and I was of African descent. When 
narrating they would mention people’s names, supposedly people who were active in that 
particular incident, or name the place where this incident had taken place. When I asked them 
who were these people, or where the mentioned place was, they would comment: “Oh, by the 
way you’re not from here”. This was most evident in my interview with Thulo Machabe. To 
illustrate this point, I asked him where Boikemisetso Secondary School was and he responded as 
follows – he was also assisted by his friend: 
Machabe Thulo (MT): You see, we had been promised that on the 11
th
 of February we were 
going receive textbooks.  …  They said comrade Machabe must lead the group to Bodibeng. …  
We were moving from Boikemisetso to Bodibeng.  We were walking along the road … 
Tshepo Moloi (TM): Where is Boikemisetso? 
MT: It’s almost a half a kilometre from here (Gelukwaarts).  It’s not far. 
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TM: From Kananelo (Secondary School)?  
MT: It’s far from Kananelo. You can see it from Gelukwaarts.  I remember you said you are not 
from here. I can go and show you.  Do you know, eh ... shop’s? Okay, by the way originally you 
are not from here.  
TM: Oh, that school is Motswela (Secondary) 
MT: Ja, that’s Motswela.  
TM: Motswela is the one next to Troubou, isn’t it? 
MT: Yes. When you drive from Troubou, next to Motswela, going towards the garage, not far 
from the shopping complex there’s a school.  
TM: Next to the library? 
MT: No. It’s not next to the library. From Motswela in Troubou ... Okay, there’s a T-junction 
next to the shopping centre.  
MT’s friend:  Which school are you asking about? 
MT: Boikemisetso. 
MT’s friend: You pass the Shell Petrol Station… 
MT: Here in Constantia 
TM: Yes. 
MT’s friend:  You pass that garage and go straight along that road. It’s the second street on your 
right hand side. Do you know Pitso Street? You pass that street, and it’s the first street on your 
right-hand side.  
MT: You will see the tarred road. From the shopping centre, there’s a small deck at the corner. If 
you look on your right-hand side, you will see a school. It’s that school.  That’s where we started 
to “work” from …145  
From this extract of our interview, it is evident that Machabe is aware that I am not a bona fide 
of Maokeng, but it is equally evident that both Machabe and his friend were at pains to provide 
me with the correct geography of the place Machabe is speaking about. The last point can be 
accepted as one of the advantages of being an ‘outsider’. Interviewees take time to explain 
themselves.   
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According to Marlize Rabe “the insider versus outsider debate is … not new in social 
research”.146 Kikumura, cited by Rabe sums it up as follows 
 On the one hand, advocates for the outsider perspective generally argue that access 
 to authentic knowledge is more obtainable because of the objectivity and scientific 
 detachment with which one can approach one’s investigation as a nonmember of the  
 group. On the other hand, proponents of the insider perspective claim that group 
 membership provides special insight into matters (otherwise obscure to others) based 
 on one’s knowledge of the language and one’s intuitive sensitivity and empathy and  
 understanding of the culture and its people
147
    
 
Indeed, as Kikumura suggests, because I was detached from the community of Maokeng (and 
Brentpark), I, with the help of Mr Mpopetsi Dhlamini (more about him below), identified and 
contacted people for interviews and these were willing to talk to me about the history of 
Maokeng. This was clearly articulated by one of my interviewees. She said she was happy to 
speak to me about the township’s history and her role in politics, because I was from 
Johannesburg therefore I would write a proper account of what really happened. Of course, not 
everyone was happy that an “outsider” was researching the history of the townships. Instead, 
they preferred that an “insider” should be the one doing it. This issue came up in one of the many 
informal conversations I had with Michael “Baba” Jordan. The latter was active in the politics of 
the BCM in the 1970s and spent over 20 years in exile.
148
 He warned me that one of the key 
leaders in the struggle in Kroonstad had complained to him about my research. This individual, 
according to Jordan, felt that I would misrepresent the history of the area. This feeling, Rabe 
believes is based on the view that in any “research there is inequality of power (between the 
researcher and the researched), because researchers are the ones who write the papers, articles 
and books, even if those they studied had an opportunity to comment on the researcher’s written 
work …”149 Marks makes a similar point. She writes that “the central youth figures in Diepkloof, 
Vuyani Mabaxa and Makgane Thobejane … were concerned that I would go into Diepkloof, take 
information, and make it public in any way I saw fit”.150 For this reason the said individual in 
Kroonstad has avoided to grant me a follow-up interview.  
Apart from the lone concerned voice about my research in Kroonstad, everybody that we had 
contacted was happy and eager to assist me. This is largely as a result of my association with 
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Dhlamini. Dhlamini is a former teacher and inspector in Kroonstad. In the early 1970s, while at 
Tshiya Teachers’ Training College in Qwaqwa, southern Orange Free State, he joined SASO. 
After retirement from his educational post, he focused on promoting the history of Maokeng. To 
achieve this he founded the ‘Rebirth of Kroonstad’, a Non-Profit Organisation (NPO), focusing 
on capturing the history of Kroonstad, but particularly of Maokeng. This turned him into a local 
historian. I met Dhlamini in early 2007 when I was involved in the SAHA/Sunday Times Oral 
History project.  
Dhlamini was born and had lived all his life in Kroonstad. His vast knowledge of the area and 
the people from different backgrounds was helpful to me in understanding the political nuances 
in the area; to gaining access to the “relevant” people, as he put it; and knowing who to contact 
for other sources like archival materials, especially in the municipality, for example. He 
introduced me to people as the ‘young man from Wits (University), who was doing a very 
important job: writing the history of Kroonstad, something that is long over due’. He always 
emphasized to the residents of Maokeng that it was imperative for them to participate in the 
research by granting me interviews, because one day they would be “gone” (dead) and their 
history would be forgotten, and at worst distorted. This seemed to work. People made time for 
me. They welcomed me to their homes and offices to conduct interviews with them. Some, like 
Hennie Ludick, former employee in the Town Council of Maokeng, even entrusted me with their 
personal photographs and few pamphlets.
151
  
Inasmuch as Dhlamini’s knowledge about the area and its people was helpful, it proved, at times, 
also to be detrimental. He only referred me to the people he knew; the people who, according to 
him, “would give you the best and honest interviews”. He tended to dismiss other people as 
“irrelevant”. In my observation this was mainly in the case of the people he did not take 
“seriously” (i.e. people outside his circles). Moreover, he seemed mostly acquainted with the 
older people (residents). And this was expected. These were the people of his generation, 
although this does not mean he was not acquainted with the younger generation, especially those 
who were actively involved in politics. Indeed, he introduced me to some of the key members of 
the students and youth organizations in the township. And they gladly assisted me, because I was 
introduced to them by mosuoe (teacher). However, generally his knowledge of this generation 
was limited. To gain access to this generation I had to rely on referrals by other former members 
of students and youth organisations I had interviewed. But most importantly when I began doing 
archival research, particularly on newspapers and trial records, I would come across names of 
activists from Maokeng and I would call Dhlamini to try and locate them for me. For example, 
when doing research at the Historical and Literary Papers at Wits University, I came across the 
judgment in the lawsuit case against the Minister of Law and Order, The Commissioner of Police 
and the District Commandant of Kroonstad by Reverend Ndimase Humphrey Gozongo and 13 
Others. The latter were suing the former for damages caused by the shooting which took place on 
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15 May 1990 in Phomolong.
152
 One of the applicants in the case was Seele Sekonyela. I called 
Dhlamini to enquire if he knew him. He did not know him but promised to trace him. 
Interestingly, when he finally got hold of Sekonyela it turned out that he knew the latter’s 
mother; they grew up together in the Old Location.
153
    
At the later stage of my research referrals, especially by local political activists, became slim. 
This was because of the formation of COPE (Congress of the People).
154
 ANC members felt it 
was unnecessary for me to interview those who had joined COPE. And members of COPE, on 
the other hand, “wanted to set the record straight” and made concerted efforts to channel me only 
to the people that would give me the “accurate” history of the township, especially in relation to 
the infighting within the congress movement. Sometimes it was hilarious, I thought. Members of 
both the ANC and COPE who were prepared to refer me to their former comrades, would 
emphasise that I should not divulge their identity (i.e. that is, I should not inform the potential 
interviewees who had referred me to them). The situation deteriorated to the extent that the 
former comrades no longer trusted each other.  
Furthermore, what was disturbing was that even during the interview members of the opposing 
parties would refuse to acknowledge or talk about the role their former comrades had played. In 
one of the interviews my interviewee, after mentioning the names and roles of the comrades he 
worked closely with in the early 1990s during the era of the Three Million Gang, refused to 
discuss the role played by one his comrades, because he had joined COPE. This was interesting 
but also provided me with a challenge of convincing my interviewees that it was important to get 
as many voices and as diverse as possible, irrespective of one’s political affiliation. Sometimes I 
was successful but not always.  
However, unlike Monique Marks’ experience when doing her research in Diepkloof, Soweto, I 
was never questioned about my political allegiance, and as far as I am aware there were no 
security checks conducted on me.
155
 Everyone I interviewed, especially the elderly were curious 
to know more about my family and educational background – and I was always honest with 
them. My knowledge of youth politics seemed to put the younger generation at ease. During the 
interviews I would sometimes give examples about the other townships where youth politics 
were strong like in Alexandra, Tembisa Townships, and Soweto. And the youth activists in 
Maokeng were acquainted or had met some of the youth activists I mentioned from these places. 
They became convinced that I knew what I was doing.  
For this thesis I interviewed 62 respondents. The latter are from different backgrounds socially, 
economically and politically. For example, some are former teachers, local councillors, civic 
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leaders, gangsters, religious leaders, and former trade unionists, and former cadres of Umkhonto 
we Sizwe (MK), ANC’s military wing. The diverse backgrounds of my interviewees provides 
the thesis with many and different voices. The interviews were conducted over a period of three 
years, 2007-2010. All the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, and sometimes 
translated.
156
 The duration of the interviews vary. Some lasted an hour and others went up to 
three hours. Very few were less than 50 minutes. Some of the interviewees were interviewed 
more than once.  
I found recording the interviews very helpful (compared to taking notes by hand), because I 
could conduct the interview without disrupting the flow of the interview by requesting the 
interviewee to stop and repeat what he or she had said, because I had missed it. But most 
importantly I was able to capture the whole interview. As noted already, after each round of 
interviews (I spent five days in Maokeng per fieldwork trip) the transcribers employed by the 
programme transcribed the interviews. I tried to return as many transcripts as I could to my 
interviewees to read and make comments, if they wished.
157
 This proved to be helpful in two 
ways. First, my interviewees felt a sense of involvement in the project and this resulted in them 
opening up to me and beginning to reveal more information, which I do not think, they would 
have otherwise given me. For instance, after my first interview with Tommy Makau I returned 
the interview transcript to him. In our follow-up interview he seemed more relaxed and trusting 
to speak freely to me about the split between the MDCC and AF, and how this split affected 
political mobilization and protests in the township. But, perhaps, most importantly he was even 
prepared to discuss the effects of this split in the present situation.
158
  
Second, my interviewees, after reading the transcripts, assisted me in pointing out and correcting 
some of the mistakes in the transcripts, particularly the names of people and places which had 
been mis-spelled. This method further enabled me, after reading the interview transcripts, to 
develop detailed and specific set of questions for follow-up interviews. When conducting the 
first interview I raised unstructured questions, because I intended to gather as much information 
about my interviewees’ life histories as possible. In the follow-up interview I then asked 
structured questions, which dealt with specific issues and events, and my interviewees’ feelings 
and interpretations of their actions. 
Taking into account flawed memory as one of the limitations of oral history, I adopted Anna 
Bohlin’s study of the physical landscape of District Six Museum as an “aide-memoire”.159 
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Bohlin in her study demonstrates how the Museum has been used to revive the former residents 
of District Six’s memories. Many years after the forced removals by the National Party 
government, for former residents who visited the museum and viewed the exhibition made of 
original symbols like street signs, the museum helps them to remember District Six, the area, as 
if it was yesterday. This was captured in one of the visitor’s response to Bohlin’s question about 
his experiences when watching the signs [in the museum]. The patron explained as follows: 
Oh, I see too many memories …because I walked most of those roads, you see. …  
I played there, and I kissed for the first time in one of those roads … I can touch it,  
it [be]comes real like a little video recorder playing it over in my head …”160  
 
In the course of my interview, for example, with Machabe Thulo, the former commander of the 
SDU, I realized that he tended to forget (or confuse) some of the events (or incidents) which he 
claimed he was directly involved in. I asked him if he would be willing to accompany me to 
some of the places (or spaces) he had been mentioning in the interview, which were significant 
to them as the SDUs during their fight with the Three Million Gang. He agreed. Amongst the 
places he took me to included the houses they used as camps like ‘Cuito Cuanavale’, named after 
the area in Angola which was used as a base by the Angolans, together with the FAPLA (The 
People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola), ANC’s MK, backed by the Cuban troops, 
in their battle against the South African Defence Force (SADF), alongside Jonas Savimbi’s 
UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
161
 ‘Cuito Cuanavale’ was 
the principal base of the SDU’s, commanded by Machabe. As he was showing me around the 
house (belonging to his grandmother) and the shack the members of the SDU slept in, he recalled 
some of the members of the SDU he had forgotten; he discussed how his late grandmother, a 
traditional healer, offered them with muthi (traditional medicine) to protect themselves against 
the Three Million and the police. The other space we visited was Thuteng – an open veld 
between Brentpark and Phomolong. When the police were about to raid the township, with the 
objective of detaining the members of the SDU and other political activists, they would receive a 
tip-off from some of the sympathetic police and they would escape to Thuteng, where they would 
sleep until the raid had been called off. This method was helpful in jogging Machabe’s memory. 
He could remember incidents and people he could not remember during our formal interview. 
The use of photographs was another method I used with some of my interviewees to help them 
remember. 
In addition to the interviews, I also conducted archival research. As already noted somewhere in 
the chapter that Tosh cautions us that oral history should be “heard alongside the careful 
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marshalling of social facts in the written record”, it was imperative to search for archival material 
in order to test the validity of the interviews. To accomplish this exercise I began at the South 
African History Archives (SAHA), situated at the University of the Witwatersrand’s African 
Library. Amongst the materials I uncovered were the UDF ‘s and Julie Frederikse’s Collections. 
In the UDF Collection I found the UDF’s Regional Working Committee of the OFS’ information 
sheet about the organizations in Maokeng. These included COSAS, Maokeng Youth Congress 
(MYC), the South African Youth Congress (Maokeng Branch), and Maokeng Civic Association 
(MCA). This sheet also contains the names and positions of activists. Through this information I 
was able to trace some of the activists in Maokeng to interview.
162
 Furthermore, in the same 
collection there is a three-page document, filled with newspaper reports about the political 
incidents in Maokeng in 1986. For example, there is one about how Dennis Bloem
163
, a leading 
political figure in Maokeng and Brentpark, narrowly escaped death after been shot at by four 
prominent community leaders. And the other report is about a united show of political strength 
by the UDF and AZAPO, when they launched a two-day consumer boycott.
164
  
On the other hand, in the Julie Frederikse’s Collection I found an interview Frederikse had with 
Mongezi Radebe (no date). Radebe was born in Phiritona, in Heilbron, in 1957. He relocated to 
Maokeng in the mid-1970s to continue with his studies at Bodibeng High – the secondary school 
at Phiritona ended in Standard Eight (today’s Grade 10). The interview demonstrates Radebe’s 
political development and his active role in the Young Christian Workers (YCW) in Maokeng.
165
 
The significance of this interview is that it shows the role of the church, especially the Roman 
Catholic Church, in introducing young people to politics; and it also illustrates the pivotal role 
played by the YCW in mobilizing the young workers in Maokeng in late 1970s; and, finally, the 
experimentation with nascent mass mobilization, using the BC emphasis of self-reliance.
166
 For 
instance, Radebe and some of his colleagues began to fix shelters for commuters at the bus 
terminus. This conscientised members of the “community” that they do not need the bus 
company or the Council to do things for them. They can do things for themselves.
167
   
Furthermore, I searched through the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) 
Collection based at the Historical and Literary Papers (HLP), at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. This collection is useful to my study in that it has press cuttings about the rent 
crisis in Maokeng in the mid-1970s. One of the cuttings carries a story about how the residents of 
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Maokeng refused to move into 200 new houses built by the North Orange Free State 
Administration Board because of the high rents.
168
 This report demonstrates that before the mid-
1980s there were attempts to mobilize in the township against high rents. Another report is about 
the shortage of housing in Maokeng in 1977.
169
 The SAIRR collection also carries press cuttings 
about the black local government elections which took place in 1988. Although, the reports are 
not specifically about the elections in Maokeng, but those in other areas, they, nevertheless, shed 
light on how township residents responded to these elections. In one newspaper it was reported 
how the youths attacked a group of voters in Soweto.
170
 Finally, the SAIRR collection has press 
cuttings reporting on boycotts in the 1990s in Maokeng and elsewhere. The newspaper reports on 
the consumer boycott against white business because of the municipality’s decision to cut water 
and electricity supply in the township. Moreover, there is a report about the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP) opposing the boycotts in Maokeng. This report is important because it shows the 
IFP’s entry into the politics of Maokeng, and its link with the Three Million Gang.171     
In the Karis-Gerhart Collection I found a short piece about the YCW. The latter provides a brief 
background of the YCW, and reasons for its foundation. Of significance for my study is that it 
also has a list of people detained in 1978 all over the country, including Maokeng. Because of 
this list I was able to know about Peace Modikoe.
172
 Finally, I researched the Delmas Treason 
Trial. This trial involved some of the leadership of the UDF like Patrick Mosiuoa “Terror” 
Lekota (a resident of Maokeng) and Popo Molefe. Of particular interest is the substantial number 
of witnesses called to testify on behalf of the defence. Amongst these were residents of 
Maokeng. Their testimonies provide an insight into the limited politics of the UDF in Maokeng 
in the 1980s. The trial also shed light on the role of political funerals as a mobilizing strategy.
173
    
In addition I visited the Johannesburg Public Library, where I went through newspapers like the 
World and Weekend World. The Weekend World covered a story about the police beating and 
forcing students from Bodibeng High to blame Ms Mekodi Arcilia Morailane, a Science teacher 
at Bodibeng, as the one who instigated the students to demonstrate in 1976.
174
 The World 
reported on the role of the Urban Bantu Council (UBC) helping the aged.
175
This concurs with the 
view that prior to the BLA, councillors attended to the communities’ needs. At the Free State 
Provincial Library, in Bloemfontein, I searched through Die Vriend/The Friend. This was a 
provincial newspaper until 1985. In this newspaper there are reports about the riots in Maokeng 
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in 1976.
176
 Again in 1985 The Friend covered the riots in Maokeng.
177
  At the National Library, 
in Pretoria, I found the The Northern Times, a local newspaper of Kroonstad. The Times, for 
example, ran the story about Caswell Koekoe’s trip to the United States of America and his 
criticism of the sanctions against South Africa.
178
 Koekoe at the time was the mayor of 
Maokeng. Another story covered by the Times was about the judgment given in favour of five 
candidates of Maokeng People’s Party (MPP) to hold public meetings during the run-up to the 
local elections in 1988.
179
 This was after the governing council had refused them permission to 
campaign. 
Furthermore, I also did desktop research, searching through the TRC testimonies on the website, 
with a particular focus on Maokeng. The latter covered the period of the fight between the Three 
Million Gang and the SDUs in Maokeng. I uncovered several testimonies by former members of 
the SDUs and the Three Million Gang, who appeared before the TRC Amnesty hearings in 1996. 
These provide insight particularly about the formation of the Three Million Gang, the roots of 
violence, and attempts at brokering peace between the two warring factions. Of significance, the 
testimonies also shed light on the difficulty political structures faced in terms of mobilizing and 
protesting during this period – all their energies were focused on the Three Million Gang.    
I also visited Bodibeng High School to request permission to search through the school’s 
logbooks. Permission was granted. Although the logbooks were incomplete; some were missing. 
Nevertheless, they provide an interesting account about the school’s outstanding performance 
over the years and how it suddenly deteriorated after 1976. In some of the logbooks there are 
entries about delinquent students and ill-disciplined teachers; teachers who did not prepare for 
their lessons and sometimes failed to turn up for work. In another logbook there is an entry about 
some of the senior students refusing to be punished (in 1975). Also there is another entry about 
political statements written on the chalkboard in one of the classrooms (in 1980). This illustrates 
that some of the students were becoming politically conscience and aware of the political 
situation inside the country.  
Finally, my research at the Moqhaka District Municipality yielded interesting records of the 
various local council meetings, dating back to 1977 (Community Council) and ending in 1994 
(City Council of Maokeng). These were useful because they provide a bird’s eye view about the 
way the councils functioned. The Community Council’s minutes, for example, show how the 
council increased rental and services charges but simultaneously challenged the Regional 
Director to instruct the Chamber of Commerce and the Afrikaanse Sakekamer in Kroonstad, to 
consider the payment of higher salaries to black employees and to give preference to the 
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employment of local blacks instead of blacks from Qwaqwa.
180
 Other minutes illustrate the 
manner in which the council made concerted efforts to meet the residents’ needs half way. For 
example, the council offered bursaries to university students from Maokeng.
181
Some of the 
minutes cover the council’s role in allocating business sites.  
During the tenure of the Town Council of Maokeng, it, amongst other issues, discussed the trust 
it enjoyed from the “community”. In one of the meetings, Koekoe, the mayor said “… the 
community admires the services rendered by the Council in their interests. He explained that the 
work done by the Council and the developments initiated by the Council are the reasons for 
peace and order in Maokeng”.182 Other issues discussed during this period related to the shift to 
the Transitional Local Council (TLC), which comprised of the Town Council of Maokeng, 
Kroonstad City Council, and the Brentpark Management Committee.
183
  
Ethical considerations 
According to Lawrence W. Neuman "the researcher has a moral and professional obligation to be 
ethical, even when research subjects are unaware of or unconcerned about ethics".
184
  Drawing 
from Neuman, and taking into account that my research is focused on human subjects, I have 
tried to ensure that my research subjects clearly understood the nature of my research and its 
purpose. I thoroughly explained to my subjects about my research before I asked them to 
participate in it. In addition, I also informed them that this research is not for commercial reasons 
but for academic purpose. When my subjects finally agreed to participate in my research, it was 
on the basis of a clear understanding that they were under no obligation (they could terminate 
their participation at any time during the course of the research) nor were they to receive any 
remuneration. They participated voluntarily. 
Prior to interviewing my subjects I guaranteed them anonymity, if they so wished. This is 
because some of my subjects in the past participated in political activities that caused permanent 
damage to other members of the “community”. "Anonymity”, Neuman writes “is the protection 
of the identity of a specific individual from being known”.185 I proposed to use pseudonyms to 
protect their identity. Exposing their identity without their knowledge (or consent), I thought, 
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might be unethical and negligent on my part as the researcher, but worse this could have a 
negative impact on their future relations with some of their victims. To my surprise, none 
amongst my subjects wished to remain anonymous. Instead, they felt that this was their history 
that needed to be told and therefore they had nothing to be ashamed about or to hide. This was 
appropriately summed by Machabe Thulo when he said, “I would like to thank you for the means 
you have taken, especially since it is not for my benefit but for the benefit of South Africa, the 
Free State, and Maokeng, so that we can leave this history for the coming generations, so that 
they would know where we come from and where we are heading”.186  
After my subjects had agreed to participate in the research, I intended to request them to sign a 
consent form, permitting me to record the interview, use the interview for writing up my thesis, 
and depositing copies of the interview transcripts (and any other personal material they offered 
me) with the ‘Local Histories and Present Realities’ Programme at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. Talking to some of them about my intention, I had a sense that they were uneasy 
about signing a consent form. Many people who were politically active in the 1980s and even in 
the 1990s are still suspicious of being recorded when interviewing them. They believe that the 
information they give may be used against them at some point in the future. This is perfectly 
understandable, taking into account that security agents within the ‘progressive’ structures used 
tape recorders to record discussions during meetings, for example. And this information would 
then be used as incriminating evidence against political activists. It is probably for this reason 
that they felt uncomfortable signing the consent form. After discussing this issue with my 
supervisor, he suggested that I should record their verbal consent when interviewing them. This 
helped. At the beginning of each recorded interview I explain about the project and its purpose, 
inform my subjects about their right to be anonymous and that they participate voluntarily (if 
they wished, they can terminate their participation at any time). In conclusion, I ask them 
whether they agree to participate or not.           
   
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter One will discuss the existing literature on black politics, with a particular focus on 
political mobilization and protests, and local governments in South Africa, dating back to 1977. 
Furthermore, it reviews literature on generational struggles. The chapter identifies gaps in the 
literature, and indicates new insights that need to be added. It also examines the importance of 
studying Kroonstad. Finally, the chapter discusses the research methodology, and charts the 
research process. 
Chapter Two examines the early history of Kroonstad’s black townships, exploring the socio-
economic and political life in the township. It deals with the evolving political culture in 
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Maokeng until the 1960s. Moreover, it focuses on the role and influences in politics of the 
“respectables” or the learned group in the township. The chapter attempts to demonstrate that 
because of the role and influences by these, there was lack of political mobilisation and protests 
in Kroonstad’s black townships. In addition, it also looks at the role of gangs and politics in the 
township. In conclusion, it alludes to the unsuccessful attempts by the congress-aligned-women 
and members of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in recruiting members in the area. 
Chapter Three focuses on the period from the mid-1960s to the end of 1979, demonstrating the 
different entry points the residents of Maokeng were introduced to politics, following the “lull” 
period of the 1960s. It particularly looks at the role of the Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM)-aligned groupings like the South African Student Organisation (SASO), Black 
Consciousness-orientated teachers, and the Maokeng Student Art Club (MASAC) in politicizing 
students and young people in Maokeng leading up to the 1976 student demonstration. Finally, 
the chapter deals with the role of the Young Christian Workers’ (YWC’s) attempt to recruit and 
mobilize young workers and students in Maokeng. Following the detention and ultimately the 
trial of the members of the YCW, the latter ceased to exist.    
Chapter Four deals specifically with the various local governments in Maokeng and the 
Management Committee in Brentpark. It shows that prior to the introduction of the Black Local 
Authorities Act (BLA) in 1982, the Kroonstad Community Council (KCC) enjoyed some support 
within Maokeng. This was because of their mediating role. The chapter demonstrates that the 
KCC was opposed particularly by the opposition councillors and not by the established civic 
associations as was the case elsewhere. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates that, unlike in other 
areas, in Maokeng the Town Council under the BLA did not experience opposition, with the 
intention to dissolve it, at least until 1989, because it made concerted efforts to provide service 
delivery and not increase rent and service charges.  
Chapter Five looks at the period between late 1984 and1989, with a particular focus on the 
beginning of mass political mobilization and protests across the country. It, first, begin by 
demonstrating the various entry points young people, particularly school-going students, were 
introduced to politics in Maokeng and Brentpark. Moreover, it focuses its attention on the 1985 
student riots and how these were later broadened to challenge the central state. It also looks at the 
formation of the students and youth organizations. Relatedly, it will explore the methods (or 
repertoires of collective action) these organizations used to mobilize the community and to 
engage in the struggle for liberation. Finally, the chapter deals with the effect the deployment of 
some of the politically experienced student/youth leaders and the split within the ‘progressive’ 
structure in Maokeng had on mobilization and protests.    
Chapter Six examines the violent phase in the history of Maokeng Township between the Three 
Million Gang and the ‘community’, led by the ANCYL Maokeng Branch. It explores the 
historical roots of this violence, arguing that it was initially gang-related, and how this violence 
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was finally resolved. Furthermore, the chapter also explores the role of political parties like the 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the police, and councillors in this violence. Finally, it demonstrates 
the combative role some women played in the violence which erupted in the early 1990s.      
Chapter Seven focuses on the impact the unbanning of the liberation movements, particularly 
the African National Congress (ANC) had on the local politics of Maokeng. It attempts to 
demonstrate the factors which caused tension between the ANC Free State leadership and the 
South African National Civic Organisations (SANCO). Relatedly, it shows that the ANC Free 
State leadership’s lack of consultation and uncompromising attitude cost the ANC votes in the 
first democratic local government elections.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
Political Culture in Kroonstad’s black locations, 1920s -1963  
 
Introduction 
The politisation of Kroonstad’s black locations dates back to the late 1920s and it was led by the 
members of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) living in Kroonstad. 
However, after the ICU started experiencing internal problems which finally caused it to split, 
‘radical’ politics in the locations came to an end. Furthermore, the dearth of political campaigns 
such as those organised by women in Herschel, in the Eastern Cape, against soaring prices in 
1922,
187
 by women in Natal and Durban opposing the municipal liquor canteens in 1929
188
, and 
finally by the Brakpan black community’s protest against the location’s heavy-handed and 
unsympathetic Non-European Affairs Manager in 1944,
189
 propelled this situation.  
In this chapter I argue that, because of the absence of campaigns similar to the ones mentioned 
above, and political organisations such as the African National Congress (ANC), CPSA (and 
later SACP), trade unions and politically conscientised individuals who could galvanise the 
masses, the leading role of bodies such as the Native Advisory Board (NAB), Joint Council of 
Europeans and Natives (JCEN), Orange Free State Teachers’ Association (OFSATA), and later 
the Society of Young Africa (SOYA) contributed to the tranquillity and quiescence in the 
locations at least until the early 1950s. These bodies did not concern themselves with mobilising 
and organising the masses. The NAB and JCEN, for example, saw themselves as ‘working for 
the people’ rather than ‘working with the people’. In the long term, especially when the residents 
failed to see any tangible results, they were discredited. The OFSATA and SOYA, in contrast, 
mobilised, but this was limited only to a particular constituency in the community, teachers.  
From the mid-1950s the situation changed. There was a sudden eruption of political energy in the 
locations. This was after the ANC Women’s League embarked in a campaign against the passes. 
Although the police were able to swiftly stop this campaign after arresting the leaders, they could 
not, however, contain the impact this had on some of the residents of Kroonstad black locations. 
In 1960 the residents demonstrated against the pass laws, others established a cell linked to the 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) aimed at recruiting members for the PAC for its ‘war’ against the 
state. Just like the women’s campaign, this cell was also quickly detected and its leading member 
was arrested, causing an abrupt end of this cell. It was in the early 1970s that the black residents 
of Kroonstad began to mobilise again, only this time the teachers and students were at the 
forefront (more about this in the following chapter).   
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To fully comprehend the reason why the ‘conservative’ bodies mentioned above were able to 
influence Kroonstad black locations’ politics for more than a decade, it is important, first, to 
understand the origins of Kroonstad, its inhabitants, economy, and the role of the various local 
authorities during the period under review.       
Settling on Kroonstad  
 
Kroonstad, located in the northern Free State Province (formerly Orange Free State) was founded 
in the 1850s and was proclaimed a municipality, with its own local government in 1875.
190
 
Already in the 1880s Africans (or Natives, as they were called then) had settled in this area. In 
1885, FG Hill, a school-going girl, observed that Natives resided about a mile (1.6 kilometres) 
outside town.
191
 Tsiu Oupa Matsepe, who was born in 1948 in Kroonstad, remembers that his 
maternal great-grandfather, Musere Thlapane, lived in Kroonstad during the town’s earliest days. 
He takes up the story as it was told to him  
The Tlhapanes ... was an old Kroonstad family that must have come into the area of  
Kroonstad in the mid-1800s and then settled themselves along the banks of the river in  
Kroonstad, which is known as the Horse River, but which the old people refer to as  
Likubu (Hippopotami) ... According to the old history, as explained to us by the old  
people, they lived in the vicinity of where the Pick ‘n Pay (Shopping Centre) and the  
Magistrate’s Court are situated. I am unable to give the street’s name as it sits now.  
But it was a community that was really mixed in the sense that there were some white  
people also living in the area. The rest of the other white people, according to what I am  
told, lived towards the east of that portion of the bank of the river and the town.  ... And  
the reason why I am inclined to believe that the Tlhapane family must have lived in that  
area in and around that time is because my great-grandfather Musere Tlhapane, who was  
buried in Kroonstad, was born around 1850 and he died in 1906. And he is buried, I’m  
told, at the old graveyard which is situated near the rail-line as one moves north of town  
just outside the subway. His grave’s stone is still intact and is in existence192  
 
Matsepe’s interview suggests that Musere Thlapane was either born in Kroonstad or had arrived 
with his family when he was still very young. This is because he was born around the same time 
Kroonstad was founded. It would seem that some of the earliest black families to live in 
Kroonstad included the Beukes, Maraba, M’Baco, Thekiso, Mokoena, Nothibi, Buffel, and 
Mareka. This is because the male members of these families (most probably the heads of these 
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families) were amongst the first people to be involved in the Bantoe-administrasieraad (Bantu 
Administration Council) established to help the Kroonstad Town Council, first, to remove ‘A’ 
location from the centre of town, and second, to manage the “new” locations (see below)193. It 
would seem that this ‘Council’ was established to advise the municipality on matters relating to 
the Natives. In 1924 it was formalized and led by the following members: W A Botha 
(chairperson), P A Beukes, Jan Maraba, Jas M’Baco, William M’Baco, Oriel Moerena, Moses 
Peter and Oriel Thekiso.
194
 It is possible that this ‘Council’ was instrumental in the establishment 
of the other three settlements: ‘B’ (or Marabastad) ‘C’ (or EC/Cairo), ‘D’ locations.  
White people living in Kroonstad began to voice their discontent about sharing living space with 
black people in the early 1900s. This was after they had observed an increase in the number of 
inter-racial relationships between white men and black women. They abhorred this but felt 
powerless to do anything because there were no regulations to deter such relationships. This was 
evident in the Kroonstad Deputy Divisional Commandant’s response to Captain Dickson’s letter 
appealing for municipality’s intervention in this matter. He responded as follows – in part 
 
 It is perfectly true I regret to say but we are powerless in the matter … At present 
there appear to be no Municipal Regulations preventing white men from going into 
the location when they like … I would suggest that after the sounding of the bell 
at 9 (o’clock) no white should be allowed in the location. Were that the rule the 
police would then be able to lay lands in many white men
195
 
 
In 1919 white people were ready to have black people removed from the town and settled in their 
own areas. Their views were expressed clearly in the same year during the campaign for the 
town council elections when Mrs Eksteen, the first woman in Kroonstad to contest these 
elections and a librarian by profession, was bombarded with questions regarding her plans for the 
town. Amongst these was the question about ‘A’ location. Her response illustrated the long-held 
desire by whites to rid the town of the black location. She said “A disgrace to the town. No one 
should object to raising money for the purpose of removing it. The natives should be 
compensated for any loss”.196 Not long thereafter ‘A’ location was removed from town and 
relocated to the north of the town.  
 
There are two possible explanations for the sudden change of attitude by whites in Kroonstad. In 
1915 Kroonstad was overwhelmed by the Scarlet Fever, a deadly and an infectious disease. Forty 
                                                          
193
 Serfontein Keurskrif,p.449 
194
 Ibid. 
195
 Free State Provincial Archives (hereafter FSPA) NAB 2, Squatting: Kroonstad. ‘Letter from the Deputy Divisional 
Commandant to Captain Dickson’, 1906; Similarly some of the black residents were against such relationships. In 
1906 the Reverend Masopi (Masopie) wrote a letter to the Attorney General complaining about white men 
sleeping with black women in Kroonstad. BFSPA NAB 2, Squatting: Kroonstad 
196
 Serfontein Keurskrif, p.364 
51 
 
nine people died as a result, although we have no evidence of how many whites died compared 
to blacks. Again in 1918, the town was badly hit by the influenza epidemic, which had swept 
across the country during the months of October and November. Writing about this subject, 
Howard Phillips notes “towards the end of September 1918 the second wave of the world-wide 
Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 struck South Africa. Within a fortnight the country 
was overwhelmed by the worst natural disaster in its history”.197 According to him, this 
pandemic could have possibly been spread by the Natal mineworkers bound for the Rand who 
had been infected by the black stevedores workers in Durban or by the migrant workers from 
Mozambique who carried the Spanish flu to the Rand.
198
 Because of the migrant labour system, 
the pandemic soon spread throughout the country, leaving masses of people dead.  “By the time 
that it abated in November”, Phillips writes “probably more than a quarter of a million South 
Africans had died”.199 In contrast, Sue Parnell estimates that the Spanish Influenza epidemic 
killed 150 000 people in South Africa.
200
 And according to Dot Serfontein, in Kroonstad more 
than 5 000 cases were reported.
201
 Phillips, on the other hand, estimates that about 229 both 
black and white people died in Kroonstad because of this epidemic.
202
  
At such times white authorities throughout the country tended to locate the source of the 
epidemic in the existence of locations in the towns. In most cases this was unfounded.
203
  
Secondly the white authorities’ aim in establishing “new” locations for blacks was to impose 
total control over these in order to reduce the number of the “master-less” or “redundant” 
Africans in towns. Only Africans who sold their labour to whites were to be allowed in urban 
areas. The rest had to be repatriated to where they came from – rural areas and reserves. To 
achieve this, the “new” locations were to be laid out with proper streets and houses; and its 
inhabitants were to be registered. In Kroonstad, for instance, the town council issued licenses and 
passes to residents.
204
 This would enable the authorities to police and maintain law and order in 
the locations unlike in the uncontrollable locations-turned slums.  
Although the (Natives) Urban Areas Act of 1923 was enacted three years after the removal of 
‘A’ location from town, it nevertheless had an impact in the manner this location and other ‘new’ 
locations for black people were to be developed and administered in future. Parnell writes “the 
Native Urban Areas Act No. 21 of 1923 was to provide the legislative framework for the 
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resolution of all conflict over the growing settled African population of the towns”.205 The Act 
was intended, inter alia, to achieve two objectives. First, to “create a reliable, manageable supply 
of semi-skilled labour through the social differentiation of the African population into rural 
dwellers, urban migrants and permanently settled urbanites”.206 And second, African working 
class had to be settled in their own areas separate from the whites.
207
  
 Moreover, the establishment of the “new” black locations shifted the financial burden from the 
central state to the local authorities, who in turn made it the responsibility of the inhabitants of 
the locations to upgrade their residential areas. Parnell, in her study focusing on Johannesburg, 
found that “money for location development was in critically short supply because it was a low 
priority in city budgeting”. [The] “council justified their decisions”, she continues “not to spend 
locally generated funds on African services because all monies generated from African passes 
were paid to the Provinces”.208 Instead local authorities resorted to a Native Revenue Account – 
copied from Bloemfontein.
209
 According to Parnell “additional funds for the new Native 
Revenue Account were to be gleaned by appropriating the revenue which employers contributed 
to native contract registration and from the sale of “Kaffir beer” monopolized by the councils.210 
Finally, rent charges were another form of accruing funding for the development of the locations. 
In 1949 the Manager of Native Administration in Kroonstad reported that the Location’s 
Revenue (Account) had increased in the sum of £2 757 compared to the previous financial 
year.
211
 
It was against this background that finally black people living in ‘A’ location in town were 
removed. Serfontein claims that the town council “provided good prices to residents for their 
huts and prohibited any other construction of buildings”.212  
Black Locations 
 
The Kroonstad’s black residential area, initially, consisted of four settlements: ‘A’, ‘B’, C’, and 
‘D’ locations. In 1950 the government promulgated the Group Areas Act, “which was designed 
to allocate separate residential areas to Africans, coloureds, Indians and whites”213 and this led to 
the establishment of ‘model’ townships for Africans across the country. In Kroonstad, 
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Seeisoville
214
 and Phomolong (also known as Vuka ‘Zenzele – IsiZulu for ‘Wake up and do it 
yourself’)215 were built in 1958 and 1960, respectively. Similarly, Brentpark was established for 
coloureds at the same time as Seeisoville. Dennis Bloem, who was born in 1953 in ‘A’ location 
recalls that he moved to Brentpark with his grandmother when he was five years old.
216
 
It would seem that the residents of ‘A’ location in town used the money they received from the 
municipality for their properties in town to purchase plots from the municipality and built their 
own houses in the new settlement, which was also named ‘A’ location. They became stand-
holders, but they did not own the land their houses were built on. It belonged to the 
municipality.
217
 Similarly, some of the families in Alexandra Township like Philip ‘Kay’ 
Manana’s were able to purchase plots there in the early 1920s.218 As noted above, the “new” ‘A’ 
location was the first settlement to be established in 1920. According to Steel Setiloane, the 
“new” ‘A’ location was situated nearest to the white residential area. It consisted of 200-300 
houses stretching from Mmote Street in the east to Thlapane Street in the west”. “About half of 
these houses”, he adds, “were built with red bricks, while the other half were built with mud 
bricks”. “A mixed population”, Setiloane notes, “inhabited this settlement”. There were Southern 
Sotho and Setswana speaking people, [Ama]Xhosa, a few IsiZulu-speaking people and a number 
of Afrikaans-speaking people”.219 James “Jimmy” Naanyane, who was born in ‘A’ Location in 
1938, likewise remembers the area comprising a mixed community. He recounts: “Well, the 
community where I lived was a mixed community: coloureds and blacks [Africans], and [people 
speaking] other languages. … So, it was mixed. Most coloureds came from town. There was an 
old location; they called it the old ‘A’ location. At [new] ‘A’ location we had about 300-400 
houses.
220
  
Taking up the same issue, Ntantala writes 
  The majority of the people in Kroonstad location were Southern Sotho-speaking,  
 with a good number of both Rolong and Kgatla-Tswana, a sprinkling of Xhosa 
 and a few Oorlaams mense, a totally de-culturated group of Africans who knew no 
 African language or claimed they did not. About three-quarters of the people were 
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 Afrikaans-speaking, having grown up on the farms of the Orange Free State …221 
 
Finally, Hilda “Mantho” Motadinyane remembers ‘A’ location as the settlement where its 
inhabitants “used to speak mixed languages like Sekgatla (SeTswawa), Afrikaans and so on, just 
like in Sophiatown. There were many coloureds staying there”. “So, my father and I”, she adds 
“would visit the Oliphants in ‘A’ location and when he comes back he’ll be speaking 
Afrikaans”222  
Miscegenation seemed to be the main cause of the growing coloured community in the area. 
Matsepe recalls that his grandfather Jonah Thlapane married a white woman, Miss Pretorius, and 
they had coloured children. One of their children was Malithuli Violet Thlapane, who was later 
married by an African man, Singaphe Dorrington Matsepe – Tsiu Matsepe’s father.223 . 
Similarly, Motadinyane remembers that her grandmother was married to a white man and they 
lived in ‘A’ Location.224 
Matsepe claims that his maternal grandparents were amongst the first people to reside in the 
location. He explains 
 ‘A’ location … that is the location I was born in. It is of interest to note that the   
first erf in ‘A’ location was my grandfather’s, Aaron Thlapane. So, Aaron  
Thlapane occupied erf numbers 1 and 2 in the location. And his brother [Jonah]  
occupied erf number  5 … which is indicative of the fact that they must have been  
the earlier people to live in the … location225  
 
The old residents of ‘A’ location have fond memories of life in it. For example, when Leboseng 
Violet Selele, who was born there in 1933, was asked to describe ‘A’ location when she was 
growing up, she responded as follows 
 Very quiet and it was fun. We were living in peace. The majority of people who  
lived there were Basotho. The elders of the community were getting along; children  
were disciplined. There was peace and harmony
226
 
 
Over a period of time, the population grew and new locations were established. A substantial 
number of black people arrived in Kroonstad during the 1920s and 1930s, in search of 
employment opportunities and a place to stay. Some came from the Setswana-speaking areas in 
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the north and others were from Basotholand (today’s Lesotho).227 Matsepe’s maternal great-
grandparents were Batswana from the area known today as Brits. Matsepe explains 
 The Tlhapanes, when they settled in Kroonstad, as far as I know they must have come  
from the Brits area. One picks this up in some of the things that they say in reminisce 
(sic) of their families who are connected with them. Some of whom are in Botswana, 
some of whom are in Randfontein, some are in Brits. The way they would refer to their 
family is that they would refer to them as coming from there - and I believe that ...
228
 
 
In similar vein, Hilda “Mantho” Motadinyane, who was born in 1927 in ‘B’ location, Kroonstad, 
recalls that her parents were from the Setswana-speaking areas. In her words: “Father came from 
Ga-Motlatla, Ventersdorp. Mother was from Serowe, in Botswana”.229 Although a sizeable 
number of Batswana lived in Kroonstad, this does not seem to have had any significant influence 
on the place the bulk of whose population were southern Sotho-speaking. Because of this, the 
children of the Setswana-speaking parents were forced to learn Sesotho. The trend continues 
even today.
230
  
Parkies Setiloane, who was born in the same year as Motadinyane, also in ‘B’ location, notes that 
his father was a Motswana, who had moved from a place he cannot remember but ended up in 
Allanridge, about 70 kilometers from Kroonstad. According to him, his father married his mother 
who was born in Kroonstad in 1917. However, notwithstanding his father’s Setswana 
background, Parkies Setiloane and his siblings learned Sesotho at school. He recalls  
‘B’ location was largely made up of settled people. I mean, we were BaTswana- 
speaking at home but I did not do Setswana at school. I did Sesotho. We never did  
any [Se]Tswana. The main language here it was Sesotho. He (referring to Mpopetsi 
Dhlamini, also a long-term resident of Kroonstad) is Zulu but he did Sesotho
231
  
 
The Sesotho influence cut across ethnic groups. Anthony Bouwer, recalls that his grandmother, 
Deborah Nomsa, who was married to his grandfather Ariel Bouwer, was an IsiXhosa-speaking 
person from the Transkei but could speak Sesotho.
232
 Similarly, Phyllis Ntantala, who was 
originally IsiXhosa-speaking, remembers that while teaching in Kroonstad she was forced to 
learn to speak Sesotho and her daughter Nandi, whose minder only spoke Sesotho and could not 
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speak English, instilled the Sesotho culture in her as well. She writes “Nandi would proudly tell 
people: Ke Mo-Sotho nna! Ake mo-Qhosa (I am Sotho; I am not Xhosa).
233
 The prevalence of 
Basotho in Kroonstad would later in the 1990s play a vital role in mitigating against ethnic 
violence, which turned to political violence, experienced in the Rand (see chapter six). 
The predominance of Sesotho can be attributed to the large number of Basotho from Basotholand 
who settled in Kroonstad.
234
 In the interview with Michael “Baba” Jordan, who was born in 
1942, he recalled that his paternal grandfather, Maimane Rakhetla was originally from Butha-
Buthe in Basotholand. He came to Kroonstad in search of employment.
235
  
In the early 1930s more and more Basotho (and coloureds) left the farms dotted across the 
Orange Free State. Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, in their illuminating study of 
Alexandra Township, write that because of the drought which began after 1927 and reaching its 
worst in 1932-34, many farmers abandoned their farms and those who remained laid off black 
labour tenants in their thousands. The latter sold up their cattle (some did not), left the land and 
headed for small and large towns.
236
 A sizeable number of them, particularly those who had 
settled on the farms in the Kroonstad district, drifted to the newly established locations for blacks 
in Kroonstad. For Ntantala this explained the influence of Afrikaans in the black residential area. 
According to her, when she arrived in Kroonstad in 1937 she found that “about three quarters of 
the people were Afrikaans-speaking, having grown up on the farms of the Orange Free State and 
moved to the city (or town) for better opportunities and wages”.237 Minutes of the Kroonstad’s 
Europeans and Natives Joint Council which dealt with the problem of unemployment confirm 
that black farm-workers invaded the Kroonstad’s locations in 1931.238  
Furthermore Bonner, in his study of the Basotho gang called ‘Russian’ (or Ma-Rashea) on the 
Reef, offers another explanation for the high rate of migration of Basotho into South Africa. 
Drawing from Murray’s work he writes that “Basotholand’s economy entered a period of deep 
distress in the early 1930s when the effects of rapidly climbing population, mounting land 
shortage and accelerating soil exhaustion were compounded by the onset of an unprecedentedly 
savage drought”. “Maize production”, he continues, “slumped, never to recover, livestock 
holdings collapsed, and for the first time Basotholand turned into a net importer as opposed to a 
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net exporter of grain”.239 He also notes that the impact of this varied between the rich and poor 
families. But such pressures undoubtedly contributed to the growing exodus of Basotho migrants 
to South Africa.
240
 True the majority headed for the gold mines in the Rand, particularly in the 
East Rand
241
, but a sizeable number also drifted to the OFS towns like Kroonstad.  
 
Other families drifted from KwaZulu to work in Kroonstad. Moses Masizane, who was born in 
Kroonstad in 1968 recalls that his grandparents, the Khambules, arrived in Kroonstad in the 
1940s – seemingly during the course of the Second World War. He explains: “The house number 
was 153 ‘A’ Location, where I was born … one of those places selling liquor … was called 
HaMakhambule (Makhambule’s place). My grandmother originated from KwaZulu. My 
grandfather came here to work as a soldier, at a local soldier camp here in Kroonstad. They then 
settled here”.242 
Black people arrived in Kroonstad mainly in search of employment opportunities. Besides 
working on the nearby farms, blacks could also find work in the number of businesses which had 
been established in town. In her description of Kroonstad, FG Hill writes that in 1885 there were 
10 stores in Kroonstad.
243
 And in 1917, according to the Braby’s directory of that year, the 
number of businesses had increased to more than 15, which among others included a chemist, 
hotels, a railway cartage contractor, and a jeweller.
244
 At this point, Kroonstad had turned into a 
place of transit. “Travelling salesmen” writes Ntantala, “to and from the Cape, Natal and 
Transvaal ma[de] stops [t]here”.245 As a result, according to Ntantala, “hotels were always full 
on weekends with these men”.246 A substantial number of black people also found work in the 
four hotels in Kroonstad. Jordan remembers that his grandfather and, later, his mother as well 
were employed in one of the hotels in Kroonstad. In his words 
 
 My maternal grandfather, Ndaba Zikhali, according to my mother came here 
 as a migrant worker; working in the hotel laundry in Kroonstad. She cannot 
 remember the name of the hotel. But Kroonstad then as it grew had four hotels. 
 My mother also worked at a hotel. Incidentally, she worked at the same laundry 
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 where my grandfather used to work
247
  
 
Without doubt the seemingly abundance of employment opportunities in Kroonstad was the 
cause of the arrival of black people in large numbers during this period. According to the Joint 
Council of Europeans and Natives Kroonstad Minutes in 1934, unemployment amongst blacks 
decreased from 600 to about 80. And about 500 were sent away to work on contracts (for 6-9 
months) in other areas.
248
 In the same year, in December the Council noted in its minutes that 
because “... of the large scheme of building on hand in town ... at the moment there was hardly 
any unemployment. Setiloane notes that during this period, some of the residents, particularly 
men, worked at the South African Railways plant, at the Milling Company, the municipality, at 
shops in town, on the roads …”249 As a result, farmers found that they could not get labour from 
the location for harvesting”.250  
 
Trading and Survival mechanism 
In spite of the fond memories the early inhabitants of Kroonstad’s black locations hold about 
their residential areas, life was not always easy for some of the residents, particularly those who 
were unemployed. They were forced to eke out a living somehow. Many engaged in trading. 
However, in Kroonstad this was deemed illegal. The Kroonstad Town Council refused to grant 
blacks trading rights, using the authority of the Urban Areas Amendment Act No.25, 1930, to 
deny such rights, which stipulated that 
Any urban local authority which has under its administration and control a location or 
native village – (a) may, and, if so directed by the Minister after consultation with the 
Administrator and after due enquiry at which the urban local authority shall be entitled  
to be heard, shall, on such condition as he may prescribe in the absence of approved 
regulations framed under paragraph (g) of sub-section (3) of section twenty-three, let 
sites within the location of native village for trading or business purposes
251
 
 
The Town Council’s position was that it would only make a definitive decision on this matter 
after the sitting of the Native Trading Rights Inquiry. This sat in Kroonstad on 5 September 
1932. By January 1933 the government had not made its decision regarding the Native Trading 
Rights. This was evident from the letter addressed to J. D. Rheinallt-Jones by B.W. Shepered 
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from Lovedale, Cape Province, enquiring about the outcome of the inquiry.
252
 It does not seem, 
however, that the government was convinced by the Kroonstad’s Joint Council of European and 
Natives’ (JCEN) argument for Natives to be granted rights to trade in Kroonstad253.  This caused 
the Kroonstad Town Council to dig its heels and refuse to grant the trading rights to blacks. To 
make a more convincing argument in future for the JCEN on Native trading rights, in August 
1934 Rheinallt-Jones sought advice on this issue from people in East London.
254
 Meanwhile, 
black people continued trading - illegally. A number of them were arrested and fined. This was, 
of course, one of the few ways in which the Council accrued finances for the Native Revenue 
Account. In June 1931, for example, 17 year-old John Moseka was arrested in ‘B’ Location and 
charged for hawking and peddling unlawfully. He was found guilty and fined £5 or one month in 
prison, doing hard labour.
255
 In the same year, Sam Kaulane, a Native Sergeant in the South 
African Police, testified in court that he had arrested a man trading illegally in the location. He 
said  
 On the 20 June 1931 I found accused in ‘D’ Location, in Kroonstad, pushing a  
 handcart, shouting “goods for sale”. I saw him stop in front of hut No.193 and 
 selling some two packets of mealie meal, which he took from his cart. Accused  
 had no licence of any kind. ‘D’ Location is within the municipality of Kroonstad256 
 
Not all the black traders were unfortunate, though. Some managed to engage in their business 
without detection by the police. Lydia Malehlohonolo Mphosi is one of these. She was born in 
1918 at Heuningspruit, a farming area in the Kroonstad district. She came to Kroonstad in 1942. 
She did not attend school; instead, conducted a vegetable business. “At the time”, writes Pherudi, 
“no family in Maokeng slept without food because Mrs Mphosi was not only selling cheap but 
was also providing credit for weekend and month end collection”.257  
The refusal by the Kroonstad Town Council to grant blacks trading right seemed to have 
continued until after the Second World War. Then in 1947-48 “the [Native Affairs] Committee 
in Kroonstad recommended that Abel Mathike, Sam Kuolane (possibly Kaulane), David 
Chakane, Nicodemus Ntanga and Gilbert Mayeza (possibly Mateza) be permitted to trade as 
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butchers in the location ...
258
 In the interview with Simon Mateza, who was born in Marabastad 
in 1931, he remembers that his father Gilbert Mateza opened his vegetable business during this 
period. He explains 
  
I went up to Standard 5. Thereafter, I went to help my father because as he was  
working, he also used to own a shop. We had some donkeys and a cart, which  
we used to collect some vegetables from the market, and sold them around the  
location. That is how we started
259
  
 
With the relaxation of the trading laws, Mateza senior, went on to establish his first formal 
business. But trading was still heavily restricted. Simon Mateza continues 
  
Yes, it used to be difficult during those times for a black person to start a business.  
We used to have something that resembled a shop at our house. So, the law was that  
we were only allowed to open very early in the morning before people went to work,  
so that they could buy some sugar and some coffee. After that you had to close for the  
rest of the day. And only open at five when people returned from work. That was how  
it worked
260
 
 
Having learnt his business trade from his father, Simon Mateza continued in the trading business. 
Amidst tribulations, he opened a barbershop, then transported people, thereafter opened a bar, 
where he sold food. In 1955 he married and in 1959 moved to Phomolong, where he established 
(after initially renting) Langa Cash Store. Describing his journey into business, Mateza remarks 
 
 We carried on until my dad passed on [in 1951]. But during that time I already had  
an idea [about running a business]. And then I later opened something like a barber-  
shop, where I was cutting people’s hair. I ran that shop even though I was not making  
enough money. … I already knew how to drive. And I did some piece jobs, and also  
transported people around the location By the way cars were scarce back in the day. I  
did that until I had a car of my own. I would … transport them to the farms. We went as  
far as Ficksburg. Then there were municipal bars during that time. Women were not  
allowed in bars; only men were allowed. I went to rent a shop in Marabastad from a man  
called Mr. Konyana. We started by selling food in the bar, me and my partner by the  
name of Mkhoane.  When Mkhoane and I separated, I decided to open my own  
[business]  
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Mateza continues  
 
I came to start my business here in Phomolong, where I was renting a place. Then in 
1963 I found myself a place of my own. I found my own stand and built a shop, which I 
named Langa Cash Store. That was my breakthrough. Business was … doing well. Shops 
like Pick ‘n Pay and Shoprite were not there yet. Shops which were there used to close at 
5 [o’clock] in the afternoon. And in town no shops operated on weekends and during 
holidays, as well. That was a good chance for us to sell and make good money
261
 
 
Other less fortunate Africans who migrated from the farms found work as domestic labourers 
and some were employed as chars.
262
 For example, Lucy Mosele Taje, who was born in 1919 in 
April’s Kraal Farm, in Kwakwatsi (Koppies), came to Maokeng during ntwa ya Hitler (Adolf 
Hitler’s War, or World War II), and worked at the kitchens (domestic work) for the greater part 
of her life.
263
 According to Setiloane, “they all earned a mere pittance”.264 Because of this, young 
boys in the locations took up part time jobs as caddies at the golf course, carried luggage of 
passengers at the railway station, worked in the gardens in white suburbs, and washed cars of the 
visitors staying in the hotels in town to supplement their parents’ meagre earnings.265  
And, of course, women who were not employed survived by selling homemade beer. Moses 
Masizane’s grandmother, the owner of the ‘Khambule’s Place’, as noted already, survived by 
selling homemade beer. “Beer brewing”, Bonner and Nieftagodien note, “... was a pervasive 
feature of location life”.266 They observe that “women monopolised the brewing of beer and it 
was often their major source of income”. “Surveys carried out in the 1930s”, they write, “showed 
that up to 75% of urban African women were involved in the brewing trade”.267 However, this 
trade was deemed illegal by the white authorities. As a result, the government, through the 
Native Urban Areas Act No.13 of 1928, prohibited the supply or delivery of any liquor to 
Africans.
268 Instead, it regulated that Africans seeking to purchase liquor should do so in the 
municipal-created beer halls.  
Accordingly, Bonner and Nieftagodien note that the Witwatersrand municipalities enforced a 
total ban on the buying and consuming of liquor on its African population.
269
 The same was the 
practice in Kroonstad. The police constantly raided the households suspected of trading in 
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homebrewed beer. The women brewing and selling this liquor devised measures to avoid police 
raids. Some used “watchmen” (particularly children of the women who brewed beer), who stood 
at the corner of the streets to watch the police. “When the police came by on their bicycles”, 
Bonner and Nieftagodien write, “the watchmen would signal by saying ‘it is red’ or by walking 
away quickly from their spots”.270 Others brewed and hid their stock so that the police could not 
find it. Unfortunately, their home-brewed beer was sometimes stolen by gangsters which had 
sprung up in Kroonstad’s black locations at the time.271 Other home-beer brewers in order to stay 
in business bribed the police by allowing them to drink beer without paying.   
 
In a miscalculated move to attempt to resolve the illegal trading of home-brewed beer, in 1935 
the Kroonstad Native Advisory Board adopted the resolution that licensed ‘Kaffir’ beer be 
placed under the Municipal control. The Native (or Location) Advisory Boards were established 
in the 1920s “to serve as mechanisms of liaison between location residents and the 
authorities”.272 Without doubt, the residents of Kroonstad’s black location believed that if such a 
resolution was to be implemented it would have had an impact on the women’s lucrative home-
brewed trade. This resolution prompted agitation in the locations, causing Keable Mote, a 
leading figure in the ICU in Kroonstad, to demand the resignation of the Native Advisory 
Board.
273
 The women continued trading in home-brewed beer. Similarly, the police increased 
their raids. This led to the residents of Kroonstad’s black locations calling a mass meeting at the 
Bantu Hall to protest, amongst others, against the police raids on Sundays for ‘Kaffir Beer’.274   
In spite of the police raids and the government’s policy on home-brewed beer, there is no 
evidence to suggest that women in Kroonstad’s black locations, particularly those who were 
brewing homemade beer, mobilised and protested (see below).  
 
Perhaps the most distinguished arrivals during this period were those who had come for 
educational purposes; either to learn or to teach. By 1940 Bantu High School (subsequently – in 
1967 - renamed Bodibeng High School), had become one of the major centres of education for 
African students in the then OFS. It was one of the two day-schools to offer matric as early as 
1940 (the other was in Bloemfontein), the only school to offer a Lower Primary Teachers’ 
Course for girls in the mid-1950s,
275
 and the only one to have its matriculants writing the Joint 
Matriculation Board (JMB) Examination in the mid-1960s, instead of the Bantu Education’s 
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senior certificate examinations.
276
 For these reasons, and later the National Party government’s 
policy opposing the building of new secondary and high schools
277
 in urban areas, dictating that 
all new provision for post-primary education should be directed almost exclusively towards the 
homelands”,278 Bantu High School attracted many students, especially those from the 
surrounding farms and other townships in the OFS such as Edenville, Heilbron, Bethlehem, 
Bothaville, Vredefort, but also from the neighbouring countries like Botswana and Lesotho.
279
 
Nana Mahomo is an example of students who left their hometown and went to Bantu High 
because of the dearth of high schools. Mahomo was born in 1930 in Vereeniging, south of 
Johannesburg, but grew up in Edenville, a small farming town about 30 kilomtres from 
Kroonstad, where his father was a church minister. In 1942, after completing his higher primary 
schooling, he enrolled at Bantu High to start his Form 1. Because of financial constraints at 
home, he had to leave school in 1945 after obtaining his JC (Junior Certificate – today’s Grade 
10).
280
  
Similarly, Peter Hlaole Molotsi, who was born in 1929 in Steynsrust, arrived in Kroonstad with 
his grandfather, Mr Afrika, at the age of seven. He started schooling at Bantu United School and 
matriculated in 1949.
281
 In the interview, Molotsi noted that during his school days at Bantu 
High “the student body comprised of people from Botswana, from Natal, from the Eastern 
Province (today’s Eastern Cape), from Lesotho, and from other places in the Free State.282 This 
trend continued well into the 1970s (more about this in Chapter Three). Inevitably, the student 
body increased. Ntantala estimates that when she arrived at Bantu High in 1937 about a thousand 
students studied there, and the school then offered lessons to students from Sub A to J.C.
283
 
Because Bantu High did not have boarding facilities, students either rented rooms in the 
locations or lived with their relatives.
284
 Either way they became residents in the locations.   
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Just as Bantu High (and later Bodibeng High) attracted students from areas outside Kroonstad, it 
also held a prized status for many teachers who taught there. It was for this reason that the school 
was always staffed by teachers from different areas, alongside locals. Dating back to the 1930s 
the school’s committee and Reginald Ndumiso Cingo, the longest serving principal of the school, 
identified and employed some of the best qualified teachers in the country.  A number of them 
came from the Cape Province. Amongst the most notable was Cingo himself, who was born in 
eFundisweni, Pondoland, and attended school there. He became the principal of the school in 
1932.
285
 Dorrington Matsepe, who was born in Douglas, Cape Province, in 1906, joined the staff 
of Bantu High in 1931.
286
 Timothy Alphy Makae from the district of Mount Fletcher, Cape 
Province, was employed at Bantu High around the same period as Matsepe.
287
 And Archibald 
Campbell Jordan, who was born in Tsolo, the district of Transkei, began teaching at Bantu High 
in 1935, while Phyllis Ntantala (later Jordan’s wife), who was born at the Duff Mission, in the 
district of Idutywa, Cape Province, joined the staff two years later.
288
  
Other teachers arrived from different areas. Prince Alfred Itumeleng Lefafa, from Kimberley, 
joined the staff of Bantu High in 1943 at a tender age of 18.
289
 Some of the teachers at Bantu 
High came from neigbouring countries. For example, Cephas Hlabangana, originally from 
Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe), became a member of the staff of Bantu High in 1940290 
and Jakotett Kholoue Kheleli, from Mokhohlong, in Lesotho, joined the staff in the same year as 
Hlabangana.
291
           
The population of Kroonstad’s location’s increased. It was further augmented by the arrival of 
ministers of churches and their families. “There were various churches”, Setiloane writes, 
“which represented a number of denominations: Methodist, Anglican, Dutch Reformed , 
Presbyterian, Ethopian, Apostle Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.), Roman Catholic and a few 
representing traditional churches.
292
 Matsepe recalls that church activities became a significant 
part of the lives of the residents of the locations. He explains 
 ... Church [was] engraved in us. You go to Sunday school on Sunday, and you would 
 go to what was called Band of Hope, which is a younger children’s organisation, where 
we [were] taught about the evils of alcohol. And on Tuesday we must go to another  
church event in the Methodist Church, which is called ‘Class’. On Wednesday, which if 
you go to a Methodist Church, you would go to an event called ‘Prayer’. It was church, 
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church, church. That is the kind of environment that [we were] brought up under ...
293
 
 
The most notable amongst the church ministers to settle in Kroonstad before the 1960s was the 
Reverend Zaccheus Richard Mahabane.
294
 He was born in 1881 in Thaba ‘Nchu, “an important 
Wesleyan Mission centre in the eastern Orange Free State”, writes Gwendolen Carter.295 There is 
no available evidence when he arrived in Kroonstad. Neither Carter nor Pherudi (profile of 
Mahabane) provide the date of his arrival in Kroonstad.
296
 However, what is apparent is that in 
1955 he was already in Maokeng. In the interview with Matsepe, who was born in 1948, he 
recalled the time when he was very ill and Reverend Mahabane was called in to pray for him. He 
remembers 
 There was a time that I got very sick and, I think, I was about seven years old at the 
 time. I discovered that there was something called prayer. Reverend Mahabane ... was 
 then called in because he was then the church minister for the Methodist Church in  
Kroonstad. I remember vividly this experience. There was this old man with his white- 
grey hair who came into my bedroom to pray for me ... and suddenly I felt well
297
     
 
 
Reverend Z.R. Mahabane (Source: Drum, July 1959) 
 
The other church ministers who came to Kroonstad during this period, included Bishop 
Lengoabala of the Presbyterian Christian Apostolic Church.
298
 The arrival of teachers and church 
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ministers in Kroonstad’s black locations had an incredible influence in the politics of the area 
(see below). To accommodate the rapidly increasing number of black people drifting to 
Kroonstad, the Kroonstad municipality, which like other municipalities, under the Urban 
(Natives) Areas Act of 1923, had a responsibility to house urban Africans,
299established ‘B’ 
location.  
 
‘B’ location, also known as Marabastad, Setiloane writes “… was said to have been named after 
[Jan] Maraba, one of the first blacks to settle in Maokeng”.300 The collective memory of the 
residents of the black locations in Kroonstad widely accepts that when Jan Maraba realised that 
‘A’ location was no longer capable of accommodating the growing number of people living 
there, he left the area and found an open space not far from ‘A’ location and built his house and 
kraal. The area was later named Marabastad. Matsepe explains as the story was told to him 
 I am told that ‘A’ location, long before my birth; that is in 1948, was too crammed  
 [with] people because the community was growing. A police officer decided to move 
 out of the designated area and moved north of the area and established a house there and 
built himself a kraal. His name was Maraba. ... A kraal in Afrikaans is called stat. ... This  
was done in defiance of the regulations and rules, which were set by the authorities.  
But Maraba insisted on staying there, and soon other families started joining him. And 
once the authorities realised that they can no longer control the movement of the people 
[to] that area, they then decided to expand the ‘Stat of Maraba’ ... by creat[ing] an orderly  
township that then came to be known as Marabastat
301
   
 
Although this explanation of the origin of the name of this location is widely accepted, there are 
some people who offer another explanation to the naming of the settlement. Mokete Pherudi, 
who was born in Kroonstad and grew up in ‘D’ location, argues that ‘B’ location was named 
after Mrs P. Buffel, who was the senior community nurse in charge of Seeisoville clinic.
302
 
Pherudi’s argument is, however, not convincing. It is highly unlikely that this area could have 
been named after Mrs P. Buffel (and not Jan Maraba), who was heading the Seeisoville clinic 
which was established in the early 1950s – following the construction of Seeisoville in 1951.”303 
In spite of these explanations, it is also unlikely that Maraba could have invaded a municipal 
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space and settle there without the municipality’s consent. It is, however, plausible that Maraba, 
as a member of the body responsible for advising the Kroonstad Town Council on matters 
relating to blacks in Kroonstad, could have raised the issue of lack of accommodation in ‘A’ 
location and suggested that a new location be established, and becoming the first resident there.     
According to Setiloane, “Marabastad was a very big place, consisting of eleven avenues, each 
approximately one mile long, running from east to west, and fifteen streets which ran from 
south-east to south-west”.304  Godfrey Oliphant, who was born in ‘B’ location in 1939, 
remembers ‘B’ location as “quite a vibrant place and quite an active place ... People used to be 
excited with jive. There used to be a local group that used to play ... musical instruments.  … 
One of their members was Miki Matsepe, who used to play the piano”.305 Isaac “Sakkie” 
Oliphant, who was born in the same location in 1952, also recalls the area as the centre of 
sports.
306
 He remarks 
 
 Marabastad. You’ll be surprised that place used to accommodate, sports-wise, teams  
like Orlando Pirate used to beaten there. Moroka Swallow was the big team in Gauteng,  
but used to be beaten. Shemrocks was one of the team … When I grew up, Shemrocks  
was always on top. These big teams used to come here specially to beat Shemrocks.  
But in my time we always came on top
307
  
 
Just like ‘A’ location, ‘B’ location also comprised a mixed community, containing coloured 
families like the Oliphants, and the Louws.
308
 The last location to be established in the African’s 
residential area was ‘D’ Location, also known as Matikiri, built West of Marabastad. According 
to Setiloane, it was a settlement of people who were not the original inhabitants of Maokeng. 
“Most of them were squatters who settled here in search of employment”. “They originated”, 
Setiloane adds, “from the neighbouring farm districts”. 309 Pherudi writes that the latter found 
employment in places like railway, Epol, kitchens (domestic work), and gardens”.310  
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Typical house in “D” Location (Source: Pherudi, The History) 
Neither Setiloane nor Pherudi indicate when this location was established, but it is probable that 
it was in the mid-1920s and that the area was inhabited largely by people who had been residing 
and labouring on the white farms in the Kroonstad District. The 1913 Land Act which “… stated 
that there would be parts of the country where ‘Natives’ shall not be permitted to acquire or hire 
land or have interests in land”311 had a negative effect on Africans, especially those who lived 
and worked on white farms. Mulaudzi and Schirmer argue “as land became scarcer, and 
populations grew, so did the need for restrictions on the size of plots and on stock numbers. 
These restrictions often led to conflicts, and sometimes to tenants leaving in protest, but in the 
1920s and 1930s it became increasingly difficult for Africans to find alternative places to 
live”.312Those who were willing to compromise and “accommodate new regulations as far as 
possible”313 remained on the farms. But the majority seem to have drifted to the towns, and some 
to Kroonstad and ended up living in “D” Location.  
In the early 1920s a dramatic change took place in the racial politics of South Africa. This 
resulted in the establishment of the coloured-only location in Kroonstad. This was called ‘C’ 
location (or Cairo).
314
 Sue Parnell contends that in order to understand the creation of the 
‘separate coloured racial identity’, we need to look at the Native Urban Areas Bill (NUAB) of 
1918 which illuminates the whites’, particularly the more powerful municipalities’, position on 
racial classification.
315
 In her study she shows how “... the draft NUAB was manipulated to 
delineate urban controls on coloured people ...”316 To solicit South Africans’, including location 
residents’, views about the Bill, Prime Minister Smuts, through, first, the Native Affairs 
Department, and after 1920 the Native Affairs Commission, embarked on a consultative process. 
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This, according to Parnell, enabled the local municipalities like in the Free State to “effect one of 
the more critical revisions to the NUAB even before it reached the second parliamentary 
reading”.317 The Native Affairs Commission (NAC), Parnell argues, had not considered the 
impact on coloureds at all, and construed the legislation as improving the position of “Europeans 
and Natives”.318 This position was rejected by the Free State municipality. 
  
The reason the conservative Orange Free State officials objected was because they were worried 
that the NUAA would revoke the provincial and municipal legal restrictions on urban 
segregation, thereby giving coloureds equal legal status to white people.
319
 “This meant not only 
free residential choice”, writes Parnell, “but also that coloured land owners could vote in town 
elections”.320 Although this privilege already existed in the more liberal Cape, it was vigorously 
opposed in the conservative Orange Free State. This should have come as no surprise, because in 
the early 1920s conservative Orange Free State officials opposed the move by the Bloemfontein 
Council to settle the coloureds in town. This was done despite the fact that “an area of ground for 
occupation by coloureds had been laid out and the Council was keen to see its establishment”.321 
Using a paternalistic argument, the officials explained: “... it was not in the best interest of the 
coloureds to live in town, in association with drink and other evils which tend to degradation of 
themselves and their children”.322 According to Parnell, this segregated scheme drew support 
from the African Peoples’ Organisation (APO), an organised coloured organisation. “APO”, 
Parnell observes “feared that coloureds would be grouped with Africans and would be 
incorporated under NUAB”. “It implored the Town Council”, she adds “to recognise the fact that 
‘coloured people, though yellow in colour, possess the intellectual and brain development of the 
white man’”.323 The main intention of the APO was to secure a guarantee of freehold under the 
old OFS Law 8 of 1893 – alas, this was ignored.324    
 
The deadlock between the central government and the Orange Free State municipalities forced 
the two to compromise, resulting in the OFS municipalities agreeing that “the standard of 
coloured citizenship in the Province”, writes Parnell, “would be raised in the Province by 
granting segregated but freehold suburbs with some measure of self-government under the 
auspices of town council”.325 It was against this background that ‘C’ location, like many other 
coloured “suburbs”, was established in Kroonstad. “Cairo”, writes Setiloane, “was situated east 
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of the African residential areas. Some 300 coloureds lived [t]here”.326 The establishment of Cairo 
seems also to have been intended to create a division between the coloured community itself: 
between the real kleurling (coloured) and other coloureds. Anthony Bouwer explains: “The area 
we knew as Cairo, there was this thing that those who lived around here (‘A’ and ‘B’ locations) 
were not coloured and those who lived in Cairo were the real Kleurling”.327 Bouwer’s 
explanation of the differences within the coloured community in Kroonstad illustrates his recent 
understanding of the Population Registration Act of 1950 which determined South Africans’ 
racial categories. Bouwer was born in 1960, long after Cairo had been demolished and its 
inhabitants moved to Brentpark. The Population Registration Act divided the coloured people 
into various categories: Cape Coloured, Cape Malay, Griqua or Other Coloured.
328
 This 
invariably caused tensions amongst the coloureds. In local communities, for example, those who 
were lighter in complexion and did not associate with Africans tended to regard themselves (and 
also seen) as ‘real’ coloureds (kleurling). It is possible that in Kroonstad in the 1920s and 1930s 
coloureds who remained in the black locations like Anthony Bouwer’s grandfather, Ariel 
Bouwer, and who continued associating with Africans (and sometimes married to Africans) were 
seen as not ‘real’ coloureds than those who had agreed to move to Cairo to live on their own and 
practicing their own culture.  
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An open space where Cairo was built, opposite is the white residential area (Source: Tshepo Moloi) 
To encourage this mindset (and segregation), the town council supported the building of a school 
designated for coloured children. The application for the school was made in 1926 but was only 
approved in 1933.
329
 Coloureds working in schools in the African locations were also forced to 
relinquish their positions and to seek employment in the coloured location. Violet Matsepe, 
mentioned above, was one of the people affected by the NUAA. Matsepe remarks   
 
My father teaches with my mother at Maokeng Bantu Primary School. Then a law  
comes that says that the coloureds must be separated from Africans. When that law  
came into operation, my mother had to stop to teach at that school because she was 
classified coloured. My father is an African.
330
  
 
However, at this stage coloureds were not obliged to relocate to their new location. It was 
voluntarily done. Thus people like Violet Matsepe worked in Cairo but continued living in ‘B’ 
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location with her family. Other so-called coloureds like Anthony Bouwer’s grandfather, Ariel 
Bouwer, did not even move to Cairo. So, did Godfrey Oliphant’s mother, Ruth Oliphant. She 
continued to stay in ‘B’ location.331   
 
Politics: protests and mobilisation 
 
In 1915 the South African Native National Congress (renamed the ANC in 1923) held its fourth 
meeting in Kroonstad.
332
 This suggests that there could have been an ANC branch in Kroonstad 
already in existence during this period.  The SANNC was established two years after the passing 
of the 1910 South African Act of Union, which withheld the franchise from all Africans outside 
of the Cape. In order to consolidate white minority rule over the black majority, Francis Meli 
argues “the first post-Union administration quickly passed laws”333 which suppressed and 
restricted blacks while empowering whites. In 1911 this administration also drafted the Native’s 
Land Bill, which was passed into an Act in 1913. This Act prohibited rural land ownership by 
Africans or occupation outside the ‘reserves’, which comprised nearly eight per cent of the areas 
of the country.
334
   
In spite of all these, and many other suppressive laws, the leadership of the SANNC failed to 
mobilise the African masses to oppose the post-Union administrations. Instead, it relied on 
petitioning and pleading with the British Crown to intervene on behalf of the black people in 
South Africa. Occasionally it held days of prayer.
335
 In fact, Lodge writes “in the first six years 
of its existence ... Congress contented itself with less dramatic forms of response”. “African 
leaders”, he adds “were keen to demonstrate their loyalty for the duration of the First World 
War”.336 Lodge argues that this was because the Congress’ leadership was then dominated by 
Cape-educated and influenced men, who tended to take a less confrontationist line than their 
Transvaal colleagues.
337
 
It could be speculated here that, because of the mother body’s modus operandi, the ANC branch 
in Kroonstad remained inactive. In 1936 Simon Ndlovu, Keable ‘Mote and Sol Ngaonabase were 
reported to be attempting to revive the ANC in Kroonstad.
338
 Again, in 1938, Paul Rich notes 
that the President-General, the Reverend Z.R. Mahabane, pressurised ‘Mote, who was now 
provincial secretary of the All African Convention (AAC) in the OFS, to establish the branch of 
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the ANC in Kroonstad.
339
 In spite of these attempts, the branch does not seem to have actively 
functioned. For example, Ntantala admits in her book that, while staying in Kroonstad, before 
departing for Cape Town in 1946, she and her husband, Archibald C. Jordan, were merely paid 
up members of the ANC, which was the only organisation we could join in Kroonstad ...”340This 
trend continued until the mid-1950s when the ANCWL revived – albeit briefly – the ANC’s 
politics in Kroonstad. 
In 1935 Umteteli wa Bantu reported that African residents of Kroonstad were delighted with the 
election of A. Krebsen, known for his liberal views, to the position of mayor of Kroonstad. They 
had hoped that progressive methods would now be taken by the Municipal Council. Before this, 
the residents of the black locations lived under suppressive rule. The mayoral term of F.A. van 
Reensen was characterised by constant police raids in the locations even on Sunday.
341
 The 
police raids were ostensibly for home-brewed beer and lodger’s permits.342 Evidently, this 
negatively affected the lifestyle of the residents of the black locations. But, unlike residents in 
other places, the residents of the black locations in Kroonstad failed to mobilise and oppose the 
Kroonstad Municipal Council.  
 
Elsewhere in the country Africans mobilised and protested either against overbearing municipal 
regulations or any other perceived injustice inflicted upon them. For example, in March 1922 
when African women in Herschel felt unjustly treated by the local traders, usually Europeans, in 
their district for failing to reduce commodity prices as it was happening in other parts of the 
country, they mobilised and boycotted the local stores.
343
 According to Beinart, because of the 
migrant labour system women in Herschel were left alone to deal with the hardships of raising 
children and providing for their families. Macmillan, cited by Beinart, suggests that 75 per cent 
of men were absent for at least six month of the year.
344
 In such circumstances, women were 
forced to complement their husband’s remittances by becoming involved in harvesting crops to 
exchange for cash to pay for the hut tax, ... government levies, and food purchases.
345
 Beinart 
notes that the years immediately after the First World War were particularly hard for the women 
in Herschel.
346
 This was caused by the sharp decline of prices for produce, and lack of rain at the 
end of 1921, badly affected the production of crops. “To make matters worse”, writes Beinart, 
“commodity costs were high ... indeed, they (rural people) felt themselves to be more vulnerable 
                                                          
339
 Rich, P. ‘Managing Black Leadership: The Joint Councils, Urban Trading and Political Conflict in the OFS, 1925-
1942’, in Phil Bonner, Isabel Hofmeyr, Deborah James and Tom Lodge (eds.) Holding Their Ground: Class, Locality 
and Culture in the 19
th
 Century and 29
th
 Century South Africa. (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1989), 190 
340
 Ntantala A Life’s Mosaic, p.124 
341
 Umteteli wa Bantu, 30 March 1935 
342
 Ibid. 
343
 Beinart ‘Women in Rural Politics’, pp.324-7 
344
 Ibid., p.326 
345
 Ibid.; Women who did not have cash to purchase commodities from the stores received them on credit on the 
agreement that they would pay their debt after they have made enough cash 
346
 Ibid., pp.326-7 
74 
 
than most, for early in 1922 they began to hear that commodity prices were falling in other parts 
of the country – yet they remained stable in Herschel”.347    
 
The women’s frustrations were summed up by Mrs Annie Sidyiyo, a women’s leader, when she 
explained at a later meeting with the magistrate 
 
 We bore the high prices when told they were due to the war and were told prices 
 might get lower ... We are poor and live hardly. We cannot even get coffins which 
 cost £3 and a beast only brings in £1. What are we to do ...
348
  
 
It was against this background that the women in Herschel, particularly those who closely 
identified with the bulk of Christian community scattered through the locations, mobilised other 
women such as traditionalist, Sotho, Hlubi and Thembu and led the store boycott.
349
 This boycott 
caused the traders, whose power in relation to individual families was great in that they could 
threaten to withdraw credit and even sue for debt, to reconsider taking unilateral decisions on 
behalf of the community. Beinart argues “a total boycott placed them in a difficult position – 
they too needed a constant cash turnover to meet their debts to suppliers”.350 After the boycott 
had begun they met and approached the magistrate who advised them that they should meet with 
a group of headmen and local African dignitaries from the Herschel branch of the Native (later 
the African) National Congress, and together they set up a committee to monitor the prices.
351
 
Similarly, in 1929 women in KwaZulu and Durban mobilised and protested against the 
municipalities’ decision to establish liquor canteens. Helen Bradfort writes 
 Incidents of women marching through the streets, chanting war songs, raiding  
beerhalls, and assaulting male drinkers, first occurred in Ladysmith in August 
1929. In September spread to Weenen, Pinetown, Glencore, Dundee, Howick, 
Escourt and Vryheid. In October it was it was in Newcastle, and finally Durban
352
 
 
Like in many places, African women in KwaZulu and Durban brewed and sold beer for survival. 
Thus when the Native Beer Act of 1908, which effectively prohibited Africans from selling 
liquor and forbade them to brew in excess of a meagre amount near the mines or towns, and 
promoted the establishment of municipal monopolies which granted municipalities rights to 
possess or make beer to sold in canteens open only to African men over the age of 15.
353
 To 
enforce this Act, municipalities unleashed their police to conduct midnight raids, searching for 
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homemade beer. For Bradford “this generated enormous resentment for the authorities by 
women”.354  and the 1928 Liquor Act, which extended the scope of rural raids, African women in 
these areas mobilised and protested. This issue boiled over when in 1928 the Liquor Act 
extended the scope of rural raids.
355
 
 
Aided by the ICU yase Natal (ICU of Natal) led by A.W.G. Champion, the women mobilised 
and demonstrated against the liquor canteens.
356
 The African women were against the 
municipalities’ liquor canteens because they perceived them as places where their husbands 
spent their hard earned money which they were supposed to use to feed and cloth their children.  
For example, Jacob Mnchunu recalled that Escourt women raided the beerhall at a time when 
men were spending rent money on utshwala (liquor), and ‘the houses were under arrest because 
of liquor.
357
 The situation was further worsened by the 1928 devastating drought which affected 
crop production, and in Weenen, for example, by the Weenen Local Board’s renewed attempts to 
whittle away herds. Bradford notes “one homestead had with three wives was ordered to cut his 
cattle from 30 to eight and his goats from 87 to 25 – and was forced to sleep in the veld for a 
week while he sold his stock for a song”.358 This agitated women in particular, because they were 
mostly left alone to carry the burden of providing for the family while men migrated to the urban 
areas in search of employment opportunities, or when others drowned their sorrows in municipal 
canteens. When urging closure of canteens, Matobana Mjara declared “they lived on the stock 
they were being ordered to reduce, and ‘I have come here to ask what are we to eat?’359  
 
Moreover, African women felt discriminated against because they were prohibited from drinking 
in these canteens. women protesters were also aggrieved by the fact that money generated from 
the sale of liquor in the municipal canteens was not used to develop their areas, but used by the 
Natal municipalities to purchase Town Lands for black settlement, the provision of matchbox 
houses in segregated locations, the maintenance of grim barracks for migrant labourers, and/or 
the payment of salaries to bureaucrats and policemen.
360
 To vent out their anger against this 
blatant disparities, African women in Durban (assisted by male members of the ICU yase Natal), 
for example, attacked canteens and clashed with the police.
361
 In spite of the physical attempts by 
2000 whites in Durban to stop the attacks on canteens, the boycott continued with astonishing 
success for the next 18 months.
362
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The political void created by the absence of the ANC in Kroonstad was filled by the ICU.  The 
latter was founded in 1919
363
 by Clements Kadalie, who was born in Nyasaland (today’s 
Malawi).
364
 Ultimately it organised workers, particularly farm workers and fought for better 
wages and working conditions on their behalf. At the same time it gradually shifted its activities 
towards politics. This was evident when Kadalie urged the ICU members to join the ANC “the 
only political body we recognise”.365 The ICU’s shift of emphasis resulted in becoming what 
Lodge describing it as “a workers’ organisation but function[ing] as a mass-based political party 
because its charismatic leaders voiced a broad range of popular grievances”.366 Likewise Johns 
III remarks  
  
In April 1925 the ICU was on the verge of becoming an organised movement of 
 mass protest. It tried to maintain its trade union character. But in a situation where 
 any question regarding non-white labour was inevitably a political one, the pronoun- 
 cement and actions of the ICU and its leader took on an increasingly political colour
367
 
 
Available evidence suggests that there were few ICU branches in the other towns in the Orange 
Free State, particularly in the northern part of the OFS that could match the role of the ICU 
branch in Kroonstad. The ICU branch in Parys came close, although it seems to have operated 
mainly from the farms. In the same way as the ICU branch in Kroonstad, the ICU branch in 
Parys was formed because of bad working conditions on the white farms and the meagre 
payment. It fought for improved working conditions for black people on the farms and also 
challenged the local authorities in town. Despite the threats by whites to physically confront 
members of the ICU, in 1933 this branch still functioned.
368
 Simon Ramothibi, who was born in 
1934 in Phiritona, remembers his father Sebolelo telling him about the ICU that they used to say 
‘I SEE YOU MULUNGU’ (I see you white man) and that the ICU’s mass meetings were held in 
Heilbron”.369  The brutal attacks on Africans associated with the Union by the white Afrikaner 
community in the area precipitated the demise of the ICU branch in Heilbron. According to 
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Bradford, “In Heilbron, a landlord actually murdered an African for being a Union member”.370 
This forced some of the blacks living on the white farms gradually to drift to Phiritona location.   
 
The branch of the ICU in Kroonstad was different because it also involved itself in the locations’ 
affairs. In 1928 the Mayor of Kroonstad, Vorster, accused the ICU of being instrumental in 
advising the stand-holders not to pay their taxes (rent charges).
371
 Although Keable ‘Mote was 
singled out as the primary instigator, this boycott seems to have been mainly led by the Women 
Section of the ICU. Helen Bradford, in her seminal work on the ICU, contends that the latter 
were defending their middle-class status. According to her, “the Kroonstad ICU Women’s 
Section leaders were distinguished from those forced into the labour-market by possession of a 
house, and hence ability to draw rent from lodgers”.372 It is not clear whether this protest yielded 
the desired results, but it certainly shook the Town Council to begin to take note of the ICU’s 
presence in the area.  
Towards the end of the 1920s serious tensions had developed between Kadalie and Kroonstad 
activist Keable ‘Mote. There is no available evidence to explain the exact reason(s) for this 
tension. But it is possible to surmise that after his trip overseas Kadalie, as the leader of the 
Union, felt that ‘Mote was becoming too radical whereas he favoured a moderate approach.373 
This was evident when during the ICU’s fight against the Kroonstad’s Town Council, Kadalie 
failed to come to ‘Mote’s defence. Instead, he distanced himself and the National Council of the 
ICU from ‘Mote’s, insisted that he was away in Europe at the time and therefore could not be 
associated with ‘Mote’s actions. Kadalie’s changed position had a great deal to do with his fear 
of being deported back to Nyasaland by the government.  
When ‘Mote, in his capacity as the secretary of the ICU in the OFS, advocated the replacement 
of the Native Advisory Board with a new association, after concluding that this body was not 
advancing the community’s interests, this proposal was hotly challenged. In a letter to the 
Kroonstad Times, M. M. Tladi, a school teacher at Bantu United criticised ‘Mote for deceiving 
people. He argued that ‘Mote had informed the paper that an association was to be formed, 
which will get rid of the Native Advisory Board. He went further and noted that he had 
interviewed the teachers and ministers of the church whom ‘Mote purportedly claimed to have 
mobilised who said they knew nothing about the imminent association.
374
 The story did not end 
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there. Soon rumours that ‘Mote was embezzling the Union’s funds began making rounds.375  
This was a ploy to turn the members against him. Johns notes “complaints were made that 
Keable ‘Mote, the Provincial Secretary of the OFS whose speeches particularly disturbed white 
South Africans, was spending union funds illegally and that he refused to heed advice from the 
headquarters in Johannesburg”.376 To contain him, in 1928 the union decided to transfer ‘Mote to 
the Transvaal.
377
  
‘Mote did not take this decision lying down. He threatened to secede from the ICU. But after 
negotiations he reconsidered.
378
 Later he hit back by associating himself and the ICU in the OFS 
with the Communist’s organised campaign to burn passes on Dingaan’s Day, December 16 
1929.
379
 Kadalie, who by this time had made a deal with the government not to deport him back 
to Nyasaland, openly opposed the campaign. This struck the final nail in the coffin of the ICU 
and the OFS’ ICU branch, spelling disunity. Already at this stage there were serious tensions and 
differences within the ICU leadership nationally. There were accusations and counter-
accusations of embezzlement of the union’s finances.380 Champion, mentioned above, broke-
away from the mother-body and formed his ICU yase Natal (ICU of Natal). 
In April 1931 ‘Mote convened a conference in Kroonstad of ICU branches in the OFS and 
western Transvaal. At the meeting 57 delegates formed the Federated Free State ICU of Africa, 
and elected Selby Msimang president and ‘Mote secretary.381 However, this new organisation 
was stillborn. And in 1934 the ICU branch in Kroonstad ceased to function after a lengthy period 
organising both on the farms and in the location, which had once led Kadalie to boast that “the 
ICU [has] never failed in Kroonstad”.382  
The contentions, differences, and finally the demise of the ICU in Kroonstad did not only pave 
the way for the Native Advisory Board (and other conservative bodies) to function without any 
hindrance, but it also arrested the vibrant political engagement in the locations for the next two 
decades.  
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 ‘Conservative’ bodies in Kroonstad 
After realising the growing schism between urban blacks and whites, particularly the officials in 
various towns which was reflected in widespread protests, the government through the Native 
Affairs Department (NAD) recommended the creation of the Boards, “and the Urban Areas Act 
of 1923 carried this through”.383 With this “the state intended the Boards to bridge the chasm 
between urban Africans and local officials”.384 Despite this the Boards had no real power. “They 
were explicitly”, Nieftagodien argues “denied any real power and their overall functions were 
limited to an advisory capacity”.385 Moreover, according to Nieftagodien “local authorities were 
neither obliged to consult the Advisory Boards nor to take into account any recommendations by 
them”.386From the start this arrangement placed the Advisory Boards at a disadvantageous 
position. 
More worrying at this stage, the Boards, notes Tetelman, “tended to be drawn from the members 
of the petty-bourgeoisie, the ‘teachers and semi-literate’”.387 Furthermore, Board members had to 
be upstanding members of the community, who “had to be free of rental arrears”, in short, 
exemplary people in the community. And these, Tetelman contends “did not agitate for radical 
change”.388 In Kroonstad, for example, the Board comprised of teachers. Among the members of 
the earliest Kroonstad Native Advisory Board were Manes, Pitso, Makhetha, Damane, Dingalo, 
Molete, Modise, Tladi (possibly the teacher who is the complainant in the letter above), and 
Lekhetla, 
389
 all of whom were teachers. In fact, in 1947 the Council waited eagerly for the 
decision whether Marumo would resign as a teacher to remain on as a member of the Board.
390
 
However, in spite of the educational background and standing in the community, teachers who 
sat in the Boards did not only fail to influence the decisions of the Town Council but also 
seemingly condoned some of the unfriendly decisions by the Council. This dented the Board’s 
credibility in the eyes of the black residents. 
 
Because of their profession, teachers were prohibited from becoming members of political 
organisations or participating in activities of organisations associated with opposition politics. 
The department of education threatened any teacher with dismissal found to have contravened 
the government regulation governing the teachers. Examples are in abundance of teachers who 
were either threatened with immediate dismissals or had their salaries withheld by the 
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government for being members of the ICU.
391
 Some like Elias Maliza were not fortunate. His 
services in the teaching profession were summarily terminated on 15 December 1927 because of 
his active membership in the ICU.
392
 But it was the case of Abiel Thabo Seele that probably 
caused teachers in the OFS, especially Kroonstad, to be particularly cautious. Seele, a teacher at 
Heilbron United Native School, was humiliated by the Department of Native Education, 
demanding that he write a letter to the department giving reasons why the department should not 
dismiss him after he seen addressing a meeting of the ICU held on 1 November 1936. Seele was 
not a member of the ICU.  In his reply, Seele wrote – in part 
 
 In the first place may I sincerely apologise for having participated at all – this error was 
 done in ignorance. To relate  ... circumstances attending this participation may I mention 
 that on this day while proceeding from church I was requested by the officials of the said 
 movement to assist them in interpretation – to this request I readily acceded because there  
 be no one efficient for the purpose.  At the end of the meeting I was asked to say a few  
 words. ... I had not the least desire or motive of creating a spirit of ill-feeling and hostility 
 between white and black, nor did I habour any malicious intention of publicly criticising 
 government administration
393
   
 
Seele’s imminent dismissal was finally shelved after the intervention on behalf of Seele by the 
Reverend C. Jummen, who noted that Seele had learnt his lesson and pleaded with the 
department to forgive him.
394
 It was probably because of such intimidation and threats of 
immediate dismissal from the teaching profession that teachers in Kroonstad felt comfortable 
working within ‘conservative’ bodies such as the Native Advisory Board.  
 
For Alan Cobley “[the NAB] credibility was ... damaged by the role of the white chairman, 
which often precluded the possibility of direct criticism of the local authority”.395 He writes 
“board members were encouraged to use their “good office” in such matters as resolving 
domestic disputes, discouraging illegal brewing and sale of liquor, informing the authorities of 
necessary repairs and improvement of services and, in general preserving ‘peace and good 
order’”.396 In some places like Cradock, Location Advisory Board members resolved small 
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disputes, studied pauperism, launched ward clean-up contests, and asked the Town Council to 
maintain the location’s cemetery”.397 Bonner and Nieftagodien note that when the magistrate of 
Johannesburg suggested that an Advisory Board should be formed in Alexandra, it was also 
stated that this Board “... would not only assist the police in carrying out the law, but it would 
also make representation on any other matter affecting the welfare of the township”.398  
 
Finally, Boards’ members were made to believe that they were superior to the rest of the 
community members. And, therefore, it was their duty to lead by example. This message was 
stressed to the delegates attending the Location Advisory Boards Congress in 1935 by J.R. Brent, 
Kroonstad’s Superintendent. He asserted 
  
You leaders must never lose sight of the fact that you are at least a century  
or two ahead of the Bantu masses you lead. You are educated men. You  
understand and have absorbed the modern civilised outlook. Never fall into  
the error of imagining that any appreciable number of your followers have  
the same outlook. Labour patiently to teach and to leaven them so that one  
day they will be able truly to enjoy the benefits of modern civilisation. Don’t  
always aim at popularity or political advantage, but stem their rush towards  
the precipice, when the necessity arises, and head them gently in the right  
direction
399
  
 
Disillusioned with the NAB, some public bodies in Kroonstad by-passed the Board and 
negotiated directly with the Town Council. The Board complained bitterly at this and requested 
the Town Council to ensure that all public bodies in the location should approach the Council 
through it.
400
 In an attempt to demonstrate its concern for the residents, the Board requested the 
Town Council to stop the night raids during the months of December and January. This request 
however was turned down. 
401Again, in 1945, the Kroonstad NAB’s request to have the name of 
the wife be removed in the lodger’s permit and for the lodger’s fee be reduced from 3 pennies to 
2 pennies was rejected by the Council.
402
 And in the same year the Board was reprimanded for 
misleading the Council that the number of taxis in the location had decreased.
403
 Finally, in 1946 
the Board’s request that the location’s inhabitants should be allowed to slaughter cattle in the 
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location for marriage feasts was turned down.
404
 For the members of the community, these were 
clear signs that the Board was failing to advance its best interests.  
 
It is important to note here that after 1944 some of the NAB’s were radicalised. This could have 
been as a result of the formation of the ANCYL which introduced radical ideas into black 
politics. It was at this stage that politicians became members of the Advisory Boards. Some of 
these included members of the ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP). Lodge writes 
“The Communist candidates stood and won the Springs, Brakpan, Benoni and Nigel Advisory 
Board elections in December 1945”.405Similarly, Bonner and Nieftagodien note that “in 1953 
ANC activist Margaret Maphanga was elected to the Dukathole
406
 Advisory Board, along with 
fellow ANC member J. Monaheng, who had already served as an elected member for several 
years”407  
 
Still the people of Kroonstad’s black residential areas were not mobilised and organised. This 
was to carry on for some time. At the same time as the NAB was functioning in Kroonstad, the 
Kroonstad Joint Council of European and Natives (JCEN) was formed. In Kroonstad, according 
to Paul Rich “the Kroonstad Joint Council was established in September 1928 [consisting of] 18 
whites and 18 Africans (see list of members attached).”408  
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Names of members of the Kroonstad European and Natives Joint Council (Source: UWL 
AD1433 (Box CK5.3) Kroonstad Joint Council 
 
According to the constitution of the Council the main objective of the Joint Councils was, inter 
alia
409
,   
a. To promote co-operation between Europeans and Natives in South Africa 
b. To investigate and report upon any matter relating to the welfare of the Native people’s 
of South Africa to which the Council’s attention may called 
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c. To make such representations to the Union Government , Provincial Administration, 
public bodies or individuals as may be thought necessary 
Skimming through the list reproduced here, particularly from the African members, one can see 
the involvement of a ‘respectable’ number of ministers of churches, the rest being a mixture of 
individuals involved in various trades. For example, Robert Sello, ‘Mote, Henderson Binda 
(trade unionist: ICU)
410
, J. Crutse (teacher)
411
, and Jan Maraba (Policeman)
412
 Their non-militant 
approach (except for the trade unionists) shaped the role of the Council. Worse in 1931 ‘Mote 
was no longer a member of the JCEN in Kroonstad. This is evident in the correspondence 
between Knight and Rheinallt-Jones, in which Knight informed Rheinallt-Jones about ‘Mote’s 
speech at the JCEN meeting. He wrote 
 Rather a disturbed meeting of the Joint Council last night. ‘Mote was introduced 
 as a visitor, and let off his usual hot-air. I doubt if he will be given another  
 opportunity
413
 
 
The non-militancy of the JCEN was also possibly influenced by the presence of the white 
members. Although the Council’s constitution stipulated that whites be the majority of members, 
in Kroonstad this was not the case. But they, as the constitution, again, stipulated held the 
leading positions.
414
  For example, Fathers Charles F. Martin and Amor were in the executive of 
the Kroonstad’s Council.   
Just like the NAB, the JCEN’s did not have real power to influence or change decisions adopted 
by the Town Council. Its role typified that of both pressure and lobbyist groups. It raised issues 
to put pressure on the local authorities. For example, it took up the issue of trading rights for 
blacks in the location, making representations to the Kroonstad Town Council and, later, to the 
OFS Municipalities’ Conference.415 Furthermore, it made representations before the Inquiry into 
Native Trading Facilities at Kroonstad beginning on September 5 1932.
416
 In between, it sought 
to send a deputation to the Minister of Native Affairs – who however refuse to meet them.417 
Again, in 1935 it began discussing the issue of home-brewing, because the Illicit Liquor 
Commission was about to report on it.
418
 Relatedly, it failed to mobilize the community, 
particularly African women brewing and selling beer, when the Kroonstad Municipality decided 
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to establish municipal canteen system, similar to those operated in KwaZulu and Durban.
419
 
Finally, it raised the issue of the exorbitant interest expected by the local authority from blacks in 
the locations.
420
  
The JCEN’s representations did not solve the problems such as inability to trade freely in the 
locations experienced by Africans in Kroonstad. This caused the residents in the black locations 
to begin to doubt the capacity of the JCEN to advance their interests. It can be speculated that 
black members in the JCEN might have felt pressure from members of the community who saw 
no progress in the Council’s role. Indeed, in the case of Cradock when the police raided beer 
brewing with increasing frequency, and in 1929 the municipality increased the powers of search 
and seizure for home-brewed beer, the black members of the JCEN in particularly understood the 
potential for conflict, since they lived with poor residents in a small location and were tightly 
connected through clan and social networks.
421
 They tried unsuccessfully to advise the 
municipality against this approach.  
Differences in approaches caused some of the blacks in the JCEN to feel that their white 
counterparts were controlling them and telling them what to do. In 1936 cracks in the JCEN 
began to show in Kroonstad. In August 1937 Charles F. Martin Knight, of the St. Francis’ Priory, 
addressed a letter to Senator Rheinallt-Jones explaining the reasons for this. The letter read – in 
part  
 But in Kroonstad the type of European here is rather put off by the title Joint Council 
 because he thinks it is a suggestion of what his ancestors called “ungodly equality”. ... 
 It is true, [he continued], that the actual dissolution of the Kroonstad Joint Council 
 was due to the defection of the Africans which made it impossible to carry on  
 without doing them more harm than good. But there had always been a problem  
connected with European members. They were so few that certainly did not effectively 
balance the African members ...
422
 
 
Finally, in 1941 Father Amor, the secretary of the JCEN in Kroonstad, wrote to Rheinallt-Jones 
making the same point. In his letter he said, inter alia,  
 I know how the Joint Council has faded away in the OFS. ... From the African side 
 there was much desire to exploit the JCs for the purpose of getting things for them- 
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selves which were difficult or impossible in other ways. ... And often Europeans also 
used their position in an endeavour to tell the Native what his place and where he got 
off
423
     
 
In conclusion, he proposed the establishment of a Study Cell, which would comprise an equal 
number of Europeans and Blacks. The purpose of the Study Cell was to meet on a monthly basis 
to “hear and discuss papers”.424 However, this idea does not seem to have gone any further than 
the proposal stage. In 1949 there were talks of reviving the Joint Council,
425
 but there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives was ever reintroduced in 
Kroonstad.  
 
Almost at the same time as the JCEN started experiencing tensions another body emerged which, 
like the NAB and the JCEN, did not mobilise and organise the masses. Instead, it concentrated 
on a select constituency, the teachers. And this perpetuated the quiescence and tranquillity 
prevailing in Kroonstad’s black residential areas. As mentioned above, from the early1930s 
young ‘fresh-from university colleges’ teachers (especially from the Cape Province) arrived in 
numbers to take up teaching posts in Kroonstad. Although, some of them joined the ANC when 
they arrived in Kroonstad, they did not play any active role in promoting the organisation’s 
politics.
426
  
 
The political situation, however, changed in the post-1944 period, partly as the result of the 
formation of the ANC Youth League
427
, which radicalised the mother-body. Now some of the 
teachers, especially in the East Rand, joined political organisations and explicitly participated in 
their organisation’s activities. But this was not the case in Kroonstad. Could this perhaps have 
been because of fear of intimidation and threats of dismissal from work by the department, as 
noted above? 
According to Setiloane, the branch of OFSATA, Kroonstad African Teachers Association 
(KATA) was already active in the 1930s. There is no evidence to suggest that KATA ever 
involved itself in raising issues affecting the community directly with the local officials. Its 
attention was rather focused on its members’ immediate interests. The teachers’ militancy was 
aroused by the terrible working conditions teachers worked under and the low payment.
428
 To 
demonstrate their frustrations, teachers in 1944 staged a march in Johannesburg, only dressed in 
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blankets to dramatise the depths of their poverty.
429
 According to Ntantala, the OFS was one of 
the provinces where teachers were not treated as professionals and as result OFSATA “started 
looking critically at their contracts and conditions of service”.430 OFSATA’s reputation grew. 
This was particularly the case following the election of A.C. Jordan to the presidency in 1943. 
Teachers organised branches in city, town, and dorp. Ntantala writes “during the two years of 
A.C’s [Jordan] presidency, new branches of the organisation sprang up in the most unlikely 
places in the OFS – Clocolan, Wepenar, Steynsrust, and other little places that one hardly ever 
heard of”.431 “By 1945”, concludes Ntantala, “OFSATA [was] the most militant in the whole 
country”.432 Even so, they were aloof from the masses.  
This was different from what happened in Stirtonville, in the East Rand in the 1940s. The 
conditions experienced by teachers, and most probably the radical influence of the ANCYL, 
caused some of the teachers to be effectively drawn into community politics.
433
 Nebojah 
Mokgako was such a teacher. According to Bonner and Nieftagodien, Mokgako, after being 
elected into the Stirtonville Advisory Board, unlike other teachers, “injected a more 
confrontational tone into Advisory Board proceedings”.434 Moreover, Mokgako became a 
constant thorn in the side of the location administration, challenging them on a host of issues, 
including permits, liquor raids, unsatisfactory bus services, poor water supply, the location 
regulations and the prohibition on hawking by women, among others.
435
 This earned him support 
from the single quarters and beer-brewing women.
436
 
 
Similarly, David Bopape in Brakpan, in the East Rand, was a founding member of the ANCYL, 
ANC branch chairman in Brakpan, secretary of the Villgilance Association (replaced the NAB in 
Brakpan), vice-president of the location’s Child and Social Welfare Society, member of the 
Communist Party of South Africa, secretary of the Anti-Pass Council of 1944. This was in 
addition to his earlier involvement in the Transvaal African Teachers Association’s salary 
campaign in 190-41.
437
 Evidently, he commanded a presence in the community and its affairs. It 
was for this reason that when the newly appointed manager of the NAD in Brakpan, Dr 
Language, influenced the dismissal of Bopape from his teaching post at the Brakpan 
Amalgamated Mission School, that on 10 May 1944 the 7000-strong workforce in Brakpan 
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stayed away from work, demanding the removal of Dr Language.
438
 When the Brakpan Council 
refused to budge and to reinstate Bopape, African women in Brakpan, led by Mrs Sello and Mrs 
Masekane, led a school boycott.
439
  Although the Brakpan Council remained intransigent and 
refused to reinstate Bopape, but the strike and school boycott galvanised the community of 
Brakpan to the extent that the Council was propelled “into pursuing a policy of ‘cleaning up’ the 
location and of reasserting total control over the lives of the town’s labour force”.440 In spite of 
these measures, Sapire argues “Brakpan remained a centre of political ferment, which the ANC 
would profitably tab a decade later”.441   
Back to OFSATA/KATA. The latter’s distant relations with the masses should not, however, be 
construed to mean that there were no teachers who were political and who, again, tried to 
conscientise their students. Peter Molotsi, who studied at Bantu High in Kroonstad and later 
became a founding member of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), in the interview with Brown 
Maaba recalled that in the 1940s teachers in the same school openly discussed politics with the 
students. In his words “the idea that this was our country was always instilled in almost every 
lesson”. “… The members of the staff”, he added, “were people with a clear purpose … prepared 
to teach us and liberate us”. “They delivered two messages”, he continued, “the syllabus and its 
need and [our] purpose in life … Our teachers were so devoted that they actually taught beyond 
the syllabus: they taught our minds to satisfy the needs of the syllabus, but they then also 
prepared us as future citizens of a South Africa that would be free. They delivered the massage 
of liberation”.442 It is possible that it was some of the politicized teachers in Kroonstad who 
invited a Youth Leaguer to come and address them in 1949. The Youth Leaguer cajoled the 
teachers to take a more militant approach 
 A significant thing has happened recently. In the tram boycott of Western Native  
 Township the lead has been taken by African youth who in their enthusiasm even 
 use violence to make this a success … These [sic] are manifestations of the new 
 spirit – the spirit of nationalism. Only these youngsters haven’t the correct orientation. 
 The spirit is there and undeniable
443
 
 
The advent of the Nationalist’s government in 1948, and at the beginning of the 1950s passing a 
myriad of oppressive laws, including Bantu Education Act in 1953, brought to an abrupt end the 
open involvement by teachers (and other civil servants) in politics. And so did the method of 
teaching of fusing the syllabus and politics. Ntantala strongly believes it was because OFSATA 
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was then in control of collaborators, who welcomed Bantu Education.
444
 Apart from the efforts 
alluded to by Molotsi, there is no evidence that in Kroonstad black teachers mobilised the 
community to protest against the introduction of Bantu Education, as was the case in Benoni and 
Alexandra.
445
 
 
In spite of this setback, in the early 1950s the Kroonstad’s teacher militancy continued, although 
in a different form. A small number of teachers were drawn into the politics of the Non-
European Unity Movement (NEUM) – and they in turn formed the Society of Young Africa 
(SOYA). In Kroonstad, SOYA, like bodies before it, also staked its political claim. Writing 
about SOYA in a different locality, Tom Lodge notes “In the Transvaal the Society of Young 
Africa enjoyed a certain vogue in the early 1950s amongst the young and usually well-educated 
men and women who attended its discussion groups.
446
 Lodge’s observation applies to the 
situation in Kroonstad. A.C. Jordan, who had moved to Cape Town and joined NEUM, was 
instrumental in the formation of SOYA in Kroonstad. Parkies Setiloane, a former member of 
SOYA and teacher at Bantu High School recalls 
I was recruited in the 50s by [teacher] Nqeleni to the A.A.C. I was a teacher  
then. And then we had a youth organisation called SOYA, Society of Young  
Africa. We didn’t pay subscription fee to join SOYA; you just became a member  
You see, at the time the ANC was using boycotts, resistance, and all that to fight 
oppression. But SOYA was saying educate the masses first so that the masses must 
know their importance in society. Yes, educate the people first politically; it’s then  
that you can take action. I can still remember, eh, A.C. Jordan came up and lectured  
… And then you had to buy stationery like The Awakening of the People by [Isaac] 
Tabata – he was from the Eastern Cape. We held meetings in Reverend Mahabane’s 
study-room at the Methodist Manse and discussed about oppression at the time. 
Sometimes we would attend conferences.
447
  
 
Evidently SOYA operated at an intellectual level. Although it managed to attract like-minded 
people, especially teachers, it also had few members who were not teachers.  Parkies Setiloane 
recalls “some of our members were not teachers. I remember we had Willie Nhlapo. Nhlapo was 
a postmaster here. Mohope “The Great” was there too.448 SOYA’s lifespan, however, was short. 
Functioning during the action-oriented period of the 1950s (1952 was the beginning of the 
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Defiance Campaign), the masses no longer tolerated political debates and discussions the SOYA 
was so much engrossed in. They wanted action. Some of the members of SOYA felt the same. 
Parkies Setiloane explains 
  
 What did not impress me about SOYA was that it was highly critical of the ANC. It 
 criticised it a lot. We never took action as SOYA like the ANC. I mean the Defiance 
 Campaign started when we were already active in 1952. But we never took part in the 
 Defiance Campaign. The action only came from the ANC. And SOYA would argue  
 that ‘they (ANC) are wisening up the white man to come up with more stringent laws. 
 We said let’s leave them (the government and its employers) and hit them where it hurts 
 the most, which was educating the masses. And then take action once! We would target 
 labourers, teachers, ministers – everybody. And once we embarked on a strike action,  
there’ll be a standstill449  
 
SOYA’s intention to ‘educate the masses’, however, remained an idea only. It was never 
implemented. Finally, some of the members of SOYA like Parkies Setoloane (and possibly 
others as well) left the location in his case to find a teaching post on the farms. This closed the 
chapter of SOYA’s functioning in Kroonstad.   
 
The revival of radical politics 
 
Although the rolling out of the Defiance Campaign in 1952, led mainly by the ANC and the 
South African Indian Congress, did not produce “an extraordinary response” as it did in some of 
the areas in the Eastern Cape, like Port Elizabeth and East London it, nevertheless, helped to 
revive the ANC in Kroonstad.
450
 Residents, ostensibly members of the ANC, embarked in mass 
political mobilisation and demonstrations – albeit briefly. From oral evidence, it is apparent that 
before or during the campaign the ANC leadership visited Kroonstad possibly to galvanise the 
people. This visit was possibly prompted by lack of action in the locations during ANC’s call for 
a national stay-at-home on 26 June 1950.
451
 Recalling the visit by the ANC’s leaders to 
Kroonstad, Mekodi Arcilia Morailane (now Mokoena), who was born in 1946 in Bloemfontein 
and had moved to Kroonstad by 1952, remembers seeing Walter Sisulu (during this period the 
only ANC’s full-time paid official)452 
 What I remember is that in ’52 or a little earlier than that we arrived in Kroonstad.  
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We were from Bloemfontein. Immediately when I arrived there I went to a crèche, 
Dorcas House. I was around five years. Who’s this short and light in complexion? I  
think he has passed away. He was arrested together with ntate Mandela ... Walter  
Sisulu. He once came to Kroonstad. We saw him ... At that time we didn’t know this  
as politics. We just knew that they were well-respected men. You’ll just hear that at 
home
453
 
 
During this period some of the teachers, even those at the crèche level, were politically 
conscious. Their awareness bordered on radicalism. This was evident in their teachings. At 
Dorcas House, Morailane remembers that they were taught recitations (poems) which were 
grounded in the history of dispossession. She recalls that during the visit by the ANC leadership 
they were made to recite this poem for them as a form of entertainment. According to her the 
poem went as follows 
 
 Mo-Afrika, ke kgotsofetse ka se keleng sona. Le hoja naha ya rona e ne e se  
tshehla. Naha ya rona e fetohile lehaha la mashodu, teng ho phela batho 
ba mefuta yohle. Batho ba ikemiseditseng ho ripitla Mo-Afrika (Stumping  
her foot)
454
 
 
I am satisfied to be an African. Our country was never barren. It has been turned  
into a heaven of thieves, where many people live. But some of these people are 
 constantly preparing to destroy Africans (Stumping her foot) 
 
Some of the members of Dorcas House were members of the National Council of African 
Women. Hilda Motadinyane was one such teacher. Lodge describes the National Council of 
African Women, up until the late 1940s, as different (together with the Zenzele Clubs led by Mrs 
Xuma)
455
 which worked for the upliftment and upward mobility of African women.
456
 In the 
1950s their role had shifted. They now became involved in political issues. Motadinyane 
remembers that she joined the National Council of African Women after listening to Winkie 
Direko, the leader of the Council, criticizing the carrying of passes by women. She remarks 
 
For me to join this organisation was when Winkie Direko had come to Kroonstad  
from Bloemfontein. She was addressing women like Mathakane and others. I listened  
to her and I became interested. She was discussing women’s issues like passes457 
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At this stage the ANC did not have a strong branch in Kroonstad, mainly because of the non-
radical stance adopted by the ANC leadership over the years until 1949. Then the ANCYL 
pushed for the adoption of its radical ‘Programme of Action’. According to Benjamin Pogrund, a 
journalist at the time, “The Programme of Action set the goal of ‘freedom from white domination 
and the attainment of political independence”. “Specifically” he continues, “it called for direct 
representation in all the government bodies of the country, and abolition of all differential 
institutions for blacks such as representative councils and the existing parliamentary council.” 
Finally, “the Programme suggested ... wide press dissemination of ideas to raise political 
consciousness; boycott of differential institutions, together with strikes, civil disobedience and 
non-co-operation ...”458 For Lodge, the ‘Programme of Action’ “was the most militant statement 
of principles adopted by the ANC to date”. “Congress, it said” Lodge adds “struggle for the 
rights of national freedom, political independence, and self-determination and the rejection of 
white leadership and all forms of segregation”.459  
  
It was against this backdrop that some of the members of the ANC in Kroonstad organised a 
march to town to demonstrate at the municipal offices. According to Setiloane, Amos 
Mahomane, Esther Montshiwa and Lenong led a demonstration in the 1950s to the municipal 
office to complain about the excessive number of whites working in municipal offices, increased 
rent and the proposed ejection of all unmarried young men from their homes in the townships 
and housing them in municipal hostels”.460 
 
The political momentum grew after the government promulgated the Abolition of Passes and 
Coordination of Documents Act in 1952, which made provision for women to carry reference 
books.
461
 Recounting the indignation women felt about this law, Maggie Resha writes in her 
book “To extend the Pass Laws was to pull down the wall which protected the women from the 
humiliation of carrying these documents”.462 Throughout South Africa women were incensed by 
this Act and decided to protest. To coordinate their protests, 150 women from different parts of 
the country converged in Johannesburg in 1954 to adopt a ‘Women’s Charter’ where they 
launched a new organisation, the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW).
463
 The 
following year, 2000 women from the Transvaal marched to Union Buildings in Pretoria, with a 
petition to the then Prime Minister B.J. Strijdom. However, the Prime Minister snubbed the 
women.
464
  This did not deter the women – they were to march again in 1956. Before that, 
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however, in March 1956 African women marched “in virtually all the major cities ... from 
locations into city centres to hand in petitions and protests to Town Clerks, Native 
Commissioners, Magistrates and other local affiliates.
465
 It possible that it was during this period 
that African women in Kroonstad’s black locations also participated in the anti-pass campaign.  
In Kroonstad this campaign was led by some of the older women (possibly members of the ANC 
Women’s League).466 The most prominent amongst these was Matseki Majoro. Majoro’s role in 
politics dates back prior to the anti-pass campaign. Violet Selele remembers her (and other 
women) leading a fight against high rent also. She remarks 
 
 This group comprised of older women of the same age as my mother. I know  
because I was married then. They would go to the town hall in town to protest  
against rent. They also protested against this thing called ... lodger’s permit.467  
Ja, they fought against the lodger’s permit and rent. They would go to town and  
demand that they should be arrested. Indeed, they were arrested. But they later  
released
468
 
     
Supporting Selele, Mike “Baba” Jordan recalls that Matseki  
 
 was an activist. She features in boycotts. Not only the anti-pass campaign, but 
 also all the boycotts of unfair service from local government. She was always in the 
 forefront – rent boycotts. She was not leading a group of women; she was leading a 
 group of residents. When she was detained, she was detained along side six or seven 
 men for the rent boycotts
469
 
 
Also Godfrey Oliphant remembers Matseki Majoro as a powerful orator. He described as her 
follows 
  
 Matseki was very powerful. That’s the lady I know personally. [She was one of  
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the] people who used to quote Mandela. As sy ge praat het (when she spoke), people  
 would listen. [Addressing people she would say] ‘It’s been long that we’ve been 
 under the yoke of a white man’ – those were the words. ‘We’ve got to stand up as  
the people today and fight for our rights’. She was that type of a person470  
 
However, Majoro is most remembered for her role in the anti-pass campaign. Setiloane writes 
“Matseki had led women in demonstrations, protesting the carrying of passes by black women 
...”471 Selele, who was present at the demonstrations, recalls 
 
I remember one incident that agitated people was the pass document. I just can’t 
remember the year. There was a group of women – I was there – we used to meet  
and talk about this thing that we don’t want passes. That’s one incident that I reme- 
mber very well
472
 
 
Recalling the actual gathering, Selele adds 
 
 I can’t remember some of these women. One of them, if I remember well, it was  
Me Masieletsa – she’s late. These women came up with this idea here in Seeisoville.  
I can still remember I was sitting next to one of these women whose husband was a 
shopkeeper when I said ‘Me Masielatsa, do you realise that there are some people here 
who will leave this meeting and go and tell the boers (police) that we don’t want passes.  
I think we should stop the meeting so that we can assess the situation. But honestly we 
didn’t want them (passes). But here in Kroonstad we didn’t trust each other473 
 
Indeed, what Selele feared happened. Not long after the meeting, Matseke Majoro was detained. 
In his interview with researchers from the Free State Provincial Archives, John Modise explained 
  
 Matseki was the person who worked in town, but she also liked to help other people 
 within the community. She worked closely with Reverend Mahabane and Mrs  
Mahabane. When Matseki was arrested, Reverend Mahabane was also arrested – on the 
same day. They arrested Reverend Mahabane first, and followed with Matseki. They 
were very active in politics
474
 
 
Mahabane’s political stance from the time he arrived in Kroonstad was moderate up until 1957.  
According to some of my interviewees, in 1957 he became actively involved in community 
                                                          
470
 Interview with Godfrey Oliphant 
471
 Setiloane The History, p.139 
472
 Interview with Selele 
473
 Ibid. 
474
 Interview with Mr K.J Modise (FSPA) 
95 
 
issues after his visit to Ghana in that year. In 1957 Ghana won its independence under Kwame 
Nkrumah. In his autobiography, Nelson Mandela notes the following about Nkruma’s influence 
on South African activists 
 … The emergence of the independent republic of Ghana in 1957 and its pan-africanist, 
 anti-apartheid leader, Nkrumah, had alarmed the Nationalists and made them even 
 more intent on clamping down on dissent at home
475
 
 
“Baba” Jordan recalls that he was informed that Mahabane came back radicalised from Ghana. 
He explains 
  
 The interesting history of a Methodist Church priest … Mahabane. We as kids used 
 to call him ou wit kop (old white head), because his head was snow white … I remember 
 something my elder cousin recalls now and then. My cousin said to me ‘I was sitting is  
 a service one Sunday morning and that was on the return of Z.R. Mahabane in 1957. He 
was invited by Kwame Nkrumah. In that sermon Mahabane said the message from 
Nkrumah for blacks in South Africa was they must get the boot of the white man off from 
their necks. Ja, that’s what I heard476  
 
Lindiwe Gladys Mwelase, who is related to Majoro, returned to Kroonstad after spending some 
time working in Johannesburg to find Majoro arrested. She recounts 
 I went back home in 1956. And when I landed I found that my grandmother had 
just been arrested … They accused [her] of being too much influential about the  
pass resistance. That was after the women had returned from Pretoria to march  
against the pass laws. I asked the people and they told me that they burned passes  
and she stayed behind when others fled. [They burned] the passes down there  
at the Old Location, just behind the market
477
  
 
However, in spite of this demonstration the government swiftly implemented its law of extending 
passes to women. Women in Winburg, in the Orange Free State, were the first to be issued with 
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passes in 1956.
478
 In 1957 African women in Kroonstad were issued with passes as well. 
Motadinyane recalls 
 Remember that we were forced to take passes. I took mine in 1957 I was working  
at the creche in Dorcas House. The municipality police came to our workplace  
and took us to the hall. When we arrived there they took us photographs. We were  
the first group of women to be given passes
479
 
 
As had been the experience of their male counterparts, females also experienced the 
unpleasantness associated with passes. Motadinyane explains 
 Then life became hard. Police would knock at our doors in the middle of the  
night, demanding to see our passes. In my case, when they arrived at my place  
and demanded to see my pass, I would tell them to show me theirs first
480
 
 
The suppression of the anti-pass demonstrations marked the end of ANC’s aboveground 
activities in Kroonstad black locations during this period. It would seem that the ANC, after it 
had decided to establish Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and engage the government militarily, some 
of its leading figures in Kroonstad attempted to recruit members of the Green-White Gang to 
engage in acts of sabotage on behalf of MK. Gangs began forming countrywide in the late 
1930s.
481
 One of the earliest gangs in Alexandra during this period was the Tuta Ranch, which 
“robbed people particularly in the early mornings at the bus rank ...”482 After the National Party 
(NP) ascended to power after the 1948 elections, having being voted into power mainly by the 
white platteland (rural Highveld/plateau) farmers, who were losing huge quantities of labour to 
industry in the towns, the semi-skilled Afrikaner workers who were threatened with job 
competition from blacks, and a section of white suburban residents who feared being swamped 
by black immigration to the towns,
483
 it appeased these constituencies by promulgating laws 
which would ensure that, first, the white farmers were regularly supplied with labour, second, the 
mixing between blacks and whites in towns ceased, and, finally, that blacks did not pose a threat 
to the semi-skilled Afrikaners. The laws affected gangsters and their gangs. African males were 
obliged to carry passes all the time to prove their legality in the urban areas. Failure to do this led 
to immediate arrest, and sometimes to young men being sentenced to work on farms in Bethal, in 
the then Eastern Transvaal (today Mpumalanga Province).
484
 Local authorities, through their 
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police, were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing these laws. And their main targets 
were young men.  
It was against this background that the Green-White Gang was established in the early 1950s. To 
understand the establishment and activities of this gang, it is important to revisit the career of 
Ditheko Josias “Makula” Molai, one of the few surviving members of the gang. This information 
is drawn from the interview with him. 
 
Molai, who is better known as “Makula”, was born in Marabastad in 1941, on the 12th of August. 
He spent part of his childhood in Germiston, where his parents lived. He claims that while in 
Germiston he befriended and grew up among Indian children. As a result he learnt to speak their 
language fluently. As a result when he returned to Kroonstad to live with his grandmother, he 
could not speak any of the vernacular languages spoken in the locations and this earned him the 
name “Makula” – a derogatory term for Indian. He explains: “I came back and lived with my 
grandmother. That’s when I got the name “Makula” because I couldn’t speak Sesotho but only 
Indian.” He started his schooling at ‘B’ Location at a government school accommodated at the 
Anglican Church, “because Bantu United [School] was too small”. He claims that life was 
satisfactory especially education-wise, but in 1952 or 1953 after he had proceeded to Bantu 
United to do Standard Three, he and some of the young boys from ‘B’ location formed 
themselves into a group and hung around the shops. They came to be known as the ‘Green 
Berets’ corner shop gang. It was more of a group than a gang then. During this period Molai and 
his friends, who were about 10 or 12 in number, were part of the baseball team called the Green-
White, because of the team’s uniform: white shirts and shorts, with green stripes. The members 
included people like David Gooie, John Sesana, Boy-boy Ponyane, who have passed away, and 
Choke Tlokotsi, and Sydney Mashoe, who are in Johannesburg.  
Molai claims that over a period of time they noticed that the municipal police, derogatorily called 
mampara (stupid) were harassing the Basotho nationals who were living in “B” location – and 
they did not take kindly to this.
485
 He remembers: “We noticed that the apartheid law was too 
harsh on the Lesotho people. We adored people from Lesotho, because every month-end they 
would receive their salaries, as well as their ration. And because their wives weren’t familiar 
with the place they used to send us to do some errands for them, and they would give us that 
ration, like beans, samp, meat, and different kinds of vegetables. These people used to give us 
their groceries, because we assisted their families. We realised (concluded) that the harassment 
they received from the government have to stop.”  According to him, the police would arrest the 
Basotho when, for instance, they had visitors. Whether it was 10 at night or 12 they were 
supposed to first get the visitor’s permit from the office, and if not so, they were arrested. If they 
were behind with rent payments or the so-called lodger’s [permit], they were also arrested. 
Finally, those women made means of living by brewing African beer would attract police who 
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would ruin their business. For these reasons Molai and others started to group themselves against 
the law. 
 
Molai confesses that it was not their intention to form a gang but they were forced to. This was 
because, as they were strategizing how they would assist the Basotho against the police, a group 
of people interfered with their plans (this was probably the rival gang, The Spoilers).
486
 They felt 
they had no choice but to form a gang in order to protect themselves. He takes up the story  
There were those from other sections of the location who were against our  
idea of stopping the harassment from the police. Now they provoked us into  
becoming a gangster [sic], meaning we were now against community members  
and the police force. But our intention was not to kill, but just to make a point  
that we were able to kill if that’s what it takes 
 
The leader of the gang, Skapie Mofokeng, introduced them to a comic book about Spicemasher. 
The latter, according to Molai, fought crime but used tactics which appealed to the gang. He 
recalls: “I may say he worked hand-in-hand with the law to fight crime. He used to dress 
differently for his opponents not to notice him, and he would walk behind them without being 
noticed, and would target (attack) his opponents along the way. So, we acted in the same way – 
only difference was that they did not work hand-in-hand with the law. We used to send half of 
our members around and when the police confronted the group, we would come out and smash 
those police who remained behind. And by the time they realised that there was only four or five 
of them left, we would be done with them”. During this period the gang fought with bricks. 
Molai recalls “We used bricks. We even got the name klipgoeiers (stone throwers). And we had 
learnt that from playing softball and baseball games. So, we never practiced softball or baseball, 
because we had no money to buy equipment”.  
 
Gradually the gang began acquiring guns by disarming the police. Molai remembers their fight 
with the police where they managed to capture a gun from one of the senior and the most feared 
policemen in Kroonstad. In his words  “They (police) came to arrest African beer sellers as 
usual, and that’s where the fight started. We started to stop the police. We overpowered them. 
One of them who was well known “Optel” - Mr. Van der Westhuyssen - we even took his 
pistol”. The gang used these guns to fight the police.  
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In 1955 all the members of the gang had stopped attending school. They were now focused on 
their gang activities. They began to stamp their authority in the location. They dictated to the 
members of the community what they could do and not do.
487
 According to Molai,   
  
If we said there would be no train going to Heunningspruit for picnics in Easter,  
September long-weekends, new year, we meant no train. Our word was final.  
There would be no train. If they convinced us to allow the train to go to Heunning- 
spruit, we would also ride the train. But on arriving there, we would make the  
situation tense. So, there used to be no picnics and entertainment, because we  
stopped them. Because the community of Maokeng didn’t show any interest in  
what we were doing  
 
And those who refused to adhere to the gang’s rules were punished. He continues 
  
But we didn’t victimise the community around the location, but also we didn’t  
want to be provoked. Because that was when we showed them what we were made  
of, if we were provoked. We didn’t mind carrying a person and lifting him up high in  
the air and then threw him onto the tarred road and leave him there. He would have to 
figure out for himself what is it that he did to deserve such a punishment 
 
The gang’s activities affected the community in more than one way. Youngsters in the locations 
were forced to join gangs to defend themselves. The junior ‘Green-Whites’ and the junior 
Spoilers – a rival gang – were formed and they fought each other. Matsepe remembers 
  
So we in ‘A’ Location had to transverse all the way to school to get up there. And  
this is the time when there were gangs. But gangs not in the sense of murdering,  
killings and muggings. You had to belong to a particular group. We were the  
younger generation of Ma-Green-White [Gang], because the gang’s name was  
‘Green-White’. And there were the Spoilers … But these were gangs to which you  
both belonged and fought. You know that sort of thing. It was not gangsters as  
you understand them. Shall we say groupings then?
488
  
 
The ‘Green-White’s’ activities reached even town. To avoid being harassed by police for passes, 
demonstrating that they were employed, members of the Green-White harassed whites in town, 
demanding, amongst others, stamps proving that they were employed. Molai remarks 
 
                                                          
487
 This seems to have been a common pattern among gangs. Bonner and Nieftagodien note that the Spoilers 
Gang, initially, robbed whites in town. But in 1951 changed and robbed everyone, including township residents. 
Bonner and Nieftagodien Alexandra, p.116  
488
 Interview with Matsepe (STHP) 
100 
 
That Cross Street in town, we used to go from shop to shop and do as we pleased, and  
the shopkeeper must just shut up. If he attempted to run to the phone, he would find one 
of us sitting on the desk where the phone was. The police also used to collect loafers; 
those people who weren’t working and throw them in the van. Our gang members used to 
collect all these rubber stamps from shops and we would stamp our ID’s [Pass/Reference 
Book] to pretend as if we were employed. And when they wanted some Reference 
[Book] and asked us Waar werk jy? (Where do you work?) They would find a lot of 
stamps on our ID’s: those from Dixies Trading Store, Ellerines, Ackermans, what, what. 
And after seeing the stamps on our ID’s, they would leave. Otherwise we would become 
angry with them for being nosey
489
 
 
Supporting Molai, Tebello “Blackie” Tumisi explains that the ‘Green-White’ refused to look for 
work as stipulated in the law. He remarks 
 There were these guys called the ‘Green-White’. There were gangs, the Spoilers,  
eh, the Caspers, and things like that.  But the ‘Green White’ was the strongest  
one. It was the most feared gang around here. There was this thug gang of Bra  
Saki (probably Skapie). The ‘Green White’ used to play softball and lifted weights.  
We finished (primary school) in 1959, and some of them finished earlier, and others  
were already at high school. People used to go to the Pass Office. But because they  
were a gang they decided that they won’t go there490   
 
Just like other gangs in different areas, the ‘Green-White’ gang was finally smashed.491 But 
before this, Molai claims, with a tinge of disappointment, that they were approached by the 
leaders of the ANC in Kroonstad to assist them in engaging in acts of sabotage on behalf of the 
organisation. Molai is unable to provide evidence in support of this claim.  
It is not clear why the leadership of the ANC in Kroonstad approached a gang for assistance. The 
possible explanation could be that the leadership of the ANC in Kroonstad had over a period of 
time observed that the ‘Green-Whites’ were fearless and harbouring anger towards the white 
government. What is apparent is that the members of the ‘Green-White ‘did not join the ANC, 
but were prepared to assist the ANC for payment. Explaining how the ANC leadership in 
Kroonstad solicited their assistance, Molai remarked 
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Even today, eh, it pains us because none of us are recognised by the ANC when we 
suffered so long; fighting the apartheid regime. Let me say a friend to Mr. Mandela,  
Mr. Boy Mofokeng used to go to the same school with Mr. Mandela, and Boy’s brother 
was our boss. So, he’s the one who told the old man about us and told him that we were 
good boys and that they could work with us, because they were looking for people like 
us. Then they came to us, Zula Thloloe and Bra Biza, whose surname I can’t recall, to 
have a caucus meeting. Bra Biza was one of the bus conductors in Kroonstad. They 
recruited us to the party. But then we asked ourselves what would happen to our own 
name, if we joined the party? We didn’t have the ANC membership cards. We only 
joined the struggle to oppos[e] the then government. By that time the ANC was very 
angry and said “We want to show these people that we will kill. We are not playing.” 
And we told them they must pay us to do the job and we would do the job. They assured 
us the ANC would pay us. We said ‘No. Cash in hand’. They used to order us to burn 
those petrol tanks situated there at Industria. Bear in mind that means to burn the whole 
town
492
 
 
It does not seem that the gang and the ANC went ahead with the planned mission. Not long the 
gang was destroyed. 
 
After this unsuccessful attempt by the ANC in Kroonstad to operate underground, the PAC 
followed and attempted to gain a political foothold in Kroonstad. Clear ideological differences 
emerged within the ANC following the formation of the ANCYL. On the one hand there was a 
distinct ‘Africanist’ group led by men such as Potlako Kitchener Leballo and Josia Madzunya,493 
which distrusted and abhorred the leading role played by the Communists and other white 
liberals in the African liberation struggle. They believed that this struggle should be organised 
and led by Africans themselves. The other group, in contrast, was rapidly shifting towards a 
multi-racial politics. It was willing to accommodate and form partnerships with the Communists 
and other non-African organisations in the fight for liberation. The tension reached its climax 
when the ANC invited the SAIC, Congress of Democrats (COD), a white liberal Party, and the 
South African Coloured People’s Organisation (SACPO) to form a Congress Alliance. The 
‘Africanist’ wing within the ANC criticised this move, resulting in its leading figures being 
expelled from the ANC. In 1955 the Congress Alliance adopted the Freedom Charter in 
Kliptown, outside Soweto, in Johannesburg. The Freedom Charter was touted as the principled 
document for a non-racial and inclusive South Africa. The ‘Africanist’ denounced it as a 
Communist-inspired document. But most importantly, the ‘Africanist’ rejected it because of the 
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controversial preamble which read: “South Africa Shall Belong to All Who Live in It”.494  Simon 
Ramogale, who joined the PAC in the 1960s and was incarcerated on Robben Island for its 
activities between 1963 and 1966, recalls that the PAC’s main rejection of the Freedom Charter 
was based on the argument that the land cannot belong to everyone; it belonged to Africans. In 
an interview, he explained 
 
The word ‘Charterist’ was from the PAC group using it as derogatory term for  
those people who were agreeing to the principles of the Freedom Charter.  We  
used to say the land cannot belong to all who live in it; the land must belong to 
somebody. And then we had some other leaders within the PAC who said ‘South  
Africa is not a prostitute that belongs to everybody who live in it. I mean, a prostitute 
belongs to everybody who’s got money.  And that influence … went down to the youth 
…495 
In 1958 the ‘Africanist’ group within the ANC, including those who had been expelled, broke 
ties with the ANC. And in April 1959 this group constituted itself as the PAC, and elected 
Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe as president. 
 
According to Lodge “in December 1959 both the ANC and PAC announced their plans for a 
campaign against the pass laws. The ANC ... proposed the 31 March. The PAC, on the other 
hand, decided to call for its campaign 10 days earlier.
496
 It had planned to mobilise the masses to 
leave their passes at home and hand themselves over for arrest at the nearest police stations. Just 
before the PAC’s demonstrations against the passes on 21 March 1960 meetings were held in 
Kroonstad by some PAC leadership, notably Nyakane Tsolo, to organise and recruit the 
people.
497
 According to Lodge, Tsolo was the secretary for the Sharpeville PAC branch.
498
 
Godfrey Oliphant places Tsolo at the centre of the brawl that took place between the whites and 
police, on the one hand, and some members of the black community in Kroonstad. But, first, 
according to him it was teacher Ndamse who stirred the situation. He recalls 
 
It was in 1959 in Kroonstad. Can you imagine? We used to have teacher Ndamse. He  
just came back from America and he passionately spoke about the attitude of the   
whites. Because remember now we get handled by whites, even our entertainment. He  
passionately expressed his disappointment by the whites. We were a crowd there outside  
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the theatre ... He came [and went] to the whites and said ‘guys, what is happening? You 
are treating us like children’. Now remember the whites had the backing of the police. 
When they started shooting, I remained behind because one of my neighbours got shot 
not dead. [His name] is Tanta. And [Amon] Mahomane and my brother Botiki got 
involved and they were arrested
499
 
 
It is possible that while in America Ndamse was influenced by the stance black people in 
America took against whites who were racist. In 1955, for example, Rosa Parks, the secretary of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) Montgomery 
chapter, refused to move from her seat in the bus to make way for a white male passenger. She 
was arrested. The black people in Montgomery, led by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., 
mobilised and boycotted the buses until the Montgomery City Liner bus company and the State 
of Alabama had ceased to enforce the policy of segregation in the buses.
500
   
Godfrey Oliphant believes that the above incident was as a result of the influence of the members 
of the PAC. He explains 
 
In fact, they were mentioning it was the PAC which brought that, because there  
 were guys who came in from Vereeniging. One of them was Mr Nyakane [Tsolo], 
 who put [made] people to realise that they were being harassed by whites. So that 
 feeling has been going around ... Mr Nyakane was the secretary of those guys from 
 Vereeniging. Yes, they were mentioning at the time it was going to be an eruption of 
 Robert Sobukwe, and that we must prepare ourselves, you know. [The] essential  
 story – the pass. They used to go house-to-house, yes. And I was involved with him, 
 because he was the brother in-law of one of [our] guys. Mr Nyakane was very good... 
 in Sesotho-speaking     
 
Due to lack of evidence, it is not clear when the residents of Kroonstad black locations took to 
the streets protesting against the passes, and if this protest was a result of Nyakane’s visit. 
However, what is apparent is that some time in 1960 there were demonstrations in the locations, 
which resulted in some people being arrested.  Mike “Baba” Jordan, who in 1960 was one of the 
people detained in Kroonstad remembers that, in addition to being labelled a klipgoeier (stone 
thrower) by the police, he was also charged for burning passes. He explains 
 In 1960 I was 17 going for 18. I was on my way to school but I had to run back 
 home because youngsters were ... spreading the information that if you are seen 
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 wearing a pair of jeans, which was called in those years ... bogat, without any 
 question they will load you on a police truck as a troublemaker who is busy burning 
 reference books. So my running back home didn’t help me because the whole  
 township, the Old Location ..., was surrounded by police and soldiers. I was taken  
 out of the backyard of my grandmother ... Although I never had any bundle  of  
 dompasses in my hand to burn. I was just loaded
501
 
 
Jordan spent three days at the Klipkraal Prison in town and was released after his uncle paid a 
fine for him.
502
   
 
The police’s harsh response - arresting and shooting people - did not immediately suppress the 
PAC’s influence in Kroonstad. It would seem already by this time there were some people in 
Kroonstad who were actively working with the PAC, or had joined it. John Motsiri Coangae was 
of these. Coangae was born in Kroonstad in 1940. After completing his Standard Six at Bantu High, he 
proceeded to do his high school studies at Moroka Mission Institution, in Thaba ‘Nchu, in 1957. It was at 
this school that he first became involved in protest politics – and this was over food.  He recalls   
 
We only fought for food once. We only had meat twice a week: on Wednesdays and on  
Sundays. But there were days ... Dr James Moroka, who lived not far from the school,  
used to give us some fruits and would also sometimes donate a cow and we would have  
meat for more days. For samp we had to bring something like curried fat to eat with or  
else you would have it as it was, without salt. The people who organized that strike were 
influenced by students from other schools because other schools were on strike, except for 
Moroka. As we were chatting that night … about what we would say the following day  the  
strike was about … And then the question again was … were we going to say the strike was  
about the kind of food we were fed or that the food was too little. There was no answer …  
They turned against us, saying we the senior students talked too much, referring to the Form  
4s and 5s. Then they started chanting shosholoza (a song about a steam train). We marched to  
the great hall and things were burned. That is where those who spoke English well and were 
 debating were made leaders, and I was one of them … with people like Ike Magashule from 
 Gauteng and Sipho Koekoe. We were arrested and accused of causing the strike. That’s when  
I left school. The punishment I got was that I couldn’t attend any school in South Africa. I was  
In Form 5
503
 
 
To join the PAC, Coangae claims to have been influenced by Peter Molotsi “who was attending 
school here (at Bantu High).
504
 Molotsi was part of the group that broke away from the ANC to 
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form the PAC in 1959. It is possible that Molotsi when he visited his hometown, before he left 
the country to go into exile on 20 March 1960, met Coangae and his colleagues and influenced 
them. But another way in which Coangae and his friends began to know about the PAC was from 
newspapers. Coangae explains “we used to read New Age. PAC was formed during that time 
then we realised that the ANC was of no use to us ...”505  
 
 
Robert Sobukwe, Potlako Leballo, Jacob Nyaose and Peter Molotsi  
(Source: A2945/A.2, Gerhart Photographs, WHLP) 
 
After the Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960, where 69 people were shot and killed and “at 
least 54 wounded”506, mass detentions of the PAC leaders and supporters, and subsequently the 
banning of the PAC, the latter was to be revived in exile, particularly in Basotholand. Potlako 
Kitchener Leballo played an instrumental role in this regard. After he was released from prison 
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(he was detained for leading the anti-pass campaign) and receiving a banning order confining 
him to a remote area of Natal, Leballo, who was born in Basotholand, successfully appealed to 
the South African government and was granted permission to leave the country on an exit 
permit.
507He arrived in Maseru, Basotholand, in August 1962. Arianna Lissoni writes “By late 
1962, the Presidential Council (under Leballo) had firmly established itself in Maseru, from 
where it set out on a vigorous campaign to regroup and build the PAC in South Africa”.508 Using 
couriers to communicate with members of the PAC in South Africa, the PAC leadership in 
Maseru summoned the branch leaders to Maseru in December 1962 and again in February and 
March 1963. “They were told”, writes Lissoni, “to step up recruitment, with each branch having 
to enlist a target number of 1 000 members”.509 Testifying in the case against Isaac Mthimunye 
and others, PAC members in Pretoria, Keseth Spolani Mdluli/Mofokeng, who it later turned out 
that he was a police informer and the chairman of the Vaal branch of the PAC, recalled Leballo 
addressing the 1962 meeting with a revolver in his right hand 
 
Gxobose and PK Leballo addressed this meeting as the leaders of the PAC Gxobose 
first introduced Leballo to all the people who were in the meeting. Mr Leballo stood 
up and unloaded the revolver and put it on the table. ... He warned us. He said we now 
have to take an oath; we had to swear. We held our hand up ... and the we swore that 
we accept death penalty, should we be found guilty by the PAC, or its members of  
giving out information to press, to police ... Leballo continued to warn us that we are 
going to war ... Leballo also told us to g back to our branches and recruit for the  
organisation. He repeatedly made mention that he wanted every branch to have 1000 
men by the year 1963
510
 
 
Responding to this directive, Coangae and friends established a cell in Kroonstad. This cell, 
Congae recalls was made up of Kuli Molaba, Bomba Sesele, Kunki Borman, Setebele (could not 
remember his name), and himself.
511
 The cell embarked on a recruitment campaign. According 
to Coangae, “during that time it was only to recruit membership”.512 However, the cell, or at least 
Coangae, developed networks with some members of the PAC in Lesotho and this proved fatal. 
He remembers: We went to play football in Maseru against Matlama. When we were there I took 
people around, because I already knew Maseru because my father worked there before; and we 
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also used to visit there with school. So I had contacts there. One of my contacts was Sqwebu, 
from a camp in Maseru”.513     
 
Before long the police uncovered the cell’s activity. This was after the letter that Congae had 
written to his contacts in Maseru informing them about their progress had been intercepted. He 
recalls 
 
 Now the police intercepted the letter and replied to me and stamped it as if it was  
 from that guy. And they put it in the postbox and told the owner of the firm (where  
 he was working) to send me to fetch the letter. They had been following me all the  
 time, without me knowing. In the letter I was just telling them about the progress  
 here
514
  
 
The situation came to a head when after reading the intercepted letter, which ordered him to meet 
his contacts from Lesotho at the train station en-route to Johannesburg. Coangae takes up the 
story 
 One day in 1963, it was Easter Monday, Goodhope [Football Club] had finished playing  
against Transvaal Jumpers for the premiership. After the match I left the ground. But 
 when I arrived there I was arrested. I spent three years on Robben Island
515
 
 
Brown Bavusile Maaba notes that “by June 1963, about 3 246 PAC members had been arrested 
nationally ...”516 The arrest and incarceration of Coangae was the final blow for the PAC’s 
politics in Kroonstad, which also marked the end of black political activism there – albeit 
temporarily. The government’s response had cowed many people. Following his release from 
Robben Island, Coangae stayed clear of politics, because nobody wanted to be associated with 
him. Instead he focused on football. He explains “I carried on playing football, because then 
people were afraid of whoever was from Robben Island. My old friends distanced themselves 
from me. It wasn’t nice at all. I had to keep myself busy with something else.517 However, in the 
early 1980s Coangae was to return to politics but this time he focused his energy on the 
government-created councils politics (see chapter four). 
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John Coangae, former Kroonstad’s football administrator 
(Source:Post, 20 November 1977) 
 
This became a national phenomenon. Ex-Robben Island prisoners in other areas also went 
through this sad phase. Simon Ramogale, who was arrested in 1963 and sentenced to six years on 
Robben Island for the PAC activities in Thembisa and Pretoria, remembers that when he returned 
to Thembisa Township the residents, including some of his family members, ignored him. He 
explains 
 
Like I said that was the time when people were scared. When I came back from  
prison there were few people who were actually prepared to talk to me. That  
was the height of the security police. They would come to you – we’ve learnt  
about that now – and say ‘that is a communist, you keep an eye on him’. You  
can’t say, ‘no’, because if you say no then you are a target. So only a few people  
came to me and said ‘Ramogale, tell us man, what’s wrong? These guys say  
we must keep an eye on you. What is it that you did?’ Then I would tell them the  
story. I mean my neighbours were approached by the security police and told to  
‘keep an eye on me’ and they should give them a report. My uncle, who was a priest,  
109 
 
was scared of staying with me
518
 
 
The period after the Sharpeville massacre was characterised by secrecy, because a feeling of 
distrust had developed amongst the people. Matsepe recalls “It was only selected people who 
remained focused in saying that in order that these things must continue to happen, you had to be 
secretive about it. Even the word underground did not exist then. In all instances it was ‘do not 
talk’ because it could lead to trouble”.519 
 
The next chapter explores the different entry points the residents of Kroonstad’s black locations 
were (re)introduced to politics, following the repressive period of the 1960s. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the late 1950s to 1963 Kroonstad’s black politics were active – albeit briefly. First, women, 
ostensibly aligned to the African National Congress (ANC), mobilised other women in the 
township against the pass laws which had been extended to African women. This campaign was 
swiftly quelled following the detention of the leaders. And second, in 1960 the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) launched its Anti-Pass campaign. In Kroonstad, as elsewhere, Africans 
participated. Scores were later arrested and fined. The PAC was banned inside the country. It 
was revived in exile in Basotholand, where it took a resolution to establish internal structures in 
South Africa. In Kroonstad members of the PAC formed cells and began to recruit members. 
Again, this attempt was thwarted by the state when the key contact between the PAC in exile and 
the internal structure in Kroonstad was arrested and imprisoned. Before these two incidents, 
Kroonstad’s black politics were quiescent and tranquil. The ANC’s late appearance and its 
inactivity until the early 1950s, and the absence of radical bodies such as the Communist Party of 
South Africa, left a political void which was filled by other bodies.   
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that Kroonstad’s black politics between the period 
1934 (the demise of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union) and the mid-1950s were 
influenced and shaped by the leading role of bodies such as the Native Administration Board 
(NAB), the Joint Council for Europeans and Natives (JCEN), Orange Free State African 
Teachers Association (OFSATA), and the Society of Young Africa (SOYA). These bodies, I 
argue, were not concerned about mass mobilisation and protests. 
The NAB was created to bridge the growing schism between Africans living in the urban areas 
and the white local authorities in various black residential areas. It had no real power to make or 
influence decisions taken by the Town Councils. This caused the NAB to be loathed in the 
locations. An the fact that some of the advice the NAB got to the white local authorities were 
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rejected left an impression in the residents that the NAB had no powers to advance their 
interests. Although individual members of the community criticised and called for the 
resignation of the NAB, the community of Kroonstad’s black locations did not take action 
against them. This was because some of the respected residents in the black locations, the 
teachers, served in the NAB. This gave some of the residents some hope that the “educated” 
people in the community, given enough space and support, would be able to advance their 
interests. But this was not to be. 
At almost the same time as the NAB was functioning, the JCEN was established in Kroonstad. 
The JCEN’s objective was to promote co-operation between Europeans and Natives, and to 
investigate and promote matters relating to welfare of the Natives, and to represent Native 
problem of trading rights to the government. The JCEN’s role helped to stabilise the situation in 
the locations, and to stifle the resentment towards the government by the black members of the 
community who were denied equal opportunities as whites to trade in their residential 
settlements. Instead of mobilising and protesting black people placed their trust in the JCEN to 
represent their interests. However, in mid-1930s there were cracks showing in the JCEN. Black 
members of the JCEN resented the feeling that their white counterparts were controlling them 
and telling them what to do.  On the other hand, the white members of the JCEN strongly felt 
that they it was their duty to remind black people of their place in society. In the early 1940s the 
JCEN in Kroonstad had stopped to function. 
OFSATA took the leading role in organising in Kroonstad – but it only organised a particular 
constituency: teachers. It fought against the terrible working conditions and low payment of 
teachers. OFSATA’s focus on teachers limited its scope of organising and mobilising. After 
some its grievances were met, OFSATA’s militancy faded. In the 1950s when the government 
introduced Bantu Education, in Kroonstad the branch of OFSATA did not resist. This was 
because the leadership of OFSATA at this stage did not concern itself with the politics of 
resisting the government. OFSATA continued to function but its influence had diminished, even 
amongst the young and politically conscientised teachers who came from the recently established 
university colleges for blacks. 
When the Congress Alliance, led by the ANC, launched the Defiance Campaign, in Kroonstad it 
was quiet. Instead at this stage another body was formed, the SOYA.  The latter’s politics were 
embedded in the politics of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM). Again membership 
was mainly made up of teachers. Hence it has been described as “...  enjoy[ing] a certain vogue 
in the early 1950s amongst the young and usually well educated men and women who attended 
its discussion groups.
520
 SOYA was opposed the Defiance Campaign, because its members 
believed that it was suicidal to expose the masses in such a campaign which the state would 
brutally suppress. Instead, S OYA believed that the masses needed to be ‘educated’ first 
politically and thereafter they could be mobilised and engage in protest actions. Some of the 
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members of SOYA in Kroonstad became disillusioned with the inactive role of SOYA and 
discussions. Some of the members of SOYA found employment on the surrounding farms and 
left Kroonstad. SOYA also ceased to function.    
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CHAPTER THREE  
Kroonstad: Post-Sharpeville era, early 1960s to 1979 
Introduction 
After the Sharpeville massacre, on 30 March 1960 the government declared the state of 
emergency which resulted in mass arrests.
521
 The following month on the 8
th
, under the Unlawful 
Organisations Act No.34 of the same year, the government banned the ANC and PAC, breaking 
the back of black political resistance in the country. Some political activists were forced to 
operate underground, and many more fled the country into exile, where they joined Umkhonto 
we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation), the ANC’s military wing, and the PAC’s POQO, later 
renamed the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA). This turn of events caused the National 
Party (NP) government to believe that it had normalised the political situation in the country. 
This was further enhanced by the economic boom that followed. But in reality the political 
situation was farther from normal.
522
  
This chapter explores the different entry points through which the residents of Kroonstad’s black 
residential areas were introduced to politics, following the repressive period of the 1960s. I argue 
that it was through the Black Consciousness (BC)-oriented South African Student Organisation 
(SASO), the BC-influenced teachers, the Maokeng Student Art Club (MASAC), also BC-
aligned; and the Christian-oriented Young Christian Workers (YCW), which is almost totally 
neglected in the literature.
523
 Finally, it was through the BCM activist banished to Kroonstad. 
These played a crucial role in politicising the residents, especially students and young people in 
Maokeng and Brentpark. However, most significantly in Maokeng, unlike many other areas, 
many of the students and young people who were introduced to politics either through the BC 
inclined organisations or the Christian-oriented institutions in the 1970s did not continue their 
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involvement in politics of resistance in the 1980s, at least not in Maokeng. Most of them avoided 
politics or left Maokeng and carried on with politics elsewhere. This helps partially to explain the 
reason Maokeng lagged behind politically in the 1980s (this issue is discussed fully in chapter 
five).  
Two significant issues are raised in this chapter. First, it is the neglected issue of the spread of 
the 1976 student revolt outside of the Witwatersrand and other big cities like Cape Town and the 
Eastern Cape.
524
 An attempt has been made to demonstrate the factors which caused the spread 
of the student revolt to some of the small towns in the Orange Free State, particularly in the 
northern Orange Free State. And second, Maokeng, in relation to student and youth 
politicisation, offers a fascinating local study which is at least partly reproduced elsewhere.  
The ‘lull’ period 
To effectively restrain black political resistance, the NP government enacted a barrage of laws, 
according to Madeleine Fullard “… to constrain both organizations and individuals during the 
1960s.”525 She lists seven laws which the government passed between 1960 and 1967. These 
were: firstly the Unlawful Organisations Act, mentioned above. “Throughout the 1960s”, Fullard 
notes, “the membership of an illegal organization would be the most common charge faced by 
thousands of ordinary members and supporters of the two organizations”.526 In 1961, the General 
Law Amendment Act, No.39, was enacted. It criminalized the organization of prohibited 
gatherings and created a presumption of guilt regarding intimidation charges”.527 This was 
followed by the General Law Amendment Act, No.76 (or the ‘Sabotage Act’) of 1962, which 
made sabotage an offence, “for which the penalties were the same as for treason, including death 
penalty”.528 In the following year the government enacted the General Law Amendment Act, 
No.37, commonly termed ‘Ninety Day Law’. This authorised the detention of any person 
suspected of a political crime for a period of 90 days without access to a lawyer. According to 
Fullard “within the first eight months of the Act being enforced, 682 persons were detained”.529  
The remaining three laws included a Law which prohibited and penalized undergoing military 
training. The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, No.96 – replacing the ‘Ninety Day Law,’ 
which doubled the period of detention to 180 days. “By 1968, Fullard writes, “almost 400 people 
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had been detained under this law”.530And finally, the Terrorism Act of 1967. It was built upon 
the provisions of the Sabotage Act and the detention laws. It authorized detention without trial 
for an indefinite period.
531
 These laws, as could be expected, cowed many people. Tsiu Vincent 
Matsepe, who in 1967 was 19 years old, recalls that in the 1960s he was attending clandestine 
political meetings in Maokeng, and because of repression some of the people he interacted with 
in these meetings suddenly disappeared. He explains 
 
 … With regard to meetings which were held one cannot see them as formal meetings  
in the sense that you would say agendas are being sent out and so on. It was occasions 
that you find yourself in, which [we]re in essence gatherings which were brought about 
without your knowledge … Such gatherings became fewer the more the repression there 
was and the more people [we]re afraid, and the more people [we]re suspicious of each 
other. And at the time there were those who would suddenly not be there in your midst … 
I remember Zula Tlholoe ... who must have also left the country during about that time 
and went into exile. We knew as children that he was one of the people who had left 
because of having to join the liberation struggle. It was not even called the liberation. It 
was ‘I’m going to join the struggle against oppression’532 
 
The government’s draconian steps were further complemented by the economic boom of the 
1960s. During this period many black people found employment and their focus shifted from 
politics to eking out a living.   
At the close of the 1960s, a significant number of the residents of Kroonstad’s black locations 
were employed. Setiloane writes “while in the 1930s and 1940s job opportunities were scarce 
and those Maokeng residents who were not teachers, ministers of churches or traders could only 
find employment at the railways, on roads, the milling company, in doing menial jobs in the 
white suburbs, in shops, and on the neighbouring farms”.533 However by the 1960s, Setiloane 
adds, “Kroonstad town had grown tremendously. There were more shops, more garages, more 
restaurants, more hotels and more suburbs”.534 In addition, he notes, “factories which were non-
existent in the 1930s and 1940s had now sprung up. Job opportunities were numerous. People 
could also find employment in the police force, the prison department and at the municipal 
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offices”.535 According to the Braby’s Directory, between 1950 and 1951 about 85 trades and 
professions were practised in Kroonstad.
536
 In the 1960s, these must have doubled as a result of 
the economic boom.  
According to Bonner and Nieftagodien “the 1960s saw the biggest economic boom South Africa 
had ever known. Huge amounts of foreign investment flooded into the country propelling an 
annual rate of economic growth of 9.3%.”537 Bonner and Segal, in their study of Soweto, write 
“Companies such as Ford, Volkswagen, Colgate and Gillette either invested directly in South 
Africa for the fist time or massively expanded the scale of their operations. Cash registers 
jingled: boom time had arrived”.538  For Bonner and Segal, this precipitated the growth in wage 
earners per family. According to them these increased from 1.3 to 2.2 between 1956 and 1968.
539
 
Likewise for Jonathan Hyslop “the 1960s saw phenomenal increases in employment. In 
manufacturing, the number of employees of all races soared from 653 000 in 1960 to 1 069 000 
in 1970”.540  
The economic boom contributed to the deadening political activity in Kroonstad’s black 
locations. People turned their attention to finding employment in order to better their lives and 
their families. Not even the teachers at Bodibeng High School in the 1960s dared to venture into 
politics, excluding the exceptional few.
541
 Marobo Jacob Ramotsoela, who was born in 1947 on a 
farm in Heuningspruit, completed his matric at Bodibeng High in 1969 and started teaching in 
1972 as an assistant teacher, compares the way they were taught in the 1960s to the method he 
used to teach in the 1970s. He claims that in the 1970s he sometimes discussed politics with his 
students when he was teaching and this was something unheard of in the 1960s. He remarks 
 I can do a little bit of comparison. It was a bit different from the way I was teaching, 
 because when I started teaching I was conscientised. I knew that our kids needed the 
 type of education I could give; not only education as far as a subject matter was  
 concerned, but generally. I needed to tell them about politics. I used to tell them  
about the apartheid situation. Whereas, with us teaching was rote learning: you do 
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Mathematics, you move out. Another teacher comes in. He does Woodwork with you  
and then out. That type of thing. They could not say a single word about [Dr Hendrik] 
Verwoerd or Bantu Education
542
 
 
Similarly, Tsiu (Oupa) Matsepe, who also completed his matric in 1969 at Bodibeng High, 
recalls that his parents Dorrington and Violet Matsepe, both teachers, were also wary of politics 
to the extent of trying to discourage him from studying law. He remembers “even the thought of 
studying law for me was like “No, no, no, o tla tsoarwa (you’ll be arrested) just like [Nelson] 
Mandela. You must concentrate on education only”.543 Echoing Matsepe, Mpopetsi Dhlamini 
remembers that Dorrington Matsepe, who also dabbled in football administration, reprimanded 
him for involving himself in political activities. He explains  
There was a guy called Makoba Moleme from Bloemfontein. This guy, I remember  
in 1969, he conscientised us to form branches of the ANC. I was with Sampie Mohohlo. 
But this was short lived, because I don’t know how these people knew that this guy was 
here. The Special Branch took us away. Now with me … because I was a man of football, 
these elderly people like [Dorrington] Matsepe were like “How come you involve 
yourself with all those things? You are such a young good boy. Forget about those things. 
This guy from Bloemfontein comes with nonsense here
544
   
 
The attempt by Moleme, Dhlamini and Mohohlo to form the branch of the ANC in Kroonstad 
during this period deserves some explanation. It is likely that Moleme recruited Dhlamini and 
Mohohlo to form a cell (or an underground unit) and not a branch of the ANC – a point Dhlamini 
acknowledges.
545
 An aboveground branch could have easily drawn the attention of members of 
the Security Branch (SB). During this period ANC members preferred to operate underground to 
conceal their activities.
546
 This was after the security police had, initially, swooped on the ANC 
and MK activists in 1964 and 1965,
547
 and again in May and June 1969. Writing about the 
second wave of arrests, Houston notes “A coordinated countrywide swoop began in the early 
hours of 12 May, and continued for almost two months, with activists and relatives of 
imprisoned political leaders being picked up in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Cape 
Town, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Cradock and other small towns”.548 Although this swoop does 
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not seem to have hit parts of the Orange Free State, particularly Bloemfontein, activists there 
would have read about it in the national newspapers such as The World.
549
 Therefore, they would 
have been very cautious not to expose themselves. 
 
Dhlamini recalls that his friendship to Moleme dates back to 1952 when he was sent to 
Bloemfontein to study there. Four years later Dhlamini returned to Kroonstad, and the two 
friends were to meet again in 1965 when Dhlamini visited Bloemfontein. When they met they 
rekindled their friendship. This was further strengthened by Moleme’s interests in Dhlamini’s 
cousin, Deliwe, who was training to become a nurse at Pelonomi Hospital, in Bloemfontein. 
Dhlamini claims that at this stage Moleme already had established contacts with members of the 
ANC in Lesotho through his gambling trips to Lesotho
550
. According to Gregory Houston and 
Bernard Magubane, “the ANC had an unofficial presence in Lesotho from the early 1960s. 
Among the most prominent people based in Maseru at the time were Joe Matthews, Robert ‘Bob’ 
Matji, and Ezra Sigwela”.551 It is not clear who Moleme’s direct contact in Lesotho was, but 
what is apparent is that at this stage the ANC in Lesotho, operating under difficult 
circumstances
552
, turned Lesotho into a base to influence developments inside South Africa.
553
 
Under these circumstances, it is possible that members of the ANC in Lesotho during this period 
sought South Africans visiting Lesotho, first, to gather information about the political situation in 
the country and, second, to pass information and literature to them about the ANC and the 
struggle. Recalling the state of mind Moleme and his friends were in when he met them, 
Dhlamini had this to say 
 
 They interacted with political exiles and came back highly influenced by the ANC’s 
 liberation politics. And literature was the order of the day
554
 
 
Between 1965 and 1969 Moleme and Dhlamini kept communication lines open between them.
555
 
Feeling confident that he could trust Dhlamini, Moleme must have broached the idea of wanting 
to form an underground branch of the ANC to Dhlamini and requested him to identify potential 
and trustworthy members. Dhlamini recalls that Moleme arrived in Kroonstad and a meeting to 
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plan the establishment of the branch was held with other people in Sampie Mohohlo’s houses, in 
Seeisoville.
556
 Seemingly Dhlamini and his colleagues held a few more meetings after the first 
meeting. But before they could start implementing their plan, members of the SB in Kroonstad 
already had the information about their intentions. Dhlamini remembers 
 
 On the verge of establishing a branch, the Special Branch were on top of us. Besides  
 being visited by a certain ‘BOSS’ agent by the name of Captain Khoathela, I was taken  
to Adami House, Special Branch offices in Kroonstad, for interrogation. I denied any 
 involvement in underground politics, stating that our meetings were purely on YCW 
 teachings
557
 
 
Dhlamini believes that they were sold-out “… by some of our members”.558 It is difficult to 
confirm this claim without supporting evidence. But, as Tom Lodge observes “during the 1960s 
the police recruited an army of informers whose activities promoted a climate of fear and 
distrust, effectively paralyzing any political initiative amongst Africans”, it is plausible indeed 
that some of the people who sat in the planning meetings passed the information on to the 
security police.
559
 With Moleme back in Bloemfontein and Dhlamini now focusing his energy on 
the YCW, and later in 1972 leaving Kroonstad to attend at Tshiya Teachers’ Training College in 
Qwaqwa, any plans to form an underground structure in Maokeng diminished.    
 
It is not surprising that Moleme was instrumental in recruiting people in Kroonstad to form an 
underground branch of the ANC. In the 1960s Bloemfontein, unlike Kroonstad, had members of 
the ANC and MK.  “Far more important than others, according to Twala and Seekings was 
Caleb Motshabi, who had joined the ANC in 1949, and in 1955 participated in the Congress of 
the People in Kliptown where the Freedom Charter was adopted. In 1961 he became the 
commander of MK in the [Orange] Free State but was arrested in 1963 and jailed for 12 years on 
Robben Island.
560
 Again in 1969 an ANC underground cell formed by Albetina Sisulu and John 
Nkadimeng, both residents of Soweto, established contacts with ANC members in Natal, the 
[Orange] Free State and Western Cape by couriers.
561
 The main objective was to facilitate the 
formation of other cells in these areas, which would be “… involved in a range of activities, such 
as distributing ANC and SACP leaflets, recruit people to carry out this task and maintain 
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underground structures”.562It is possible that Moleme was one of the people who were recruited 
to the ANC in the OFS through his interaction with activists such as Motshabi and/or members 
of the ANC who were in contact with the couriers linked to Sisulu and Nkadimeng. It is also 
plausible that he was tasked to recruit members in other towns in the OFS. The unsuccessful 
attempt to establish the ANC branch in Kroonstad promoted docility in the black townships.  
 
The politically docile mood amongst certain black people seems to have been further entrenched 
by their improved earnings. It would seem that in the Witwatersrand and in other bigger urban 
towns elsewhere where new industries had been built African workers’ income improved. Of 
importance, during this period the Verwoerd government increased minimum wage paid to 
Africans …563 However, most significantly African workers’ wage improvement was caused by 
the promotion of some of the African workers from unskilled jobs to semi-skilled jobs – jobs 
previously reserved for whites.
564
 According to Owen Crankshaw, in his study of the changing 
relationship between racial and class divisions, “the period of unprecedented economic growth 
intensified the shortage of skilled white labour since the craft unions lacked the power to 
negotiate the improved conditions of employment that would draw in white apprentices”. “They 
were placed”, he adds, “under increasing pressure to concede the employment of Africans in 
skilled jobs …”565 As Crankshaw, however, also points out that, notwithstanding this 
“promotion”, African workers were employed “at much lower rates of pay”.566 Generally, the 
wage paid to the few African workers increased.  
 
However, in spite of the economic boom not everyone benefitted equally. Consequently, this was 
to have a political reawakening effect on the African masses. For African workers who continued 
doing unskilled jobs, their pay remained, according to Bonner and Nieftagodien “dismally 
low”.567 And judging by the available statistics there was a significant number of Africans 
employed as unskilled labourers. Deborah Posel, in her study of influx control, notes that “by 
1960 approximately 84% of the African workforce in manufacturing was unskilled.”568 It could 
be speculated here that the Free State and parts of the Transvaal possessed greater numbers of 
unskilled African workers. Crankshaw’s research on the history of the South African building 
industry demonstrates the unwillingness of whites in the Free State and Transvaal to agree to 
open up skilled trades to Africans, but instead preferred to have them reserved for whites. 
According to him, the Minister of Labour authorized the Industrial Tribunal to investigate the 
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feasibility of reserving the skilled trades for whites. Although this Tribunal found that there were 
deep divisions within the unions over the question of job reservation, it nonetheless made an 
important recommendation. In 1959 it recommended the reservation of all skilled work for 
whites in the Transvaal and OFS.
569
 
In a small town like Kroonstad African workers’ wages remained low. A superficial explanation 
would be the intransigent attitude of whites in the OFS, which kept African workers in unskilled 
jobs, with low pay. But of significance during this period is that Kroonstad does not seem to 
have developed into a fully industrial area. Instead, when going through the Braby’s OFS and 
Northern Cape Directory (1959), it is clear that most of Kroonstad’s businesses were service 
providers or suppliers, which did not require African workers with special trade or training.  
These included hotels, insurance companies, publishers and many more.
570
 The few 
manufacturing factories included the J.C.I., an engineering company dealing specifically with 
steel; and the Premier Milling Company, which manufactured bread and flour.
571
 The other 
manufacturing company in Kroonstad was Jeff and Company, a clothing factory, established 
around 1952.
572
 Those who were not employed in the manufacturing sector, found work in a 
number of sprawling businesses, especially those owned by the Jewish community in Kroonstad. 
For example, Mpopetsi Dhlamini and Motshabi Rakgajane worked for Cyril Scheamidt’s 
pharmacy from 1965 to 1971, and 1968 to 1969, respectively.
573
  Others worked for furniture 
stores. James Nanyaane remembers that in the 1960s he worked for the ABC Furniture store and 
thereafter the Wynburg Furnitures.
574
 
It was against this background that the low wages received by African workers in Kroonstad 
should be understood. For example, Anna Mampe Motshoeneng, who was born in Kroonstad in 
1950, was employed as a general worker at K.G.I. in 1969 and earned R2.50 per month.
575
 This 
is the category of workers that in the 1970s seriously felt the pinch of high cost of living. This 
was after their situation had worsened, following the economic decline caused by what Jeremy 
Seekings suggests was “... a combination of an international economic downswing following oil 
price rises and the chronic weaknesses specific to the South African economy.”576 The low 
wages and the rising inflation, which caused an increase in the average workers’ cost of living, 
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caused the lowly paid workers to strike in the early 1970s.
577
 According to Bonner and 
Nieftagodien “weekly wages in 1973 were still as low as R9.00 with semi-skilled labour 
receiving R12.00”.578  Hence when in 1970 the taxi operators in Kathorus proposed a fare 
increase from 10 cents to 15 cents a ride, residents became incensed to the point of threatening to 
change to using buses in spite of the inconvenience they would cost them.
579
 In 1973 workers in 
Durban and in the East Rand, an industrial hub in the Rand in the 1960s, went on strike over low 
pay.
580
   
 
The economic downswing also affected the black residents of Kroonstad. But for some like 
Leonard Butiboy Mafokosi, who in the 1980s became a leading figure in the council politics in 
Moakeng, their earnings increased. He explains   
 
I … started working at Smart Western (in 1976). Smart Western was a sister shop  
to Sales House …  I was earning R22 per month. It was quite good money. I  
[then] worked at Jeff & Co. It was a clothing company. … I worked for about  
three months [and] my payment was R14 a week. After deductions I would get  
R12.83 cents
581
  
 
At Jeff and Co, Mafokosi earned more than R50 per month, double what he received at Smart 
Western. Although never enough, but the workers whose earnings had improved as Mafokosi’s 
had no reason to go on strike. This helps explain the low level of worker demonstrations in 
Kroonstad during this period. However, it was not all workers who were as content with their 
earnings as Mafokosi. Some of the lowly paid unskilled workers in Kroonstad felt the economic 
pinch. In 1977 the majority of black workers in Kroonstad are reported to have earned R50 or 
less “… for a hard month’s work”.582 It was for this reason that in 1979 workers at the Union 
Steam Bakery led by Dennis Bloem organised a strike, demanding improved wages (more about 
this below).
583
 It was only in 1980 that the management of the Bakery agreed to increase the 
workers’ wages.584 After this strike, it took another five years before the workers in Kroonstad 
mobilised and challenged their employers – only this time they were unionised. The chapter will 
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now turn to the entry points the residents of Kroonstad’s black residential areas used to enter into 
politics. 
 
‘Bantu’ Universities and Student Politicisation  
 
Most scholars have written about the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 and the 
effect it had on the education of black students.
585
 Others, like Clive Glaser, have demonstrated 
the role played by the ‘South African Student Organisation’s drop-outs’ in conscientising 
students in townships’ high and secondary schools.586 Most of the work on this organization and 
its influence on township politics have regrettably largely focused on major urban areas like the 
Rand, Western Cape, and Eastern Cape. Less work has been devoted to the history of this 
organization and the influence its members imparted in the Orange Free State, particularly in 
Maokeng, Kroonstad.
587
  
 
Following the enactment of the Extension of University Education Act five university colleges 
affiliated to the University of South Africa (UNISA) were established.
588
 These were the 
University of the North (better known as Turfloop University), which served the BaSotho, 
BaPedi, BaTswana, and VhaVenda, and VhaTsonga students; the University College of Zululand 
at Ngoye, in Natal, for the IsiZulu-speaking students. At the same time Coloured students were 
directed to the University of the Western Cape, in Bellville; and the University College in 
Durban was established for the Indian student.
589
 It was against this background that some of the 
students who had completed their matriculation at Bodibeng High School headed for Turfloop 
University. The first group in 1963 included students like John Taje, Shadrack Kgotlagomang 
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and Elias Rankoe.
590
 Taje remembers that when they went to Turfloop they had received strict 
instruction from the principal that after completing their studies, they must return to take up 
teaching positions at Bodibeng. He recalls  
 You must remember that at the time they didn’t have qualified teachers to run the  
 school. So after we passed matric, he (Setiloane) just told our parents that I would 
 be sending these boys to university. They will qualify as teachers and come back  
and help us get the school going
591
 
 
It was while at university that Taje and many other students were introduced to politics. Taje’s 
first observed political protests at Turfloop in 1969 when Harry Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu (a 
leading figure in SASO) and several other students were expelled for leading a solidarity protest, 
demanding the re-admission of the expelled students at Fort Hare.
592
 In 1968 Barney Pityana, 
Justice Moloto, and other students at Fort Hare requested the university to accord the University 
Christian Movement (UCM) recognition and university refused, about 500 students embarked on 
a non-violent strike. The university called in the police, seven students were arrested and 
convicted of malicious damage to property, and 22 others were kicked out as ring leaders.
593
 It is 
unlikely that Taje played any significant role in this protest. But such a stance by students 
encouraged him to join the UCM and become involved in student politics.  Mzamane, Maaba 
and Biko write “… various upheavals left students unsettled and irritated”594 – and pushed many, 
even those who were politically naïve, into the politics of resistance.  
 
Taje, more than his fellow students from Bodibeng High, was attracted to politics. He became 
exposed to the politics of the National Union of South African Student (NUSAS) and later the 
South African Student Organisation (SASO). However, he became devotedly involved in the 
University Christian Movement (UCM).  He remarks 
 
… I know that when we got there and all of a sudden now you are exposed to politics  
and so on. It was student politics at the time. You know, you’re complaining about  
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food. Later on NUSAS came … Now it started mobilizing. It was mostly fellows from 
Wits (University of the Witwatersrand), UNISA … Ultimately, these fellows, black 
fellows, also came: the SASO fellows. Ultimately, we decided as a student body that we 
were going to support SASO. Of course, we were still supporting NUSAS. I remember 
we used to have meetings and so on. Then there was the UCM. I was the chairman
595
 
 
The University Christian Movement (UCM) was formed in 1967, following the disbandment of 
the Student Christian Association (SCM) in 1965. Although it was a multi-racial movement, 
UCM attracted a majority of blacks. Describing it in 1972, members of the UCM said  
  
The formation of the University Christian Movement in 1967 gave black students a  
 greater chance of  coming together. Because of its more radical stance, and also  
because at that stage it had not developed a ‘bad’ complexion politically in the eyes  
of the black campus authorities. UCM tended to attract more black students to its 
conferences, and this opened channels of communications amongst the black  
students
596
 
 
Taje remembers that they used to discuss about apartheid. “How it affected us and what could be 
done about it? And how to contribute to student life politically …” “We’d [be] coming from 
Turfloop”, he continues, “and then spend a weekend … discussing these issues under the cloak 
that we were a religious group. Sometimes we’d go down to the Natal’s north coast.”597 
However, the religious cover up had only a limited shelf life. “The police”, Baruch Hirson notes, 
“kept the members under surveillance, halls of residence were raided periodically and leading 
members were held for interrogation”. “Attempts were made”, he adds, “by the authorities to 
discredit the organization, and in 1969 the UCM was banned on black campuses after only two 
years’ activity.”598 It was probably at this point that Taje decided to end his participation, which 
marked the end of his student political activism. At the end of 1969, armed with his Bachelor of 
Education (B.Ed) degree, he returned to Kroonstad to take up a teaching post at Bodibeng High. 
In 1970 he was appointed vice-principal of the school.
599
 He now focused his energy to the 
activities of OFSATA (Orange Free State African Teachers’ Association), which later earned 
him the position of Assistant Secretary of the association.
600
 There is no evidence to suggest that 
Taje made serious attempts to politicize students or any of the young people in Maokeng during 
this period. For him teaching his students was the primary objective. Besides, he noted in the 
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interview, that the principal of the school expected nothing from his staff but to teach. In his 
words 
 
 Well, we’ll just make them [students] aware of what was happening at the university 
 and what’s happening in the country generally. … I think they were positive. They  
did ask questions here and there. But at the time … Do you know what sort of a person 
 Setiloane was? He did not want nonsense. You just get into class and teach! But we also 
 did not want this thing to go out and let the police know that we were discussing politics 
 at school, because it was that time of the Special Branch. We just focused on the school 
 on education
601
   
 
Despite its banishment from black campuses, the UCM continued to exist until 1972 when it was 
finally disbanded. For Hirson, the reason for this can be found in the differences of opinion 
between black (largely also SASO members) and white members of the UCM. The former, 
according to him, began proposing literacy projects and were espousing the cause of Black 
Theology and this lay outside the orbit of the (white) founding members of the UCM (and many 
left the organization). By 1971, the polarization inside the organization was formalized when it 
was converted into a federation of projects, or ‘interest groups’. For Whites, Hirson notes, there 
were White Consciousness and Women’s Federation sections, for the Blacks, Black 
Consciousness and literacy projects.
602
 In 1972, Winkie Direko, the President of the UCM, 
formally announced the disbandment of the organizations. She explained 
 
 … the main reason [for disbanding] was the growth of Black Consciousness among  
the black members, and their consequent unwillingness to work within a multiracial 
organization. They no longer believed ‘that multi-racialism is a viable strategy to bring 
about real change
603
  
 
A year after the formation of the UCM another student formation had been established. This was 
the South African Students Organisation (SASO). The latter was formed in 1968 following 
disillusionment of some black students with NUSAS’ leadership.604 NUSAS had been formed in 
1924 in order to unite all the university students of South Africa. Following the proscription of 
the ANC and PAC in 1960, and a slump into inactivity of their student wings, the African 
Student Association (ASA)
605
 and African Student Union of South Africa (ASUSA), 
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respectively, black students were left with no alternative student bodies to join, except NUSAS. 
Lodge writes “in post-Sharpeville era the avowedly liberal NUSAS was one of the few 
remaining vehicles for multi-racial political activity”.606  
 
However, towards the end of the 1960s many black students became disenchanted with NUSAS 
leadership. They felt that the latter and the white members of NUSAS in general paid lip-service 
to the total destruction of the apartheid government, but also were content with the status quo 
because they benefited from it.
607
  
 
The decision to finally split from NUSAS and form SASO was taken at the UCM conference in 
July 1968 at Stutterheim.
608
 Amongst other things, SASO aimed to: 
 
1. To crystallize the needs and aspirations of the non-white students and to seek to make 
known their grievances 
2. To heighten the degree of contact not only amongst the non-white students but also 
amongst these and the rest of the South African student population, to make the non-
white students accepted on their own terms as an integral part of the South African 
student community; and  
3. To establish a solid identity amongst the non-white students and to ensure that these 
students are always treated with the dignity and respect they deserve
609
 
 
On the issue of the term ‘non-white’ as a description, members of SASO felt it was 
inappropriate. Thus they came up with the term ‘black’ to identify themselves. Testifying in the 
SASO/BPC (Black People’s Convention) trial, Steve Biko explained this issue as follows 
 
 Students took a decision that they would no longer use the term ‘non-white’, nor  
allow it to be used as a description of them, because they saw it as a negation of  
their being. They were being stated as non-something, which implied that the stan- 
dard was something and they were not that standard. They felt that a positive view  
of life commensurate with the build-up of one’s dignity and confidence should be 
contained in positive description, and they replaced the term ‘non-white’ with the  
term ‘black’610 
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This was based on the philosophy of Black Consciousness. Biko, who was elected the first 
president of SASO in July 1969, in a paper produced for the SASO leadership course, probably 
in December 1971, explained the BC philosophy as follows: “… Black Consciousness in essence 
…seeks to demonstrate the lie that black is an aberration from the ‘normal’ which is white”.611  
In short, what the BC philosophy strived to achieve was to instill pride in black people. It was 
against this background that SASO developed the slogan ‘I’m black and I’m proud’.  Saleem 
Badat, likewise, writes “The positive doctrine that SASO proclaimed itself to uphold was the 
concept of Black Consciousness, which was defined as an ‘attitude of mind, a way of life.”612  
 
It was during the formative years of SASO that the recently matriculated students at Bodibeng 
High were admitted to the ‘Bantu’ universities-colleges and their world-view was changed. 
When they arrived at Turfloop some of them joined SASO and began to engage in serious 
political discussions. They became adherents of the BC philosophy. Tsiu Matsepe remembers 
 
 Then [in] 1969 I matriculated and decided to go to university. By the time we were  
at the end of high school there was this wind blowing … The wind of black power 
 emerging in America and then the concept of Black Consciousness arises. At  
university if you talk ANC, you know there was going to be trouble. It spelled trouble  
for you to belong to the PAC. The one thing any informer could not do is to say you’re 
being political if you are talking about ‘blackness’. That is not a political concept; it is  
a cultural concept that says I am living out my ‘blackness’ to its fullness. And we would  
debate issues of black consciousness. And then life became exciting to me
613
   
 
Jacob Ramotsoela, too, studied at Turfloop during this period. He remembers that his political 
awareness developed when he started attending the SASO meetings at university. He explains: 
“these meetings politicized us. They used to discuss very important political issues like this thing 
of whites ruling [i.e. administering] the university”.614 Matsepe, also, claims that through the BC 
philosophy he became psychologically liberated and thus began to take pride in being black. In 
the process, he began to challenge everything that denigrated his blackness like the song “Baa-
Baa black sheep”.615 As university students they would ask: “Why would the sheep have to be 
black, because black is a negative term?”616 ‘Baa, baa black sheep’ is a nursery rhyme, not 
intended to denigrate black people’s blackness. But, like Matsepe alludes, the use of the term 
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‘black’ was jealousy guarded by the BC-aligned students. They always questioned the form and 
context in which it was used. Another student to matriculate from Bodibeng High who was also 
influenced by the BC philosophy was Mekodi Arcilia Morailane. Although she started at 
university before the formation of SASO she was exposed to the BC philosophy in the early 
1970s while studying at the University of Zululand. She was to play a crucial role leading to the 
student demonstration in Kroonstad in August 1976 (more about her role below).  
 
Finally, Isaac Aubrey “Sakkie” Oliphant was the other student to be influenced by the BC 
philosophy. “Sakkie” Oliphant, unlike the others, was not a product of Bodibeng. His political 
career merit greater attention.  
 
Oliphant was born in Marabastad in 1958, but grew up in Brentpark after his family had been 
removed to that area in 1959. Because he was classified Coloured he was not permitted to attend 
at Bodibeng but at Cairo Higher Primary. After passing his Standard Six there he went to Aliwal 
North at St. Josephs to further his studies. From there he completed his matric at William 
Prescott, in Kimberley, in 1971. For tertiary education he went to the University of the Western 
Cape (UWC), in the Western Cape.  He recalls 
 
It was the only one that I could go to. UWC [was for] Coloureds. We were  
with Danny Jordan, this guy of the World Cup. We were together … [with]  
people like Reuben Hare, Johnny Issel
617
 
 
Oliphants’ introduction to the BC philosophy can be traced back to his dubious expulsion from 
UWC on academic grounds in 1973. This prevented him from going on to do his second year. He 
remembers  
 
I had 73 per cent which was high … I was aware how I had written my exams. I  
even convinced everybody. I only had to cover 33 percent (actually 27 per cent  
to make it 100 per cent) . That was the agreement. If you had 60 per cent, you  
needed to make up 40 per cent in your end of year exams. I was sure that I had  
passed. And according to the requirements, I did.  We were going to 1973 now. I  
must go and do my second year. I told my parents that I’m going back because I  
hadn’t received my results and those people were not responding. I took my belon- 
gings and went there. Only to find the 300 students who were in my course: B.A.  
Social Sciences, including Law they selected 100. And their criteria was the  
top guys. So, if somebody matched me and had a point more than me was allowed  
to go through. No more requirements that were written down on paper. We organized  
a big protest. By June … May actually that university was not functioning anymore618  
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This may have been true. But a more convincing explanation for the closure of the university is 
offered by Badat. The latter argues that after the expulsion of Onkgopotse Abram Tiro, a former 
SRC (Student Representative Council) president at Turfloop (more about this below), students at 
the UWC embarked on a boycott in solidarity with Tiro and other students at Turfloop who had 
been expelled for demanding Tiro’s re-admission.619 This caused tensions between the students 
and the university’s administration, which was mainly white. Students boycotted lectures. 
Following the intervention by parents, students agreed to return to their lectures. Badat contends 
that “this was frequently followed by reprisals against students which took the form of 
suspensions, expulsions, loss of bursaries, and a ban on SASO”.620  
 
After his expulsion, Oliphant joined throngs of students who had been excluded from university. 
They protested their expulsion and, in the process, formulated more grievances. Oliphant 
remarks 
We started asking for support at the local level in Cape Town. Our demands were 
increasing by then. We were telling people we have grievances and the grievances  
[we]re 1) this is a university which was set aside for so-called Coloured people. Being  
so, it was not run by Coloured people. The Senate - everything about it
621
 
 
The students at UWC demanded the appointment of a black rector. They reasoned this was 
because “it is an undisputed fact that the rector at a Black university has supreme power … to 
manipulate and gear the situation into whichever direction he desires”.622 As was the norm, 
students from other universities, including those who had been expelled for political reasons, 
converged at the UWC to find out what was happening and to offer their support. Oliphant 
remembers that it was during this period that he first made contact with some of the likeminded 
students 
 
Room 20 was Art students’ room. It was the biggest room, accommodating us.  
Many things happened in Room 20. We were not having lectures in that room  
anymore, for many months. In that year that was when we met guys from other 
universities who were suffering from the same thing. People like Terror [Lekota]  
from Turfloop. People like Ratha [Mokgoatlheng]. People from universities like  
Fort Hare, Zululand. All those universities we came together. These guys were  
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interested to know what [wa]s happening
623
 
 
It was more or less during this period that Oliphant was introduced to the works of Malcom X 
and other Black Consciousness oriented organizations based in the United States of America by 
American students on an exchange programme in South Africa.
624
   
Oliphant then joined the students from the UWC who travelled across South Africa garnering 
support, especially amongst the coloured communities, ending up in Natal where he and his 
colleagues met Steve Biko. He explains 
   
Then one Sunday we met with Biko. We were busy briefing the guys about the  
fight and unrest at UWC. He was sitting at the corner ... look[ing] clumsy and like 
someone who was dizzy. But when he opened his mouth I could hear that this man  
was talking extreme sense. He reminded me of the American guys. And from thereon 
people like [Harry] Nengwekulu, [Themba] Sono made speeches
625
 
  
When it finally dawned on Oliphant that his chances of being readmitted to the university were 
growing thinner, he returned to Kroonstad. In Kroonstad he connected with some of his peers 
who had been expelled from Turfloop like Matsepe. They formed a BC-aligned structure. He 
recalls 
When I was supposed to go back to Cape Town that’s when [my mother] fought  
the biggest fight. She made sure that I did not go back. In the meantime, we were  
forming structures in Kroonstad. Everyone was back home … We had KROONSO,  
led by people like Oupa Matsepe.  Kroonstad was now aware. Now we had students  
who could shout ‘Black Power’. And we started to get all the literature. We’d get the 
whole book and photocopied it for dissemination for people to read. It was more 
American Black Panther Movement. We started imbibing these things. We started 
meeting in the old township. Places like Phomolong were quite small and still 
developing. The people that I regularly met with - and we did not meet daily; we didn’t 
want to attract attention – Matsepe, Nanaile Lefafa, a powerful guy. He lives in Pretoria 
now. There were people like Lawrence. And [Holomo]Lebona, who used to be the mayor 
here
626
   
 
Before the pro-Frelimo rallies to celebrate the independence of Mozambique from the 
Portuguese rule, Oliphant’s participation in the BC activities had waned. He had been forced to 
take up employment at Boitumelo Hospital.
627
 With Oliphant committed to his work and some of 
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the leading figures in KROONSO having to leave Kroonstad to further their studies elsewhere, 
particularly in the Rand, KROONSO was left moribund (see below). 
 
The Tiro affair and expulsion of students 
 
Towards the end of the 1960s Turfloop University was tranquil and quiescent despite the 
existence of the SASO branch on campus. This situation can attributed to Professor E.F. 
Potgieter’s, the Rector, firm but cordial relationship with the students, particularly the SRC.   
This was evident when he forbade students from embarking on a solidarity strike action with the 
students at Fort Hare University in 1968. While at the same time encouraging discussions 
between himself and the university’s SRC. This was confirmed by the SRC president-elect 
Petros Machaka. This prompted the Star to report “Professor Potgieter’s open door policy, 
coupled with his personality is probably a chief reason why Turfloop shows no signs of 
disorder”.628  The situation changed following the resignation of Professor Potgieter on 30 June 
1969, to take up an appointment as Commissioner-General in Gazankulu.
629
  
In the interim the university had two rectors. First, it was Professor F.J. Engelbrecht, who took 
over briefly only to relinquish this position because of ill-health. He was replaced by Professor 
M.J. Louw. On 1 December 1969, Professor J.L. Boschoff assumed duty as rector.
630
 Professor 
Boschoff was born in Utrecht, Natal, where he received his school education until he 
matriculated in 1933. He then enrolled with the Natal University College. On completing his 
training as a teacher, having passed the higher education diploma, he obtained the Master’s 
(M.A.) degree in history in 1939.
631
 In the same year he started teaching in various high schools 
in Natal until 1957. In between he served for 12 years on the executive committee of the Natalse 
Onderwysers-Unie – and for seven he was the chairman. In 1957 he was appointed Inspector of 
Bantu Education. He also served as a member of the council of the University of Natal. As 
Inspector he served for six years as a member of the examination board and was also chairman of 
the Afrikaans subject committee. In addition, he was also a member of the council of the Fort 
Hare University for many years.
632
 Boschoff administered the university in a heavy-handed 
manner. 
 
Students at Turfloop had been angered by two incidents. First, it was the government’s 
proclamation of the university-colleges as automous. “Parliament promulgated the University of 
the North Act 47 of 1969”, writes Abram Mawasha, “which came into effect on 1 January 
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1970”.633 “The Act”, he continues, “changed the status of the University College of the North to 
that of University of the North (UNIN), ending UNISA’s ten-year academic trusteeship”.634 In 
spite of this, much of the status quo remained. Whites continued to control the university. For 
example, three quarters of the 109 academic staff were white.
635
 Furthermore, in spite of the 
fully-fledged status accorded the university, the state maintained tight control over the 
institution. The university could not borrow money without the approval of the Minister.
636
 This 
prompted the students to view the changes as cosmetic only. They contended that if the 
university belonged to blacks, it had to bear the stamp of black authority.
637
 
And second, students were angered by the investiture of Dr W.W.W. Eiselen as the first 
chancellor of the university. According to Mawasha, on 1 May 1970 the University Council 
unanimously elected Dr Eiselen, then Commissioner-General of the Northern Sotho Ethnic 
Group as the chancellor.
638
 But what probably angered the students the most was the Council’s 
decision to elect Dr Eiselen who was directly responsible for the passage of the Bantu Education 
Act of 1953, which led to the implementation of the much-despised Bantu Education system.
639
 
To curb any protests by the students, the university banned protest - peaceful or violent - on 
campus.
640
 This further fuelled the students’ anger and frustration, especially at having decisions 
imposed on them by the rector and the Council. The situation came to a head in 1972.  
 
In 1972 Turfloop University was closed, following a strike action by the students after the 
expulsion of Onkgopotse Tiro because of his politically-loaded speech at a graduation ceremony 
at the university on 29 April.
641
 Tiro, a former SRC president and member of SASO, had been 
asked by the graduating class to represent them at the graduation ceremony.
642
 To appreciate 
Tiro’s speech, it is worth studying briefly his career. According to Butler “Tiro was no stranger 
to politics; indeed his short life was a compressed history of relentless political struggle”.643 He 
had been born on 9 November 1945 in a small village of Dinokana in the northwest of South 
Africa. He was forced to leave school at primary level following the strike against the imposition 
of passes on women. This caused Tiro to work as a child labourer on a manganese mine. He left 
Dinokana to continue his schooling in Soweto, but was arrested for failure to produce a pass. He 
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returned to the northwest and went to Mafikeng to finish his schooling. At university his life was 
dominated by debate and organization.
644
 
 
When he took the podium to make his speech, Tiro, unlike the speakers the university usually 
invited to make presentations at the graduation ceremonies, who Ruel Khoza, a former student at 
Turfloop, described as “… custodians of the ideology of the time”, launched a breathtaking 
attack on the university administration and the apartheid system in general.
645
 On 2 May (1972) 
the all-white disciplinary committee expelled Tiro. It reasoned that Tiro was expelled because he 
“… chose a wrong occasion to give the type of speech he gave, and so embarrassed the 
authorities”.646  A student petition for his reinstatement was rejected and the students boycotted 
lectures. 1 146 students were expelled,
647
 and others were suspended. Matsepe was among the 
expelled students. Ramotsoela was suspended. They both returned to their hometown, 
Kroonstad.
648
 
  
In the early 1970s wholesale restructuring took place in the teaching staff of Bodibeng High. In 
1972 Setiloane recorded the shortage of two teachers in the school’s logbook.649 Although the 
school has always generally striven to employ qualified teachers, like many other urban schools, 
they were now experiencing a shortage. “The shortage of teachers”, Hyslop argues, “was partly 
created by the government’s application of influx control to qualified people who would 
otherwise have accepted posts [in urban areas].”650 For Nozipho Diseko, the ceiling on teachers’ 
salaries was also a contributing factor. She argues “… by 1970 a male African secondary school 
teacher with a matriculation certificate and a teaching diploma received on average R145.00 per 
month, while his counterparts in the engineering and printing sectors were paid R228.00 and 
R268.00 per month respectively”.651 To overcome this problem, the principal and the school’s 
committee of Bodibeng High employed some of its former students. It was against this 
background that Matsepe and Ramotsoela were employed at Bodibeng as assistant teachers. 
Matsepe taught General Science and Ramotsoela Mathematics.
652
 Ramotsoela recalls 
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I got myself a part time job at Bodibeng. They knew me as a Mathematics student  
and they needed a Mathematics teacher … and a General Science teacher. So they  
knew I was around. So they sent somebody to come and fetch me to come and teach. 
During those days you would fill in the application forms …It was myself and Tsiu 
Matsepe
653
 
 
The employment of the university students who had been expelled from university, or who had 
simply dropped out of university for political reasons, became a common practice for reasons 
advanced above. But in the Free State this practice seems to have been widespread. This could 
have been because not many qualified teachers wanted to teach in a region which was Afrikaner-
dominated and relatively isolated from major urban centres in the country. Expelled students 
from the ‘bush’ colleges, however, accepted teaching positions in various schools in the Free 
State seemingly with the main objective of politicizing students and young people in the black 
townships. John Lewele Modisenyane, who was born in Vredefort but went for part of his high 
school at Manthatisi Secondary in Qwaqwa in 1971, recalls that in 1972 the students at 
Manthatisi rioted against bad food. For him, this was caused by the presence and influence of 
some of the expelled students from Turfloop University, who had taken up teaching positions at 
Manthatisi, such as teacher Mothibeli, a BC-adherent. He remarks 
 
In 1971. Yes, that’s when I got to Manthatisi. Manthatisi was where we rose; it’s  
where the protests started becoming very serious. You see, it was around the time of 
Abram Tiro’s uprising – 1972. So, some of the students that had been expelled from 
Turfloop came to teach at our school. So, they brought that Black Consciousness spirit 
with them. One of them was Mr. Mothibeli from Bethlehem. When he came to  
our school he pumped us up with politics. I was one of the ring leaders there. We were 
rioting against bad food ... That it was not proper food and it was not cooked properly, 
and so on
654
  
  
The rapidly growing influence of Black Consciousness, especially amongst the high and 
secondary school students, distressed many local – mainly white – authorities. In some areas 
such as Phiritona, in Heilbron, the superintendent, Van Assweging, refused to allow two students 
from Turfloop who had been offered teaching posts at Phiritona Secondary to stay in the 
township. Motlogeloa “Lazzy” Nkitsing, who was a senior student at the school in 1972, 
remembers 
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Remember then that there were always strikes at the University of the North  
by students. So some of the students, Thlapane and Sefuthela, arrived in Phiritona  
to take up teaching posts but the Superintendent refused them permission to stay 
here, claiming that would bring bad influence to the students and other people in  
the township. So he chased them away
655
    
 
In Kroonstad, Ramotsoela and Matsepe were under constant police surveillance. Some of the 
students Matsepe taught recall that he was continuously taken to the police station for 
questioning. Theletsane Mokhele, who was in Matsepe’s Form 2 class, remembers that although 
Matsepe taught them General Science he would also venture into History. He explains 
 
 He taught us Science. But … from time to time steal a few minutes and teach us  
History. And we enjoyed it. Even though we knew that amongst ourselves there  
would be those who’d divulge what was said in the classroom. Because the next  
morning … before our long break or during long break the police would come to  
our school to arrest him. He would be gone for three days or so. But he would  
eventually come back. We were used to it
656
  
 
Ramotsoela remembers that after he had started teaching at Bodibeng he was “visited” by the 
members of the SB. He remarks 
  
I was visited by one gentleman, Mr. Els, who told me that at the age of 18 he took  
an oath if a black man does nonsense he must shoot. Ja, he told me straight. I was  
renting a room. He came with a black detective. He was a detective, Special Branch.  
I remember on that day I was [listening] to The Voice of Zimbabwe … during the 
[Joshua] Nkomo and the Zimbabwean [War of Liberation]. I was still a young teacher 
then … I used to like it: “The people of Zimbabwe victory is such a good thing”. You 
know, he told me something … and said if I listened to that again, they will come back.  
I was threatened by that. I couldn’t listen to that any longer. I thought if I listened to this 
that man will come
657
 
 
However, such intimidation did not curb the spread of the BC philosophy in the OFS. For 
instance, from the mid-to-late 1970s it was expanded by young people who had studied at 
tertiary institutions, including Turfloop, Fort Hare and Zululand Universities. Twala and 
Seekings note that, among others, Janie Mohapi from Bloemfontein studied at Turfloop from 
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1976-1979, Max Makhubalo, also from Bloemfontein, studied at Fort Hare (1976-1978), Oupa 
Molema studied at the University of the North (Turfloop), 1974-1981, where he participated in 
SASO and then the AZASO (Azanian Students Organisation) … and was later recruited into the 
ANC. Finally, Fezile Dabi, a key activist in Tumahole, in Parys, studied at Fort Hare in the late 
1970s.
658
 The latter played a central role in conscientising some of the young people in 
Tumahole. After he was expelled from Fort Hare because he (and other students including Elias 
Ace Magashule, also from Tumahole) opposed the Ciskei’s homeland government, returned 
home and helped to establish the Tumahole Student Organisation (TSO) – but before this they 
were instrumental in the establishment of the Parys Student Organisation, a BC-inclined 
organization (see below).
659
 Jeremy Seekings writes “… TSO was concerned with drama 
productions and contests, held for fundraising as well as putting across political messages”.660 
Recalling how the political message was spread to other young people in the township, Moalusi 
Andrew Majoro ‘Aluta’ Sebitlo, one of the young people who joined TSO in its early stages, 
remarks 
 
 Before the unbanning of the ANC, I was part of the Tumahole Student Organisation.  
This organization was established by the likes of Fezile Dabi, Ace Magashule and  
others who were from tertiary institutions. I was still in high school doing Form 2  
then. These leaders involved us in symposiums which highlighted the social evils of  
our community. We were also engaged in drama and stage plays. In the process of that  
we realized that there was more than what we had expected. These leaders indirectly 
involved us in the struggle. After such activities we would also spread the message to 
some of our friends about these stage plays, and that is how the message spread around 
Tumahole and into the neighbouring towns
661
 
 
In the 1970s, although some of the school-going students received their political education either 
at church or from their parents at home
662
, the role played by the BC-inspired teachers had a 
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lasting impact on some of the students.
663
 This was particularly evident among the students at 
Bodibeng High School. Upon their arrival the new staff members, made up of young and BC-
influenced teachers, made their presence felt. Critically, they broke the long observed boundaries 
between the teachers and students. Unlike in the 1940s, students at Bodibeng High in the 1950s 
and 1960s were discouraged from engaging their teachers politically. There was always fear of 
reprisal. Ramotsoela remembers that during his school days their principal, Mr Setiloane, was 
unapproachable. According to him“… You wouldn’t come near the principal. He would tell you 
‘you were a child’. It was not nice. Even to see him, it was not nice.”664 Similarly David Lebethe, 
a Form 2 student at Bodibeng in 1972, adds “Our principal was not only strict to us, but was 
feared and respected by both the educated and uneducated. Every time he would appear, even if 
he was a distance away, you’d make sure that you don’t cross his path. That’s how he was”.665 
The new generation of young and politically conscientised teachers, however, not only 
encouraged students to express themselves in the classroom, but also overtly introduced them to  
political issues.  
 
Lebethe recalls that there was something different about the new teachers, especially those who 
joined the school following the Tiro expulsion. In his words 
 
My Form 2 in 1972 … it was around the same time that there was a national  
strike by black universities in the country. Your Turfloop, Ngoye or  
Zululand University.  Now most of the students from those universities came  
to teach in black schools, and there were some who came to Bodibeng. One  
of which was Oupa Matsepe. Who else came to teach? Eh, … Sipho Koekoe,  
who is now late. … Over and above the task that they were there to perform,  
there was something striking about them, which is that they would wear  
… (pauses) wigs. Not the artificial wig, but, I mean, they wore your afro hair.  
… They were easy going themselves. And, you know, unlike the sterk  
(hardened) teachers, who would find it difficult to even correct [you], but  
with them it was always easier. And they would sacrifice a lot. They would  
not be working your strict office hours: from 07h00 to 14h00. They would be  
there until very late. Even come to night studies at times, Saturday studies  
at times; to come and assist some of us who were struggling with our subjects 
…Now that was something very striking about them666  
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Moreover Lebethe remembers that in his “one-on-one meetings with Matsepe he came to know 
more about the BC”.667 
And Mpopetsi Dhlamini, who joined the staff of Bodibeng High School in1974, working as a 
teacher-clerk, remembers the impact the new staff members – mostly from Turfloop – had on the 
learning environment at Bodibeng. He explains 
  
Let me just call [name] them. It was, eh, Sam Chabedi, Charles Kgotlagomang, eh,  
Taje from Turfloop.  And then Mokete Rankoe, Sipho Koekoe, Rebecca Tlhagane.  
… Then Tshidi Mabote. And then Oudag you spoke to him – Ramotsoela. Well, there 
was a guy called Philip Hlatshwayo, but he was from Fort Hare; and then there was Oupa  
Matsepe. Remember some of them came after the time of Onkgopotse Tiro and these  
guys were political when they came around. Even their approach to us. Because, as I  
said, before Bodibeng was strict. No, not strict but it was disciplined. But these guys  
came with relaxed attitudes compared to the older teachers, who emphasized more on 
discipline (i.e. corporal punishment). Now these guys would emphasize children must 
just be relaxed. I mean, by way of discussions. But discipline still be there, you see
668
  
 
However, there was more to Matsepe than attending to night studies. He used these to engage 
some of the students, particularly those in matric.  In his words 
 
 When I came back from university I was almost the age of some of the students   
 who were there [at Bodibeng], and some of my friends were still students doing  
 matric. Although, I was teaching Forms 1 and 2 I used to socialize with them …  
It was fun to come to a situation where we build up now towards a serious thought 
 about the issues that came out of our membership as the South African Student 
 Organisation, and the mission – specific mission – to inculcate into, at least, the 
 matriculants already the notion of self-reliance, self-esteem, and all the important  
 values that we have come up from our involvement in Black Theology and Black 
 Consciousness as a whole. … I, myself, shared with the students at night studies. 
 Because remember what was happening was that much as I was teaching, I still  
 registered with UNISA. So I’d come to the night study classes and at times then  
[I’d] hang around with the boys who were doing matric and they’d ask: ‘What is  
going on?’ Then Ke tla bahabodisa (share political knowledge) in the process and  
give them addresses; tell them ‘when you’re in Johannesburg communicate with  
so and so; and  when you leave do this and that. In an informal manner networking  
starts in those evening classes
669
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Tsiu Vincent Matsepe in the early 1970s  
(Source: T.V. Matsepe) 
 
It was against this backdrop that some of the students at Bodibeng High gradually adopted a 
defiant and assertive behaviour. Like in many other black townships around the country in the 
early 1970s, some of the students at Bodibeng formed the branch of SASM in 1973.
670
 It is not 
clear where the idea or influence for forming this branch emanated from. However, David 
Lebethe intimates that Matsepe could have been the force behind the formation of the SASM 
branch at Bodibeng. He claims, for example, that because of his close relationship with Matsepe 
every time there was a meeting of SAMS in Johannesburg he would know about it and would 
attend it. He explains 
 
I remember when I travelled to … what’s that? Eh, Rothman’s Cup, a football  
activity around there. But I would not end up at Orlando Stadium. I would end  
up in a house somewhere in Soweto, meeting with some other guys from Soweto.  
Ja, that’s how it was671   
 
Matsepe, on the other hand, credits KROONSO for the formation of SAMS at Bodibeng. He 
remembers: “You had to be at university to belong to SASO, but you didn’t have to be at 
university to belong to SASM. So we created SASM. That’s how SASM came about”.672 The 
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role of SASO branches across the country in making steady advances to high and secondary 
school students with the aim of conscientising them is supported by Mzamane, Maaba and Biko. 
They write  
 
 By early 1972, SASO branches catering for students in high schools were either 
 in existence or in formation in far-flung places such as Umtata, Kimberley and 
 Port Elizabeth in the Cape; Pietermaritzburg in Natal; Pretoria and Springs in the 
 Transvaal; and Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State
673
 
 
KROONSO was established in 1973 by members of SASO. This was after SASO had taken a 
resolution “to penetrate and conscientise the urban youth constituency beyond school.”674 Such 
SASO branches were established in many townships. For example, in Bloemfontein, the 
Bloemfontein Student Organisation (BSO) was established. White Mohapi, whose political 
activism dates back to 1977 during the student uprising in Bloemfontein, recalls that the BSO 
was mainly Black Consciousness oriented.
675
 It is possible that BSO was established by SASO 
members such as Janie Mohapi, White’s older brother, who, as noted above, was a student at 
Turfloop from 1976 to 1979 until he was expelled for political reasons.
676
 White Mohapi argues 
that the BSO’s role was to organize students “based on the problems they faced”.677  
Similarly, the Parys African Student Organisation (PASO) was formed in Tumahole, Parys. 
According to Seekings, PASO was established in December 1975 by young people who had 
studied in areas such as Welkom and Sebokeng.
678
 Seekings contends that these young people 
used “… their experiences in schools in Welkom and Sebokeng as a basis for organizing on their 
return to Tumahole”.679 Members of PASO, as emphasised within the BC movement, used plays 
to conscientise students and other young people in Tumahole about the political situation in the 
country. Mzamane, Maaba and Biko write “the BCM was active in most spheres but in none 
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more vigorously or successfully than in the arts and culture”.680 According to them, “BC cultural 
workers were student leaders … They wrote and performed to ‘conscientise’ the people with 
whom they lived …”681 A member of PASO who wrote the play ‘Panga man’ had the following 
to say about the message the play intended to disseminate: “The play was on crime. But in the 
closing part I tried to show that crime is just because one does it, but because of oppression and 
exploitation”.682 In spite of PASO’s efforts to conscientise students and young people in 
Tumahole, a year after its founding it had ceased to exist, because “the more committed leaders 
temporarily left the township”.683  
There is no evidence to demonstrate that KROONSO was involved in community campaigns in 
the township in the same way as were other branches in other townships (including the 
abovementioned) and campuses. Elsewhere branches like the Durban West SASO and the 
University of the North SASO offered tuition and tutorials for matriculants – and in the process 
politicized the latter. In 1974 KROONSO was among the four branches declared defunct or 
inactive because “they have not been involved in any activities up to this point”.684  
When some of the branches of SASO began to flout, such as KROONSO, the task of recruiting 
and disseminating information about SASM was assumed by the National Youth Organisation 
(NAYO) and its regional branches such as the Transvaal Youth Organisation (TRAYO). For 
example, by mid-1973 the links that the SASM organizers in the Transvaal, particularly in 
Soweto, had forged with TRAYO, an affiliate of NAYO, formed in July 1973, assisted them to 
access areas in different parts of the country.
685
 “National Youth Organisation members would 
convene”, writes Diseko, “meetings of the local youth where SASM organizers would explain 
the aim and objectives of the organization after which discussions would follow”.686 This could 
have been one of the ways in which the students at Bodibeng were introduced to SASM.  
 
SASM was established in 1968 (then named African Students’ Movement – ASM) by a group of 
students who attended various Christian clubs in Soweto.
687
 The main impetus for its 
establishment was the need to give a voice to student grievances, foremost amongst these being 
authoritarianism and corporal punishment. Glaser writes “one of the SASM’s key concerns was 
to institute SRC’s at schools to enable students to air their grievances and negotiate change”.688 
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The contacts between SASM and SASO between 1971 and 1972 radicalised the organization 
substantially. Members of SASM became increasingly assertive in articulating their grievances. 
Mary Mxadana, who taught at Morris Isaacson High School during this period, remembered that 
“by 1974, they insisted on being thoroughly consulted on any issue that concerned them, from 
administrative decisions through to corporal punishment and school uniform”.689 The 
organization, according to Glaser, published a newsletter … that bluntly attacked apartheid. This 
inevitably exposed the organization to the Security Police. Between 1973 and 1974, especially in 
the wake of the Frelimo solidarity rallies, SASM was “battered by detentions”.690 
 
The branch of SASM at Bodibeng was formed amidst heightened security police repression 
focused on SASM and its members. But this branch was also faced with particular problems, 
which ultimately caused its demise. Its members were Lebethe, Papi Mogoje, Bulara 
Liphotho
691
, Neo Sello, Prince Mahloane, Lesole Morobe, Lee Noge and Maepa Maredi.
692
 From 
the onset the branch of SASM at Bodibeng was beset by a myriad of problems. Critically, it 
failed to mobilize the mass of students at school (David Lebethe, the branch’s first and only 
chairman, recalls that their branch had less than 20 members). Worse still, the members lacked 
commitment. Lebethe remembers that [people] “like Mahloane were more into debating 
committee. I think he was the chairperson of the debating committee. Eh, Papi Mogoje was a 
softball liaison [officer]. So Wednesday was generally a day of practice for different sporting 
codes and people got caught up in these things”.693 Finally, the leadership was constantly 
harassed by the security personnel. As time went on, the problems became increasingly 
unbearable, especially police harassment. Some of the key figures lost interest and the branch 
ceased to exist.  
 
However, the short existence of the branch of SASM at Bodibeng can also be contributed to 
KROONSO’s inactivity. But more importantly, it can be argued that the internal problems 
besetting SASM, especially the Soweto branch, must have had a lasting impact on the Bodibeng 
SASM branch.
694
 From 1973 until 1977 before it was banned SASM, especially in Soweto, was 
faced with internal problems which affected the way it functioned. First, it was discovered that 
SASM had been infiltrated by police informers. Members, some of whom were in the leadership 
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positions, were exposed as informers and expelled from the organization.
695
 Second, some of the 
members of SASM were beginning to become critical of the BCM and its philosophy. They felt, 
inter alia, that the BCM’s position on whites, particularly liberal whites, did not conform to 
reality. This was based on the view that there were some white people such as Beyers Naude and 
some of the journalists who were contributing to the liberation struggle financially and through 
other means.
696
 Finally, SASM’s most significant criticism of the BCM related to the question of 
the armed struggle. Some of the members of SASM argued that the BCM was unable to counter 
state repression against its members. “Its response”, contends Diseko, “tended to consist 
primarily of harsh rhetoric and walk outs”.697 In the end, these forced some of the leading figures 
in SASM to forge links with the ANC – some even fleeing into exile to join the ANC and its 
military wing. 
 
Before it collapsed, the Bodibeng branch of SASM embarked on one of its most important 
campaigns. True to the tradition of adherence to the BC stance, it organized a boycott of the visit 
to Kroonstad of Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi in 1973.
698
 Buthelezi was seen by many in the BC 
as a sell-out, because of his pro-Bantustan position. In the June 1971 issue of the SASO 
Newsletter, Steve Biko turned to the problem of black leaders who operated within the 
framework of Apartheid. In this article, ‘Fragmentation of Black Resistance’, he … singled out 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, once ‘regarded as the bastion of resistance to the institution of a 
territorial authority in Zululand, and accused him of having swayed many people’s minds in 
favour of accepting Bantustans and the ethnic politics it represented”.699 Although the visit went 
ahead without any disturbance, and the students and teachers from Bodibeng packed the stadium 
to welcome Buthelezi, Lebethe and the members of his branch, and Matsepe, boycotted the 
event.
700
    
 
A year later the president of SASO, Muntu Myeza, conceived an idea to celebrate the 
independence of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonial rule. These came to be 
known as the Frelimo solidarity rallies, to be held in Durban and Turfloop on 25 September 
1974. “To black students in South Africa, in particular”, writes Mzamane, Maaba and Biko “the 
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fall of the Portuguese rule heralded a new dawn”.701 They felt that if “Portuguese colonialism 
could be defeated, so could settle-colonialism in South Africa”.702 The government, through the 
Minister of Justice Jimmy Kruger, banned the planned rallies. But it was too late. Publicity had 
already gone out. In Durban large numbers of people gathered for the rally. The police responded 
by dispersing the crowd and arresting the leadership of SASO, including Myeza, Zithulele Cindi, 
Saths Cooper, Mosiuoa “Terror” Lekota, Aubrey Mokoape, Strini Moodley and Nkwenkwe 
Nkomo.
703
The state charged the latter with terrorism and they were tried in what came be known 
as the SASO Trial, which dragged on for 17 months. The SASO leaders were finally found guilty 
and sentenced to various lengths of prison terms in December 1976.
704
  
 
In spite of this momentous event, Maokeng remained tranquil and quiescent. On the surface this 
could have been because the rallies planned took place in areas far away from Maokeng and its 
immediate environs. But more plausible reasons could have been the heightened repression on 
the SASO/BCM members by the security police
705
and the fact that the Frelimo rallies took place 
when some of the leading figures in the SASO/BCM in Maokeng were either committed to their 
employment or were avoiding exposing themselves to the police.
706
 This affected the 
SASO/BCM activities.  
 
Notwithstanding the sudden demise of the BC-oriented organization like the SASM, it could still 
be argued that its brief existence at Bodibeng helped radicalize some of the young black people 
in Kroonstad. This was evident when some of them began openly to defy their teachers. This 
signaled the advent of generational tensions. In 1975 a group of students in matric refused to be 
punished and boycotted the lessons. The school suspended them.
707
 These included David 
Lebitse, Dennis Lekubung, Jordan Ranca, Philemon Magashule, John (Lewele) Modisenyane, 
William Molefi, Peter Mokone, Paulus Mosala, Petrus (Thami) Nkolonzi, and Jacob 
Ramotsehoa.
708
 Modisenyane, who was in Form 5 and the main instigator of the incident, 
explained what happened 
 
When I refused to be hit in class, one of the teachers, the late Mr. Kgotlagomang,  
said he would not teach grown men in his class. He dragged me out of the classroom  
with my shirt, tearing it in the process. I took it off in front of the other learners and  
said: “You’ll sew this shirt and return it back to me.” After that I put it back on, took  
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my bag and shook my head; and when I walked down the stairs, the entire class followed  
me. We left - the entire matric class. The other one [student] was Thami Nkolonzi. We  
were about four who refused. They were my closest friends. I had already poisoned them.  
This was in ’75. ... I realised that we were going to get into trouble, so I said we should  
go and sit in a classroom that was free [i.e. unoccupied] during that period. We went and  
sat there. The principal came to beg us. He started with his learners; the ones that had  
been at his school since Form 1, because I had done mine at Manthatisi (in Qwaqwa).  
Yes, ntate Setiloane, he called them with their names: “Dennis Lekubung, didn’t I teach  
you in Form 1?” “You taught me, sir”, Therefore, accept punishment.” The boy  
agreed and stood on one side of the classroom. He took the learners that he had taught,  
one by one. People like Khothule Mphatsoe. He took them all one-by-one. Then I was  
left alone again. So, I had to follow them. Back to classl, we went. The principal did  
something stupid by not walking back with us, because he didn’t want his teachers [i.e.  
staff] and other students think[ing] that he had begged us to come back. So when we  
turned around a corner I said: “What rubbish was this you’re doing boys?” So, we turned  
around. We then went out of the school yard. It was Form 5. It was a critical time for  
exams and I was aware of the fact that the school would have to do something about the  
matric results ... The school decided to write letters to our parents. The letter was very  
simple: “Your child refuses to be disciplined at school. So, we are giving him so many  
days to get in order, after that we are removing him from the school register.” Hey! Our  
parents came flying to speak to us: “My child, why would you do this when you are  
already so far ahead? Go back to school.” We spent about two weeks away from school.  
Our parents took us back and we had to be punished ... We were told to dig out all the old  
tree stumps in the school yard
709
  
 
There is no doubt that this open defiance by students emasculated the teachers of their traditional 
authority, and without it that they resorted to the ‘divided and rule’ mechanism, as 
Modisenyane’s story demonstrates, but they generally tended to condemn students they 
perceived as ‘trouble-makers’ to failure in the future and avoided them. Modisenyane recalls that 
some of the teachers at Bodibeng opposed his admission to the school because they were aware 
of his history of political activism in Qwqwa. He remembers “They did not want me at all. They 
knew me. Even the late Mr. [Caiphus] Caluza would say: “Had we known about this devil, we would’ve 
stopped him from coming here”.710 Furthermore he recalls that when Setiloane, the most feared and 
revered principal of Bodibeng, realized that he was knowledgeable about the rules regarding 
punishment, he completely avoided him. He explains 
 
 I had picked up some tricks from my previous school, because I had read a book  
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about how learners should be punished. So, I knew the school was supposed to  
record your offences and the method of punishment should be appropriate, and things  
like that. Yes, I knew things like that. The only thing that ntate Setiloane used to say  
was: “He’s from a silly school, because he knows all his rights”711 
 
The Bodibeng students’ sudden change of behavior confirmed that there was a new calibre of 
teachers: young and highly politicized. And for some of the students at Bodibeng, who interacted 
with them, this was a turning point. The newly appointed teachers challenged everything their 
former teachers believed in. They avoided punishing students by means of caning them. They 
believed in talking to the students. This had a huge impact on the students. The latter adored and 
respected their new teachers. The teacher-student relationship changed. However, it was not all 
the teachers who had been to Turfloop, who did not believe in corporal punishment. Matsepe 
recalls that some of his colleagues like “Scara Kgotlagomang and Taje used the stick”.712  
 
Matsepe, more than his colleagues, tried from the onset to make it his mission, with every little 
chance he got, to introduce students to the BC philosophy. And his influence was most felt in the 
junior classes, particularly Forms 1s and 2s. Mokhele Petrose Theletsane, a Form 1 student at 
Bodibeng in 1975, remembers vividly how Matsepe introduced him to the ideas of BC. He 
remarks 
  
I did my Form 1 at Bodibeng in 1975. That’s where I first met Mr Matsepe. Well, at  
that time he was still not qualified but taught us Science. And that’s where I became  
politically conscious, because he used a simple thing like when we wrote our names on  
the [cover page] of the book like Mokhele Petrose Theletsane. He would call you and say  
Hey, mampharoane hake o eme ba hobone bobejane (Hey, fool stand up so that  
everyone can see you’re a baboon). Then he would ask you what was the meaning of  
this? Referring to your English name. First time we didn’t understand what was going on  
until he asked us where did we get our English names and their origins. Do we know the  
history behind those names? He started teaching us our own history. He explained to us  
what we must do. I don’t think even the principal would have been happy to hear about  
that. You see … he would instruct us to remove our English names from our books. He  
would say Hlakola nonsense eo mampharoane (Remove that nonsense, fool). From Form  
1 onwards all my books were written Mokhele Theletsane. That’s why even today you  
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see that I only use Mokhele Theletsane
713
 
 
Echoing Mokhele, Masiza Mkhulu Nhlapo remembers: 
 
 When I went to Bodibeng he (Matsepe) asked us our names. Then we would give him  
our names: I am Masiza Sherlock Nhlapo. He would tell you not to use Sherlock  
anymore, because he said “It is not my name, but it is a white people’s name. It is a  
slave name.” We could not understand why he said that name was a slave name; it  
was a slave name in which way? He told us that these names were given to us by white  
people, because they could not pronouns our real names. He would tell me not to use  
Sherlock anymore and to use Masiza and my surname only
714
 
 
This way of conscientising students was pervasive. In Alexandra Township, Jaki Seroke who in 
in 1974 or 1975 was in Form 1, remembers that his class teacher, Cindy Redley, used the same 
modus operandi to make them aware of the political situation in the country. In his words 
  
I mean she used to tell us in class … She would just hold the session, and she would  
tell us about the stories of the Black Consciousness (BC) and Africanism; tell us to use 
our African names.  She’d ask us in class ‘What is your African name?’  Use your 
African name. Are you not proud to be black - type of thing during class
715
 
 
And finally, Tsepo Oliphant recalls that Matsepe would also remind the students about the 
important historical days in South Africa  
 
 Oupa Matsepe. He was a teacher. Oubuti (elder brother) Oupa would remind us 
around March during the parade to say “Hey, people lost their lives because of the  
passes”. Yes, during the parade. He would say it. We would cry during the parade  
all of us. And after his [Matsepe’s] parade you’d feel like if you could meet a white  
man, you know ...
716
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Instead of encouraging them physically to challenge whites, Matsepe pacified them and 
introduced them to other methods to express their anger. Tsepo Oliphant recalls that Matsepe 
helped them form an art club. He remarks:  
  
And he said to us, ‘No, you don’t need to confront a white man to express your anger.  
You said you’re artists, paint. Do something about it. Paint. Express your anger  
through paintings. And if you want accommodation be at my place’. That’s where  
we met everyday and we formed a team of artists: MASAC (Maokeng Student Art  
Club). Now we started being involved directly in politics. We painted everything
717
 
 
In Thembisa Township, again, Thami Myele, a staunch supporter of the BC philosophy and a 
protégé of Wally Serote, used similar methods to recruit and conscientise students. But, unlike 
Matsepe, he also explicitly engaged the students in politics. Timothy Mabena, one of the students 
recruited by Myele in early 1970s in Thembisa, recalls  
 
 There was a group of people who were from Alexandra who were staying in  
Difateng section. They approached a few students and informed them that  
they wanted to form a social club. This is where we were taught how to play  
chess. We would read and practise drama. We would also have discussions  
about the current issues. They also taught us to play tennis. I can still remember  
Thami Myele used to play tennis. They then introduced us to jazz and artists like 
Abdullah Ibrahim, Duke Ellington, Hugh Masekela, Herbie Hancock. Some of them  
had already completed their matric level and others were teachers. We realised  
later that some of them were involved in Black Consciousness Movement. Thami  
Myele, James Moleya, Ralph Mothiba, Obed Raphalla, Mazizi Mbuqe, and Mike 
Mthembu were some of the people who opened our eyes
718
 
 
And Matilda Mabena, also a member of Thami’s political circle, adds 
 
 We would meet in different houses. Mostly we would meet at Thami Myele’s  
place. Sometimes we would stay overnight. At this stage Thami was working as  
an artist [for the South African Committee for Higher Education]. We would sit there  
and listen to political debates. For example, they would ask why were black people 
supposed to carry passes and yet whites did not? They discussed the forced removals. 
Why black people attended schools which were of lesser standard to white schools in 
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town? Those discussions made us aware that whites and blacks were living under 
different conditions
719
 
 
At this time, the influence of the BC adherents in Kroonstad’s black residential areas, in 
particular Maokeng, seems to have been matched only by the BC supporters living in townships 
in and around the Rand. In most of the Free State townships the BC influence appears to have 
really taken hold in the post-1976 period – and in the 1980s it had given way to the ‘Charterists’ 
politics.
720
 The BSO in Bloemfontein, as noted above, was such a BC-oriented organization 
formed during this period to spread the BC philosophy.
721
 But it did not last long because in 
October 1977 all the BC-aligned organizations were banned.   
 
Matsepe, with the help of Pule Tom Mokuane, established MASAC. The main objective of the 
club was to politicize as many students as possible. Mokuane explains: “from the beginning our 
aim with Oupa [Matsepe] was to give them [students] latitude to express themselves … And then 
this freedom of expression we emphasized that they should not be afraid to express their views. 
Now that is where issues came up like social inequality: ‘But why do we live like this?’ And 
[Oupa] would come up with his own views and opinions”.722 Among the members of MASAC 
were Tsepo Oliphant, Masiza Mkhulu Nhlapo, Lephephelo Mosala and Chabeli Chabalala.
723
 
One of the high points of the art club was Chabalala’s painting. Oliphant remembers that the 
latter drew a painting of a black hand strangling Prime Minister John Vorster. And this, he 
claims, was admired by all the students at school.
724
 However, MASAC did not last long. 
Matsepe left and his departure from Kroonstad, Nhlapo believs “crippled” MASAC to the extent 
that it ceased to function.
725
  
 
Soon the political influence infused on the students by teachers like Matsepe prompted the 
students to begin to question the status quo and, later, to challenge the school’s authorities. 
Tsepo Oliphant recalls that they started questioning the blatant racial discrimination prevailing in 
Kroonstad. They questioned why their parents were forced to stand outside the shop owned by 
whites when buying (or told to use a separate entrance)? Why their parents were beaten when 
returning home from work at 9 o’clock (at night)?726 And why the discriminatory laws did not 
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affect everybody (i.e. whites).
727
 Dirk de Hart, who was born in 1944 in Bloemfontein but moved 
to Kroonstad in 1949 with his parents, recalled the siren that signalled that blacks should leave 
town at night. According to him 
 In the 1950s when we stayed in Marlherbe Street I remember there was a siren and  
this siren started at 8:45 and again at 9:00. It picked up speed very slowly – at a low  
pitch. It indicted that at 8:45 everything that was black must get out of town. There  
was a guy called “Optel”. He took his work very seriously. And he had a black Station  
Wagon, we called Black Marias. At 9:00 he’d be here and police vehicles and they would  
start chasing up and down the streets. And any black that got caught was taken to the  
police station
728
   
 
Although the politicisation of students mostly took place at the school, some of the parents also 
played a crucial role in introducing their children to politics. Masiza Mkhulu Nhlapo, a Form 2 
student at Bodibeng in 1976 and one of the leaders of the demonstration that year, recalls how 
his mother, a teacher, took time off to discuss political issues with him. He remembers 
  
My mother was friends to this other elderly man who was a taxi driver. They liked 
talking about these people who were called terrorists saying that ‘These people would 
come back and we are going to win this war.’ I would ask myself about this war we are 
going to win ‘How are we going to win it? Why should these people come back and 
fight?’ My mother would then explain to me: ‘You know, these people had to go to other 
countries in order to be trained to fight so that they could come back and fight for their 
country from the whites, because white people are not treating black people well.’ I said 
why can’t they just sit down and talk? She told me that there are ANC leaders who 
wanted to talk with these white people but they refused. And the leaders decided to take 
up arms and fight, because they could not have the talks
729
 
 
Although parents were cautious not expose their children to politics or fear of police reprisal, few 
parents were instrumental in their children’s politicization. Apart from some of the well-known 
parents such as Walter and Albertina Sisulu
730
, the Moiloa’s played an important role in 
conscientising their children. The Moiloa brother, Uhuru, Tizza and Busang, were inspired by 
their parents in Zeerust. In the 1970s and 1980s they themselves were involved in the local 
politics in Kagiso.
731
 Other students were introduced to politics by their older siblings. White 
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Mohapi, for example, confesses that he learned politics from his brother Janie. According to him 
“I took tune from the many things he was doing. He partly influenced my political understanding 
and political awareness”.732  
 
Morailane and the student demonstration 
 
For Sifiso Ndlovu, to explain the student eruptions in 1976 it is important to understand the role 
of the Broederbond, the secret society behind Afrikaner ascendance in promoting the use of 
Afrikaans by the Bantu (Africans).
733
 Citing Wilkins and Strydom, Ndlovu notes that the forcing 
of Africans to use Afrikaans was articulated in a secrete policy document of September 1968 
titled ‘Afrikaans as a Second Language for the Bantu’.734In their discussion of the importance of 
imposing Afrikaans on the Bantu, the Broederbond noted two considerable areas of progress, 
however, one of these is the most revealing: ‘… most right thinking Afrikaans speakers today 
address the Bantu in Afrikaans whenever they meet’.735 In the early 1970s the government 
gradually enforced the use of Afrikaans as one of the two media of instruction, with English 
being the other one, at higher primary and secondary schools. In 1975 the Minister of Bantu 
Affairs, M.C. Botha, announced that the use of Afrikaans would be compulsory in half the 
school subjects from Standard 5 (today Grade 7) onwards. 
From the onset, students found it very difficult to learn in Afrikaans. For example, as early as 
1973 students at Thembisa High Schools were taught some of the subjects in Afrikaans and they 
could not cope. Michael “Figo” Madlala remembers  
 
In Thembisa students’ concern over the use of Afrikaans began in 1973. In 1973 I  
was in Thembisa high doing my Form 1. My subjects were Maths, Arithmetic, History  
and Geography and Health Studies and Agriculture and Languages: Isizulu, English and 
Afrikaans.  Other than the Afrikaans language the other subject which we were taught in 
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Afrikaans was Agriculture. Agriculture was called Die Landbou. Teacher Molala  taught 
us this subject. The first day in class he asked us ‘Wat is die grond?’ (what is the soil?) 
How do you explain what soil is in Afrikaans?  And communication was difficult because 
we had to respond in Afrikaans. [Someone] said ‘Die grond is bietjie things’ (Soil is very 
small things). We could not explain ‘wat is die grond?’ Then he read it out for us in the 
book what soil is in Afrikaans.  But still So every time he asked us we could not 
understand what that was. [this question] we would repeat exactly what the text book was 
saying …736 
 
Gandhi Malungane, who before June 16
th
 was a student at Nghungunyane Junior Secondary 
School, in Soweto, corroborated Madlala’s testimony: 
 
When everything started, when I came from my primary, I didn’t like Afrikaans. … It  
was difficult. You see, Arithmetic and Afrikaans were very difficult subjects
737
 
 
In similar vein, Dikeledi Motswene, a student at Ithute Junior Secondary School, in Soweto, 
added  
I was doing Mathematics in Afrikaans and it was difficult. … And we were doing  
this Arithmetic in Afrikaans and it was difficult
738
 
 
Determined complaints by students forced the school’s authorities to change to English. Madlala 
explains 
 
 Well, we couldn’t understand a thing. [So], we complained to say we don’t  
understand this language. In fact there was a dismal failure rate in the first  
quarter such that it was clear that students didn’t understand Afrikaans. We …  
said we wanted to change the subject.  They changed the language from Afrikaans  
to English in 1973 after the first quarter.  So we had to go and buy the English text 
books
739
 
 
This, however, proved to be a temporary relief. From early 1976 onwards the DBE (Department 
of Bantu Education) intended to make it compulsory for some of the subjects to be taught in 
Afrikaans on a 50-50 basis with English. This was the main cause of the student uprising in 
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Soweto, and probably in other areas as well.
740
 In addition to being a difficult language to use to 
learn other subjects, African students abhorred the language. They argued that Afrikaans was not 
an international language, therefore, it was not practical to learn it because it would not assist 
them outside of South Africa. But in Kroonstad, and certainly in many other townships in the 
Free State, Afrikaans was not the cause of the revolts. In Maokeng, as will be shown below, the 
influence of the BC-inclined teachers was the main impetus.  
 
For example, in Bothaville, in the northern Orange Free State, the revolt began on 3 July 1976.
741
 
This was after a provincial traffic inspector and two police reservists stopped a film show for 
about 300 black persons before the end of the performance because, they argued, the appropriate 
entertainment tax had not been paid.
742
 The crowd of 300 strong responded by attacking the 
Bantu Affairs Administration Board (BAAB) offices and a beer hall – symbols of apartheid. The 
damage totaled about R16 456. According to the Cillie Commission “a number of rioters were 
arrested and charged”.743 On 20 July, Tumahole was on fire. African students in one of the 
school burned a class-room.
744
 The Cillie Commission does not provide reasons for this 
action.
745
 Recent research and oral testimonies reveal that solidarity with the students in Soweto 
was the main impetus for the eruptions in some of the areas in the OFS. Magashule, who was 
already exposed to PASO and whose class in 1976 was the last Standard 6 at the school, recalls  
 
In 1976 … I was doing Standard 6. We were doing our studies in Afrikaans.   
That’s when I became more active because of that event … The influence of  
Soweto in our schools ‘Away with Afrikaans’. I know the school in Parys where  
I was it was burned down and some of the students were arrested
746
 
     
Magashule’s interview suggests that the students at Tumahole revolted in solidarity with their 
counter-parts in Soweto certainly.  
 
It was not long before the revolt had spread to Thabong, in Welkom. During the nights of 9 to 10 
August, a cupboard containing textbooks was set on fire at the Hlolohelo Community School, 
and R400 damages were caused. The Commission noted “no … relevant details were submitted 
… in connection with this matter”.747 In Vrederfort the revolt began on 5 November. It was 
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alleged that black men, Matsoane and Mogorosi, incited the black inhabitants to public violence. 
The latter set the local school on fire the following day.
748
  
 
The student revolts spread throughout the Free State and finally reached Phiritona, a small and 
quiet township outside Heilbron. Since the student demonstration in 1972, when students at 
Phiritona Secondary called a class boycott for two days following Superintendent Van 
Assweging’s allegation that the male students who attended night study had spilled the buckets 
full of night soil in the street
749
, the township had not experienced any protests. Youth 
organizations such as the Young African Christian Association (YACA) steered clear of political 
issues. Despite this, there had been some discomfort amongst the students, particularly those who 
were politically enlightened like Mongezi Radebe, about the imposition of Afrikaans as a 
medium of instruction. But what seems to have been more disconcerting for the students at 
Phiritona Secondary was the feeling of being treated as beggars. Radebe explains 
 In Heilbron, for instance, textbooks that were used for History, Geography and 
 Maths … were written in Afrikaans and they were not new textbooks. They were 
 from a local white school – old books that were to be burned. They were dumped 
 at our school for our consumption …750 
 
Buoyed up by the happenings in Soweto and their feeling of discontent about the situation in 
their school, students at Phiritona responded by attacking and burning their school.
751
  
And for students at Bodibeng High Afrikaans was not an issue, as already noted. However, this 
does not imply that they liked and enjoyed it – at least not all of them. After taking over as 
principal in 1962, Steel Setiloane made it compulsory for students to speak English and 
Afrikaans at school. The languages were used alternately on a weekly basis, with English 
alternating with Afrikaans.
752
 Khotso Sesele, who was doing Form 1 at Bodibeng in 1975, 
remembers that they were forced to use only these languages during school hours and failure to 
do so meant punishment and “punishment was going to clean the school on Saturday”.753 As a 
result, students at Bodibeng developed the capacity to communicate in Afrikaans. Some of them 
even excelled in the language. Tsepo Oliphant remembers one of these as Pius. He remarks: 
“There was this guy Pius. Oh! Pius… he was good in Afrikaans. He used to translate English to 
Afrikaans, or translate Afrikaans to English. Ja, he was very good.”754  
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A further factor lessening the burden of Afrikaans on students was the fact that Bodibeng had 
teachers who were proficient in Afrikaans. Theletsane Mokhele recalls: “They were very good, 
particularly those who taught us Accountancy. It was Jackie Phalatse … He was a Motswana. 
Sometimes when he was absent it would be Philip Hlatshwayo. [He] was so good in Afrikaans. 
He even had an Honours [Degree] in Afrikaans. At some stage he was an interpreter at court, and 
then here [in Kroonstad] it was only Afrikaans”.755 Taje, who was the vice principal of the school 
in 1976, claims that even though they had teachers who could teach in Afrikaans, the school, in a 
form of protest, opted to apply to be exempted from teaching half the subjects in Afrikaans. He 
explains  
 
 I think it was a sense of protest, because we had fellows who could teach in Afrikaans. 
 But then we didn’t want to. … So I think we did very little subjects in Afrikaans,  
 because we would always say we don’t have teachers who can teach in Afrikaans  
Secondly, we were doing J.M.B. (Joint Matriculation Board examinations), so we 
 were preparing these children for exams in English. And there’s no room for  
 Afrikaans …We would teach subjects like Maths in Afrikaans756  
 
When the Form 1s and 2s at Phefeni Junior Secondary School embarked on a class boycott in 
May 1976 and, ultimately, participating in the 16
th
 June demonstrations against the use of 
Afrikaans in half the subjects, students at Bodibeng continued studying as normal.
757
 But an 
explosion was waiting to happen. Just like the students in Soweto, students at Bodibeng needed a 
spark. This was provided by Mekodi Arcilia Morailane, a Science teacher.  
 
Morailane was born in Bloemfontein in1946 and arrived in Kroonstad when she was five. After 
completing her matric at Bantu High School in 1965, she enrolled in a number of universities, a 
subject she felt not particularly important to discuss in the interview. One of the universities she 
attended was the University of Natal in the mid-1960s, at its Wentworth Campus. She 
remembers “… At Wentworth that’s where there were lots of activities – political activities – in 
our campus. That’s where I became aware of politics. We were together with Steve Biko.758 
Morailane recalls that in 1967 Steve Biko wrote an invitation to the students to attend a meeting. 
This was probably to discuss the imminent break-away from NUSAS. In her words:  
 
Now at some point, I think towards the end of the year, Steve Biko wrote an  
invitation, inviting the students. You see, they wanted to break away from, eh  
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... I have forgotten it. But it didn’t include blacks … Yes, NUSAS. NUSAS  
didn’t serve the interests of the black students. So when Steve Biko and others  
wrote that invitation they wanted to form a black movement. Now I’ve forgotten  
what it was
759
  
 
In 1974 Morailane was admitted at the University of Zululand, after a short stint at Turfloop 
University. In her words “I can still remember at Ngoye that’s where political activity was alive. 
When I arrived it was during that time when that person was killed by a letter bomb (i.e. 
Onkgopotse Tiro).
760
 After completing her Bachelor of Sciences (B.Sc) degree Morailane, joined 
the staff of Bodibeng High at the beginning of 1976.
761
 She brought her political awareness with 
her to Bodibeng. Because of this, she did not stand idle when she felt the need to “educate” 
students about politics.    
 
The students at Bodibeng took to the streets on 24 August 1976.
762
 According to my 
interviewees, who were doing Form 2 at the time at Bodibeng, the students were instigated by 
what Morailane had said in their classes. Nhlapo, one of the student leaders to be arrested first, 
explains 
 
 In 1976 [Ms] Morailane was teaching me. She had a hidden influence; it was not  
open. But I can’t blame her because you could be arrested and you would be taken  
away. Listen to what she said “You are failing my tests, but you attend everyday.  
What about Soweto students who are unable to attend. I think they only attend two  
days and they pass tests.” You could hear that this person is taking you somewhere,  
but she is not direct. She wanted to be on the safe side, you see. In Soweto it had  
already started. After the end of our class, me and Makhema - he is late now - I asked  
him “Did you hear what Ms. Morailane said? Yes, she is right.” But she did not  
really mean that”, Makhema replied. “Yes, I know she did not mean that,” 
I said
763
 
 
Joseph “Fifi” Nkomo makes the same point 
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… When our mistress (lady teacher) told us retsereane, redutse …[we’re foolish  
and just sitting and doing nothing]. Truly speaking she said that to us in class. She  
said retsereane, redutse bana ba bang ke bale baloana [You fools, you’re sitting here,  
doing nothing when other students are out there fighting]. When she came in she was  
in that mood. You could see that she was hurting. She didn’t even put her books on the  
table. She was hurting. She came in and said ‘You’re sitting here doing nothing, what’s 
wrong with you. Are you that foolish?’ We looked at each and we said ‘Banna is waar. 
She was being honest. I mean, people were dying and we were hiding in our classrooms.  
And they are fighting against what is also affecting us. But we were not doing anything, 
just sitting there folding our arms
764
 
 
From Nkomo’s testimony we can deduce that students at Bodibeng were aware about what 
Morailane was referring to when she admonished them for being docile. At this stage students at 
Bodibeng read newspapers as part of their academic development. Joseph Litabe, who in 1976 
was in Form 2, recalls that the principal, Setiloane  
 
encouraged us to read newspapers daily. Some of the newspapers that we used to read, 
before The Post, I think it was The World, and then The Post. By reading these 
newspapers we would, as students, come up with our own topics to discuss. We would 
discuss daily events that were happening
765
    
 
Morailane remembers this incident differently. She admits that she, indeed, made her feelings 
known to her students about what was happening in Soweto, in particular, but certainly in the 
Free State as well. Then she decided to “educate” her students about solidarity for them to show 
their support to the students in Soweto. She recalls that after overhearing some of the students 
from her school complaining that they had read in the newspaper that students from Soweto had 
threatened to come to Kroonstad to beat them because they had failed to support them, she felt 
obliged to “educate” her Form 2 students about solidarity. She explains “I decided that let me 
teach these children about solidarity, because that’s what they could do to express to the kids in 
Soweto. Otherwise there was no way that they could assist them. … So I told these children that 
“You must know there is something called solidarity. Solidarity is like when you sympathize. 
You see, when one family in the location has lost one of its family members other members of 
the community visit that family to console that family.” She moved from one class to the other 
articulating the same message. Sometimes she went beyond her advice about solidarity. In her 
words: “I remember I spoke in the Form 2G class … But I can’t remember exactly what I said to 
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them. Oh, I said ‘I mean you could run around and ...’ But you [must] remember that I’m a 
teacher so I couldn’t say to them they must break down beerhalls and so on. I was just letting 
them know that it was possible for them to do something … but must be careful that they are not 
arrested. Yes, I said that! But I said it a little.”766  
 
Morailane’s message seems to have seriously prodded the Form 2s to take action. Some of the 
students hastily decided to do so. However, lack of experience is evident in the planning and 
execution of what followed. The idea of a demonstration was not properly communicated to all 
the students at Bodibeng. Only a few male students were privy to the information about the 
planned demonstration (this is because the demonstration was discussed during night study);
767
 
students in senior classes like Form 4s and 5s were not involved in the plans; and the leaders do 
not seem to have a clear idea what they wanted to achieve, except to express solidarity with the 
students in Soweto. Nkomo claims that during their discussions it was agreed that the school 
should not be burned but only government property. He recalls 
 
Ja, we discussed it. We said “Gentlemen, we’re not going to destroy our school. We  
must only burn the municipality’s buildings, because tomorrow we’ll have to go back  
to school.” Indeed, it was our intention to go back to school the following day.  
Unfortunately, we were detained the very same night
768
 
 
Lawrence Prince Tlokotsi, one of the leaders, makes a similar point: 
 
You must remember that during those days the inspectors like (Reginald) Cingo 
supported the previous government to oppress us. So, when we left night study  
we decided to go to the Seeisovile Hall, because that’s where their offices were. We 
wanted to destroy them. But I must say our strike was not organised. We went to the  
hall and pelted the inspectors’ offices with stones. From there we went to the beerhalls769  
 
On the 24
th
 of August after night study students at Bodibeng converged in the school yard, 
outside their classrooms, and started singing Ntho ena ke masaoana (This thing is nonsense!), 
and marched in the direction of the police station and the community hall. On their way some 
began pelting the police station and the hall, and other government buildings with stones.
770
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Sesele describing the march recalled 
 
I would say we started by throwing stones at the school, but not too many stones.  
We then proceeded to the hall. Some were chanting, and some were just making  
noise, as we were walking. There was this certain song which goes like this Ahe,  
ahe, ahe, ntho ena ke masaoana (Hey, hey, hey, this thing is nonsense). We chanted  
it like that repeatedly. I can’t remember well, but if my memory serves me well, we  
came across a certain car between Phuleng School and the stadium. It was either a  
teacher in the car or… But we did certainly meet someone who was also targeted.  And  
that person ran away but was never chased. We then carried on. And when we  
approached the police station we stoned a Simba Chips bakkie. We were many. ... And  
at that time it was only the night study group.  Okay, I would say maybe it was a group  
of more than 200 to 300 who were involved. We never burned anything along the way.  
We only damaged some windows
771
 
 
Having heard and read about the student demonstrations in Soweto and elsewhere, the security 
personnel in Kroonstad was in no mood to tolerate any student disturbances. They called in 
reinforcement. Lawrence Prince Tlokotsi, who was one of the leaders of the demonstration, 
recalls “So the government called in soldiers. And there were the municipal police, which were 
called mampara (stupid). And there was also SAP (South African Police). The government’s 
intention was to restrain the demonstration before it could explode like in Gauteng.
772
 They 
rounded up all the leaders and swiftly crushed the demonstration. Nkomo remembers that he was 
arrested on the very same night of the demonstration at his home. He recalls that the police came 
to his home and asked: Wie loop die skool daar by Bodibeng? (Who attends school at 
Bodibeng?). And that is how he was arrested. Nhlapo was also arrested in his home and because 
of this he strongly believes they were sold out. He explains: “I was at my home. So they had 
information as to who was involved. Do you understand that violence was not happening at that 
section where my home was; it was at Phomolong and Seeisoville. Why would the police be at 
our section? Obviously they were tipped off.”773  
 
It is difficult to substantiate this claim without supporting evidence. But it is possible that the 
police, particularly the Special Branch, had students working for it at Bodibeng. Khotso Sesele 
who was arrested days after the night of the demonstration remembers that during interrogation 
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at Adami House
774
 he noticed a name of a fellow student who was the police’s informer in the 
list of the people the SB was searching for. He takes up the story 
 
After those people were arrested there was a moment where people were picked  
up one by one for interrogation. When I heard that I was being “hunted” by the  
police and I wanted to save myself the embarrassment of being collected from  
school … I decided to … not attend some studies so that they can fetch me from  
home. And they definitely arrived on that day. So during interrogation I was sitting  
there and Captain Ronald was sitting over there and this side was Mr. Mofokeng,  
who was interpreting what Captain Ronald was saying. Now unfortunately for them  
there was a board with the name of who the informer was and a list of names of people 
 who were “hunted” which Captain Roland had put in front of him … I realized there was 
 a name on top of the list followed by names of people who were … already arrested.  
 
After interrogation, Captain Roland attempted to recruit Sesele 
 
He then told me that they needed my help. I said no problem. He then ordered this  
Guy (Mr Mofokeng) to take me home. So, the same year, just towards the end of  
the year, in our class during night studies, as we were standing near the chalkboard 
writing some stuff, I saw a blue card with a police badge in his (a student residing  
next to Mr Mofokeng’s house) pocket. I firstly ignored it. Then I gave it a second  
glance and saw his name and number written. I then took it and ran away as he tried  
to chase me. I returned it to him and said to him “I told you, you are a sell-out” 775  
 
Among those arrested were Masiza Mkhulu Nhlapo, Joseph “Fifi” Nkomo, Alfred Morwenyaane 
– who has since died - Mokhele Theletsane, Prince Tlokotsi, Papi Hasego, and Ben.776 
 
The police were not convinced that the students had organized the demonstration on their own; 
rather they strongly suspected that there were agitators who used the students. Nkomo 
remembers that during interrogation the police would ask: ‘Truly speaking, who influenced you 
to do this thing and why?’ It was not long before some of the students broke down during 
interrogation and mentioned Morailane’s name. Morailane was picked up from school and 
detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act of 1967.
777
 She was charged with sabotage, which 
carried a prison sentence of five years. Remembering the day she was arrested – after the police 
had picked her up from school - Morailane remarks  
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 When we left the school they drove us (she was arrested together with some  
of the students) to Adami House.
778
 There was OK Bazaar and Adami House 
was at the top of that building. When I arrived there they told me that I was … 
By the way what was Joe Slovo? A Communist, and I was bringing politics 
to school. … There was a man who was asking questions. He said to me ‘You 
are political. What did you say to those children?’779 
 
Morailane was then detained. Not long after she was taken back to her house to search for 
banned material that could be used against her in court. She continues 
 
 When I was in Kroonstad at the nuwe tronk (new prison) members of the CID (Crime 
 Investigation Department) came to fetch me from prison and took me to my home to 
 look for materials. I think they were searching for any material that they could use 
 against me. As they were searching they came across that pamphlet I received at  
Wentworth – the Steve Biko pamphlet. And they said Ja, ons het jou gese moes (Yes, 
we told you that you’re a communist780  
 
After spending time in detention, undergoing long spells of interrogation, and continuous threats 
made by police who warned her batho ha ba sahlola ba hobona (people will never see you 
again), Morailane’s case was finally transferred to the Bloemfontein High Court. The police 
compelled the students to become state witnesses. But this strategy backfired. In court, the 
students informed Judge T.M. Steyn that the police had forced them into falsifying or distorting 
the truth in their affidavits.
781
 Theletsane, the key state witness, claims that the security police 
made a last attempt at the court to try and encourage him to lie on the stand in order to implicate 
Morailane. But once again they were unsuccessful. Theletsane explains what happened 
 
 Before I forget. The first day I went to court around 09h30. They (police) took me 
 and when I went inside we kept turning and taking the stairs. I did not know where 
 we were going. We then reached the second floor and it was the prosecutor’s office, 
 who told me that this case was dependent on me; their success was on my shoulders. 
 He added that if I were to assist them they would be able to help me to a certain 
 extent. I told them to stop it if they did not want to be embarrassed, because I would 
 tell the judge what had happened and I will show him where they have taken me, which 
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 was the prosecutor’s office. They apologised782 
 
Without the cooperation of the key witness, the state failed to prove that Morailane had 
influenced the students to demonstrate. As a result Morailane was not found guilty and was 
acquitted. She returned to school on 1 December 1976. But because of continued police 
surveillance, she finally left Kroonstad and went to teach at Tseki High in Qwaqwa.
783
  After 
working there for a year, she was forced to relocate because of police harassment. Members of 
the CID visited her home and tried to recruit her to spy for them. When she refused they 
threatened her. She explains: “They said if you refuse to work for us, you must know that 
anytime and everytime these children engage in political activities, breaking government 
buildings and looting, you’d be the first one to be picked up. I said it’s fine”.784 The same pattern 
continued in Sebokeng where she was now teaching at State School and living with her husband, 
Mr Mokoena. She was again forced to resign. Finally, she went to teach at Letare Senior 
Secondary School in Soweto. Again she was strongly warned against agitating students. She 
remembers “The principal informed me that a certain white man wanted to talk to me. This white 
man said ‘should there be riots in Soweto, we’re going to arrest you’. I asked why? And he 
responded ‘It’s because you are aware of the situation in the country’”.785 Morailane taught at the 
same school until she retired. 
 
Morailane was not the only one harassed by the security police. Some of the students, especially 
those perceived as the ring-leaders, were under constant surveillance by the security police. 
Nkomo remembers that after Morailane’s case police kept a close watch on them. He remarks 
  That woman won the case. And that was the end of the case. We came back home.  
But I’ll tell you this, every night they’d be watching us. They’d follow us around. Did  
you see our toilet outside? You know every time I went to the toilet at night I’d find a 
police vehicle parked outside my house. I knew and I was used to it. They also drove past 
our school
786
 
 
Ill-treatment at school by some of the teachers and total isolation by the members of the 
community forced some of the students either to abandon their studies or to leave Kroonstad and 
further their studies elsewhere. Nkomo stopped his studies because of the bad treatment he 
received at school. He explains 
  
 I can still remember at some point we were asked to write a composition.  I decided  
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to write about my experiences with the whole issue of riots and detention. I wrote about 
how we were arrested, and how the police treated us. And our teacher Mr Molefe said he 
was not surprised at all. He hated me ever since that day. He was teaching me English. 
He didn’t even mark my composition. Instead, he threw it back at me. Ja, bra Abbey! 
We’re not on speaking terms – he’s dead now. You know, I feel very bad when I think 
that I couldn’t continue with my studies to become a teacher, because most of these 
students have forgotten about our role
787
 
 
Nhlapo, on the other hand, felt isolated and uncomfortable about continuing to study and about 
living in Kroonstad after the case. He left for Qwaqwa. According to him 
 
None of the community members liked a person who was involved in politics at that 
time. Everyone was afraid at that time, especially in a small town like Kroonstad. 
Everyone was afraid to associate with us. They did not want to be closer to us. Do you 
know what made people afraid? It was because white people would kill you at that time. 
Yes, it was just that we were lucky not to have been murdered …  I was still at Bodibeng 
but the situation was bad. I no longer enjoyed to be in Kroonstad. I asked my mother to 
move me somewhere. Then I went to Qwaqwa. In Qwaqwa I got arrested immediately 
when I arrived there because the police were already there
788
 
 
Police harassment and the forced relocation of students who had internalized the BC ideas did 
not only deprive Maokeng of leaders who could help conscientise and mobilise the “community” 
in the early 1980s, but this seems also to have forced the residents of Maokeng to docility. In 
fact, Bulara Diphoto, in his hard-hitting report, criticized the black residents of Kroonstad for 
this situation. Diphoto argued that he was displeased by the situation he observed in Kroonstad 
when he returned from Soweto where he was impressed by a show of solidarity amongst the 
residents during the memorial service for the student uprisings. He blamed the lack of 
organizations “which cater for the welfare of the community”.789 And for him, this had pushed 
people to drinking and each individual keeping his/her grievances to themselves. “People go 
about in large groups on an intoxicating spree…”790In conclusion, he lamented “sometimes a get 
a notion that God made the world – but the devil made Kroonstad”.791 
But this situation changed – albeit temporarily – after some of the young people in the township 
revived the Young Christian Workers (YCW).  Although a Christian-based and worker-focused 
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organization, towards the end of the 1970s the members of the branch of the YCW in Kroonstad 
made a radical shift and seriously considered confronting the government militarily. This 
galvanized the “community” and radicalized some of the young people in the township.   
 
The Young Christian Workers, post 1976 
 
YCW’s song from the New Songbook (Source: Peace Modikoe-Tsotetsi) 
In 1977 the YCW was revived. For a structure that has played a significant role in conscientising 
young people in various townships, the YCW has received little scholarly attention in the 
literature. Few scholars have researched it and produced scholarly work.
792
 The YCW was 
founded in Belgium in 1923 by Cardinal Cardijn.
793
 Its aim was to bring hope to the young 
people of the working class; that life is worth living after all, that things can change, and that the 
Church of Christ is with them in their struggle to get jobs and proper wages, and proper housing, 
and decent level of education.
794
 In South Africa, Donovan Lowry notes that, the YCW was 
established by Eric Tyacke “as a working-class and largely coloured and black movement, but it 
had subsequently developed as a youth movement without a strong class affiliation”.795 It was 
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emphasis on young people who joined the YCW in South Africa that the YCW’s purpose was to 
“give an education based on the events of daily life”.796 As will be show below, young people in 
the YCW were trained, among other things, to be sympathetic to the needs of the community.   
In Maokeng, the YCW seemed to have been in existence since the 1960s. Mpopetsi Dhlamini 
joined it in 1965 as a new young worker. Because of hardships at home Dhlamini was forced to 
leave school at the end of 1964 to look for employment and found it at the Schmiedt 
Pharmacy.
797
 Even though Dhlamini was not a member of the Roman Catholic Church, which 
had strong links with the YCW, he was allowed to join the organization under Father Taole, who 
was the presiding Minister in Maokeng. He recalls that Father Taole used a simple method of 
recruiting young people into the organization. “He used to get young guys and workers”, 
Dhlamini remembers, “who would during the day [be in] scouts and they would come in the 
evening as if it’s a recreational club, where now we are dancing, others were playing karate. And 
then on Wednesday - now talks about politics”.798 He recalls that people like Mosiuoa “Terror” 
Lekota and Lebona Holomo were members of the scouts but would also attend these 
gatherings.
799
 Lebone Holomo, who was born in Kroonstad and raised in the Catholic Church, 
corroborates Dhlamini’s testimony 
             We used to hold discussion groups here. And then we used to have youth clubs, 
             debating groups, soccer … We used to mix with Mpopetsi and others. They were 
             senior to us, and through that he will tell you about the young … what, what 
             movement. Oh, Young Christian Workers
800
 
            
Seemingly it was the YCW’s position to use a moderate strategy to recruit young people, and 
later on to engage them in serious political discussions or in challenging prevailing injustices. 
Jane Hlongwane, who was born in 1935 in the then Western Native Township, in Johannesburg, 
remembered that after joining the branch of the YCW at Moroka, where her family had been 
forcibly removed in the 1950s, she was introduced to dancing. She explained: “other actions 
were also carried out by the YCW outside of the workplace. There was, of course, some social 
events where each of us could invite our friends to come and participate. Most of us learnt there 
how to dance to the waltz or quickstep rhythm”.801 But the members of the YCW’s Moroka 
branch soon challenged the restaurants in the city centre for their undignified service towards 
their black customers. Hlongwane recalled that these restaurants “did not provide tables, chairs 
and spoons to the customers, forcing them to stand and use their fingers when eating”.802 
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Hlongwane’s YCW branch reported this matter to the Health Department. According to 
Hlongwane “this abuse of human dignity was discontinued when the Health Department took 
action”.803 Probably because of her active involvement in the YCW, Hlongwane was elected to 
the position of regional president – a position she held until 1963.804 
In similar vein, before long the activities of the YCW branch in Kroonstad also became overtly 
political. Father Taole invited people like Reverend Z.R. Mahabane and Mr Ruzwani from 
Swaziland to give political talks to the young members of the YCW. According to Dhlamini 
“after SASO had been formed some of its leading members like Dr Selele used to attend the 
YCW’s meetings in Maokeng”.805 Young people were also introduced to political material. He 
recalls: “Interestingly enough that’s where I got to know about Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a 
dream’ video, because it was banned at the time”.806 In addition, members of the YCW were 
exposed to other young workers from the African continent. Dhlamini recalls their trip to 
Durban:  
            There was a guy we met there with Maitse Mokhere, Father Taole, and a certain  
lady called Christina Kalane. We were traveling in a Volkswagen. So we were  
            representing these guys (YCW). And when we arrived there we found people from             
            Swaziland and from the then South West Africa - students. Some were workers. So  
we  would come and sit and have discussions and everything
807
 
 
But perhaps most importantly the YCW also discussed the plight and rights of the young 
workers. Dhlamini continues:  
Young Christian Workers - it was very interesting. I mean you couldn’t just say  
anything it’s politics. Today when you analyze what we used to do in the Young 
Christian Workers it was a question of these unions. … It was addressing things like 
Christians who are working and working into what? Working to tower against what? 
Against the regime - the apartheid regime. So it was preparing us that when, as workers, 
you must be aware of your rights, you see. But as you know that things (people) were 
submissive, you couldn’t just say trade union what, what …808 
 
In spite of these seemingly lively discussions, there is no evidence to suggest that members of 
the YCW in Maokeng made any concerted efforts to challenge the government. However, their 
political discussions soon attracted unwanted attention from the police and other senior members 
                                                          
803
 Ibid. 
804
 Ibid. 
805
 Interview with Dhlamini 
806
 Ibid. 
807
 Ibid. 
808
 Ibid. 
167 
 
of the church, and this spelt the end of the  YCW’s activities in Maokeng – albeit temporarily. In 
1967 Father Taole was transferred to Phiritona, Heilbron, and members of the YCW began to be 
harassed by the police. Dhlamini remembers and further explains how the YCW’s activities were 
banned from the church: 
 
 Immediately after Father Taole left here, then we started being harassed by these  
SBs. … He invited us to Heilbron. We went to Heilbron trying to conscientise people  
there for a while, you see. Mostly we were discussing the political set up in South  
Africa.  So, from there I went into football ... Then came a guy called Father John. Now  
with Father John, in our first meeting he found that most of us were not Roman  
Catholic people. That’s number one. Secondly, this guy realized that, no, no, what we  
were talking about in that meeting everything was not only religious. He found that we  
were talking politics, too. So what happened he banned (i.e. stopped) that thing
809
 
 
In 1972 Dhlamini also left Kroonstad to further his studies at Tshiya Teachers’ Training College,  
in Qwaqwa. While at Tshiya he joined SASO.
810
   
 
 
Back, L-R: Chippa Morobela and Mpopetsi Jonas Dhlamini 
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Seated: Molifi Kobue, at Tshiya Teachers’ Training College, Qwaqwa. 
 (Source: Mpopetsi Dhlamini) 
 
It took ten years before the YCW could be revived in Maokeng. It was only in 1977 that a branch 
of the YCW was re-established in Maokeng. Peace Modikoe (now Tsotetsi), the only female 
member of the organization and founder member, recalls:  
 
Father Joseph Falkiner was the one who came and taught us about it and how  
it worked. It was actually introduced in church. Well, because I have always  
been active, the Father nominated me [and others] to attend a course. It was at  
Hillside, in Durban. It was myself, Peter Theletsane and Martin Kau. And the  
other three were from Welkom. We left on Friday … The people who led that  
course were people like Father Falkiner and Phelane Makgane. That’s where we  
were taught about the movement: how it works and that we should know our rights,  
and how to fight for our rights
811
 
 
Unlike other branches of the YCW in other townships, the branch of the YCW in Maokeng 
limited its attention solely to worker-related issues. It avoided addressing issues affecting the 
“community” and steered clear from student and civic matters (it was for this reason that 
opposition councillors in the community council assumed the leadership position in civic matters 
– see chapter four). This was to work against its members later when they attempted to recruit 
more members to the organisation. Conversely, in places like Kagiso, the members of the YCW 
were involved in the campaign against rent increases in the township; they also participated in 
student matters. As a result, Lekgoathi argues that “the YCW was able to attract a large 
contingent of young people not only in Kagiso but also from the neighbouring township of 
Munsieville”.812    
 
On their return from the course at Hillside, inspired, Modikoe and her colleague formed the 
branch of YCW in Maokeng.
813
 “When I arrived in my parish”, Modikoe remembers, “I 
requested the Father to make an announcement that young workers should come forward, though 
I wasn’t a young worker then. That’s how it became known. We used to meet there in church”.814 
Again, having a non-worker at the forefront of the fight for the rights of the workers 
disadvantaged the YCW in Maokeng. Although no readily available statistics could be found 
about the membership of the branch of the YCW in Maokeng, it is unlikely that it had a large 
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contingent of followers. This was evident when the core leadership of the YCW was detained, 
the branch ceased to function (more about this below).  
 
In the initial stages, the YCW in Maokeng comprised only members of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Their message to the young workers was clear: “they must not allow exploitation such 
as working unpaid over time and not to think that they were expected to do so, meanwhile it was 
wrong; do not work during lunchtime; and do not work during holidays without pay … Go and 
conscientise fellow workers”.815 But perhaps more importantly it was the concepts of ‘See, 
Judge, and Act’ in their message that was most persuasive. Jane Hlongwane explained that the 
‘See’ concept helped the young people to enquire, hear and notice what was happening at work, 
home, church and around them. And through the ‘Judge’, the young people were encouraged to 
try and debate issues without prejudice. Finally, through the ‘Act’ concept the young people 
were introduced to trade unionism, but most significantly were encouraged to be action-
orientated.
816
  
 
But later the branch of the YCW in Maokeng opened its membership to non-Catholics. One of 
the branch’s recruits was Mongezi Radebe. Radebe’s association with this branch is discussed in 
detail below. But it is suffice here to note that he was a member of the Apostolic Church in Zion. 
In the interview with Frederikse, Radebe claimed that he was attracted to the branch of the YCW 
in Maokeng because their discussions did not revolved around religion. He explained 
 
“Whenever we were there, bible wouldn’t be discussed at all. And there were no 
church rituals that were conducted…. Because I was not Roman Catholic. I was 
always Zionist
817
 
 
Apart from Radebe, there is no evidence to suggest that the branch of the YCW in Maokeng was 
able to attract more members who were non-Catholics. Moreover, due to its lack of interest in the 
“community” related matters, the branch of the YCW in Kroonstad was unsuccessful in 
attracting more members, especially those who were non-Catholic. To conscientise young people 
in the catholic Church, this branch used cultural plays and poetry. Ntai Alfred Matube, who was 
born in 1947 and in 1977 was a member of the Roman Catholic Church in Maokeng, recalls that 
in addition to inviting youth from other Catholic Churches in the surrounding environ to perform 
poetry, the members of the YCW in Maokeng also staged a play depicting the social injustice 
prevailing in the country. Remembering the play, Matube remarks 
 
 There was this play where they showed how mineworkers lived. One would buy  
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cigarette with R10 and would not even get change. Another one would buy cigarette  
with R15 there. [In the play] it was a white person's shop. These people were shouted  
at when they went to buy: ‘The price has changed’. There was no stable price. So in that 
play it was a matter of the Young Christian Workers going to the shop to buy … Then 
they found that ‘Yes, it is the truth’. Another one went back to the organisation and 
asked: 'What can we do to change that?' Then they said 'We have to go and challenge the 
shop owner'. Now in the play they beat the shop owner.  It looked as if it was real, but it 
was just a play
818
  
 
Matube claims that this play was used by the state in the case against the members of the branch 
of the YCW in Kroonstad to demonstrate that they were conscientising young black people to 
rise against the government
819
 (see below) 
   
In contrast, engaging in civic matters popularized and legitimized the branch of the YCW in 
Kagiso.  For example, when the community council decided to increase rent, the members of the 
YCW branch there embarked on a house-to- house campaign, also visiting the homes of ordinary 
policemen, informing them about the imminent rent increase and how to resist it.
820
 According to 
Lekhoathi, the branch of the YCW in Kagiso held rotational meetings in the homes of members 
and this “ensure[d] that the parents supported the youths’ initiatives”.821 It came as no surprise 
when some of the members of the YCW played prominent roles in the formation of the civic and 
student organizations in Kagiso.  
 
Bafana Seripe, who had worked as an organizer of the YCW in the Western Cape for 18 months, 
was instrumental in strategizing the modus operandi for the new civic organization. He 
introduced the concept of door-to-door campaign and the use of media in organizing people.
822
 
Similarly, some of the members of the YCW played a significant role in the formation of the 
Congress of South African Students (COSAS). One such member was Nomvula Mkhize (now 
Mokonyane), the current premier of Gauteng Province.
823
It was not surprising when Lawrence 
Ntlokoa, one of the leading figures in the YCW, was elected into the executive of the Kagiso 
Residents Organisation (KRO), a civic organisation.
824
 The branch of the YCW in Kagiso was 
also distinct because it operated in cells. Seripe explained 
 
 … When I joined the Young Christian Workers did not have big groups. It basically 
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 operated in small cells. So you would find in a group between ten and 20 people. And 
 as the group grew larger then we would form another group, say for example you get 
 more than five or six groups in the same area. But the idea was that we wanted  
 everybody to engage the issues, everybody to participate in the meetings – that is why 
 the groups were smaller …825 
 
Indeed the idea might have been to encourage every member of the cell to participate in the 
debates and discussions. But it could be argued that the use of cells was also another form of 
protecting the branch from being summarily destroyed if the leadership was to be detained or 
constantly harassed by the police.  
 
Conversely, the branch of the YCW in Kroonstad experienced difficulties in attracting large 
numbers to its branch. Apart from the fact that this branch focused solely on a single issue: 
workers’ rights, it also included in its leadership non-workers. Few of its leading figures were 
employed such as Joseph Dikotsi and Mpho Makae. Makae was employed at Spoornet, and 
Thabo Pieterson worked for the South African Defence Force (SADF). But Peter Thelatsane and 
Peace Modikoe were still students.
826
 Modikoe concedes that it was doubly challenging for them 
to convince young workers to join them: “Some would tell you that you were not even 
employed; you are still a learner”, she remembers.827 However, that did not deter them. Modikoe 
adds “But you had to convince them that ‘Well, it’s true I’m not employed, but I could see and I 
knew what’s happening”.828 This does not seem to have convinced many people to join the YCW 
in Kroonstad. 
 
Just as in the 1960s, the branch of the YCW in Kroonstad in the 1970s also attracted police 
attention. Modikoe believes that this was prompted by informers within their midst. Just before 
the mass arrest of the whole leadership, some of the members of the YCW were beginning to 
shift their focus away from discussions and only recruiting young workers. They were now 
seriously considering turning to the armed struggle. It is possible that some of the members of 
the YCW who strongly felt it was time to fight fire with fire had been influenced by the media 
reports about the skirmishes between the ANC military wing’s, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) – 
The spear of the nation – and the police, particularly the Goch Street shooting, in Johannesburg. 
In 1977 the MK Central Operational Headquarters established the Transvaal Urban Machinery 
(TUM) in Maputo. This was headed by Charles Ramusi and Siphiwe ‘Gebuza’ Nyanda. In mid-
1977 the TUM infiltrated George ‘Lucky’ Mazibuko, Monty Motaung and 19-year old Solomon 
Mahlangu inside the country to “… divert police attention from the stone-throwing youths in 
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Soweto”.829 The plan went wrong and Motloung and Mahlangu were arrested. Mazibuko, on the 
other hand, managed to escape and returned to Swaziland. As a result of heavy beatings by the 
police, Motloung was later declared unfit to stand trial. Mahlangu was found guilty of treason 
and was hanged on 6 April 1979 at Pretoria Central Prison.
830
     
 
The details about the plan to engage in military action by the members of the YCW were 
divulged during the trial involving members of the YCW in Kroonstad in 1979. The state 
attempted to demonstrate that this was not a Christian organization but a terrorist organization, 
intending to bring it down by violent means.   
Modikoe observes that the idea to shift to military action was seriously considered after the 
members of the YCW were angered following the detention and torture of one their members 
Mongezi Radebe.
831
 Radebe was born in 1957 in Phiritona, Heilbron. While growing up in 
Phiritona he was exposed to politics. First, it was through the history of the ANC told to him by 
granny Mankele (possibly MaMokhele), who had been banished to Phiritona. In the interview 
with Julie Frederikse, Radebe recalled:  
… In that township we had some granny called Mankele, who used to   
help us. For instance, mend our clothing, give us some old clothing, and  
she used to tell us a lot about black history … When I was at secondary  
level I started understanding that she – from explanations – [was] a member  
of the ANC and she knew people like Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki,  
Ahmed Kathrada, Albert Luthuli – she was working with them832  
 
Not long after he joined YACA (Young African Christian Association), and became its branch 
organizer.
833
 In 1975 he resigned from YACA because he felt that it was not political enough. He 
remembered: “Well, the leadership was trying to limit it just to church and simple community 
projects such as help yourself project, teaching the young ones in the townships to be self-
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responsible and respect elders … But we were more interested in politics and we felt that it was 
not political enough”.834    
 
In 1977 after completing his Junior Certificate (J.C., or todays’ Grade 10), he moved to 
Kroonstad to continue with his studies at Bodibeng High. “I went to Kroonstad to do the JMB 
and that’s where I came into contact with the Young Christian Workers and I joined it. That’s 
where I learned a little bit about trade unionism”.835 Radebe recalled that what attracted him to 
the YCW was its slogan “See, Judge, Act”.836 This prompted the YWC, and Radebe in particular, 
to be involved in community development. He remarked:  
 
 For instance, I started being aware of the need to do something about the lack 
 of shelters for commuters in the township, because you would find on rainy 
 days a lot of people waiting for buses there and no shelter being provided by 
 bus companies. And then we would be thinking in terms of erecting shelters 
 there. We would also be concerned about those elderly people who’ve got no 
 one to look after them – who lived alone in their houses and yards being dirty …837 
 
While at school, doing matric, he was detained twice. Fanela Nkambule, who was doing Form 2 
in 1978, believes that Radebe was detained after he had addressed students, inciting them to 
boycott a prescribed Afrikaans textbook titled Man van Blyskap by A.A. Ondendaal. Nkambule 
explains 
  
And that time in our school we were reading one book written by Mr. [Andre]  
Odendaal. The book was entitled Man van blyskap. Now Mongezi Radebe wanted  
to instigate us so that we should not accept this book, because that Odendaal, the  
author of the book, was a minister of religion from the N.G. Kerk. Some of the ideas  
which were written in that book, eh, were ideas that was showing that a black person  
is very inferior. And the following day we saw the security police arriving and Mongezi 
Radebe was handcuffed
838
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Prescribed Afrikaans in 1977 at Bodibeng High 
(Source: Pule Yster Moino) 
 
From oral testimonies with former students at Bodibeng it seems this textbook was used before 
1978. According to Theletsane, who in 1976 was in Form 2, remembers that in that year they 
used it as a prescribed textbook. It was at this stage that students began questioning the objective 
of Odendaal’s message in the book. Theletsane, who was the previous year a student of Matsepe, 
the BC-aligned teacher and a member of MASAC, describes the textbook as degrading black 
people. He explains 
  
We used to read a book called Man van blydskap. This was an Afrikaans book that  
we read in Form 2. Blydskap in English means happiness. It was written by Pastor 
Odendaal … a professor at Lefika. Lefika was a Theological school in Qwaqwa.  They 
taught Ministers for the N.G. Kerk. He had written this book. And you’d be surprised 
because the teacher who taught Afrikaans used to be very happy when we read this book. 
He was an old person named Mr. Sekgwe.  I, as a child, felt that this book was insulting 
us. According to this book, Malefu sold liquor. She was a shebeen queen. But he [Pastor 
Odendaal] used language like Malefu was ‘n hoer vrou. Eenige man wat daar so wel 
slaap, kon so maar maklik daarso gaan slap. Malefu sal altyt vrede wees met eenige man 
wat net haar slaap. That was the language he used. And to us it was an insult – and it was 
an insult to black people. It was diminishing our integrity as black people
839
 
 
Seemingly this view had become widespread amongst the school-going students using this 
textbook. This was evident when an article appeared in the newspapers defending and trying to 
discourage students from discarding the textbook.  Modisenyane, who was at this time working 
for the Department of Bantu Education (DBE) in Odendaalsrus, recalls 
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Yes, it was in ’76 I was working at Odendaalsrus as the school board secretary. Then  
a letter appeared in the Weekend World that said “We the students of Odendaalsrus 
supported Die Man van Blydskap, because it had been written by Odendaal”. As you can 
imagine when the students saw this they got very angry, because they did not make that 
statement. Even today we don’t know who wrote that letter840  
 
Modisenyane, concurs with Theletsane, and went further to argue that the textbook taught 
students to be docile. He remarks 
 
 The book taught you to be obedient and not to fight for your rights. You must be a  
Man van blydskap - you must be a good and happy man. But the students realised  
that it encouraged them to be subservient
841
 
 
There is no evidence that the book Man van blydskap encouraged students to be docile, but 
perhaps the reason African students rejected this book was because it portrayed Belina Tsukulu, 
an African woman, as a prostitute.
842
 
 
The detention and torture of Radebe was the turning point for the YCW in Maokeng. According 
to Modikoe   
  
The issue of bombs was once discussed, but it was during the time when Mongezi had 
 been tortured, because it made us very angry and we started planning to plant bombs… 
 Plus the fact that [Thabo] Pietersen was working for the defence force … so we planned 
 that he should place the bombs in their barracks to destroy their ammunition in order to  
 unable them from coming to the township. This was the discussion
843
 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that none amongst the members of the YCW had received formal 
training in the use of explosives, except for Makae who could make a petrol bomb, the male 
members of the YCW went ahead and tested the petrol bombs on a farm outside Kroonstad. 
However nothing practical came out of this and the discussions. Not long the whole leadership 
was detained, interrogated and tortured.
844
It is not clear how the police found out about the 
branch’s plans. It is possible, though, as in the case of the students in 1976, that the members of 
the branch of the YCW in Kroonstad were also sold out. Modikoe recalls that she was detained 
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in the early hours of the morning in her home and spent almost the whole month in detention. 
She explains 
 
 When I was arrested … On that Sunday afternoon I was from the youth club. I  
went home to prepare my school uniform. We then went to bed. Round about half  
past one in the morning my sister heard a knock and suddenly there were torches on  
the windows and doors, of which I expected because of the Mongezi [Radebe] issue.  
Ag! It was also during the time when police were arresting people for lodger’s [permit] 
and unpaid radio license. They thought police were looking out for such things. They 
mentioned that they were looking for me. And my mother asked what for. And they told 
her not to ask many questions. It was cold in winter. They then started searching. 
Eventually, they told me they wanted the YCW material and I told them I didn’t have the 
material
845
 
 
Modikoe was to find out that the whole leadership of the YCW had been arrested. She adds 
 
 Then as I was about to put on my watch, they told me not to put a watch. I told them  
I wanted to check what time they had picked me up and what time they were going to 
return me. So, they took me away. There’s a place up there next to OK in Kroonstad 
called Adami House. That’s where the Special Branch was based. They put me in a room 
and as I was sitting there in that room, I noticed someone passing by and I identified him 
as Petersen. They then took us to a bigger room. And when we got there, we found 
Dikotsi, Tledima and Peter Theletsane, who was the last person to be arrested
846
  
 
According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report 
  
Alfred Raymond Thabo Pietersen, of the Young Christian Workers, in June 1978  
was detained by the Security Branch in Bloemfontein and taken to Adami House  
where he was questioned about the activities of his organization and was tortured.  
He was later taken to a police station in Vredefort where he was again tortured. In 
December of the same year, Pietersen was detained again in Bloemfontein and  
tortured by means of electric shocks
847
 
 
The detained members of the YCW were separated and sent to different police stations where 
they were held. This was possibly to frustrate them and prevent them from influencing each other 
in relation to the case. Modikoe was transferred to Heilbron Police Station where she was 
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detained. Later she was removed to Steynsrus Police Station. In the end the members of the 
YCW appeared in court on charges of sabotage. The rest of the group was not found guilty and 
was acquitted, except for two members. These were Mpho Petros Makae and Mosiuoa Jacob 
Tledima. This became a serious issue within the Roman Catholic Church to the extent that their 
trial was included in the agenda at the Southern African Catholic Bishops conference in Pretoria 
on 2 February 1979.
848
  When the judgment was passed four days later the two were found 
guilty, charged and sentenced, for conspiring to commit sabotage. The state alleged that they 
planned to blow up the Kroonstad power station, a military camp, the magistrate’s court, a police 
station, an office of the Security Branch and other buildings during a general strike of black 
workers. They were sentenced to five years.
849
 This marked the end of the YCW in Maokeng.  
The following year, Modikoe left Kroonstad to continue her schooling in Lesotho where she 
stayed until 1981. Martin Kau, on the other hand, dissociated himself from the YCW and its 
activities.
850
 
In spite of the state’s success in defeating the branch of the YCW in Maokeng, the latter’s 
activities were able to arouse a political interest in some of the members of the “community”. 
Matube was one such person. He explains 
 People that were arrested there were Mpho [Peterose] Makae, another one was  
[Jacob Mosiuoa] Tlelima. I was always attending the trial of this case. That's  
where I heard the horrific things about the government …  Such things made me  
feel that indeed black people needed to change. So that such things could stop.  
That thing made me interested
851
 
 
Although the interest in politics remained an idea, it was only in 1985 that it was turned into 
action when students took to the streets (see chapter six). 
   
Finally, some of the individuals in Kroonstad entered into politics and the struggle for liberation 
through their interaction with other political activists. Dennis Bloem is a case in point. He was 
born in ‘A’ Location, in the Old Location, in 1953. At the age of five he moved to Brentpark, a 
Coloured designated area, with his grandmother Betty Petrus. After completing his schooling, he 
found work at the Union Steam Bakery as an apprentice confectioner.
852
 It was while working at 
the Bakery that in 1977 he began to interact with Michael “Baba” Jordan. Jordan was born in ‘A’ 
Location in 1942. As already noted in the previous chapter, in 1960 during the state of 
emergency he was detained with the other 300 people in Kroonstad for “wearing a bogad” – a 
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pair of jeans.
853
 After he was released he left Kroonstad and went to stay in Alexandra Township. 
It was in Alexandra that he befriended Bokwe Mafuna, Mongane Wally Serote, Vukile 
Mthethwa, Frank Nkonyana, and later Mosibudi Mangena. This led him to joining the BCM.
854
 
Moreover, he joined Molefe Pheto’s group, Mehloti Black Theatre, and in 1973 he was recruited 
to the Black People’s Convention (BPC) where he served in the committee of labour.855 Jordan 
recalls that Mehloti Black Theatre’s main objective was to conscientise black people to fight for 
their rights. The group underscored this by refusing to perform in white suburbs, preferring to 
perform in townships. “Those in the suburbs”, recalls Jordan, “who wanted to see Mehloti 
perform had to come to Alexandra or to go to the DOCC  (Donaldson Orlando Community 
Centre), or to go to Hunter’s Hall in Katlehong”856 During his period of activism in the BCM he 
was detained twice under Section 6 of Terrorism Act, first in 1975 and again in 1977. 
Furthermore, in 1977 he was served with a five year banning order, restricting him to Brentpark, 
in Kroonstad.
857
 In Brentpark he stayed with Bloem. Bloem recalls: “… in 1977 “Baba” Jordan, 
he’s my cousin, was banned to Kroonstad. The security police took him to my granny’s place; 
that is from my father’s side. Then life was not nice at my granny’s place. Then he came to stay 
with me and that further opened my eyes.”858   
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Mike “Baba” Jordan in Kroonstad after he was banned 
(Source: Post, 24 January 1979) 
 
At this stage, Bloem was apolitical and focused on his work. According to Isaac “Sakkie” 
Oliphant, “I used to struggle to talk sense to this guy, to say why are you always content with the 
little that you receive from these whites?”859 However, the situation changed immediately he 
started living with Jordan. Bloem recalls: “We used to talk for very long time at night when I’m 
from work. And he was telling me about life in general; what happened in Soweto. He was a 
leader in the 1976 uprisings. He was working for … the South African Council of Churches 
(SACC) then. … My meeting with him really opened my eyes.”860 Bloem’s oral testimony 
demonstrates one the limitations of oral history; that of, exaggeration. It is true that in 1976 when 
the student uprising broke-out in Soweto, Jordan was in Johannesburg and active in the BC 
movement. But he was not a leader of the uprising nor was he in any way instrumental in inciting 
them. Jordan recalls that in 1976 he was employed by the South African Council of Churches 
(SACC) in their Braamfontein Offices and his contact with the leaders of the uprising was when 
Tebello Motapanyane and Raymond Ramapepe, leading figures in the South African Student 
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Movement, came to his office to request donations – money he believes was used to purchase 
material to make pamphlets used on the day of the demonstration
861
. It is possible that Bloem 
places Jordan at the centre of the student uprising, arguably a turning point in South Africa’s 
political history, to legitimize his role in the struggle and professional careers. At the time of the 
interview, Bloem was an ANC Member of Parliament and the Chairperson of the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services in the national parliament.
862
 Such information that he was 
introduced to politics by a leader of the student uprising would undoubtedly guarantee him 
indefinite respect from his offspring and his colleagues. An unsuspecting researcher/scholar 
would use such information without testing it against other sources. It is therefore imperative to 
verify oral testimonies before using them.  
   
It was not long after Bloem had received political lessons from Jordan that he put to use his 
political knowledge. In December 1979 he organized a strike action at the Bakery, complaining 
about low wages and working conditions. Remembering how he organized the strike, he 
remarked proudly 
 
I spoke individually to them (workers), … to say, ‘No, this man (owner) is making 
millions of rands.’ And I said, ‘We can bring him down to pay us more.’ You know  
he paid us 10 cents then for an hour overtime. I started with R7.50 per week; and that  
was now the highest salary. This old man, ntate Kleinboy, was getting R5.50. .. And I 
said, no. And I organised them. The Sunday we planned with them [that] I will meet them 
at the Post Office in Phomolong. I had a Ford bakkie. And by five o’clock or six o’clock 
in the afternoon all of them were there – the workers. … We explained it this way: we’re 
going to take the nightshift away, and then in the morning when the dayshift starts at five, 
then from four o’clock we are going to block the gate. All of us we’re going to town to 
protest there so that these people must join us. The entire nightshift I met them there at 
the Post Office in Phomolong and I transported them to my house in Brentpark. All of 
them slept there that night. Four o’clock I took the van and transported them to town … 
And at five o’clock all of us were there and the strike went on for three days. The third 
day then the Security Branch came there - the very same guys who were watching ntate 
Baba - and arrested me. They said that I’m the leader and I have organised this. Then 
they took me to a farm called Heuningspruit Police Station. They detained me there for 
seven days before I appeared before court. But there was interrogation in the seven 
days
863
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The strike action was partially successful. The Bakery could not supply bread to its clients in 
Kroonstad and the mines in Welkom. In Bloem’s words “For three days we shut that 
bakery.”864In contrast, Isaac “Sakkie Oliphant remembers the strike differently. According to 
him, the strike lasted a day and it was broken by the police when they arrested the striking 
workers. Then the company hired scab labour to work.
865
 In spite of the outcome, it is clear that 
Kroonstad was shaken by the strike action organized by Bloem and his co-workers at the Union 
Steam Bakery. This resulted in Kroonstad being placed under the strict control of the security 
police. For instance, in 1980 Kroonstad was amongst a number of other townships served with a 
ban on political meetings of more than 10 people.
866
 This was a serious blow to any further 
attempts to organize. Notwithstanding, the strike failed to win the workers their demands. It was 
only in 1980 after another strike action by the workers that the management of the Union Steam 
Bakery agreed to issue the workers with a 10 per cent increase to their wages.
867
  
 
At the end of the 1970s, the local municipality and the state in general, in their attempt to restore 
law and order in the once-tranquil and quiescent Kroonstad’s black locations, changed tactics. 
They no longer relied solely on using force to quell political resistance. They planned to win the 
‘hearts and minds’ of the residents, especially the younger generation. They organized camps for 
young people still at school. At these camps young people were indoctrinated by the members of 
the South African Defence Force (SADF). Nkambule remembers  
 One other thing which was used during this time were camps. These camps were  
 organized to indoctrinate the Standard 7s (Form 2), before they could get to matric. 
 It would be a group of boys, accompanied by one teacher into the veld. In that veld 
 we would find that we were having instructors; and these instructors were members  
of the SADF. Girls would be organized separately. We were taught that communism 
was not right. We were told by white people in the presence of our teacher
868
  
 
This tactic seemed to have achieved its objective in Kroonstad – albeit temporarily. Maokeng 
was to erupt again in 1985 (see chapter five). Before then, the opposition councillors within the 
community council led resistance against the governing councillors. Chapter four will examine 
the roles of community and town councils in Maokeng and the Management Committee in 
Brentpark.  
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Conclusion         
 
After the Sharpeville massacre, the National Party government enacted a battery of repressive 
laws. This, coupled with the economic boom, cowed many black people. Those who remained 
active in politics were forced to function underground. The majority of people instead focused 
their energies in trying to find employment to eke out a living for themselves and their families. 
It was not long before the situation would change. New entry points were created to introduce 
black people to politics. First, it was through the newly established university-colleges for black 
students. It was in these institutions that many young black students joined the South African 
Students Organisation (SASO) and became adherents of the Black Consciousness (BC) 
philosophy. 
 
At the beginning of the 1970s the majority of these students were expelled and others were 
suspended from their university-colleges mainly for political reasons. A significant number of 
them were employed as teachers in various high and secondary schools across the country, 
including Maokeng Township. At Bodibeng High some of these teachers used their position to 
conscientise students. They instilled in them a BC philosophy, which encouraged the students to 
be proud of being black. For students, this dispelled the notion of white superiority. Firstly, the 
students at Bodibeng established the branch of the South African Student Movement (SASM) 
and, secondly, the Maokeng Student Art Club (MASAC). The central spine of these bodies was 
the BC philosophy. Consequently, when the students in Soweto rose against the imposition of 
Afrikaans as one of the two media of instruction, the previously timid students in Maokeng also 
demonstrated in solidarity with the students in Soweto and elsewhere in the country. Although 
this demonstration was swiftly curtailed by the police, a seed of resistance had been sown in the 
young black people in Kroonstad.    
 
The other group of young people entered politics through their involvement in church, 
particularly the Roman Catholic Church. It was in this church that these young people joined the 
Young Christian Workers (YCW). The YCW’s role was to recruit and give support to the young 
workers. Furthermore, the YCW conscientised young black people through the politically-loaded 
stage plays. These activities drew the attention of the police. The leading figures in the YCW 
were detained and tortured. This forced the members of the YCW to begin to question the role of 
organization in fighting apartheid. They concluded that apartheid could not be defeat solely by 
engaging in passive resistance. They decided to use military tactics. The leading figures in the 
YCW were all detained before they could implement their tactic. They were charged and tried. In 
the end, the rest were acquitted except for two. This ended the role of the YCW in Kroonstad.  
 
Finally, it was through a banned activist that Dennis Bloem was introduced to politics. Buoyed 
up by the political knowledge he received from his cousin, Michael “Baba” Jordan, an ardent 
member of the BC movement, Bloem mobilized and organized a strike action at his workplace, 
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demanding better payment. Although the strike was swiftly halted by the police but it left an 
indelible mark in the minds of the black workers in Kroonstad. At the beginning of 1980 workers 
at the Union Steam Bakery organized successful strikes, demanding better payment.  
 
These entry points into politics assisted political activists such as Bloem, “Sakkie” Oliphant, 
Khotso Sesele, Lewele Modisenyane, and many more in the 1980s to lead the mobilization of the 
“community” and protests.869 Similarly, Mongezi Radebe, for example, benefitted from his 
association with the YCW. In the 1980s he became a trade unionist, organizing for CCAWUSA 
(Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union of South Africa).870   
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CHAPTER FOUR  
Kroonstad’s black local council politics, 1977-1989 
Introduction 
The 1973 black workers’ strike in Durban and the 1976 student revolt, which started in Soweto 
but soon spread to many other townships across the country, as noted in the previous chapter,  
aroused “the anger related to deep-rooted grievances over housing, transport, influx control, 
liquor, crime, corruption, and complete denial of meaningful political rights”871 for Africans. 
Moreover, the total condemnation both nationally and internationally of the government’s brutal 
response especially to the student revolt
872
, coupled with suggestions from business to 
government, particularly from the Transvaal Chamber of Industries arguing “... that it was 
essential to recognise the permanence of the urban black in contrast to viewing him as a 
temporary sojourner”,873 forced the NP government to introduce reforms, particularly in relation 
to black local government.
874
 In 1977 the government introduced the Community Councils, and 
in 1982 upgraded them to either Town or Village Councils, under the Black Local Authorities 
(BLA) Act. Meanwhile for the Coloured communities, the government had earlier introduced 
Management Committees in the early 1960s.
875
 However, these institutions had limited powers, 
and, most worryingly, they were forced to be financially self-reliant. Inevitably, this caused 
tensions between these institutions and the communities they were supposed to serve. This was 
particularly evident in the African townships under the Town Councils in the mid-1980s. For 
example, these institutions’ failure to provide the basic social services to their respective 
communities and their reliance on increasing rent and service charges placed them in an exposed 
position. Communities, initially, led by civic organisations and, later, by students, youth, women 
and trade union organisations, opposed and challenged them, and in a number of townships they 
were forced to dissolve.    
This chapter attempts to demonstrate that the Kroonstad Community Council (KCC) and the 
Town Council of Maokeng (TCM), in contrast to other councils in many other townships across 
the country, did not experience protests by members of their community whose main objective 
was forcing them ultimately to dissolve – at least not until 1989. This does not imply, however, 
that certain sections of the “community” did not oppose or challenge these Councils. They did. 
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But these lacked wider “community” support. It was for this reason that they were always 
unsuccessful. The Councils, including the Management Committee (Manco), for Coloureds in 
Brentpark, remained at the helm of the administration of their townships for their full terms. In 
fact, the TCM (renamed City Council of Maokeng in 1989) and the Brentpark’s Manco were 
only finally dissolved following the introduction of the Transitional Local Council (TLC), which 
administered the three areas: Maokeng, Brentpark and town until the first democratic local 
government elections in November 1995. The main reason the TCM and the Manco in Brentpark 
remained in power for their full terms, I contend, was because they satisfied their communities’ 
social needs, especially those of the adults’ (rate payers), and made concerted efforts to keep the 
rent and service charges at a minimum level. But most importantly, and this largely applied to 
the TCM, they interceded with state officials on behalf of their communities over various issues.  
In 1989 the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), a formal alliance between the United 
Democratic Front (UDF)
876
 and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was 
established, and it pushed for radical changes. From the onset the MDM embarked on a defiance 
campaign, during which, amongst other things, all the government-created structures were defied 
and subjected to protests. It was against this background that the TCM was explicitly opposed 
and even called to dissolve. Although this chapter will focus more on the situation in Maokeng, it 
will also allude to events in Brentpark. 
 
According to Seekings, “during 1978 and 1984 there was considerable popular discontent over a 
range of local issues: rent increases, evictions, the lack of development, and unresponsive 
councillors”.877 This was certainly true of residents in many of the townships in the PWV and 
elsewhere. In Maokeng, by contrast, during this period, because of lack of such pressing social 
issues, save for a proposed rent increase in 1977, residents remained unorganised and therefore 
less hostile to the Council and its councillors. Any challenge to the latter came from the 
opposition parties in the Council.  
After the elections of the Town Councils under the BLA Act of 1982, opposition to these 
Councils and the councillors became intense and violent. “During 1984 politics in townships on 
the East Rand, Vaal Triangle and Pretoria underwent the transition from quiescence to 
confrontation”, writes Seekings.878 Struggles over rents and education proliferated. For Seekings 
“these were initially little different to struggles of previous years, but they were increasingly 
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distinguished by their number, concurrence, intensity, deepening politicisation, and finally 
violence”.879 These struggles were mainly against the Town Councils and the councillors. Thus 
Seekings asserts that “during 1984 ... protests arose out of not just the inability of the township 
councillors to redress grievances (especially rent increases) adequately, but also the councils’ 
responsibility for the grievances.” “Councillors”, he observes, “were the focus of discontent.”880 
In Maokeng, conversely, protests were not directed against the Town Council until 1989.  
This chapter will show that, unlike other townships, Maokeng did not experience mobilisation 
and protests against the Kroonstad Community Council (KCC) and the Town Council of 
Maokeng (TCM), in the case of the latter at least until 1989. This was largely due to the fact that 
in Maokeng during the 1977-1983 period there was no civic organisation to mobilise the 
residents against the KCC, which in turn was because there were no pressing socio-economic 
problems experienced by other communities elsewhere. Similarly, between 1985 and 1988 the 
‘progressive’ structures which had since been established focused their energies on opposing the 
central government. In other words, the politics of the local activists in Maokeng during this 
period were national in character rather than local.
881
  
 
Three reasons can be cited for the different turn of events in Maokeng Township. First, the 
councillors serving in the KCC, which was established in 1977, to borrow a phrase from Jeremy 
Seekings “... provided residents with one channel through which they could raise and resolve 
certain limited problems”.882 Specifically, these councillors challenged some of the unpopular 
decisions taken by the Northern Orange Free State Bantu Administration Board (NOFBAB) on 
behalf of the community. But more importantly, during the administration of the KCC resistance 
against the governing councillors was mainly led by the opposition party councillors working in 
the KCC. Second, the TCM, which took over the administration of the township in 1984, was led 
by an astute and charismatic politician, Caswell Koekoe. Under his leadership the TCM was able 
to provide the residents with the necessary social services such as houses, tarred and well-
maintained roads, without increasing rent and service charges (or at least keeping them at a 
minimum level compared to other townships). More significantly, Koekoe’s TCM continued in 
the tradition of the KCC, taking up conciliatory and arbitration roles. And finally, the absence of 
a civic association (Seeisoville Civic Association, in 1992 renamed the South African National 
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Civic Association, was only formed in 1990/91), and the late arrival of trade unions (they only 
became active from 1985) perpetuated the TCM’s stay in power for two full terms. 
 
Most significantly, what particularly distinguished the TCM from other Councils across the 
country was that it was the governing councillors, especially its chairman Koekoe, and not the 
opposition party councillors in the TCM who mediated and interceded with the central 
government’s officials on behalf of the residents, and who occasionally flouted the government’s 
policy governing Africans living in the urban areas. In other townships this role was played by 
the independent opposition councillors or opposition parties within the Council. Seekings, and 
Bonner and Nieftagodien in their studies describe such councillors as ‘popular conservatives’ or 
‘dissident councillors’.883 For instance, for Seekings Shadrack Sinaba from Daveyton, in the East 
Rand, was a ‘dissident councillor’, because of the populist line he adopted within the Council.884 
Sinaba, who represented residents in the informal settlements (or squatters), opposed and 
challenged the East Rand Administration Board’s (ERAB) and the Council’s decision to 
demolish shacks belonging to the poor and homeless people in the township.
885
 Bonner and 
Nieftagodien, on the other hand, point out that Jacob Khoali of the Katlehong Action Committee 
was also a populist conservative figure in the Katlehong Council in the early 1980s. According to 
them, in 1985 he threatened to resign if the Council implemented rent increases. Furthermore, he 
was also involved in organising a public meeting to oppose the rent increases at which calls were 
made for councillors to resign.
886
 
 
This raises the question of whether one can plot a significantly different trajectory in small towns 
and whether Kroonstad is representation or unrepresentative.    
 
Community Council, 1977 to 1983 
During the period 1977 to 1983 – just before the BLA’s elections – Maokeng’s council politics 
were no different from other townships in the country. For instance, the Kroonstad Community 
Council (KCC) had limited powers, was under the supervision of white officials in the 
NOFBAB, who imposed unpopular decisions on it to implement, and most importantly mediated 
in domestic disputes. In Maokeng, however, unlike in other townships, the residents did not 
organise themselves into a fully-fledged civic organisation to oppose the KCC even after the 
latter had endorsed a rent increase by the NOFBAB. The only challenge against the KCC came 
from the opposition party within the Council (in 1980 the latter was assisted by the Committee of 
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12 who had been elected by the residents of Marabastad to fight the rent increase).
887
 
Conversely, in Lingelihle, Cradock, in the Eastern Cape, the councillors in the Cradock 
Community Council (CCC), which came into being in 1978, were attacked in 1980 by the 
members of the Masakhane (IsiXhosa for ‘Let us help each other’) organisation for failing 
repeatedly to fulfil its promises of, for example, constructing and building schools.
888
 Similarly, 
in 1981 the Kagiso (later renamed Krugersdorp) Residents’ Organisation (KRO) was formed in 
response to rent increases in Kagiso, in the West Rand.
889
 And in 1982 some of the Natal 
townships like Klaarwater, in Pinetown, and Sobantu residents’ organisations were formed 
specifically to fight against rent increases.
890
  
 
Finally, in other areas such as those in parts of the then Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) 
region (today’s part of the Gauteng Province), because of the growth of massive manufacturing 
industries experienced a rapid expansion of African population, which needed to be 
accommodated and provided with the necessary social services. When the townships’ 
Development Boards and Councils failed to meet these requirements many of the immigrants 
were forced to settle in the growing informal settlements within some of the townships. The 
threat to forcibly remove or demolish these settlements caused the formation of representatives 
or committee structures which, according to Hilary Sapire, “arose in virtually all settlements”.891 
These representatives or committee structures’ functions included “co-ordinating defence, 
providing basic resources and ensuring social order”892 in the shack settlements. Moreover, they 
negotiated with the local authorities.
893
 Before 1980, Sapire argues that shack dwellers avoided 
joining together with ‘progressive’ structures in the townships “and were less overtly 
confrontational towards the state ...”894 This was largely because of their precarious presence in 
the urban area. Because they lacked legal rights to be in the urban areas, shack dwellers were 
forced to lead a clandestine existence. “Engagement in overt confrontation (popularly supported 
by the ‘progressive’ structures) or political activity would have invited exposure to hundreds of 
these vulnerable men and women”, writes Sapire.895 In contrast, because of Kroonstad’s limited 
manufacturing industries, black residential areas did not experience a growing number of work 
seekers. It was for this reason that Maokeng enjoyed the absence of shack (or informal) 
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settlements. In 1990 some of the ‘progressive’ activists attempted to mobilise the residents to 
invade a vacant land and erect shacks there. This attempt was, however, swiftly halted by 
Koekoe and his council.    
 
To explain why Maokeng was different it is important to first understand the national politics 
and the impact it had on the local level.     
  
Bernard Magubane writes that from the late 1950s the National Party government embarked on 
the road to ‘high apartheid’, “because of the perceived failure of its previous policies to stem the 
tide of African urbanization and limit dependence of the ‘white’ economy on African labour”.896 
The key objective of the government’s policies during this period of ‘high apartheid’ was to “... 
shut off all further African immigration to the towns and channel all new investment in black 
communities into the African homelands”, according to Bonner and Nieftagodien.897 From that 
point on, Africans were no longer differentiated as ‘detribalised’ (urbanised) and ‘tribalised’ 
(rural), but were now classified as members of specific ethnic groups in accordance with the 
Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. Furthermore, the promotion of ‘homelands’ resulted in 
massive reallocation of resources from urban areas to the reserves.
898
 “As a result”, argues 
Magubane, “African urban townships suffered from neglect and entered a spiral of socio-
economic decline in the late 1960s”.899 One of the measures the government utilised to 
discourage Africans from migrating to the urban areas with the intention of living there 
permanently was by withholding all kinds of infrastructure and other resources such as 
housing.
900
 
 
Again, in 1967, Africans living in the urban areas were debarred from purchasing houses as they 
were regarded as temporary sojourners.
901
 If they wished to purchase a house they could do so in 
their homeland. Seekings writes “from 1968 until the late 1970s housing development in 
townships outside of the Bantustans had been subject to severe restrictions and very few new 
houses were built”.902 According to the Progress Report, Thembisa Housing Section, for 
example, in February 1969 a total of 161 houses had been completed during the course of that 
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month.
903
 And “between 1973 and 1979 fewer than 7000 houses were built on the East Rand”.904 
At this stage the government focused its efforts on two issues: tightening influx control 
especially over African women and building single-sex hostels to accommodate the rapidly 
growing number of Africans employed in the urban areas.
905
 In spite of this Africans obstinately 
swelled the towns and cities’ population in search of employment906, causing congestion 
particularly in townships closer to towns that were host to expanding manufacturing industries. 
The government’s efforts to expel or turn residents into temporary sojourners were undermined 
by the capitalized manufacturing industries’ heavy reliance on a semi-skilled and permanent 
workforce rather than a cheap migrant workforce. By contrast, because of the fewer numbers of 
industrialized manufacturing undertakings in Kroonstad, Maokeng, as noted above, did not 
experience an exponential population increase. For instance, in 1982 Maokeng’s population 
stood at 64 000 blacks and in 1988 67 000. Thembisa Township, in the East Rand, on the other 
hand, which was established in 1957 already by 1969 had a population that was estimated to be 
about 66 214.
907
 
     
As a consequence, Maokeng did not experience a severe shortage of housing – as was the case in 
other areas. Similarly, lack of infrastructure common in many townships in the then PVW region 
seems to not have been a problem in Maokeng either. As a result there were no squatters in the 
township. Tsiu Matsepe, for example, does not remember the existence of shack settlements in 
the township to accommodate people living there. He explains 
 
What is interesting is that if one had to compare my area with the derelict area of  
today, the phenomenon of shacks was not really there. It would be small houses  
built with bricks, [but] somewhere else, you know, it would be corrugated iron. And,  
I think, generally Kroonstad even today must have developed in that way, because the 
 phenomenon of shared buildings does not exist. You can find shacks anywhere in most  
of the townships in South Africa but you don’t get shack buildings like in Soweto or any 
 other place
908
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To deal with the acute housing shortage in Maokeng, for example, the local authorities, in the 
mid-1970s developed Constantia Park and LTA.
909
 This soaked, albeit temporarily, the pressure 
of homelessness in the township.
910
 
 
Factors that served as an impetus in other townships for residents to mobilise and organise 
against the Community Councils (for example, the Soweto Civic Association formed in 
September 1979 to oppose rent increases, the Mamelodi Action Committee formed two years 
later for the same reason
911
) did not exist in Maokeng. According to Seekings, “civic 
organisations established at this stage challenged the councils, but neither sought to win control 
nor substitute themselves for the council”.912 “Their role”, Seekings adds “was to provide an 
alternative institutional channel through which grievances could be raised, and to serve as a 
watchdog over the councils”.913 These were different from conservative extra-state associations 
such as the Thokoza Progressive Association (TPA), which was formed in 1980. The TPA’s 
opposition was aimed at substituting the governing council.
914
 The chapter will now turn to the 
role played by the KCC in Maokeng.  
 
In 1977 the government promulgated the Community Councils Act, which allowed for the 
devolution of specific powers from the Administration Boards to the new councils, subject to 
ministerial approval.”915 Initially, specific powers and duties devolved to the Urban Bantu 
Councils – predecessors to the Community Councils - included making recommendations to the 
authorities concerned and controlling the keeping of dogs and the imposition of a levy for 
keeping dogs, and the promotion of sound community development.
916
  At this stage the 
residents in different townships were content with the Councils and councillors because of their 
modest roles did not encourage corruption. However, after the Verligtes (enlightened people) in 
the ruling party begin to regain some authority in the government in the post-1976 student 
uprisings, the Councils’ role was transformed. This was after the new Minister of Bantu Affairs 
(renamed Plural Relations and Development, and later Co-operation and Development), Dr Piet 
Koornhof, made it clear that he would devolve upon the Community Councils far greater powers 
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than his predecessor had apparently contemplated.
917
 The most important powers vested on 
individual council could now include: 
- to allocate and administer accommodation for migrant labourers and family 
accommodation for persons qualifying under Section 10 of the Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act for such housing in urban areas; 
- to approve building plans for private dwellings and to prevent the illegal occupation and 
buildings of dwellings; 
- to allocate trading sites and to maintain essential services such as water supply, refuse 
removal and sewerage and roads within the townships
918
  
It was after this that allegations of corruption against some of the community councillors began 
to spread in the townships.
919
 Seekings argues that there remained important limits in practice to 
the Council’s power. “Firstly”, he notes, “Administration Board officials retained much of their 
authority, whether within the Boards or seconded to the new councils – and many of these were 
opposed to the reforms.” Hennie Ludick, who started working for the Community Council in 
Maokeng as an assistant manager in late 1981, for example, recalls that the Vaal-Orange 
Administration Board (VOAB), which was established following the amalgamation between 
NOFBAB and the Vaal Triangle, refused to transfer some of the assets which legally belonged to 
the Kroonstad Community Council (KCC). He explains 
 Although at that stage there was still a certain fight that was on. I remember so well  
we expected from the Orange-Vaal to transfer all the assets to the council, because for 
one or other reason they kept some of the information. They kept some of the financial 
investments. Because once you’re a new municipality, they have to transfer what belongs 
to us. You remember there was a brewery here. We used to make Bantu beer. And we 
argued that that brewery was part and parcel of Maokeng. They have to transfer that … 
Eventually it was done. But it was a hell of a fight
920
 
 
“Secondly”, Seekings asserts, “that councils controlled too few resources to be able to make the 
more important decisions.”921 Financially, the community councils relied on allocations from the 
Department of Co-operation and Development’s (CAD) annual budget.922 These dimished rather 
than grew. According to Hughes and Grest, “although the CAD budget vote for 1982 was 10% 
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higher than the previous year’s, inflation was running at 13,5%.923 Furthermore, the community 
councils’ financial woes were aggravated by the boards’ misallocation of funds and ‘fruitless 
expenditure’.924 More worrying was that in the post-1976 period the traditional sources of 
revenue available to the Boards and Councils like the employer levies and beer and liquor sales 
had declined. This would help explain why the KCC experienced difficulties in providing some 
of the social services in the townships. Reporting about the appalling state of streets in the 
Maokeng townships, Bulara Diphoto wrote  
  
In the townships all the streets except one, are untarred. Only the main street is 
 covered with a simple tar and heavy rains always mark the alleys with potholes. 
 These streets become slippery on rainy days and the taxi owners find it difficult 
 to deliver the passengers at their homes
925
 
 
According to Seekings, “From 1977 to 1983 the employer contribution rates were not increased. 
The Riekert Commission of Inquiry headed by Dr Riekert, an Economic Adviser to the Prime 
Minister, called for them to be abolished altogether”.926 For the Riekert Commission, Africans 
living legally in the urban areas “... should themselves bear a greater share of the total financial 
burden in respect of housing, services and transport”.927 Thus in many townships the situation 
either remained the same or worsened. For instance, Bonner and Nieftagodien point out that in 
the mid-1980s the residents of Kathorus “... had to contend with decrepit sewerage systems, 
limited access to clean water and electricity, and a general decline in housing standards”.928  
 
In spite of the financial difficulties in which the community councils found themselves in, 
Councils initially enjoyed community support because of one role they played: mediating in 
domestic affairs. Seekings notes “until the early 1980s many township councillors provided 
residents with one channel through which they could raise and resolve certain limited problems. 
Councillors served as arbiters in township disputes, mediators for residents with the authorities, 
and dispensers of limited forms of patronage. These roles brought councillors some significant 
popular support”.929 This view was clearly corroborated by the interviewee in the statement 
below:  
 
 If you fought with your wife, you could be taken to the councillors, and they will  
sort out the problems ... most of the cases were not handed over to the police, but  
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were being solved by them. Or if you have a relative living in the rural areas, and  
you want that relative to live in the township, this can be done through the councillors  
... That is why our parents had confidence in them
930
  
 
In similar vein, other residents viewed “the councillors’ roles as limited and well-defined 
  
The councillors were people who were just going to help with family disputes. 
 Our people didn’t think of them playing any active political role whatsoever, 
 they were just like social workers, or marriage counsellors
931
 
 
Indeed, Simon Monne Ramothibi, who became a councillor in the Phiritona Community Council 
(PCC) in 1979, claims that he, as a councillor, made it his responsibility to assist members of his 
community when they approached him for help. He explains 
  
 When residents came to me for help I’d never turn them back, “rather I would say  
let’s go to my office so that you can tell me about your problems”.932 
 
In addition “Councillors would lobby and intercede”, writes Seekings “with state officials over 
such issues as residents permits, house and license allocations, development and rents”.933 Such 
action endeared the councillors to their communities. However, it was not long before the 
situation changed.  
 
For Seekings, it was the changing role of Community Council which inevitably impacted on the 
councillors’ relations with other residents; that was a key factor in the growing tensions between 
the residents and the new councils. Now that the councillors had the powers to allocate 
accommodation and trading sites, for instance, Seekings and other commentators believe this 
encouraged corruption on the part of the councillors. In 1983, for example, councillor ‘Tiger’ 
Rabolou was killed by an irate supplicant. According to a witness, writes Seekings, Rabolou’s 
killer told him 
 
 ‘Tiger’, since I gave you my R200 last year you promised that you would get me a  
 house in the township but instead you decided to give the house to your children and  
you left us stranded
934
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Similarly, Bonner and Nieftagodien note that the Vosloorus Council was criticised for 
misallocation of funds. According to them “In 1983 the Vosloorus Council spent R3.5 million on 
the construction of a civic centre instead of using the money towards the provision of houses”.935 
Similarly, in Munsieville, West Rand, residents organised themselves into a civic organisation to 
oppose the community councillors, including the Mayor Mrs Makgongwane, not only for 
increasing rent but also for allegations of an arbitrary, oppressive and unjust methods of 
allocating housing.
936
 In Maokeng, such allegations of corruption against certain governing 
councillors were spearheaded by members of the opposition in the Council.  
 
In accordance with section 21 of Ordinance No. 8 of 1978 the election of community councillors 
in the OFS were held in March 1978.
937
 And on 26 September of the same year, the Mayor of the 
Kroonstad Municipality reported that “a Community Council for the local black township would 
be inaugurated on 18 October 1978 ...”938 The Council was made up of the following councillors: 
S.M.C. Seroto (chairman), M.M. Mabitle, A. Lechalaba, E. Phakoe, P. Tau, J. Monyake, E.M. 
Setai, N.B. Plank, D. Ramakhale, Mrs J. Mokgoetsi, Mrs B. Roro, T.A. Thibile, and A. 
Mohanoe. The executive comprised of Seroto, Mogoetsi, Lechalaba, Mabitle and Monyake.
939
  
The rest were opposition councillors in the council.  
 
Not long after the inauguration of the Kroonstad Community Council (KCC), tension arose 
between the governing councillors and the opposing councillors. This tension can be traced back 
to the period of the Urban Bantu Council (UBC) and NOFBAB. In 1977 the NOFBAB built 400 
houses in Constantia Park, Maokeng, whereas 9000 families were on the local waiting list.
940
 
This was to done at the cost of about R3 500 per house. The total cost came to just above R30 
million. This cost, according to the NOFBAB’s administrative control officer, Johannes Kruger, 
was higher than in Soweto because it included plans for waterborne sewerage and internal 
bathrooms.
941
 After spending this sum of money, the NOFBAB expected to accrue part of its 
expenditure through money from rentals and service charges. It therefore increased rents in 24 
townships in the northern OFS, including Kroonstad. Rents were increased for sites with 
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waterborne sewerage from R5 to R9, and those without waterborne sewerage from R4.50 to 
R8.
942
   
Initially, the more than 5000 people who were removed from Marabastad to Constantia to 
occupy the newly-built houses refused to take occupation of the houses because of increased 
rent.
943
 They were now expected to pay R8 compared to R3 before, which some of the residents 
were already struggling to pay.
944
 There is no evidence to suggest that these residents were 
organised. But it seems plausible that they were encouraged by (or had the support of the) the 
opposition councillors to boycott the newly built houses in Constantia. After the KCC took over 
from the UBC, it not only inherited the debt but the agreement reached between Kroonstad’s 
UBC and NOFBAB. The UBC, initially opposed the NOFBAB’s decision to increase rent, but 
finally relented and agreed to rent increments. Ernest Mahloane, secretary of the Kroonstad UBC 
said “The UBC was against the increases at first, but we later accepted them as necessary”.945  
 
These rent increases affected the site-holders. Rent, for example, as noted above, was increased 
in Marabastad. In Seeisoville, Constantia and Phomolong rents for houses without water borne 
sewerage leaped from R4.50 to R8 and in houses with water borne sewerage increased from 
R4.50 to R9.
946
 Comparatively, Kroonstad’s rent increases were lower than in some of the OFS 
townships. For instance, John Dlamini, a member of the Bethlehem UBC reported that new rents 
had increased from R7.10 to R10.50.
947
 The KCC, faced with a dearth of financial resources 
chose the obvious route: they increased rent. Residents failed to pay and the debt increased.
948
  
 
In its attempt to encourage residents to pay rent, the KCC Executive Committee met in January 
1979, where suggestions were made by councillors that either a mass meeting or ward meetings 
be called to inform the residents about the “true financial position of the town council. In the 
event, the councillors decided that a ward meeting be held first, and later a mass meeting, in 
which officials may attend.
949
 It is not clear whether such meetings were held or what the 
outcomes were. But from the available evidence, rent debt continued to increase. In 1981 the 
council owed the OVAB
950
 R257 007.10 in site rentals; R3 610.00 for business site rentals; and 
R31 347.00 in rentals for scheme houses.
951
 Unlike the Community Council, the OVAB decided 
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to take vigorous steps to recover its money – steps which were later to be enforced by the KCC. 
The OVAB issued notices warning “the culprits may face eviction and their movable properties 
would be confiscated to recover the owed money”.952 Tensions boiled over between the 
opposition councillors and the ruling councillors when the latter seemed to be supporting the 
OVAB’s decision.  
Ben Plank, leader of the opposition councillors, at a well-attended meeting at Social Centre Hall 
in Seeisoville criticised the KCC’s executive committee reveal[ing] “that the committee always 
takes irrelevant decisions which are harmful to the residents”. “Worse still”, he added, “other  
councillors are not duly informed about those decisions.”953 Phakoe, another member of 
opposition party “advised all those who have received notices which bore the signature of the 
township manager, J.J. van Rooyen, to meet him urgently.”954 Moreover the opposition 
councillors accused van Rooyen of acting beyond his authority.
955
 The governing councillors, 
through their chairman Seroto, responded and criticised the opposition. Seroto termed the 
statements by the opposition as “irresponsible”, and went on to defend Van Rooyen’s actions. He 
argued that Section 7 of the regulations promulgated under proclamation number R186, dated 
August 25 1967, empowered him to recover the outstanding rentals.
956
 From available sources, 
particularly the council minutes, there is no evidence to suggest that either the OVAB or the 
governing councillors evicted rent defaulters, or confiscated their belongings to recover money. 
Instead, the OVAB’s police went around the township daily with a loud-speaker, advising 
residents to pay their rents.
957
  
The opposition councillors do not seem to have taken further steps either, except to hold the 
meeting with the affected residents, where the Community Council committee was criticised. In 
an interview with Alfred Matube he claimed that Soroto’s and some of his councillors’ properties 
were destroyed by the residents.
958
 None of the other people interviewed for this study recalled 
this incident. It is unlikely to have happened during the Kroonstad Community Council’s reign. 
The only time when councillors’ and the council’s properties were attacked and destroyed was 
during the student revolt in 1985 (see Chapter Five). Matube probably misplaces this incident to 
the late 1970s. 
Opposition to rent increases in Maokeng was not properly organized. Although it affected all the 
townships in Maokeng, opposition was, however, only mounted in Marabastad. And this 
opposition was led by the opposition party in the council. A closer look at the reason the 
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opposition party in the council, which in 1980 had coalesced with the Committee of 12 elected 
by the residents of Marabastad, opposed the OVAB and KCC’s executive decision to increase 
rent suggests that the coalition group opposition was simply not because it was against the policy 
of increasing rent. But this coalition opposed the rent increase particularly in Marabastad, 
because the area was neglected by the local authorities and the fact that the UBC, prior to the 
KCC, had made an undertaken that the proposed rent increases in the townships would not affect 
Marabastad. Plank, the leader of the opposition party, argued 
 The increases should affect Marabastad, which has been declared a slum.  
Marabastad received little attention, if any, from the Orange-Vaal Admini- 
stration Board
959
 
 
A.T. Thibile, a spokesperson for the opposition party, addressing a meeting at Maokeng Higher 
Primary to discuss the rent increases, referring to the previous resolutions by the defunct UBC, 
added 
 Marabastad has been declared a dead donkey, it has long declared a slum but 
 most humiliating, the board does not shame itself for collecting even a cent 
 from the poor residents
960
 
  
In the same meeting, Plank reasoned that it was illegal to charge the residents of Marabastad 
additional rental fees because “the residents of Marabastad live in dilapidated houses because the 
board discouraged them from improving them”.961  
 
The uncompromising position by the coalition group, led by Plank, encouraged the residents of 
Marabastad to refuse to pay the rent increases. This caused serious tensions between the 
governing councillors and the opposition party. These intensified. The opposition watched the 
governing councillors’ every move like hawks. If they suspected misconduct on the part of the 
governing councillors, they informed the higher authorities. For example, in 1980 Councillors 
Phakoe, Thibile and Plank sent a letter to the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet 
Koornhof, informing him of alleged irregularities in Kroonstad. This mainly involved the 
chairman of the Council’s [mis]use of the Council’s Kombi to transport prison convicts to jail in 
the afternoon of the 14
th
 December 1979, which was for his own benefit. They complained that 
“his travelling expenses are borne by the community which is very much hit by scarcity of work 
in its area."
962
 In the same year, a report was given to the Community Council, informing it that 
the chairman of the council had been temporarily allocated two business sites by the Township 
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Manager without the notification of the Council. Thereafter the sites were advertised. The source 
of the report is unknown but it is possible it might have come from the opposition councillors.
963
  
Other than the opposition councillors in the council challenging and even exposing unpopular 
decisions and corrupt tendencies within the council, there was no other structure in Maokeng 
such as a civic association to mobilize the residents against the Council. But some of the 
members of the community were conscious of the misdeeds perpetrated by the governing 
councillors and perceived these as the cause of lack of improvement in the township.  
For Leonard Butiboy Mafokosi, the founding member of the Dikakapa (‘The Legends’) Party, 
this was the key factor in them forming a party that was to contest the 1983 Black Local 
Government elections. He remarks 
I remember then I was still working in the insurance industry – this was in  
the ‘80s. I was the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the party. I didn’t join  
Dikakapa; I was the founder member of Dikakapa. And as we sat and  
discussed with other people, then we felt that Kroonstad was going [nowhere].  
Ntate Koekoe had just left Kroonstad for homeland politics. He was in Qwaqwa.  
Ntate Mabitle took over and other people as councillors [in the KCC]. But we  
realised that ‘No can go’. There was no improvement in terms of infrastructure,  
schools, anything, you know. Then we felt that we had to do something as people  
in Kroonstad
964
  
 
These sentiments were also shared by other disgruntled residents in other townships. In 
Phiritona, Heilbron, in the northern Free State, some of the members of the community organised 
themselves to contest the community council elections, with the intention of substituting the 
incumbent UBC councillors in the township because they felt the latter had not only failed the 
community but were also “puppets” of the Superintendent, Asseweging. Ramothibi, who became 
the Mayor of Phiritona towards the end of the 1980s, explains 
 
During this period there were ‘blockmen’. These were nominated by the residents  
but it was the Superintendent who decided who became a member of the ‘blockmen’.  
If he liked you, you became a member and if not you couldn’t. Some of the members  
of the ‘blockmen’ included Ms Maipuso, who was also a nursing sister; Mr Shongwane,  
Mr Mabusane. They were old people most of them. Then we plotted to oust them from 
office. This was in 1978 or 1979. We held our meetings clandestinely in the houses of the 
people that we trusted. The reason for this was that at this stage there were the Special 
Branch here
965
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Ramothibi and his colleagues won the Community Council elections. Ramothibi continues 
 
Okay, we were able to oust the ‘blockmen’. And we took over. It was Sephula,  
Hlahane, Molete, Ms Mamolora, myself, teacher Mpembe – we were seven.  
I’ve forgotten the other member. We became a Council. This was in 1979966 
 
In spite of the challenge from the opposition councillors, the governing councillors in Maokeng 
continued with their mandate as stipulated in the Community Council Act. Among other things 
they allocated business sites. For example, in the Community Council’s meeting held on 9 
February 1980, the Council reported that it had considered 14 applications for business sites on 
subdivided stands 3971 and 5698 in Constantia.
967
 The council, subject to the approval of the 
Department of Co-operation and Development, also planned to allocate 442 stands in Constantia, 
provided with sewer, water reticulation and gravel road at a total estimated cost of R203 000.00. 
The bulk of the money to finance this project, it was claimed, would come from external 
loans.
968
 Equally important, the Council offered bursaries to local students, and for others, loan 
bursaries.
969
 Finally, it purchased and distributed 2 136 blankets amongst indigent persons 
residing in their respective wards.
970
 
To finance these projects the Council used various methods to both save and raise money, in 
addition to rent. It saved its finances by amending its expenditure account. For example, in 1980 
the Council reduced the contribution towards the maintenance of buildings from R32 000 to R25 
000. It did the same with the contribution intended for the maintenance of electrical networks. It 
reduced this contribution from R30 000 to R25 000. Whereas, contributions towards the 
replacement of refuse bins and sanitary pails were deleted. In the same vein, it deleted the R1000 
contribution towards bursaries for students.
971
 In the following year, the Council accrued its 
finances by charging building plan fees. With effect from 1 July 1981 new building plans cost 
R20 and additions R10. And any person erecting buildings in accordance with standard plans … 
with a size of up to 60 square metres had to pay R10 for a new building and for additions 
R5.
972
In addition, the Council expected to receive its revenue from rent, which mostly was not 
forthcoming because of the boycott by the site permit holders.
973
 From 1 April 1982 unsewered 
sites cost R19.50 per month and R20.50 per month for sewered sites.
974
 The Council also levied 
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other service charges: Unmarried persons without dependants had to pay 6.00 per month; a head 
of a family whose wife or dependant children or both resided with him had to part with R6.00 
every month; along with R3.50 per month for a female headed-home, whose dependent children 
resided with her; and scholars who did not reside in Kroonstad were charged R1.00. Hostel fees, 
on the other hand, were R18.00 monthly and R1.00 daily.
975
 
Finally, the Council accrued its revenue by imposing spot fines on residents who flouted the 
council’s regulations. A. Gampepe of Seeisoville, E. Kambule of Constantia, and A. Mmath of 
Constantia, for example, were each fined R10 for hawking food without a licence.
976
 Elsewhere, 
these were some of the issues used by local activists to mobilize township residents. In Maokeng, 
in spite of such financial burden on the residents nothing happened. Perhaps it was because the 
residents relied on opposition councillors to take up their fight with the governing councillors. 
But it could also have been because of the KCC’s efforts at improving the living conditions of 
the residents with little resources at its disposal as well as its mediating role on behalf of the 
residents of Maokeng. For instance, when the Chamber of Commerce and the Afrikaanse 
Sakekamer, probably with NOFBAB’s approval, preferred to employ Africans from Qwaqwa, 
the KCC pleaded with the NOFBAB regional director to request the abovementioned institutions 
to reconsider this position and “to pay higher salaries to the black employees and to give 
preference, where possible, to the employment of local blacks instead of blacks from the 
Qwaqwa National State.
977
 There is, however, no evidence to indicate whether this request was 
granted or not.  
Ketena eo re tlo o hula ka yona re be re o diela nokeng koana (We’ll pull you with  
that mayoral chain and drown you in the river:
978
 Town Council of Maokeng, 1984-1994 
 
This section will demonstrate why the Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) was able to remain in 
power from 1984 to 1994.
979
 This was in contrast to many Councils in other townships, which 
were forced to dissolve in the mid-1980s. I will attempt to explain this in two parts by focusing, 
firstly on, Koekoe, the Mayor, and his personalised attention to individual issues, and secondly, 
on the TCM’s ability to deliver infrastructure without significantly raising rents. 
 
The inability to provide infrastructural development, pervasive allegations of corruption against 
councillors, and the persistence in raising rents discredited many community councils across the 
country. Hughes and Grest write “clearly the system was not working in the manner intended and 
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in 1982 it all but collapsed”.980 Seemingly, the government, following the persistent crises 
associated with the Community Councils, concluded that this mode of local government could no 
longer be sustained. Hence, in 1980, Dr Koornhof, the Minister of Co-operation and 
Development (CAD), introduced a package of three Bills, broadly dealing with Africans in urban 
areas, for comment.
981
 These Bills, according to the authors drew widespread protest and were 
withdrawn. The Minister responded by setting up a ten-man commission under Judge Justice E 
Grasskopf. After two months of intensive deliberations, the commission reported in May 1981. 
Interestingly, the findings were not immediately published and only emerged in the press in 
October 1982. It then transpired that the Minister ignored the commission’s recommendations982 
and had re-introduced the Bills in early 1982, as the Black Communities Development, the 
Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons, and the Black Local Authorities. It was 
against this background that the Black Local Authorities Act No.102 of 1982 was enacted which 
allowed for the upgrading of the KCC to the Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) in 1984. Hennie 
Ludick explains  
 
 There were elections at that stage. It was 1983/4, I’m not 100% sure … But it’s round  
about there. And then the very, very first black town council was being elected and it 
was called the Town Council of Seeisoville. Later on it was changed to the Town Council  
of Maokeng. So one other technical reason was that the authorities didn’t want to accept  
Maokeng at that stage. But after we had made recommendations, they changed to Town  
Council of Maokeng. And then Mr. Koekoe was elected as the Mayor amongst the other  
councillors. I think they were 11 in total
983
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Maokeng Township (Source: Tshepo Moloi) 
 
Koekoe’s Matla A Sechaba (South Sotho for ‘Power of the Nation’) Party won probably the 
most fiercely contested elections in the history of Maokeng in 1983. Before this Koekoe had 
been a councillor in Kroonstad during the era of the UBC and, he later joined the Qwaqwa 
homeland government as a minister (his political career is discussed in detail below). Some of 
the parties which contested the elections included Seroto’s Inkatha Ye Sizwe, Dikakapa led by 
Mafokosi, John Coangae and others, and Pitso’s Dinkwakwetla (South Sotho for ‘Strong 
People’). Describing the election campaign, Mokhehle Letsabo, who worked for Matla A 
Sechaba, remarks, 
 
Do you remember that the previous Mayors used to wear chains around the neck?  
You see, when we were canvassing with the mics (microphones) in the morning,  
when we took over in 1983 … We took over from ntate Pitso. You see, people who  
were chairmen were Pitso, Mabitle and Seroto. I remember when we were canvassing, 
they used to wake up at 03h00. They’d come and stand in front of your house – I’m 
talking about the opposition. They would say Ketena eo, re tlo o hula ka eona re be re  
o diela nokeng koana (We’ll pull you with that mayoral chain and drown you in  
the river)
984
 
 
Fanela Nkambule, for his part, recalls that Dikakapa’s campaign centred around Koekoe’s spell 
as the Minister of Interior in Qwaqwa. He explains:  
We had some secret meetings where we said we wanted to do away with  
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Liphuramollo (UBC councillors). We felt that they were an apartheid structure,  
for example. And at that time … Koekoe was a leader of Qwaqwa  government,  
the Bantustan.  … Then he came here and wanted to become a mayor. So we said  
‘No, he’s going to come with the Bantustan things here and the like …985  
 
Nkambule’s involvement with Likakapa, which opposed Koekoe, caused tension between 
himself and his grandmother, who revered and supported Koekoe from his days as a councillor in 
the UBC. The tension deteriorated to the extent that his grandmother threatened not to pay his 
tertiary fees anymore. Nkambule recalls 
 
I was living with my grandmother, Violet Nkambule. Then my grandmother had  
two sons: it was my father and his brother, Mzozephi. Mzozephi was hit by a police  
car - hit and run - and he died. My grandmother and my grandfather did not know how  
to work out this case. What happened they went to the former councillor Mr. Koekoe. 
Mr. Caswell [Koekoe] fought this thing and my grandmother got some money from the 
state. And to my grandmother, you know, he [Koekoe] became the most important person 
in her life. At some point when I was at Mphohadi (Teachers College) we wanted to form 
a party called Dikakapa - it was a local party. I was a student. … I did not want my 
grandmother to know about this thing [that] … we wanted to overthrow the organization 
of Caswell Koekoe and others. Mama (grandmother) wanted to know why I returned 
home after 10 o’clock [at night]… And then she learned that we have formed a structure 
that want[ed] to oppose Koekoe. It was terrible between me and my grandmother, 
because my grandmother knew how important this Koekoe was: he fought for that 
money; challenging the state. I was totally discouraged not to participate in anything that 
was political. She even went to the extent of saying she would make sure that I didn’t  
go further with my studies at Mphohadi College if I joined that party
986
 
 
At this stage Koekoe’s support came mainly from women, especially elderly women. Matshiliso 
(Tshidi) Paulinah Rantie, who was born in 1938 on a farm at Mahlakamaholo, in the District of 
Steynsrus, in 1938 but grew up in Kroonstad, claims that she was a member of Matla A Sechaba 
and during their campaign for the BLA elections in 1983 Matla A Sechaba targeted elderly 
women for support. She explains 
 
 I joined Matla A Sechaba and supported Koekoe because of Mr Mahlatsi, who also 
 became a councillor. His house was opposed our home. I can still remember during 
 the elections, transport would be organized to fetch grandmothers to take them to 
 the polling stations. Some of them would refuse to get into the cars if I was not there. 
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 They would demand that I should be fetched. We targeted mostly old people, particu- 
 larly grandmothers
987
 
 
It is possible that old people, especially elderly women, supported Matla A Sechaba because they 
believed that Koekoe, the leader of the party, could assist them as he had done during his days as 
a UBC councillor, as noted in Nkambule’s testimony above. This was, however, not peculiar to 
Maokeng. Opposition parties within community councils, just like squatter movements, tended to 
receive more support from women. The latter were generally the most marginalized in society. 
First, their existence in the urban areas was constantly under threat. For example, if not married 
their chances of owning a municipal house were very thin, if not non-existent. And second, many 
were unemployed and therefore survived by engaging in illegal trade of home-brewed beer. The 
municipal police frequently raided their homes and confiscated their beer. This had a devastating 
effect on their trade. It was for these reasons that women in the urban areas had the propensity to 
support leaders who could challenge either the governing councillors or the administration 
boards on behalf of the community, and women in particular. Gideon Ngoduka, leader of the 
Vosloorus Progressive Party (VVP), also enjoyed support from women. Ngoduka launched the 
VPP in 1980, initially, to fight for the Xhosa migrants, who had been deceived by Ezra Jukuda, 
the Xhosa councillor.
988
  Bonner and Nieftagodien note “Ngoduka’s ambitions extended well 
beyond a campaign to root out corruption from council politics. His aim was to gain political 
control of the council …”989 To achieve this, amongst other things, he “was particularly keen to 
address the needs of unmarried mothers”.990 Ngoduka campaigned that the council should build 
houses for the unmarried mothers. Undoubtedly, such efforts must have endowed Ngoduka to 
women, particularly unmarried mothers, in Vosloorus.
991
   
  
In the mid-1980s many of the town councils, as already mentioned, had been either forced to 
dissolve or to become inoperable. One of the first councils to have its councillors forced to resign 
was the Lingelihle Village Council (LVC) in Cradock, in the Eastern Cape. The LVC had been 
inaugurated in January 1984 and led by Doris Hermaans.
992
 The latter had initially been part of 
the Cradock Community Council (CCC), which she joined in 1979. The CCC was notorious as 
comprising councillors who had been cleared by the Special Branch as apolitical and therefore 
suitable to be in the council.
993
 When the LVC took over it was confronted by a highly politically 
charged community as a result of the unfulfilled promises made by the CCC. The situation had 
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been worsened by the latter’s decision to endorse the Eastern Cape Administration Board’s 
proposed “sliding scale” rental scheme in 1983, “… in which residents would pay rates based on 
their monthly incomes”.994 This was in spite of the economic recession of the early 1980s, which 
caused mass unemployment in the township.  
 
According to Tetelman, “many families survived on the income of domestic servants, whose 
wages ranged between R30 and R40 rand per month”.995 The Cradock Residents’ Association 
(CRADORA) was launched in 1984 under the chairmanship of Gladwell Makhawula to take up 
civic issues.
996
 The inability of the LVC to fulfil its mandate largely caused by lack of funds, and 
the unresponsive behaviour of the councillors agitated some of the sections of the community, 
particularly the younger people. In mid-April (1984), a small crowd engaged in a militant dance 
known as toyi-toyi and sang insulting songs in front of Hermaans’ home. Two days later, 
younger people stoned her house. All six councillors in the LVC installed wire fencing and 
corrugated iron sheets around their houses.
997
 The situation boiled over after the police had 
orchestrated the bombing of a CRADORA executive’s home, prompting younger residents to 
petrol bomb Hermaan’s home as well as that of one of the councillors. Hermaans’ mother, who 
suffered from heart trouble, died from shock.
998
 For some of the councillors this incident left 
them with no choice but to resign.
999
 Later in October more councillors resigned after a rumour 
had spread that councillors were “dishing out houses” in return for money. Hermaans and a few 
other councillors remained in office obstinately. But she was finally convinced by Matthew 
Goniwe in a secrete meeting to resign. “On 4 January 1985”, Tetelman notes “she and the 
remaining councillors capitulated”.1000  
     
In March 1986 councillors in the Alexandra Town Council (ATC) followed.
1001
 The ATC was 
chaired by the Reverend Sam Buti, who played a significant role in the ‘Save Alexandra 
Campaign’, after the government had intensified its resolve to remove the township to make way 
for a hostel complex in the 1970s. At the time Buti, together with other prominent members of 
the community, established the Alexandra Liaison Committee (ALC) “… to make representation 
to the government about the removal of the township”, with the main objective of saving 
Alexandra.
1002
 On May 1979, after 16 years of uncertainty Alexandra received reprieve.
1003
 Later 
in the year, the ALC announced to the community that it would participate in the forthcoming 
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Community Council elections as the Save Alexandra Party, led by Buti. Three years later the 
ALC won the BLA’s elections and took over the ATC. The main impetus prompting residents of 
Alexandra to press the ATC councillors to resign was lack of service delivery in the township. 
The residents of Alexandra started to boycott rent in early 1986, because the 1980 Master Plan, 
which had promised to uplift the community, had failed.
1004
 
 
Following the disbandment of the ATC, an administrator, Steve Burger, was appointed to 
manage the township. But at this stage, the activists’ in the township literally managed the 
township through the street and ward committees. This was the era of the ‘People’s Power’. 
Examples abound of the councils which were forced to dissolve in the mid-1980s.
1005
 
 
The town (and village) councils under the BLA’s inherited all the challenges faced by the 
community councils before them. Worse, these councils were directly responsible for deciding 
on and enforcing rent increases. Just like the community councils, the town councils were 
required themselves to raising their revenue to administer the townships. As Bonner and 
Nieftagodien note “one of the debilitating and far-reaching policies of the government was that 
townships had to be financially self-sufficient”. “Moreover, the political responsibility for 
achieving this objective”, they add “fell squarely onto the shoulders of the BLA’s”.1006 Thus 
faced with lack of available sources of funding and absence of development in the townships 
many town councils were forced to increase rent and service charges to accrue revenue to 
develop their townships. This was done without proper consultation with the communities, and 
worse there was generally very little to show what the money the residents paid for rent was used 
for. This incensed the residents. For example, when the residents of Thembisa Township 
embarked on a rent boycott it was not only against rent increases in themselves but against the 
uses to which they were put. Comparatively rent was generally lower in Thembisa than in 
Soweto.
1007
 As one Thembisa resident remarked: 
 
In Thembisa people were also concerned about where their rents went. On checking  
what was happening … and not seeing any improvement in the township I became  
aware of the people in charge of the township progressing in life, in fact, becoming 
business owners. Most of the senior Thembisa councillors owned businesses, and 
reportedly restricted competition through a careful zoning of shopping centres.
1008
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It was because of this that properties belonging to councillors in Thembisa were attacked during 
rent protests. For example, in 1985 the house of Herbert Majokoana, the deputy mayor of 
Thembisa, was damaged in a hand-grenade attack.
1009
 The attacks and demonstrations against the 
town councils continued unabated. They even spread to townships which were relatively tranquil 
and quiescent. Zamdela, in Sasolburg, was one such township. The township was established in 
1954 to accommodate the employees of the Sasol and Natref oil refineries.
1010
 Unlike other 
townships in the northern Free State, Zamdela was initially the responsibility of the Sasol 
Company. The latter built houses for its employees and equipped them with electricity, water and 
toilet inside the house.
1011
 However, the situation changed in 1977 when the Vaal Triangle 
Council, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Orange Vaal Administration Board (OVAB) 
took over the administration of the township.
1012
 Rent and service charges paid by the residents 
of Zamdela to the Council were used for the development of townships in the Vaal and not 
Zamdela. In 1984, following the Vaal uprisings in September, students at Nkgopoleng High 
School,  together with some of the disgruntled members of the community, attacked and burned 
down the two shops belonging to Paul Mahlatsi, a Lekoa Town Councillor (formerly of the Vaal 
Triangle Council).
1013
 Reporting the incident, a Sowetan reporter wrote “A group of about 40 
people marched through the streets. A bus was later hijacked and driven through the display 
window of a butchery and supermarket belonging to Mahlatsi. After plundering the shops, the 
police used teargas to disperse the crowd. An 18 year-old man was arrested”.1014  
    
Not all councils which were attacked and opposed by residents and civic organisations 
succumbed to pressure and dissolved. A few obdurately held on to power until the early 1990s 
when the transitional local governments took over. The Phiritona Town Council (PTC) was one 
of these. It was able to remain in office until 1993. The PTC was led by a politically astute 
Mayor, Simon Monne Ramothibi. Ramothibi claims to have been introduced to politics in 
Dukathole Location, Germiston, in the early 1950s when he lived there. He explains 
 
I was born in Phiritona, Heilbron, in 1934. I started my primary schooling on the  
farms, where I did my Subs A and B. I came to Heilbron when I was to start my  
Standard 1at Bantu United until Form 3. I could not continue, because my father  
became ill … After dropping out of school I found work for a year as a clerk of the  
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town council at Clasdale. Then I moved to Germiston to work as a petrol attendant. 
While in Germiston I came to know Bertha Mashaba (later came to be known as  
Gxowa) and Mr [Joshua] Moagi. These people were very political. On Sundays Ms 
Mashaba would climb on top of a horse-cart and address the residents of Dukathole.  
We would shout the slogan ‘Mayibuye iAfrika’ and raise our hands, with our fists  
closed and thumb out. For that sign and shouting Mayibuye you could be arrested and 
sent to prison. There was a time when there was talk that potatoes should not be eaten; 
they were boycotted, because people were arrested and sent to Bethal to work on potato 
farms, and sometimes they were killed there
1015
  
 
In the mid-1970s he returned to Phiritona, where he became involved in the politics of 
Community Councils, as mentioned above. Ramothibi could claim that his stature in the 
township steadily rose during his days as a councillor in the Community Council. Like other 
councillors during this period, Ramothibi, also interceded with government officials on behalf of 
the members of the community and also helped to resolve residents’ domestic disputes. This won 
him some support in the community. He seemed to have used this to his advantage even during 
his tenure as the mayor of Phiritona from 1989 to 1993. He claims that his Council was able to 
convince the residents to not boycott paying rent. He asserts this was because his Council did not 
impose decisions on the residents but it discussed with the residents and reached a consensus 
before taking any decisions. In his words 
 
 I remember when we wanted to improve services in the township, we would  
inform the residents in a meeting that this is what we intend doing. And for us  
to be in a position to achieve this, you the residents would have to pay so much  
rent. Then we would say ‘If you’re satisfied and willing to pay this rent, then we  
would be able to do all these things’. The residents would then advise us to prioritise 
certain services and the rest like, for example, recreational facilities, we could do in  
the coming years. After we had agreed, we would explain to them that each and every 
house would have to pay so much rent so that we can be able to repay the government  
its money, because we received loans from the government. It was for this reason that  
we did not have any problems when it came to the residents paying rent, because the 
residents were the ones who gave us the mandate about what to do. They would say 
‘Provide us with all those services and we would pay for them’1016   
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In spite of this, the situation changed towards the end of the decade when the residents, led by 
younger people in the township, attacked and burned properties belonging to the councillors. 
Ramothibi argues that this happened because the residents were emulating what other youth were 
doing in other townships and not because they were genuinely dissatisfied with the Council. The 
residents accused Ramothibi of having embezzled funds. They burned his house and kombi.
1017
 
 
There seems to be some element of truth in Ramothibi’s assessment of the situation. This is 
corroborated in Mogotho Steven “Ace” Mogoera’s oral testimony. In the mid-1980s Mogoera 
was a leading figure in the branch of the Azanian Student Movement (AZASM) in Phiritona. 
Recalling the attack on the councillors and their properties, Mogoera explains 
 
Then there were what we called dibonda (councillors) and these were perceived as 
colluding with the enemy. I mean, we used to say they were in the enemy’s camp.  
Here in Phiritona some of them were Mr Mpembe, Ms Molora, and later came Mr 
Ramothibi. These people were working for the discredited system of the white people. 
So, for us to fight the apartheid system we would tell our community to boycott paying 
rent. Well, we had learned that in some areas communities were not paying rent. So, we 
asked ourselves why should we continue paying rent here in Heilbron?
1018
 
 
The attack on the councillors and their properties does not seem to have succeeded in 
discouraging some of the residents from continuing supporting the PTC. These residents carried 
on paying their rentals. As a result the Council was able to remain in office until the early 1990s.   
 
Just like the PTC, the Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) enjoyed a considerable support from 
some sections of the community. And because of this it was able to remain in office for two full 
terms. Before attempting to explain the reason the TCM was able to remain in office for so long, 
it is necessary to trace Koekoe’s earlier political life. 
 
Caswell Montshiuwa Koekoe was born on a farm in Heinnenman, about 50 kilometres from 
Kroonstad. My interviewees were unable to determine the date of his birth. But Mpopetsi 
Dhlamini, a long time resident of Maokeng and close family friend, believes he was born in the 
early 1920s.
1019
 After leaving school, before attaining his matric,
1020
 he headed for Germiston, 
where he studied to be a motor mechanic (and probably worked there for sometime as well).
1021
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According to Bonner and Nieftagodien, “from the 1930s the mines and industries of the 
Kathorus region had been growing rapidly. This was as a result of the economic boost provided 
by the 1933 increase in the gold price. Industry expanded even more rapidly during World War 
II because South Africa was forced to manufacture for itself many of the goods that it had 
previously imported from Europe”. “Germiston”, the authors assert, “was in the forefront of this 
development.”1022 Because of this and the reasonably easy access to Germiston, because of the 
railway system, large numbers of Africans settled in Germiston. Raphael Palime, cited in 
Kathorus, noted “that’s where the trains met.”1023 It seems likely that Koekoe also joined the 
throng of Africans who went to Germiston in search for better opportunities.  
 
While in Germiston, Koekoe claimed to have joined the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). Mantoa 
Leseri, who worked closely with Koekoe in Qwaqwa and Maokeng as his personal typist, 
remembers: “He said he was born in Heinnenman, and proceeded to Germiston to look for a job, 
where he ran away during the time when [Nelson] Mandela and others were arrested, because he 
was also involved in politics.”1024  There is no hard evidence to prove Koekoe’s involvement in 
the ANCYL’s politics, particularly in Germiston. For now we will have to be content with the 
oral testimonies provided by the residents of Maokeng. These suggest an entrenched collective 
memory about Koekoe’s membership in the ANCYL. Blackie Tumisi recalls that in the 1990s, in 
the period leading to the first democratic local government elections, Koekoe’s historical ANC 
membership caused tensions between the ANC and the Maokeng Civic Association to the extent 
that even Nelson Mandela, then president of the ANC, had to intervene (more about this in 
Chapter Seven).
1025
  
 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that it is not the least bit implausible that Koekoe joined the 
ANCYL in this period. Firstly, the ANCYL at its inception was both anti-Communist and anti-
Indian, and in both Germiston and Benoni, on the East Rand and Alexandra to the North of 
Johannesburg, it mobilised pressure against Indian businesses in African areas. In Germiston and 
Benoni, one target was Indian taxi-drivers, which would likely have struck a chord with motor 
mechanic or aspirant taxi-owner, like Koekoe. Secondly, the ANCYL was active in Germiston, 
and became a leading force in Germiston politics when Germiston City Council announced its 
plans to remove the African Location of Dukathole, where Koekoe in all probability lived. 
Joshua Moagi, who played a leading role in the formation of the Germiston branch of the 
ANCYL, recalled  
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we, the youth decided we would act to prevent the removal by force. We, the  
youth, decided to call another conference in December. We invited people from  
other areas. I was elected assistant secretary of the whole East Rand region ...  
(some while later) the police raided me and told me my permit was no longer valid  
... People were told not to move. Even though the police came we, the youth, would   
protect them from being moved. This is how we came to be arrested
1026
 
 
Thirdly, the campaign against removal overlapped and re-inforced the Defiance Campaign of 
1952, which led to many arrests. Against this background, it is probably true that Koekoe was 
indeed a member of the ANCYL in Germiston during this period and had to flee to Kroonstad in 
1952 when some of his comrades were arrested, as Moagi explained above.  
 
In Kroonstad, he operated a taxi business and established the African Garage. Hennie Ludick 
remarks: “He was a businessman. He [wa]s a qualified mechanic. He used to have a motor 
garage in Seeisoville, named African Garage.  And he started a taxi business.”1027 Mamatela 
Lenong concurs: “Also he owned a taxi. And when we were going to board a train, we would 
phone his house and give them the number of that train, so that he could be able to come and 
fetch us together with abuti (older brother) Jimmy… He drove the taxi himself.”1028  
 
Koekoe also participated in community affairs. He was, among other things, a member of the 
School Board, together with some of the prominent members of the community like Mr Pitso, 
Reverend Tsoai, and teacher Dorrington Matsepe.
1029
Koekoe was also actively involved in sport 
in the township, chairing Shamrock Flowers Football Club, together with Mr Ben Plank, a 
businessman.
1030
 In addition, he was also interested in providing the township residents, 
particularly the unemployed, with marketable skills which could enable them to find 
employment. Violet Motlhacwi explained: “In 1952 he called the community to the stadium, 
where people were taught how to work with tractors, hoe, and so forth, especially those who 
were unemployed”.1031  
 
Undoubtedly, Koekoe’s involvement in the community popularized his image in the township. 
When the UBCs were established, he became a councillor, or Sephuramollo (“Fire extinguisher”) 
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as they were known locally. After a slow start, by 1967 only four UBC’s had been established, 
including one in Kroonstad.
1032
 Because of their circumscribed powers and persistent allegations 
against the councillors that they were prone to corruption, the UBC’s came to be derogatorily 
labelled the “Useless Boys’ Club” or the “United Bantu Crooks”.1033 In the main they advised the 
white local authorities like the Administration Boards (ABs) on ‘township opinion’ …1034 But as 
noted before they also played an important role in resolving family disputes and mediating with 
government on behalf of the township’s residents.1035 It was this role that Koekoe excelled in and 
that won him considerable support and respect in the “community”. For example, Mamatela 
Lenong recalls that Koekoe interceded with government officials on behalf of her family to help 
them register the house her father had purchased from a cousin in her family’s name. She 
remarks 
 
My father, Madimabe Lenong, was uneducated … lived on a farm in Bothaville. He 
bought a house in Kroonstad location called Marabastad while he was on the farm so that 
his mother and children can have a shelter, because his mother used to move from one 
place to another with us. So he sold his cattle in order to build a house for his children in 
Kroonstad. That is how we came to know ntate Koekoe and to be closer to him. Because 
the house that my father had bought was not yet registered in his name after a long time 
he had bought it, it was still registered in the person who sold the house to him. And my 
sister realized that this would give us difficulties should my father die. So she went to the 
municipal offices to sort it out. I think it was around ’60 … Way back in the 60’s. I’m not 
sure about the year but it’s a long time ago … I don’t want to give wrong information but 
it was during the 60’s. During the times of Diphuramollo, you see. So he (Koekoe) was 
sorting the matter out for us, and he would come over to our house. My sister was 
working at Baragwanath Hospital and every time she came down she would go to the 
offices to make a follow up on the ownership of the house, because the records at the 
offices didn’t show that my father had taken ownership of the house. They only showed 
payments that my father made to the owner of the house. And remember my father 
couldn’t write but his wife could, and they lived together on the farm. So it was easy for 
my sister to get all this information from my mother. So my sister …. collect[ed] those 
slips (receipts) and letters and got the house to be registered in my grandmother’s name, 
you see, because there was this thing that my father will not be allowed to own a house in 
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the location, because he lived on the farms, especially because it was Bothaville farms 
and not Kroonstad farms
1036
 
 
Again, in 1974 Koekoe, in his capacity as a member of Diphoramollo, intervened on behalf of 
Mamatela Lenong and other students to be accepted at Mphohadi Teachers’ Training College. 
She explains 
 
Before my matric ntate (Reginald) Cingo gave me a job on the farms as a teacher, and I 
did my matric privately. And then I proceeded to Mphohadi (Teachers’ Training College) 
to do PTC (Primary Teachers’ Certificate). That’s during the time when I realized … that 
Mr. Koekoe was an ambitious man. I think there were about seven of us; those with a 3
rd
 
and not a 2
nd
 class pass at JC (Junior Certificate). Yes, we were the second group at 
Mphohadi, of which during that time the principal there was white and the whole staff 
were whites, except for ausi Ouma Lebona, who was a Mosotho. We were told we 
couldn’t be accepted because we have 3rd class and not 2nd class. Then Mr. Koekoe stood 
up and intervened. I don’t know how he came to school, but he did come and he asked 
Mr. Ledo what the difference was between a person with a 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 class and whether 
they knew the reason why we didn’t make the 2nd class? And he insisted that we should 
be accepted. And eventually we were. And once we had been accepted, we studied very 
hard. And after I finished my PTC, I went back to the farms to teach there …1037 
 
A similar role was also played by the UBC councillors in other areas. Sesomo Samuel Seakhela’s 
oral testimony corroborates this. Seakhela, who in the early 1970s was a councillor in the UBC 
in Viljoenskroon, OFS, recalls that one of their roles was to settle family’s or neighbours’ 
disputes. He remarks 
  
After 1972 … I became a councillor. ... Our duty then was to ensure that peace 
 prevailed in the township … Conflicts amongst neighbours, such as when one  
 neighbor complains that his neighbour’s children messed up in his yard; or a  
 conflict between couples; or thirdly, when one becomes jealous. When that happens 
 we would call them together and get them to reconcile. We had no problem and 
 never fought  
 
Because of this role, Seakhela concludes   
 
We were respected then. And people used to listen to us when we called them to 
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order
1038
  
 
In 1975 Koekoe joined the Qwaqwa homeland government under Tshiame Kenneth (T.K.) 
Mopeli. There are two possible reasons Koekoe made this move. First, it is plausible that he was 
requested by Mopeli to join his Dikwankwetla National Party (DNP) prior to the first Qwaqwa 
elections in 1975. Before Mopeli’s DNP (later it was renamed Dikwankwetla Party) won the 
elections, Qwaqwa was under the control of two tribes: Bakoena and Batlokoa.
1039
 However, this 
arrangement divided the community of Qwaqwa along tribal lines. This seems to have continued 
even after the two had been constituted into Bakoena and Batlokoa Tribal Authorities in 1969, 
and again later on 1 October 1971 after the legislative assembly had been created, which began 
to function in 1972 under Chief Wessels Mota.
1040
 These tribes were seen by the majority of 
people in Qwaqwa – who incidentally were not South Sotho-speaking - as collaborators with the 
apartheid regime. This was after Chief Charles Mopeli of the Bakoena tribe had supported the 
unpopular agricultural improvement programmes in the area.
1041
 When Mopeli assumed power 
as the Chief Minister of the homeland government, he intended to change this perception. This 
followed the Dinkwakwetla Party’s manifesto that it “… undertook to represent the aspirations 
and wishes of the broader South Sotho-speaking people within the framework of the homeland 
government”.1042 Twala notes “… Mopeli, therefore came to be seen by the majority of the South 
Sotho-speaking people, both in and outside Qwaqwa, as a leader with a vision”.1043 It was against 
this backdrop that seemingly Mopeli decided to invite people who were not aligned to the two 
tribes and who were without chiefly ties, but people who were “experts” in administrative work. 
When Koekoe joined Mopeli’s government in 1975 he had already proven himself as a member 
of the UBC in Kroonstad.  
 
The second reason is that Caswell Koekoe was recruited to join the Qwaqwa homeland 
government by his older brother Michael Koekoe. The latter had been a teacher at Bodibeng 
High School until 1970.
1044
 After a brief stint as the principal of Moepeng Primary School still in 
Kroonstad, Mpopetsi Dhlamini claims that he left and joined Radio Bantu (for Basotho) and in 
1974 left and became part of the Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly under Chief Mota.
1045
 When in 
Qwaqwa, Dhlamini adds, Michael Koekoe drew closer to T.K. Mopeli and his Dinkwakwetla 
Party that he was requested to traverse the country mobilizing the elite amongst the South Sotho-
speaking to join the Qwaqwa homeland government. In Kroonstad, according to Dhlamini, 
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Michael recruited his brother, Caswell who was appointed the Minister of the Interior in 
Mopeli’s government.1046 In Welkom, Michael recruited James Ngake. Ngake became the 
Minister of Education and chairman of the Dikwankwetla Party.
1047
 And Ramabolu and Marumo 
were identified in Bloemfontein and Sebokeng, respectively.
1048
  
 
Recalling Koekoe’s performance as the Minister in Qwaqwa, Leseri remarks 
  
He was such a good Minister, even if he was in a bad mood … Mopeli wanted ntate  
Koekoe to be present in every meeting we held. And he would ask ntate Koekoe to give  
him a script of what the meeting was going to be about, and Koekoe would explain to 
him that he didn’t write down what he’s going to talk about because when he was alone 
he couldn’t think. He could only think about what to say when there were people around 
him. He would say “I can’t write down notes when I’m alone. But only when there were 
people around me”.  I was even secretly called one time by Mopeli and others to ask me 
if ntate Koekoe had never asked me to write notes for him. And I told them no. They 
used to say that Koekoe knew how to address a meeting than Mopeli, and others
1049
 
 
Leseri’s testimony is supported by Twala. According to him, “Koekoe and Ngake (who was 
expelled after Koekoe’s dismissal from cabinet) were considered hard workers with 
Dikwankwetla Party circles, articulate and fiery speakers, and among the most powerful men in 
the cabinet and ruling party”.1050 
 
Part of Mopeli’s reason for wanting to see advance copies of Koekoe’s speech was that Koekoe 
was sometimes critical of the homeland government. This strained the relationship between 
Koekoe and Mopeli. In a newspaper article it was reported that “the Chief Minister and some 
members of his Cabinet, [we]re not happy with, in particular, the radical speeches … Koekoe 
often ma[de] in public.”1051 In 1976 when the Qwaqwa government was barely nine months in 
office, Koekoe is reported to have raised his concerns about what he saw “… as a softening up 
on the part of the Chief Minister.”1052 Because of Koekoe’s continued criticism of the Chief 
Minister and his government, in 1979 Mopeli summarily to dismissed him from his government. 
However, according to Twala, before this in January 1979 Koekoe was deployed to the ministry 
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of Public Works, where he served for less than a month before his dismissal.
1053
 Twala notes that 
the reason given for Koekoe’s dismissal was that he had refused to grant a trading license to one 
of Mopeli’s white friends.1054 But it was “later discovered”, Twala writes “that Koekoe’s 
dismissal was propelled by what Mopeli viewed as insubordination because Koekoe openly 
criticized and challenged him in cabinet meetings”.1055 After unsuccessfully challenging his 
dismissal in the Supreme Court and through the Dikwankwetla Party structures
1056
, in 1982 
Koekoe returned to Maokeng, Kroonstad.   
 
In Maokeng he formed a political party, Matla a Sechaba
1057
 (‘Power of the Nation’), and 
towards the end of 1983 he contested the BLA’s elections. Armed with the vast experience in 
government politics and his understanding of the “community” of Maokeng from his days as 
Sephuramollo, Koekoe used these to his advantage leading up to the elections. He recruited some 
of the older and more respected people in the “community” to contest the elections on behalf of 
his party. These included people like Mokhehle Letsabo (then a teacher), Azael Lepedi Nkukane, 
(then school principal and later inspector), Vernon Cwaka Mfazi (then teacher and later 
inspector), Alfred Itumeleng Lefafa (then inspector of schools) and Edgar Phakoe (then 
businessman). Dhlamini, a party official of Matla a Sechaba during the 1983 elections, believes 
that the composition of Koekoe’s party, and later his council, was his “trump card”.1058 Letsabo 
remembering how he was recruited, remarks 
 
My principal then was the late Mr. Nkukane. He’s the one who made ntate Koekoe 
approach me. Right! There were older teachers than me there at the school, but he 
approached me young as I was then. What exactly he saw in me I do not know. But  
as a teacher, haai (no, ways), I worked hard. If something [wa]s wrong, it [wa]s wrong.  
I did not allow it just because you [we]re a principal. … Even if you [we]re an  
inspector, ‘No, you don’t tell me [my problems]. I should tell you my problems and then 
we can assist each other. You should not dictate terms’. That’s the reason I think Mr. 
Nkukane saw that I will be the right person
1059
 
 
It is possible that Koekoe took advantage of the trust and respect the people of Maokeng, 
especially the adults, had for teachers in particular. This paid off. Matla a Sechaba won the 
elections. The unavailability of the election results makes it impossible to prove Koekoe and his 
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party’s popularity during the elections. For now we will have to be content with the oral 
testimonies provided by the residents of Maokeng to underscore this. When recalling the 
campaigns by different parties for the first BLA’s elections, my interviewees were all in 
agreement about Koekoe’s ability to combine shrewdness and intelligence as a politician. 
Mafokosi, who was the Public Relations Officer of Dikakapa Party, recalls a meeting addressed 
by Koekoe in which he denigrated his party: He remarks  
 
... When we were starting to campaign, ntate Koekoe would hit at us, calling  
us marakana (small dogs). I remember it was on a Sunday when he had a public  
meeting, and we were having a public meeting on Monday – it was public holiday.  
So, I attended their meeting and sat there, listening as he was slashing us left, right  
and centre. I was the target. This was our sign (a half-opened hand or clawed-like  
hand). Then he would say: Lebone le letsoho labona le khaetsi, letlonka dichelete  
tsalona (Look at their sign is a half-opened hand; it shows that they are here to take  
and embezzle your money)
1060
 
 
For Lewele John Modisenyane, who later became a leading figure in the ‘progressive’ structures 
in Maokeng, Koekoe’s ability as a politician was evident when he “tore the leadership of 
Dikakapa apart” and went on to win the elections. He explains dramatically – at length 
 
It was Phakoe who called people and he said: Sechaba sa Maokeng se eme sehlohong  
ke ntante Koekoe! (People of Maokeng are proud because they were once led by  
(Mr Koekoe). Then he played some hymns. As supporters of the UDF we were trying to 
mobilise people not go to the meeting. But that didn’t work. Old grannies and 
grandfathers were on their way to the meeting. And ntate Lengoabala’s brass band just 
got everybody excited at the Seeisoville Community Hall. When he [Koekoe] stood up he 
said: Kene ke nahana hore ke le siile le banna mona, hathe ke le siile le maphyeha. (I 
thought when I left that I was leaving you in the capable hands of real men but, instead, I 
left you in the hands of cowards). …  
 
In conclusion he said  
 
Ba bang ke bana ba ngola dimpampiri empa ha ba ipolele hore ke bo mang. Ha ba santse 
ba peperana pele haka, ba tla etsa eng makhoa. Hobane ke bana ba tshaba le ho ipolela 
hore ke bo mang. Feela le ha hole jwalo ke ya ba tseba, ke tla ba bitsa. Ha e le banna ha 
ba nyolohe batle ba eme pele ha ka. (There are some people amongst us who are busy  
writing pamphlets, but they don’t say who they are. How will they deal with white people 
when they are still tripping over their own feet in front of me, because they are afraid to 
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say who they are? But I know their names and I will call them out. However, if they are 
real men they must stand up and come up and sit with me here [on the podium]. Nobody 
stood up!  
 
Then he started picking on them, one by one, starting with the leader of Dikakapa. He said  
 
Moshimane ke ona ba re ke Mafokosi. Ha ke sheba o phasitse matriki sekolong, fela  
o phasitse ka ‘S’. (There’s this boy called Mafokosi. I understand he passed his matric, 
but with an ‘S’ symbol). The hall was packed. People were even standing outside. He 
continued: Molebaleng! (Forget about him!). How can [such] a person lead the 
community of Maokeng? Re mo lebetse, members of the community shouted back (We 
have forgotten about him). Then he went on to the next one: John Coangae. Koekoe said: 
E kae Good Hope? (Where is Good Hope [Football Club]?). Motho ha a hloleha ho 
tsamaisa club ya bolo, o re a ka tsamaisa motse wa Maokeng. Molebaleng! (If a person 
can’t even run a mere football club, how can he manage the community of Maokeng? 
Forget about him!). Re mo lebetse! (We have forgotten about him!). After he had rounded 
them all, the whole township was shouting: “Koekoe, Koekoe!”1061  
 
Finally, Alfred Matube remembers how Koekoe convinced the residents of Maokeng not attend a 
campaign meeting organized by Dinkwankwetla Party. Dinkwakwetla had slaughtered cows, 
with the hope of attracting masses of people to its meeting. Koekoe’s brilliance thwarted 
Dinkwankwetla’s campaign. Matube recalls 
 
 You know, there were Dikwankwetla. You know, the [TK] Mopeli Party. So, he  
[Koekoe had] left Dikwankwetla. And so it happened he had to face the followers  
of Mopeli here. Now the supporters of Mopeli slaughtered cows. Then Mr. Koekoe  
called a meeting and  announced: 'Yes, they have slaughtered cows there because  
they know that you would come in large numbers. …  You must know that when  
you go there, you are a dog, because they are going to call you a dog there'. And  
that rumour made those who were supporting Mopeli to take all the food, because  
people didn't go there. Mr. Koekoe could convince people not to go there, because 
 they would be called dogs
1062
 
 
After the elections, Matla a Sechaba emerged victors and Koekoe was elected mayor of the 
township – and he held that position until 1994.  
 
                                                          
1061
 Interview with Modisenyane, Kroonstad, 9 July 2008; an ‘S’ symbol in matric does not qualify a student to enter 
a university. A student would need an exemption for that 
1062
 Interview with Matube; Mopeli was the leader of Dinkwankwetla Party in Qwaqwa and when Koekoe was in 
Qwaqwa he was also a member of this party. In Maokeng Dinkwankwetla Party was led by Pitso 
220 
 
Koekoe, as mayor in particular, endeared himself to the majority of the residents of Maokeng, 
because of his management style. He was hands-on and accessible. Leseri remarks  
 
He didn’t want to see people suffering - not at all.  He would try by all means to help  
them. People used to go to him to explain their situation; that their children were  
unemployed and they had no income at all at home. And he would personally go to the  
house to see for himself. And if it was true, he would take the older one (child) and offer  
him a job at the offices to clean the yard. And if it was a girl, he would offer her a job as   
a general worker
1063
    
 
 
Caswell M. Koekoe, former Mayor of Maokeng 
(Source: Hennie Ludick)  
 
Matube echoing Leseri said 
 
 Mr. Koekoe was this leader who … if you went to him and then he heard your plight,  
he would make a decision immediately. If you came begging that ‘Hey, ntate, …  
there's no one who is employed at home Mr. Koekoe’. And knowing his community,  
he would go and find out. Just to research. Is it true there's no one who is employed at  
the Moloi's? And he would employ one of the family members on Monday. He would  
start working
1064
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Lenong, again, recalls that Koekoe demanded quality service from his officials when dealing 
with the residents. She explains  
 
Because even if you went to the offices and you found that a white person was not  
helping you and ntate Koekoe found out, that white person would be reprimanded. 
I remember there was a white guy called Ludick. Mr. Koekoe would tell him that he  
must do his work and serve the people, because he was not a baas. But he was there 
to serve the people. He was still young and worked nicely with people. But Koekoe  
didn’t tolerate any wrongdoing from him, and would shout at the top of his voice1065  
 
Mrs Mokoena makes a similar point 
 
 When he was leading the community, you could see that we were being led by  
a black person and not white people. There was a big difference. He made it his 
  responsibility that people were treated like human beings … He was not afraid 
 to challenge white people
1066
 
 
Those who benefitted during his tenure regarded him as a hero. Ntlama Abel Kholumo made this 
point succinctly when he said: “Some of us managed to own taverns because of the assistance 
and the good advise we got from Mr Koekoe. He was our hero in Maokeng.”1067 It was because 
of these reasons and others that Koekoe and his council were able to stay in power for two full 
terms, even though in the last term protest against the council and Koekoe in particular erupted.  
The ‘progressive’ structures in Maokeng aligned to the ANC campaigned for his resignation and 
the disbandment of the council. 
 
Moreover, Koekoe, more than his colleagues in the council, continued in the tradition of the 
UBC and KCC by interceding with government officials on behalf of the members of the 
community. Among other examples is when he had to intervene to help Mrs M.J. Mokoena. The 
latter’s husband was not permitted to reside in Maokeng because of his political activities. Mrs 
Mokoena explained  
 
 Mr Koekoe played an important role in leading the community of Maokeng. ... 
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Let me use my husband’s case as an example. My husband was involved in politics,  
so he was told to leave Kroonstad and go and live in Qwaqwa. To show that he was  
not allowed to stay here his passbook was supposed to be signed every year in June ... 
But when Mr Koekoe came to lead the township’s council my husband told him about 
his problem. Mr Koekoe then challenged the whites and asked them if Qwaqwa was 
a dumping place. That’s how my husband got a reprieve and was allowed to stay here 
until his death
1068
   
 
Koekoe’s popularity amongst certain sections of the “community” of Maokeng was not tarnished 
even after he was alleged to have fatally shot and killed the 10-year old Pinda Vincent Mntuze in 
1986 during the riots in the township.
1069
 He was neither arrested nor prosecuted for this 
incident. It was alleged that he had shot and killed an innocent child that did not pose any danger 
to him. Pinda’s astounded mother Elisa Mntuze, testifying before the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) hearings, said she was informed that her child was playing in the streets with 
other children when he was shot by Koekoe through the window of a minibus he was travelling 
in.
1070
 This incident, and later the shooting and killing of two children by the municipal police in 
1990, was to be raised in the mid-1990s when some of the members of the ANC fiercely 
contested the inclusion of Koekoe’s name in the ANC’s local government elections’ list (see 
Chapter Seven).
1071
 In spite of this incident, the “community” does not seem to have called for 
his resignation. Interestingly, two years after the incident Koekoe was acknowledged for his 
contribution as one of the best local government administrators and for that he was awarded with 
a trip to the United States of America. In 1988 he attended the International Institute of 
Municipal Clerks Convention in Spokane.
1072
 Seakhela recalls that when Koekoe returned from 
his trip a big welcoming party was thrown in his honour.
1073
 
However, the situation changed in at the beginning of the 1990s following allegations that 
Koekoe supported the Three Million Gang (TMG), which terrorized the community of Maokeng 
(more about this in Chapter Six). During this period he was also alleged to being an accomplice 
in the murder of township residents. In 1990 the municipal police shot and killed Paul Rabanye, 
10, and George Mabitle, 18, when the “community” planned to march to the Maokeng and 
Kroonstad town councils to present a petition complaining “of corruption, high rents and 
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exorbitant electricity bills and demanding the reinstatement of 700 municipal workers who were 
dismissed last year (more about this in chapter six).
1074
 Criticism against his council and himself 
grew louder, and this was spearheaded by some of the women who previously supported him. 
Paulina Rantie was one such woman. Rantie felt personally aggrieved and betrayed by Koekoe. 
On 11 October 1990 Rantie’s 17 year-old son, Solomon, was brutally murdered by the members 
of the TMG in her presence. Testifying before the TRC, Rantie recalled that her son, who was a 
member of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) was chased from his school to her house by the 
TMG and “chopped” to death.1075 What particularly incensed Rantie was that Koekoe, as a 
mayor and someone she used to support, failed to demonstrate solidarity with her and her family 
during their bereavement. She remembers 
 I used to canvass for Koekoe’s Matla a Sechaba. But when the Three Million  
 started killing our children, he didn’t even send a message of condolences. As 
 mayor, when we wanted to meet and discuss this issue with him, he would  
instead fly over the township in a helicopter and distribute papers, explaining 
his position. He discussed with us through papers. If he was genuinely  
concerned he would have instead used other media like T.V. (television) to  
send a message of condolence
1076
  
  
At this stage the influence of the campaigns spearheaded by the MDM was very strong in 
Maokeng, particularly against those perceived as collaborators. In spite of this, at the beginning 
of the 1990s Koekoe joined (or rejoined?) the ANC, and was elected chairman of one of the 
Wards. There is a strong belief among some of the residents in Maokeng that he joined the ANC 
because he was tactical. When he realised that the political situation was changing, he decided 
not to resist the changes but rather accommodated them. Reflecting on this period in Koekoe’s 
life, Matube observed: “He was a leader who, when he made a mistake, was able to [admit]. 
That's why when things changed he joined the ANC.”1077  He continued to work as a councillor 
for the ANC until he passed away in the year 2000.  
Having sketched Koekoe’s career, which is intimately linked to the black local governments in 
Maokeng, the chapter will now turn to the Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) and the reasons it 
enjoyed support within the “community”. 
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“What we need to understand is that the municipality here was very powerful”1078: The 
Town Council of Maokeng and Service Delivery 
 
On 25 August 1988 Koekoe, addressing his council, said 
 
 The council enjoys the trust of the community – that of all its residents: adults,  
pupils and children. ... The community admires the services rendered by the  
council in their interests. ... The work done by the council and the developments
 initiated by the council is the reason for peace and order in Maokeng
1079
 
 
Koekoe’s astuteness and charismatic character were visible in the way the TCM managed the 
township. But this also caused strains between himself and some of the councillors. For example, 
a year after Matla a Sechaba took over the town council some of the councillors quit. Letsabo, 
who was a councillor then, contends that these resignations were caused by Koekoe’s 
uncompromising stance. He remembers 
 
Ntate Nkukane, inspector Lefafa, teacher Mfazi, who had been promoted to  
become an inspector, ntate Phakoe, and then ntate Koekoe, we were the people  
who formed the first executive. But as you know, problems are never ending.  
Then Mfazi and Lefafa quit. I think it was after a year. And some of the coun- 
cillors also quit ... some were members of the executive. They quit. They said  
that Majoro (Mayor) Koekoe was dictating the terms. Ja, he doesn’t take their  
point. Yes, Koekoe was like that. If he says this and that, his suggestion should  
be considered. It was his personality
1080
 
  
But these resignations do not seem to have disrupted the TCM. The latter identified and brought 
in new councilors like Sesomo Seakhela, and continued with its work. The TCM under Koekoe’s 
leadership made concerted efforts to meet the residents’ needs, without increasing rent and 
service charges (or at least keeping them at a minimum level compared to other townships). This 
helped the council to circumvent potential tensions between itself and the residents, as it was the 
case in many other townships. The residents’ main grievance in other townships, as noted 
already, was the rent and service charges increase, without visible provision of services. In 1986 
Thembisa residents, through the local civic organization, “… made the non-payment of rent an 
official stand in the township … which resulted in rent boycott in Thembisa”.1081 This, as 
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Siyotula observes, “made Thembisa the second township after the Vaal to embark on a rent 
boycott”.1082 The rent boycott continued unabated, and in 1989 the chairman of the Board of 
Thembisa Administrators, Mr. Gert Muller, announced that the township had sustained a loss of 
R7.1 million.
1083
 Bonner and Nieftagodien, in their study of Alexandra Township, note “the rent 
boycott, which had previously been launched by the Alexandra Residents Association (ARA) … 
enjoyed immediate success.” “In fact, in March 1986”, they continue, “the income derived from 
rent had plummeted to about one-third of the rent collected in December 1985 (R51 285 
compared to R155 938).” In conclusion, the authors write “at the height of the rent boycott in 
July 1986, only slightly more than R19 000 was collected.”1084 This rent boycott played an 
important role in forcing the councillors in the Alexandra Town Council (ATC) to resign en 
masse in1986, as noted above.
1085
   
In Maokeng the situation was different. From the outset the council embarked on uplifting the 
community. After coming to power, Matla a Sechaba , inter alia, revealed that  among its 
responsibilities were to carry on in the UBC’s and KCC’s traditions that of mediating on behalf 
of the residents and helping to resolve domestic disputes. Letsabo explains  
 
 When I joined the council our main job was to oversee that things were running  
 smoothly in the township. And people’s problems should be resolved by us, instead  
 of being taken to court. They could only be taken to court if we had failed to resolve 
 them
1086
 
 
Furthermore, the council scrapped both the lodger’s and visitor’s permits. Letsabo continues  
 ... Things like lodger’s permit were no longer there. We got rid of them. We also  
got rid of the visitor’s permits. We got rid of this thing that if you were visiting ...  
you could sleep over that night, but the following morning you had to go and 
request the visitor’s permit at the municipality’s office, or else you’d be arrested1087   
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In similar vein, the Management Committee (Manco) in Brentpark intervened on behalf of the 
residents of Brentpark when the Kroonstad Municipality proposed rent and service charge 
increases in the 1980s. James “Jimmy” Nanyaane, who was born in 1938 in ‘A’ Location, 
Kroonstad, and joined the Brentpark Manco in the mid-1980s, recalls  
 
We fell under the white guys’ municipality. We got our finances from the[ir] 
municipality. We got an annual budget for Brentpark. Yes, the issue of rent. I had a 
cousin here. He was a very good politician. We worked together in the Management 
Committee and we gave them hell. The guys from town came with the proposal of 
[increasing rent]. So, we had to fight against that. This time they were proposing, say 
from R3.80 to about R7.00. We fought the matter at committee level. Even the 
community didn’t know about it. They saw the rent not changing. No increments 
whatsoever.  Well, the argument was the same old argument: people are poor. They  
can’t even buy a packet of mielie meal. So how can you raise the rent?1088  
 
Seakhela, who joined the executive committee of the TCM in1985, adds that the council was 
able help the community because sometimes Koekoe took issues into his own hands:  
 
 ... Ntate (Mr) Koekoe was a very stubborn person who sometimes took decisions  
rather than comply with the rules. For example, there was a rule that said people  
from the farms were not allowed to enter into the location, but they should go to the  
homelands. But ntate Koekoe would unlawfully let people into the location
1089
  
 
Before long the council also embarked on infrastructural development as part of its tasks. 
Seakhela remembers 
 
 We managed to build the [Municipal] offices that are situated at Constantia; and  
the two roads; and Mphefela [section]; and we also managed to build the power  
station  next to the [municipal] offices. Then the riots erupted
1090
 
 
Similarly, Letsabo remembers proudly 
 
 People were satisfied. Roads were fixed. If it was raining like it is (today), they   
[people] were certain that the following day streets would be levelled. During   
Koekoe’s tenure that’s how things were. You know, in the afternoon he would  
drive around the township – all over. The following day when he arrives at the  
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council he would say ‘Men, you must go and fix this and that street because I  
found it not in a satisfactory state. He did not wait for a white person to come  
and inform him to go and do this and that. He was hands on
1091
 
 
Leseri concurs 
  
Ntate Koekoe used to drive around the location to check roads. You would not find  
roads as bad as they’re presently during his time. He would drive slowly in his  
car around the location, and in a wink of an eye you would see construction people 
fixing roads. Even if you went to him and said ‘I live near an open space and people  
are dumping things near my house’. He would go there personally to check for himself   
and then would later send people to remove the dirt and clean that area. You wouldn’t   
find the location as filthy as it is now
1092
 
 
John Lewele Modisenyane, who later became the organizer of the UDF in the OFS, corroborates 
these testimonies 
 
When you look around now you can see there isn’t any (development). But during  
his term he wouldn’t allow you to keep an old car in your yard. He would say  
“jwale ore tlisetsa litweba wena”(Your old car is going to infest this township with  
rats). He worked really hard and he monitored his people. He was so powerful. It’s  
sad he’s not here anymore1093 
 
Ludick, who was the Secretary for Housing and Community Services, remembers that to develop 
the township the council began by purchasing land from the surrounding farms. He explains 
 
To start off, we identified the need for land. We purchased land. We purchased the  
farm, Jason, to built Constantia; the Farm Gelukwaarts. Now it’s a township. But  
the farm’s name was Gelukwaarts, you see. We bought that farm from Mr. Dirkson1094  
 
In 1986 Volksblad reported that Mr Willie de Bruyn, a property broker from Kroonstad, invested 
R1 million in the development of Gelukwaarts. The housing project aimed at civil servants who 
could afford to purchase modern houses ranging between R26 000 and R56 000. The houses, 
according to the report, would be fitted with carpets, cupboards, modern baths and toilet 
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facilities, and a television room. By June 50 houses were almost ready. In line with the council’s 
policy, the project created 160 vacancies for the residents of Maokeng.
1095
  
 
Lenong, one of the beneficiaries of the project, concurs 
 
 Here there were real changes. Constantia location was established. And the people  
there got running water in their yards when they came, and the municipality gave each  
one of them a fruit tree to plant. Also in Gelukswaarts. When we arrived here in 1986,  
we found running water as well, even though we weren’t given some fruit trees. I mean, 
there was water in every household and electricity. Ours was just to get them connected 
into our yards
1096
 
 
Furthermore, the council built more houses on the land it had bought. Just about the time 
Gelukwaarts was built, the council also commissioned the building of Troubou. This area was 
designated for pensioners. Mpho “Bebe” Taka, who later joined the Three Million Gang, recalls 
that his family moved to Troubou after his grandmother was offered a house there. He explains 
  
… We got a house from the municipality at Troubou, next to Gelukwaarts, for  
pensioners, because we were staying with a pensioner, our grandmother. What  
a peaceful area ... and beautiful. You see, if you were a pensioner you would go  
and register your name. Then you would be given a certain number to show that  
you were on the waiting list. Then you get a house. We were taken in municipality’s 
tractors in those times of Mr Koekoe. [The houses were] only for pensioners. They  
would allow you to go with whoever you were staying with; your own children or 
grandchildren. [What happened to the house in Marabastad?] We put tenants
1097
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(Source: Mpopetsi Dhlamini) 
 
Machabe Thulo, whose family struggled to make ends meet, recalls that he was forced to 
abandon his schooling to look for work to help out at home. He was employed by the 
construction company that built Troubou. He remarks 
 
 I was working for Troubou. Troubou is not a name of the location. It’s a contract.   
We were building. Then it happened that when the owner of that company was  
supposed to give us our last payment, he disappeared.  We took the wheelbarrows,  
hose-pipes, and whatever the material was there. [Even] the thing that you climb on  
230 
 
when you’re build[ing] … scaffolds.  We sold them to pay ourselves. It was in 19861098 
 
In the early 1990s Troubou changed from being a peaceful and beautiful place and became a 
violent-torn area after the Three Million Gang had changed it into its stronghold in its fight 
against the “community” (see chapter six). 
 
In spite of the efforts the council put into developing Maokeng, in 1986 Dennis Bloem, a leading 
figure in the local politics called for the resignation of the council but for reasons not pertaining 
to lack of service delivery (or rent increase). He informed newspapers  in a service to 
commemorate the deaths of people who ‘died in the struggle for a just South Africa’, that they 
(i.e. the “community”) will call for the immediate resignation of mayor Caswell Koekoe and his 
councillors, because of their participation in the ‘system’s’ politics and because residents have 
declared them undesirable characters.
1099
 Bloem’s call was made in response to the dismissal of 
43 workers from three prominent businesses in Kroonstad, the death of Viljoenskroon activist, 
Meshack Letshabo. The latter was shot dead during an unrest at Viljoenskroon. And finally, the 
call was in protest against the acute lack of facilities at Bodibeng High and Kananelo Secondary 
schools.
1100
 Evidently, Bloem’s demand had nothing to do with the council’s inability to provide 
services, or that it had increased rent and service charges. 
 
It was for this reason that this call did not deter the TCM and its councillors. The majority of the 
councillors continued with their work. One resigned though. Ben Plank was reported to have 
resigned from council after 18 years service in various councils. Seemingly his resignation was 
prompted by the call to councils to resign. Explaining to the Citizen reporter why he decided to 
resign, Plank said “People have told us that they no longer need us. I decided to bow to their 
demands after threats were made to my life as well as threats to boycott my shop … in 
Constantia”.1101  
 
Just like Bloem’s call, Plank’s resignation did not discourage the other councillors. They 
continued with their work in the council. In addition to constructing houses, the council also built 
schools. Ludick explains 
 
 We made a motivated application that there was a need for schools because, as I said 
 two of our councillors were circuit inspectors and we had a very good relationship with  
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the late Dr. [Reginald] Cingo. … And with his assistance, we managed to build … I can 
name them Motswela High School, Boikemisetso is the other one … And later on there  
was Phephetso at Koekoe Village. Koekoe Village is another farm that was bought. But 
the farm’s name was Nasiebithorn. That farm was bought and the township that was  
established there was named after ntate Koekoe. It was called Koekoe Village
1102
  
 
In 1989 the Lofty Group Constructions collaborated with the council to build a large bakery, 
Ultra City (including a petrol station) in Kroonstad, and a school in Maokeng at the total cost of 
R8.75 million.
1103
 Mr Bruce Ross, managing director of A Fairweather and Lofty-Konstrukse 
companies, told Volksblad that his companies were involved in a R5 million project building the 
Dr. Reginald Cingo High School. He noted “the school [would] be the largest black high school 
in the Free State and [could] accommodate 1000 pupils”.1104 “[It would] consists”, he added “of 
an administration block, library, the classrooms block, with laboratories and a workshop, where 
motor mechanics and other technicians would be trained”.1105 
 
Similarly, the Brentpark Manco, in spite of its circumscribed powers, was also able embark on 
infrastructural development in Brentpark, although on a smaller scale than the TCM. Nanyaane 
explains 
 Well, the role of the Management [Committee] was far better, because of our efforts.  
We established a high school – a boarding house high school. We got a swimming pool. 
We got a stadium …1106  
 
On the other hand, the TCM went further and constructed an old age home and a resort. Ludick 
recalls 
  
And apart from the houses we built, we built the community hall …, we built an old  
age home. And in that old age home we accommodated a lot of people. The old age  
home got registered. It’s now called the Boiketlong Old Age Home, yes, yes.  And 
furthermore we also identified the need for a resort, you know. So at the back of 
Gelukwaarts there’s  …  a spot for a resort. So we got the extension of money also  
from the government and we built a holiday resort. You know, starting with the 
caretaker’s house, we fenced the whole area. We built the swimming bath, because  
there was no swimming bath in Maokeng. And we built the conference facilities there 
and little lapas. All these were also done during the term of the very same Mr. Koekoe
1107
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1103
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1104
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1105
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1106
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Koekoe and the TCM’s efforts did not go unnoticed. And some of the accolades he garnered 
came from unlikely quarters. Some of the activists supporting the UDF in Maokeng recognized 
these as the reasons the local activists could not unseat the council. Joseph Litabe, a leading 
figure in the township politics in the 1980s, remarks 
  
Ntate Koekoe was powerful and respected by many people, because when he   
returned from Qwaqwa he fixed the infrastructure in Kroonstad. He did so many  
things. … He installed the sewerage system and water taps were installed in people’s  
yards … He was intelligent. That’s why during the elections for the local government  
he was widely supported …1108      
 
Similarly, Modisenyane concurs and explains:  “... What we need to understand is that the 
municipality here was very powerful. It was under ntate Caswell Koekoe. People voted for him. 
He had influence”.1109  
 
What probably made it even more difficult for the ‘progressive’ structures in Maokeng to 
mobilise the residents against Koekoe and the TCM was the latter’s ability to create employment 
for locals and still manage to build all these infrastructures and not raise rent and service charges 
(or keep them at a minimal level compared to other townships). Leseri explains  
  
At the time when these houses (Ditlenkereng, in Gelukwaarts) were built, he [Koekoe] 
 told us to inform him about any builder that we knew. And we did. The builders went  
 to see him and each one of them was given a number of houses to build. He explained  
 to them that they should appoint their own labourers. He also informed them that he’d  
pay each builder what they charged and they would have to pay their labourers. Then  
the houses were built
1110
 
 
Ludick echoes Leseri 
  
… At the same time we were creating job opportunities, because we employed people.  
We employed a leader for a house, so you can earn as a leader. You can say I can build  
and we can see that. And then we allow you to have say, for instance, 5 or 6 labourers to  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1107
 Ibid.; In 1994 Koekoe’s council bought tracts of land for future projects. In 1993 the government offered the 
City Council of Maokeng - CCM (after the 1989 elections TCM changed to CCM) R17 million to purchase land. The 
council bought the Meadows and Dawie Malan smallholdings. See The Citizen, 22 February 1994 
1108
 Interview with Litabe (LHPR), Kroonstad, 14 January 2009 
1109
 Interview with Lewele Modisenyane conducted by Tshepo Moloi for the “Local Histories and Present Realities” 
Programme, 9 July 2008, Kroonstad 
1110
 Interview with Leseri; Ditlenkere are a special type of bricks. These bricks were used to build houses in 
Gelukwaarts, hence the area was named Ditlenkereng. 
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build the house. Once that house is finished, we give you another plan, you see
1111
 
 
In spite of all these efforts, the TCM does not seem to have alienated the residents by increasing 
rent and service charges. Letsabo claims that their council “never had instances where people did 
not pay for the services”.1112 And Seakhela, on the other hand, remembers “we never 
experienced such problems (protests), because our rent was very low. ... Koekoe never increased 
rents.” “Rent”, he asserts, “was only increased recently after he had left”.1113 Seakhela’s 
recollection is somewhat of a bit of an exaggeration. The City Council of Maokeng (CCM) under 
the leadership of Koekoe did increase rent and service charges. At the beginning of the 1990s the 
council increased rent to R41.40 – and it was at this stage that the Maokeng Democratic Crisis 
Committee (MDCC) mobilised the residents and opposed the council.
1114
 Although it is not clear 
if this amount was charged for smaller houses (two-roomed) or bigger houses (five-roomed), but 
comparatively it was relatively lower than elsewhere. In Thabong, Welkom, for instance, in 1985 
for a two-roomed house residents paid R43.90 and for a three-roomed house R50.90.
1115
 In 
March 1990 tariffs for services in other OFS townships were as follows: Thabong (Welkom) R44 
per month and in Phiritona (Heilbron) R31.
1116
 Lenong remembers that for the two stands they 
owned at Gelukwaarts they paid R57.80 for rent and service charges. For Ludick, because of cuts 
in rent payments like the lodger’s fee (and of course because of satisfactory service delivery), 
residents were encouraged to pay rent and service charges and the council managed to break 
even.
1117
 
 
The council was able to sustain itself financially because it did not solely rely on rent and service 
charges payment – although this made up the larger chunk of its revenue. It used various 
methods to raise funds. One of these was to approach directly the Minister responsible for local 
government and request financial assistance – and in the case of Maokeng this was made easier 
by Koekoe’s charm and charisma. Ludick claims 
  
So the problem was to get funds. Fortunately, Mr. Koekoe had the skills and he was  
a person who could easily arrange a meeting. He would jump into his car, pull the  
officials with him and we would go to even Bloemfontein or Pretoria to see a Minister  
or whoever, and then arrange for something. I can still remember good, you know, at  
one stage we went to Pretoria
1118
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In addition, the council also used innovative methods to raise funds. It employed residents with 
building skills – probably at cheaper rates – to build houses, which then the council sold to 
private companies. The council avoided using construction companies, which were likely to be 
expensive. Ludick explains 
 
Locally, because there were a lot of people in Maokeng with very good building skills, 
we built the houses and sold them to Transnet, for instance. … We built houses even for 
the local firms. There’s a motor company in Kroonstad, FCNH. We built houses for their 
employees. Then we got our money back into this account 
1119
 
 
Although documented evidence to substantiate the amount of money the council was able to 
generate from the external sources is not readily available, it is clear however, taking into 
account the number of projects the council successfully carried out, that funding was not a 
constraint.  
 
It was perhaps for this reason that Koekoe in August 1988 confidently informed his council that 
the TCM enjoyed the support of the whole “community”. Notwithstanding his pronouncement, 
during the campaign leading to the BLA elections in October 1989, Matla a Sechaba 
demonstrated signs of intolerance. It attempted to impede opposition parties from campaigning. 
For example, a case was opened against the TCM for allegedly using state resources to 
intimidate other contestants. The Supreme Court in Bloemfontein found it guilty of obstructing 
other parties like the newly formed Maokeng People’s Party (MPP) from campaigning freely. It 
was established that the council twice forbade the MPP from holding public meetings.
1120
 This 
suggests that the leadership of Matla a Sechaba feared its party might not perform well in the 
elections if opposed. It is also possible that the leadership of Matla a Sechaba had come to terms 
with the fact that in 1989 the majority of the residents in Maokeng, particularly the younger 
generation, had been involved in the struggle for liberation since 1985. And this was the 
generation that was totally opposed to any government-created structures such the town councils 
and its activities. Therefore, it could not count on its support. The only section of the 
“community” that would support it were the elderly who, in spite of the perception that the TCM 
was collaborating with the apartheid regime, still held Koekoe and his council in high regard. 
Indeed, Ludick observes that even though support was still there but it came mainly from stand 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
boycotts. Koekoe informed his council that “Maokeng [had] made an application to the previous government for 
funding in its attempt to guard against financial problems, especially to be able to pay for the salaries of its 
employees and emergency services”. See City Council of Maokeng Minutes of the Hundred and Fourteenth 
Committee Meeting, 13 April 1995 
1119
 Ibid. (Italics my emphasis)  
1120
 Die Noordelike Stem – The Northern Times, 26 August 1988 
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owners, because they knew (i.e. still had faith in) Koekoe.
1121
 But this generation was rapidly 
shrinking because many, regrettably, were passing away.  
 
Although Koekoe’s Matla a Sechaba won these elections it does not seem to have received huge 
support as was the case in the previous elections. Despite the propaganda used by the 
government to encourage residents to vote, voter turnout was low across the country. For 
instance, the government distributed a leaflet announcing that Nelson Mandela’s release from 
prison was dependent on the residents turning out to vote in their numbers.
1122
 One newspaper 
estimated that only 40 716 or 19.8 per cent in the Orange Free State voted in the 1989 
elections.
1123
 Interestingly, a significant number of the eligible voters in Maokeng registered but 
only a few actually voted. In 1987 it was estimated that there were 31 779 adults in Maokeng 
(this number might have slightly increased in 1989) still 22 462 registered to vote, but only 7 277 
cast it.
1124
 The Reverend Mzimase Humphrey Gozongo, the first applicant in the case between 
Gozongo and 11 Others against The Minister of Law and Order and Two Others, claimed in his 
affidavit that “On 10 October 1989 in a total poll of 21% only, the present mayor, Mr Koekoe, 
and his councillors were elected to office as the municipal government of Maokeng”.1125  
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 ‘Voter Boycotts in the 1980s: Black Local Authority Polls’, in Mark Benett and Deborah (Research Co-
ordinators) Political Conflict in South Africa: Data Trends 1984-1988 (An Indicator SA Issue Focus, December 1988), 
p.167 
1125
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(Source: Mpopetsi Dhlamini) 
 
To comprehend the low turnout during the 1989 elections various factors have to be considered. 
First, the call by the ANC in exile in January 1989 to make that year a “Year of Mass Action for 
People’s Power”, second, publicized attacks on voters at the voting centres by young political 
activists
1126
, and finally, and perhaps more importantly, the opposition mounted by the MDM 
must have galvanized the masses to boycott the council’s elections in the townships. As part of 
its Defiance Campaign, the MDCC, aligned to the MDM, mobilized the residents to oppose the 
City Council of Maokeng (CCM) – at this stage the Town Council of Maokeng had changed its 
name. The MDCC called for the disbandment of the council and the resignation of the 
councillors. But its efforts were unsuccessful.  
 
                                                          
1126
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Chapter Six explores attempts by some of the local activists to force the City Council of 
Maokeng to dissolve – albeit unsuccessfully. However, first, the next chapter focuses on mass 
political mobilization and protests in Maokeng. It particularly deals with students, youth partly, 
and older political activists’ organizations (these were not civic organizations, as will be shown).   
 
Conclusion   
 
After the student uprisings in 1976, the government introduced reforms. Among these, it 
established community councils, replacing the Urban Bantu Councils, to manage African 
townships. The government devolved specific and limited powers to these councils but without 
financial backing. To accrue revenue to service the townships, community councils increased 
rent and service charges. Towards the end of the 1970s most of the residents in African 
townships across the country mobilized and established civic organizations/associations (or 
civics) to oppose rent and service charges increases. This rendered the community councils 
inoperable. In 1982 the government upgraded them and introduced town (and village) councils 
under the  Black Local Authorities Act. Still this was done without providing these councils with 
financial assistance. Worse, the town councils, unlike the community councils, had no tax base to 
accumulate funding. State-owned liquor and beerhalls were privatized, there were few businesses 
in the townships and they were under severe competition from the big shopping outlets in town. 
Just like the community councils, town councils also dependend on charging exorbitant rental 
and service charges. On observing that there were no real changes in their areas of settlement 
despite the rent service charges they were paying every month, coupled with allegations of 
corruption and embezzlement against the councillors, the residents, through the civics, 
intensified their opposition. By mid-1980s many of the town (and village) councils across the 
country had dissolved.  
 
This chapter has tried to show that in Kroonstad’s black townships of Maokeng and Brentpark 
the situation turned out differently. First, the community council, and later the town council (and 
the management committee in Brentpark) were never opposed to the point of being forced to 
dissolve. These local authorities continued managing their residential areas until they were 
disbanded in the early 1990s after the transitional local government was established. In 
Maokeng, for example, because of the dearth of pressing infrastructural problems such as lack of 
housing experienced in other areas like Lingelihle, in Cradock, Eastern Cape, and in the Rand 
townships such as Alexandra and Kathorus there was no civic organization which was 
established to mobilize the “community”. Instead, during the era of the community councils the 
residents’ grievances were taken up by the opposition councillors (or dissident councillors) 
within the council against the governing councillors. In some of the areas lack of housing was 
the main problem. This was largely compounded by the unabated influx of immigrants from the 
rural areas in search of employment in the ever expanding manufacturing sector in some of the 
urban areas. Those who could not be accommodated in houses found accommodation in informal 
238 
 
settlements. These were the people who were mobilized easily by civic organizations against 
threats of eviction and shack demolition by the councils.  
 
What distinguished the Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) from other town councils was that it 
was led by a charismatic mayor Caswell Koekoe, who assisted the residents of the township, 
including finding employment for them. The council under him made concerted efforts to 
provide the necessary social services in the township, without increasing rent and service charges 
(or at least retaining them at a minimum level comparatively). Moreover, councillors working for 
the TCM continued in the tradition of the UBC and Kroonstad Community Council (KCC) of 
mediating on behalf of the residents. As a result the TCM enjoyed support in the township, 
particularly amongst the elderly people (i.e. rate payers). The same applied in the case of the 
management committee in Brentpark. The later opposed rent increments proposed by the 
Kroonstad Town Council. These efforts severely limited the space for any opposition against the 
TCM and Manco, in the case of the TCM at least until 1989. After 1989 the MDM-aligned 
structures in Maokeng mounted pressure against the TCM (then known as the City Council of 
Maokeng - CCM), called for its disbandment and its councillors to resign. This was after the 
CCM had increased rent and service charges. But more importantly vociferous demands for their 
resignation were made after rumours made rounds in the township that the council, particularly 
Koekoe, supported the Three Million Gang.  
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CHAPTER FIVE   
Mass mobilisation, political protests and generational struggle, 1984-1989 
Introduction 
 
The 1980s were arguably the turning point in South Africa’s late 20th century political history. At 
this point a massive intensification of the struggle took place against the apartheid state. By 1984 
an upsurge of resistance was occurring in most urban townships.
1127
 For example, the school 
boycotts which broke out in February 1980 in Coloured schools in the Western Cape quickly 
spread to some schools in the then PWV and OFS.
1128
  In OFS students began boycotting classes 
in July 1980 in Botshabelo, then Qwaqwa, after which Thaba ‘Nchu followed. In September the 
boycotts spread to Mangaung, in Bloemfontein.
1129
 The main reason for these boycotts was “a 
growing popular rebellion against the imposition, over the years, of various school board 
structures”.1130 Chitja Twala notes that students’ resentment of the school boards was based on 
the “belief that they were remote-controlled by the apartheid education authorities”.1131  
 
Moreover, in November 1983 students in Thabong Township, Welkom, protested, inter alia, 
against the proposed introduction of age limits.
1132
 The government regulations gazetted in 
December 1980 and May 1981 laid down ‘age limits’ of 16 years for African pupils in Standard 
Five (today’s Grade 7), 18 years for Standard Eight (Grade 10), and 20 years for Standard Ten 
(Grade 12).
1133
 For the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) this regulation was a 
sinister attempt by the government to “exclude students who had missed school through boycotts 
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 Marks, M. and McKenzie, P. ‘Militarised Youth: Political Pawns or Social Agents?’, in Cock., J. and McKenzie 
(eds.) From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa (Claremont, David Philip, 
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1128
 See Hyslop, J. ‘School Student Movements and State Education Policy: 1972-87’, in William Cobbert and Robin 
Cohen (eds.) Popular Struggles in South Africa (Africa World Press, 1988), p.188. In the Western Cape students 
boycotted against the South African Defence Force (SADF) national servicemen teaching in schools, demanded for 
free and compulsory education, and called for the re-admission of barred pupils.   
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 Post (Johannesburg), 10 and 24 September 1980; Mosoeunyana White Mohapi, who was doing Form 1 in 1980, 
recalls that in the same year during a demonstration by students from his school Lereko High two students were 
shot and killed by police. These were Papi Makotokoto and Sejake. See interview with Mohapi by Chitja Twala, for 
the SADET Oral History Project, Bloemfontein, 18 January 2008  
1130
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No.2, December 2007, p.40 
1131
 Ibid. 
1132
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Issue Focus, December 198), p.31 
11331133
 Carter, C. ‘Comrades and Community: Politics and the Construction of Hegemony in Alexandra Township, 
South Africa, 1984-1987’ (Mansfield College, University of Oxford Ph. D Thesis, 1991), p.96 
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or because they had been detained for long periods.”1134 Finally, in 1984 in Tumahole Township, 
in Parys, students first became active in protests over a rent increase.
1135
 
In spite of all the political action taking place in other townships, especially in the OFS, 
Kroonstad’s black townships, Maokeng and Brentpark, remained conspicuously quiet until early 
1985. It is important to note here that these were not the only townships which lagged behind in 
terms of massive political revolt. Seekings writes that [the transition to confrontation] “did not 
occur during 1984 throughout the PWV … Several townships remained largely quiescent, in the 
sense that there was no mass political protest or confrontation”.1136 These townships included 
Soweto, Kagiso, Munsieville and Mohlakeng, in the West Rand; and Mamelodi, in 
Pretoria.
1137
Although by 1984 already civic organisations had been established in these 
townships
1138
, Seekings notes that the reason(s) for the slow shift to confrontational politics there  
was generally because of the absence of rent increases, the weakness of radical civic 
organisations, and the continued credibility of former conservative civic organisations which 
now controlled the township councils.
1139
  
But there were also particular reasons which were only applicable to individual townships. For 
example, Seekings argues that Soweto was quiescent because it was subsidised by the state; and 
in Kagiso and Mohlakeng no rent increase were imposed. Most important though, in these two 
townships the structure of local employment, which was particularly service rather than 
industrial, militated against the development of collective consciousness and organisation.
1140
  
Maokeng and Brentpark, like these townships, were held back, first, by the dearth of pressing 
socio-economic grievances, and the fact that, as noted in the previous chapter, the recently 
elected Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) and the Brentpark Management Committee (Manco) 
did not raise rent and interceded with the white government officials on behalf of the members of 
their communities. However, unlike these townships, in Maokeng in the period under review, 
there was a striking absence of political events or incidents like, for example, a funeral of a 
victim of political unrest (or of a struggle stalwart), or commemorations of historic days that 
could be used to galvanize the residents.
1141
 The detention, severe torture and finally the 
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sentencing of Mpho Petros Makae and Mosiuoa Jacob Tledima of the YCW in 1979 seemed to 
have cowed the residents of Maokeng. Furthermore, the government’s ban on political meetings 
of more than 10 people worsened the situation in Kroonstad. Although there were sporadic but 
isolated acts of radicalism especially among some of the students at Bodibeng High, these failed 
to reach and galvanise the wider “community”. For instance, in July 1980 slogans were written 
on the chalkboard in Standard 7B at Bodibeng, urging students to boycott classes and night 
studies.
1142
 In 1983 more slogans were scribbled on the school’s chalkboards, advising students 
to revolt and boycott sports. But this time the slogans were also directed against the government. 
Mahlatsi, a student at Bodibeng, admitted to having written “Vote No’, ostensibly urging the 
students (and probably the teachers as well) to disregard the BLA elections to be held towards 
the end of the year.
1143
 Finally, Maokeng lacked political veterans who, in other townships, 
helped to disseminate information about the role of the banned African political organizations 
such as the ANC and PAC
1144
, or veterans who created links between local activists and the 
banned organizations in exile, and in the process encouraged political mobilization and 
organisation.
1145
 Indeed, there were political veterans in Maokeng – albeit limited. However, 
these avoided becoming involved in resistance politics. For example, John Coangae, who at the 
beginning of the 1960s organized the PAC’s cells in Maokeng, steered clear of resistance politics 
after he was released from Robben Island in 1963. Instead, Coangae, as shown in the previous 
chapter, participated in the government-created council politics.  
Furthermore, what distinguished Maokeng from other townships was that when the opportunity 
to embark in mass political mobilization and protest finally availed itself in the mid-1980s, the 
residents of this township failed to sustain the momentum. This chapter will argue that this was, 
first, because of the long-term detentions of the leadership and the deployment of some of the 
committed and experienced political activists to regional and national structures. Second, the 
split within the ‘progressive’ structure in Maokeng between the Activist Forum (AF) and 
Maokeng Democratic Crisis Committee (MDCC) divided the residents in general, but the 
activists in particular. And, finally, the fight between the Three Million Gang (TMG) and the 
“community”, particularly the MDCC-aligned political activists, affected attempts to mobilize 
the “community” and wage protests (the majority of the residents were scared to be seen taking 
sides, particularly after the TMG formed an alliance with the Inkatha Freedom Party).    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Municipal Bantu Control Office in Dube. Molefe died after his bomb prematurely exploded, and it injured 
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In the course of political revolt from the mid-1980s inter-generational struggle developed in 
Maokeng. However, unlike in other areas such as Crossroads, in the Western Cape
1146
, and 
Thabong, in Welkom,
1147
 in Maokeng this struggle did not degenerate into a backlash by the 
older generation against the younger generation in the broader township. It emerged between 
school-going students and the teachers in schools, particularly at Bodibeng High. This was 
evident when students disrespected, clashed, sometimes physically, with their teachers, and 
smoked marijuana openly, and refused to be punished. On the other hand, some of the teachers 
struck back in a heavy-handed manner. This chapter will make two-pronged argument in 
attempting to explain the reasons for this. First, in Maokeng from 1985 to 1989 school-going 
students were plunged into the leadership of the politics of resistance. This was largely because 
of the absence of pressing socio-economic grievances in the township. In townships where these 
existed, as shown in the previous chapter, they were taken up by the adult-led civic 
organisations. And second, the fight against the TMG necessitated a close working relationship 
between the younger generation and the older generation outside of the school environment.     
 
Quiescence: Maokeng Township, 1980 to 1984 
From 1980 there was a discernible shift from black consciousness philosophy to the 
‘charterist’1148 ideology.1149 This was evident when the Congress of South African Students of 
South Africa (COSAS), formed in June 1979, adopted the Freedom Charter in 1980.
1150
 In the 
same year, the Sunday Post publicised the Freedom Charter, and in mid-year a campaign was 
undertaken to celebrate the Freedom Charter’s 25th anniversary.1151 However, most significantly 
during this period the ANC in exile and its members on Robben Island were beginning seriously 
to discuss the formation of a non-racial united front to lead the struggle inside the country
1152
 – 
this was to be realised in 1983 with the formation of the UDF. For instance, Lazarus Mawela, a 
former member of the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and, in the 1980s an 
underground operative of the ANC in Thembisa, claims that he received instructions from the 
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ANC in Botswana to help prepare for the formation of the united front inside the country. He 
explains 
So after a while we took a decision to go and speak to [Thami] Mnyele in Gaborone, 
Botswana. Alex Segale, whose younger sister later got married to Mnyele, was the first  
to go there. Segale returned and briefed us … I first went to meet him in 1980. We were 
instructed to prepare for the formation of the UDF
1153
 
 
Similarly, prisoners on Robben Island were instructed to form youth congresses to be affiliated 
to the proposed front after their release.
1154
 For example, Reuben Mahlagare and Thabiso 
Radebe, who in the 1980s became active in the branch of COSAS and youth structures in 
Thembisa, recall that Michael “Figo” Madlala and Brian Mazibuko, prisoners on Robben Island 
from 1977 to 1982, influenced the formation of Moya Youth Movement (MYM) in 1983.
1155
 
They claim “Brian gave Greg Thulare a copy of the Freedom Charter and also gave him the 
guidelines of how to form an organization”.1156 The Freedom Charter’s profile, and by extension 
the ANC’s, was further raised in 1980 through the extensively publicised bombings of the Sasol 
plants, both in Sasolburg and Secunda, by MK cadres.
1157
 
 
The expanding influence of the Freedom Charter/ANC inside the country caused the 
development of severe contestation between the ‘Charterists’ and members of AZAPO, 
derogatorily referred to in the townships by the supporters of the Freedom Charter as the ‘Zim-
Zims’.1158 The contestation between the two groupings was mainly caused by ideological 
differences. The supporters of the Freedom Charter, on the one hand, argued that South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, both black and white. And, the members of AZAPO, and its student 
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wing the Azanian Student Movement (AZASM) form in 1983, on the other hand, refuted this 
view and contended that Azania (South Africa) belongs to blacks. In the mid-1980s fierce 
tensions between the ‘charterists’ and the ‘zim-zims’ erupted in Maokeng and claimed people’s 
lives (see below).  
   
The government’s problems were further compounded by the economic recession at the 
beginning of the 1980s. According to Gerhart and Glaser “a brief economic boom between 1979 
and 1981 had been followed by falling gold prices and growing balance-of-payments deficits that 
soon induced a full-blown recession”.1159In 1982 about 24 per cent of black people were 
unemployed, to which number even more were added by a steep rise in retrenchments of 
employed workers during 1982 and 1983.
1160
 The situation worsened in late 1984 following the 
waning of foreign investment in the country as the gradual exodus of multinational companies 
accelerated.
1161
 Due to these developments when the recently elected town (and village) councils 
– integral parts of the government’s reforms – increased rent, purporting it to be for the 
development of the townships, residents who were already feeling the pinch because of the 
economic recession, took to the streets to protest against rent increases. This was evident when 
on 3 September 1984 the residents of Vaal Triangle, who “under the Lekoa Town Council were 
paying the highest average township rents in the country”,1162 declared a one-day –stay-away, 
protesting against rising rent. Describing the situation in the area, Gerhart and Glaser write 
 
 On September 3, bands of youths throughout the Vaal townships disrupted 
 transport services and set up barricades to hinder access by the police. In  
 Sharpeville and Sebokeng most of the public buildings, dozens of shops, 
 and many homes belonging to councillors were gutted by arson attacks. The  
 majority of workers in Sharpeville, and many from other Vaal townships, 
 stayed away from work. For the next week the Vaal triangle was in a state 
 of crisis and confrontation and the regional economy was severely disrupted. 
 Police responded with brutality to the uprising, using teargas, rubber bullets, 
 and sometimes live ammunition to disperse crowds
1163
 
 
It was against this background that townships across the country erupted in the early 1980s 
generally against apartheid, but more specifically against, first, the community councils and, 
later, the town (and village) councils. However, when this happened Maokeng remained 
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quiescent and tranquil. As already explained, this was mainly because of lack of pressing socio-
economic grievances and the fact that the governing councillors, especially the town councillors, 
continued functioning in the tradition of the community councillors, resolving family disputes 
but also interceding with white government officials on behalf of the residents of the community 
(see the previous chapter). But crucially, Maokeng during this period lacked political events such 
as a funeral of a political veteran or a victim of police killing, which in some areas were used to 
galvanise residents into political action.  For example, the killing of Emma Sathekge, a student at 
Atteridgeville, in February 1984 by a police vehicle served as an impetus even for students who 
did not live in Atteridgeville. Simon Mashishi from Thembisa claims that this incident convinced 
him to become involved in student politics, first, joining COSAS and, later AZANYU (Azanian 
National Youth Unity), the PAC’s youth wing.1164  
 
The brutal murder of Saul Mkhize in April 1983 in Driefontein, Mpumalanga (formerly Eastern 
Transvaal) by a white policeman, Constable Nienaber, also motivated some of the young people 
in the area to resolve to become involved in the liberation struggle to oppose the apartheid 
system. Mkhize was leading the residents in their resistance against the government’s intention 
forcibly to remove them from Driefontein, because the area had been declared a ‘black spot’ in a 
white area.
1165
 Zweli Sidu, who had been born in Lochiel next to Amsterdam in 1966 and arrived 
in Driefontein in 1982 to further his schooling, recalls that his decision to be involved in politics 
was influenced by Mkhize’s killing. He explains 
 
 When I arrived in Driefontein in 1982 there was a rumour that the government  
wanted to remove the people living in this place to homelands. That was what  
really influenced us politically – and the killing of Saul Mkhize. We organized  
ourselves and during school holidays we would go to Johannesburg to receive  
political education. When some of our friends from Jabulani, in Soweto, like  
Sibusiso Yende and Bongi Yende came to Driefontein they introduced us to Radio 
 Freedom. Sibosiso had a small radio and we would search for the station and listen.  
It would be Sibusiso, Bongi, Vusi, and myself – actually I think we were about six.  
This was in 1983 after Mkhize’s death1166   
 
After Mkhize’s funeral, Sidu and some of the students he was at school with formed the 
Driefontein Youth Congress (DRYC). And when he left Driefontein to complete his matric in 
Dennilton, he continued his involvement in student politics there.
1167
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Similarly, Bonner and Nieftagodien demonstrate how the funeral of Vincent Tshabalala “… 
infused a new dynamism and militancy in the Alexandra Youth Congress …” According to 
them: “A crucial moment in the development of youth politics in Alexandra was the death of 
Vincent Tshabalala on 9 February 1985. Tshabalala, a student at Minerva High School and 
leader of the Alexandra branch of COSAS, had left the country in 1984 to undergo military 
training with Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the ANC. He returned to South 
Africa in early 1985 but died soon afterwards in a gun battle with the police. … More than 3 000 
mourners attended the funeral, which took place on 23 February, in what was one of the largest 
political funerals yet mounted in the township. It marked the first major demonstration of public 
support for the ANC in the township for many years and signalled an important shift whereby 
that funerals of activists became acts of defiance against the state.”1168   
 
Indeed, for many of the local activists in Alexandra this funeral demonstrated the active 
existence of the ANC inside the country, but more specifically in the township. For example, JB, 
interviewed by Charles Carter, emphasising this point indicated 
 
 My father used to listen to radio Zimbabwe. He was interested in the history of 
 his country. He would say why there’s fighting there. He would tell us [his children] 
 the whole story, and end up with the ANC in South Africa. It was with Vincent’s 
 death, however, that I knew that there are (sic) cadres inside the country
1169
 
 
More importantly, political funerals also played an important role of bringing together activists 
from different areas who, under the repressive circumstances that prevailed then, did not have the 
chance to meet openly. It was at such gatherings that some of the activists made contacts with 
people who could assist them to leave the country to undergo military training in exile. Hosia 
Lengosane’s oral testimony supports this view. Lengosane, who was born in Brakpan, East 
Rand, in 1966 and in 1984 was a leading figure in student politics in Tsakane Senior Secondary 
School (TSSS), recalls that after several unsuccessful attempts at finding people who could help 
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them leave the country to go into exile he, and some of the members of the branch of COSAS at 
TSSS, met ‘contacts’ who could assist them to achieve their goal. Although Lengosane could not 
leave, many of his ‘comrades’ were able to leave. He explains       
 
We tried again in 1985. We went to Alexandra ... to attend the funeral of Vincent 
Tshabalala. That’s where we got contacts ...  for us to go to exile. You see … it was 
around February … when we got there we found that the only means of transport was  
a Kombi but there were many of us. We had some of the comrades from Duduza, 
Tsakane and KwaThema. But here in Tsakane we had a problem. A point was raised  
that the whole executive of COSAS wanted to leave (the country) and if that’s the case 
the branch would be left without an executive. And most importantly we were the people 
who were active. Then it was suggested that we should decide who should remain behind 
(and they can only leave in June). But they should return to Tsakane to organize the 
structure first. So we came back. And we formed TSAYCO (Tsakane Youth Congress). 
Only the two of us returned. It was myself and MacMillan Mngomane [who] died in 
exile
1170
  
 
Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the residents of Maokeng commemorated 
historic days, which in some areas played a significant role in conscientising and attracting 
people to participate in politics. For instance, the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU), 
which had been formed in February 1981, used this tactic effectively. On the 21
st
 March 1981 it 
commemorated the 20
th
 anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, and in 1984 the June 16 student 
demonstration. AZANYU held a night vigil at the Hector Petersen’s home in Zone 10 
Meadowlands, Soweto.
1171
 These, and other community projects such as ‘Masifundisane’ (Let’s 
Teach Each Other), won AZANYU maximum support from the various sectors of the 
community.
1172
  The absence of political organisations such AZANYU and AZAPO
1173
 in 
Maokeng at the beginning of the 1980s, for example, partly helps to explain the lack 
commemorations. But more importantly, the dearth of political activists like Tsiu Oupa Matsepe 
who could openly remind young people about the significance of remembering the historic days 
(see chapter three), encouraged quiescence in Maokeng.   
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Furthermore, the quiescence in Maokeng during this period was aggravated by the relative 
absence of local political figures that could disseminate historical information about the banned 
African organisations to the young activists and also, clandestinely, link the latter with these 
organisations. This is underlined by the role played by Peter Nchabeleng in Sekhukhuneland. 
Nchabeleng was born in the village of Apel … in the north of Sekhukhuneland (in today’s 
Limpopo Province). He was active in the ANC, the Office Workers’ Union (a South African 
Congress of Trade Unions’ affiliate) … In 1963 he was tried for involvement in MK and 
sentenced to eight years on Robben Island. … By the mid-1970s [after his release] he had helped 
establish a number of small discussion groups amongst students at the local schools which drew 
in some older activists and a few teachers.  … In the context of national political mobilization 
from 1983 onwards, Nchabeleng and the youth with whom he was in contact provided a crucial 
impetus to local organization. In 1984 a Sekhukhune Youth Committee was established …1174  
 
Again, interaction between some political veterans helped conscientise young people who in 
later years became actively involved in trade unions. Mongezi Radebe’s story clearly 
demonstrates this point. Radebe, as noted in chapter three, was introduced to politics in Phiritona 
by Mankele (possibly MaMokhele), an ANC veteran that had been banished to Phiritona, 
Heilbron. After his involvement in the Young Christian Workers (YCW) in Maokeng in the mid-
1970s, Radebe joined the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union 
(SACCAWU) – forerunner to the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union of South 
Africa (CCAWUSA) in 1980.
1175
He recalled 
 
At first I organized in Jo’burg (Johannesburg), and after some five months or so  
I went back to the Vaal Triangle, in the Free State area, and I was to establish a  
branch there in Vereeniging … in April 19811176  
 
It was not long before his involvement in trade union activities led him to meeting with Chris 
Hani, chief of MK operations in Lesotho, and Ray Alexander and Thozamnile Botha, both trade 
unionists. While in Lesotho Radebe attended meetings with Hani and others, briefing them about 
the deliberations taking place at the FIET (International Federation of Employees and 
Technicians) – organised labour conference held in Lesotho, but most importantly he underwent 
sessions of umrabulo (political training).
1177
 After six months in Lesotho he returned to South 
Africa and began to operate covertly as an ANC underground operative.
1178
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It was probably at this stage that, in addition to leading the Orange-Vaal CCAWUSA branch, 
Radebe in the mid-1980s, together with Mosioua “Terror” Lekota attempted to organize activists 
in Maokeng to establish a civic organization – albeit unsuccessfully1179. Interview with 
Fredererkse alluded to his involvement in the formation of an ad hoc committee charged with the 
formation of branch of the UDF in Maokeng (see below for a detailed account of the various 
attempts to form UDF structures in the OFS, including in Kroonstad).
1180
   
 
As noted in chapter three that “Commandant’ Caleb Motshabi was one of the few key members 
of the ANC and MK in Bloemfontein in the 1960s, from the late 1970s he, together with Ike 
More, a young journalist for The Friend and an ANC underground operative in Bloemfontein, 
recruited a series of young activists, mostly from the Bloemfontein area, and facilitated their 
travel to Lesotho, where the ANC had a substantial presence.
1181
 One of Motshabi’s recruits, 
Nape Khomo, remembers  
 
 I was recruited by … comrade Caleb Motshabi. I went through political education 
 in Lesotho as well as crash courses in different military activities
1182
 
 
In similar vein, Janet Cherry, writing about ANC’s underground structures in the Eastern Cape, 
points out that, just as in Bloemfontein, in Ezibeleni, Eastern Cape, Mzwandile Koyana 
politicized young people and linked them with MK in Lesotho. But, in contrast, many of the 
young activists who went to Lesotho returned to the Eastern Cape after receiving crash courses 
on military activities to carry out military missions. Major Bobelo was one such young activist. 
“Bobelo and some of his trusted friends consulted one of the MK veterans who had recently been 
released from Robben Island – Koyana”, writes Cherry.1183 The latter had been recruited to MK 
in Port Elizabeth by Vuyisile Mini in the early 1960s. After 18 years in prison he was banished 
to Ezibeleni, where he made contact with Bobelo.
1184
 Bobelo explains the ‘lectures’ offered by 
Koyana 
 
 When we met we used to listen to what was called umrabulo, that is the politics of  
 the ANC, the struggle, why was the ANC formed, what were its aims, its policies. 
 He was lecturing in [Isi]Xhosa. Not in a big group, two or three people in his house.  
 This was the first time I heard the actual history from a person who was involved, 
 who was sent to Robben Island and came back with such a vast knowledge, and clarity 
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 of things, he was well-versed although not well-educated …1185 
 
Not long after these ‘lectures’, Bobelo left for Lesotho, where he received military training and 
returned to South Africa with the instruction to work with the student movement, COSAS, “to 
build it and to recruit from it”.1186 Just as Koyana did with them, Bobelo and some of his friends 
also ‘lectured’ other students in umrabulo, with the intention of recruiting them.1187  
 
It was for this reason that the Eastern Cape had strong and active branches of COSAS and 
operations by MK cadres during this period.
1188
  
 
Although Sello “Bra Zile” Monyake had left the country in 1980 or 1981 to join MK in exile, 
there is no evidence to suggest that, like Bobelo in the Eastern Cape, he returned to Maokeng to 
recruit for the ANC and MK. However, the knowledge that he had joined MK seemingly at a 
later stage encouraged some of his close relatives to become involved in the politics of 
resistance. Liphaphang Frank Mohapi, who in the mid-1980s was a leading figure in the student 
politics in Maokeng, recalls 
 
 … There was another cousin of us who had left, I think in 1980 or 1981.  
Bra Zile, Sello Monyake … He is one of the older MK members. So that’s  
one of the persons that motivated us in my family
1189
    
 
In December 1982 Dennis Bloem was introduced to Lekota by a prison warder working at the 
Kroonstad Prison. Lekota had been transferred to this prison after he was released from Robben 
Island.
1190
 After Lekota was appointed publicity secretary of the UDF in 1983
1191
, he connected 
with Bloem again with the aim of mobilizing for the UDF in Kroonstad. Bloem readily took up 
the task and attempted to conscientise some of the members of the community of Brentpark by 
disseminating information about the UDF. Bloem, giving evidence at the Delmas Treason Trial 
in 1985, stated: 
 
On 18-11-83 around 05:30 when I was still at home, Mosioa (sic) Lekota arrived.  
He gave me a packet of UDF yellow posters to distribute in Brentpark. He also gave  
me 26 SASPU national newspapers and 1 The Eye newspaper to also distribute in  
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Brentpark. I took the pamphlets and newspapers ... to my shop. Lekota still had a lot of  
the UDF pamphlets in his red Toyota Corona’s boot. ... He did not tell me what he was  
going to do with the pamphlets or who he was going to give them to. ... I took the ...  
pamphlets and I gave 13 of them to a school pupil, Michael Molotsi, and asked him to  
give one to each teacher at Brentpark Primary school. ... I can’t really say if he gave the  
posters to the teachers or not. I still had not distributed the newspapers yet ...
1192
 
 
Bloem’s attempt was summarily quashed following the detention of his young protégé, Michael 
Molotsi. Molotsi who was 15 years old at the time, was detained for assisting Bloem in his 
mission. He remembers 
  
 On my side I was at [Dennis Bloem’s shop] that morning, before going to  
school. … We’re distant family members. I used to help him in the afternoons.  
So, that morning he gave me some pamphlets of the UDF … to give to some  
of the teachers. At that time I didn’t know about politics … I think there were  
three or four white teachers. I think I was in Standard Four or Five. When I got  
to school I started handing them out and I gave one of the white teachers. So,  
she called the police. I wasn’t aware she had called the police. The next morning  
when I got to school something like four or five vans, fully armed policemen were 
 looking for me. So, they took me to their headquarters in town, where I was interro- 
gated for the whole day
1193
 
 
However, before handing over this material to Molotsi, Bloem, first, briefed him about the UDF 
and its role. Molotsi remembers: “He told me that this thing of apartheid should be stopped. And 
the UDF will stop it. So, that we can go to town anytime we want …”1194 
 
Bloem’s efforts at conscientising people were also confirmed by Daniel Marco Lethae, a resident 
of Maokeng and close relative of Bloem, during the Delmas Treason Trial. He explained to the 
court that Bloem sold him a UDF t-shirt and thereafter informed him about the role of the UDF. 
He stated: “What he said to me was that the UDF is an organization which looks into the 
problems of the residents. He further said that the UDF does not approve of apartheid.”1195 When 
he was asked if he ever joined or took part in the activities of the UDF, Lethae responded in the 
negative.
1196
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It is also possible that Bloem’s efforts at mobilizing for the UDF, in addition to Molotsi’s 
detention, were summarily quashed because he was unsuccessful in convincing the residents of 
both Brentpark and Maokeng to support the UDF. In Maokeng, as already noted, for example 
activists supporting the UDF failed to oppose the BLA’s elections because of the support Koekoe 
and his Matla a Sechaba enjoyed within the “community”. Relatedly, it could also have been 
because of lack of political support from the national leadership (in 1984 the UDF’s national 
leadership decided to seriously deal with this shortcoming). It was for this reason that the UDF 
structures in Kroonstad failed to develop until 1989.    
 
The UDF was made up of different affiliated organizations from various regions, ranging from 
students, youth, women’s, trade union, civic organizations, and many more. Keith Gottschalk, 
citing Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson, writes “at the UDF’s launch there were 313 local youth 
congresses affiliated to it; 32 separate women’s and 47 student congresses, and 82 civic 
associations.
1197
 Any organization could affiliate provided it supported non-racialism, a united 
South Africa, and did not collaborate with apartheid institutions.
1198
  
It was formed, initially, to co-ordinate opposition to the National  Party (NP) government’s 
reforms, particularly the introduction of the ‘Tri-cameral parliament’, which provided racially 
segregated representation in central government for Coloured and Indian as well as white South 
Africans. The proposed parliament excluded the African majority altogether, although African 
people were granted greater representation in segregated local government institutions (like the 
BLA’s).1199 For Seekings, the UDF’s primary focus on national politics and not on local politics 
during the period 1983-84 “… distracted the UDF from direct involvement in the local struggles 
which were central to politics in African townships.”1200 Although his study looked at the 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) region, its findings also applied to Maokeng and Brentpark. 
Seekings’ study also demonstrates the inactivity of the UDF in Kroonstad in particular, but in the 
OFS in general.  
Twala and Seekings observe “Overall, political struggles in the [Orange] Free State did not 
compare with those in many other parts of the country. There was no effective organization at 
the regional level until 1990, and no regional UDF structure was ever formally launched.”1201 
Seekings, in his study of the UDF, notes that prior to the launch of the UDF in August 1983 
“regional structures were established in only three regions, the Western Cape, Transvaal and 
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Natal, where opposition to the Tri-cameral parliament was strong”.1202 Other regions like the 
Border and Eastern Cape followed later.
1203
  
To redress the dearth of formal UDF structures in the region, numerous efforts were made by the 
UDF’s national leadership. First, the UDF’s National Executive Committee (NEC) decided that 
the Transvaal region, together with Popo Molefe and Lekota, should undertake organization 
building in the OFS.
1204
 In 1984/85 Lekota ran several workshops for activists, and liaised 
closely with activists in Bloemfontein and in the corridor from Welkom through Kroonstad to 
Parys. This resulted in the establishment of Ad-Hoc Committees in different townships, but the 
Seeisoville’s was non-existent in August 1985.1205 
Second, in April 1985 the UDF’s National General Council (NGC) invited a delegation of about 
ten people from the OFS to a meeting in Azaadville, in the West Rand, where links between 
different townships in the OFS seem to have been created.
1206
 Papi Kganare, from Mangaung, in 
Bloemfontein, recalled Lekota introducing the delegation from Bloemfontein to comrades in 
Welkom.
1207
 Prior to this, the relationship between different townships in the OFS was weak. 
Twala and Seekings write “In most cases the towns in the northern part of the Free State 
preferred to be associated with the Vaal Triangle than the Free State itself.”1208 This was 
supported by Janie Mohapi, cited by Twala and Seekings, who recalled that “Thabong (in 
Welkom) activists said they were not part of the Free State but rather wanted to be considered 
part of the Vaal Triangle”.1209  
 
The Orange Free State delegation seems to have returned from Azaadville spurred on, because 
not long after that NGC, a regional UDF workshop was held in Welkom. The workshop is said to 
have been convened by Lekota. It was at this workshop that a co-ordinating committee was 
formed comprising two delegates each from four townships, including Kroonstad’s Dennis 
Bloem and Wilfred “Bizza” Makhathe.1210 This co-ordinating committee, however, does not 
seem to have been very active, “in part because of problems of transport”.1211 Finally, realising 
the slow pace of organization in the OFS, at the beginning of May, the UDF’s NEC, again met 
and noted that the ‘OFS and head office should meet to discuss how the organizing work in that 
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region will be coped with’.1212 However, matters were made even worse when Lekota and 
Molefe were arrested and only emerged from jail in 1989.  
 
In spite of the UDF’s presence in the other regions, awareness about it was still low in African 
townships. This was evident during the October and November BLA’s local elections in 1983. 
The UDF attempted to organize a boycott against these elections but was unsuccessful. This led 
Seekings to conclude “The Black Local Authority elections seem to have occurred too soon for 
the UDF to organize a well co-ordinated campaign against them.”1213 Notwithstanding this, 
Seekings notes “In mid-1984 localised struggles over education and rent increase began in 
townships across the PWV”.1214 As a result, Seekings notes that “in the face of revolt and 
consequent state persecution, in April 1985 the UDF’s National General Council met and 
amended the Working Principles. The UDF’s stated goals were reformulated to encompass 
opposition to apartheid in general.
1215
 To carry out this task, in Kroonstad older activists like 
Bloem turned to the students. “We went to the students”, recalls Bloem “and that’s why I’m 
saying that was a turning point”.1216   
 
Traditions of Resistance 
 
Notwithstanding the UDF’s shortcomings in entrenching itself in the OFS region, particularly in 
Kroonstad’s black townships, there were other routes toward conscientising the residents of these 
residential areas, especially young people in Maokeng.  For some politics started at home.  
Liphapang Frank Mohapi’s interview reveals the strong family influences that finally helped to 
shape his political outlook at a later stage. It is worth quoting Mohapi’s career in detail:  
  
Mohapi was born on 10 November1968 in Kroonstad. His father worked for the Railway and 
mother was a domestic worker. His father passed away in 1983, when he was 15 years old. The 
responsibility of raising five children was left to his mother, and this was not an easy task. 
Mohapi recalls “You know, you had your school fee, which was very cheap, R30 or R50. But, 
you know, as a domestic worker she couldn’t afford.” But Mohapi’s mother totally refused to 
have her children, like most other children in Maokeng at the time, take up part-time work to 
supplement her income. Mohapi continues: “I remember I sneaked out to do gardening for a 
white family and she heard about this. I was thoroughly beaten. And she gave me the reason 
later. She told me ‘I will never suffer at the white man’s hands and let my children suffer, too. I  
will suffer on your behalf.’ Mohapi’s mother’s strong-willed and willing-to-sacrifice attitude 
must have also rubbed off on Mohapi’s siblings. One of which was Hlohosang. After leaving 
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Bodibeng High School, he completed his schooling in Sharpeville. And after matric he found 
employment at SASOL, until he was summarily dismissed following the SASOL bombings in 
1982.
1217
 It was while he was in Sharpeville that he became actively involved in politics. Mohapi 
remembers that whenever he was at home he would encourage them to tune in to Radio 
Freedom, the ANC’s clandestine radio broadcasting from exile. He explains: “He would fight me 
and my other brothers when we listened to radio Sesotho or Radio 702, and would say ‘What a 
crap. Are you listening to 702 …?’ And in 1984 he started introducing me to Radio Freedom and 
some materials like the ANC’s Freedom Charter. And the first book he bought me was [Vladmir] 
Lenin’s – Biography of Lenin’1218 
 
Because of this background, by 1985 Mohapi was more advanced than his peers in terms of 
political understanding. This was evident when he joined the AZASM in Maokeng in 1984. In 
his words: “So, my actual first movement to be part of was the BC, although he (Hlohosang) was 
not. And I remember I became the first executive member and treasurer of AZASM in my 
township.
1219
 After joining AZASM, Mohapi observes: “I began to understand that the situation 
in [my] family is not of my parents’ making. There’s a bigger picture: that if there’s no food on 
your mother’s table, it’s not a mistake. It’s because of the system”.1220 At the beginning of 1985 
Mohapi was recruited to the UDF by his teacher, Oupa Ntombela, and he left AZASM.
1221
   
In much the same way as Mohapi, Mamokhele Sebetoane, one of the few leading female student 
activists in Maokeng in the 1980s, was first made aware of the injustices prevailing in the 
country by the discussions her grandparents used to have at home. She remembers 
            
They spoke about apartheid. Sometimes when they were listening to the news,  
they would talk about what white people did to them. For instance, [my grandfather]  
would say white people would appoint a white person to be their foreman, even if that  
white person did not have proper schooling. … Also that white people’s children,  
especially here in South Africa, are raised by our parents but they don’t give them the  
respect that is meant for the person who was always there when their parents were not 
there. When they meet them in town, they would realize that here in South Africa you 
were even mistreated by a young person just because you were black and they were  
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white
1222
 
 
Daniel George was another figure in student politics who was also influenced by his 
grandmother’s narratives about how the family suffered at the hands of white people and how 
this resulted in the family being forced to appropriate a white man’s surname. She would also 
lament how her family was removed from the Old Location in Marabastad, but was never 
compensated. He recalls  
 
My grandmother would tell me how my grandfather used to have cows and how  
they were taken away. And myself, how I became George [surname]. Because she  
would tell me that I’m supposed to be Mahe, but because they were evicted from  
another farm by this white man and the only condition was that when you get onto 
another farm, you must adopt the surname of the farm owner. So, that’s how I became 
George. George is not my surname
1223
  
 
He continues: 
I grew up with my grandmother, my uncles, my cousins, even my younger brother.   
We were staying in one house at 546 B Location. Well, after some time we had to  
move because there were these [things], what one can call evictions, to Phomolong  
2907. … Then my grandmother used to tell me that we did not get our money - the 
money that they were supposed to have got[ten], because we were removed from 
Marabastad
1224
   
 
When asked how he felt after listening to his grandmother’s sad tales, George responded “they 
really influenced me a lot.”1225 The political influence that these young people received from 
home shaped their political outlook, but the lasting impact was to follow when they began 
interacting with individuals from outside Maokeng (more about this below). Other young people 
in Maokeng, and elsewhere, were introduced to politics through church and youth formations in 
these churches.   
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The Chiro
1226
 and Church 
Church youth formations were particularly common and influential. Through them some youth 
became actively involved in political resistance in the mid-1980s. In Kagiso, West Rand, Frank 
Chikane of the Apostolic Faith Mission, for example, directed the Interdenominational Youth 
Christian Club (IYCC), which combined “evangelical work with social projects”.1227 The IYCC 
was established in April 1978.
1228
 According to Frank Chikane, in that year it requested to use 
his church, the Apostolic Faith Mission in Kagiso, for its spiritual services. At the end of the 
year, it established the Social Welfare department which “… started help projects with the 
community (to help the community help itself)”.1229 Through these projects some of the young 
members of the IYCC’s Social Welfare developed to become leading figures in local politics in 
Kagiso in the 1980s. Lekgoathi writes that the IYCC “became a place where a significant 
number of Kagiso youth – both males and females – received informal training in leadership and 
organizing skills”.1230 It was no surprise when some of former members of the IYCC like Ike 
Genu later became leading figures in the Krugersdorp Civic Organisation (KRO).  
 
However, arguably it was at the Roman Catholic Church where many young people in the 
townships were introduced to politics.
1231
 Seele Sekonyela’s story supports this view. 
Sekonyela’s main political influence can be traced back to his involvement in youth clubs at the 
Roman Catholic Church. Having been brought in the Roman Catholic Church, Sekonyela, who 
was born in 1967 in Kroonstad, joined Chiro Junior Group in 1981. At the end of 1982 he moved 
up to the youth group. He recalls being taught slogans and “freedom songs”. In his own words 
 
 There was a church youth league called Chiro Junior Group. So we learned stuff from  
our leaders like Thabo Petersen, Sister Peace Modikoe.
1232
 And we had our own slogans 
such as “Building relations in the spirit of Christ”. And we would say: “If you want 
peace, work for justice”. Stuff like that. We used to sing freedom songs like “Africa will 
be saved”, you see. And we started conscientizing our minds from an early age. Our 
Priest at church was Mr. Jan van Serford, who retired and went back to Holland late last 
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year, and people like Vincent Twapa, who is still around. And from the Junior Group you 
went to Chiro Youth Club
1233
  
 
It was in the Chiro Youth Club that Sekonyela and his colleagues began to engage in political 
discussions, and also shared their concerns with youth from other areas. He continues 
 
And then we would have discussion groups from different committees, such as  
discussion committee, interchange committees, etc. And we used to visit other  
youth leagues from other churches and exchange information. It was about how  
we were affected by oppression as Christians, and what role we, as Christians,  
could play in the society. That’s where we spoke about slogans such as “If you want  
peace, work for justice”1234 
 
These discussions were, however, not limited to the confines of the church, or only to members 
of Chiro. In fact, members of Chiro took them outside the boundaries of the church, and they 
discussed them with their age cohorts in the township who were not members of the church or 
Chiro. These two groups began to share and compare ideas. Sekonyela explains 
  
Like I previously mentioned that we learned politics from Chiro at an early age. And  
whatever we learned from Chiro we would come back and compare it with the infor- 
mation we received in the location to check if the two corresponded. The situation  
was quite challenging, because we used to watch [television] dramas like Bosollakgwadi, 
Sewesa wa Soweto, and Sekgwe ke moferekanyi, etc. on television. In Sekgwe’s case, 
Sekgwe was a soldier, a hero, you see. But when we got to church, we were told the likes 
of Sekgwe were those people who had skipped the country to fight for our liberation and  
they were referred to as baferekanyi (terrorists)
1235
  
 
Sekonyela’s association with Chiro prepared him for his involvement in the politics of resistance 
from the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s he was part of the self-defense units in Maokeng fighting 
the Three Million Gang. 
 
In spite of the role of the family and church youth formations in introducing young people in 
Maokeng to politics, it was, however, the part played by activists from outside Maokeng that 
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eventually influenced young people in Maokeng to actively participate in the struggle for 
resistance.  
  
Mobility and Individuals 
 
After the 1976/77 student uprisings many parents in the urban areas moved their children to the 
rural areas to live with their families and next-of-kin and to study there. This was because rural 
areas were relatively quiet and schools there did not participate in the student uprisings. It was 
these children from the urban areas who introduced politics in the rural areas and influenced 
rural-based students to become involved in political activities. Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi’s 
study focusing on rural areas in the former northern Transvaal (now Limpopo Province), 
emphasises the role of the urban students who were studying in schools in Lebowa as the driving 
force behind the uprisings in that area.
1236
 According to him “… the most pivotal role in the 
disturbances at Matladi Secondary School in Zebediela was played by urban students – mostly  
boarders, particularly those from the townships around Pretoria.”1237  
 
In the 1980s, somewhat differently students living and studying in urban schools, who were 
running away from police harassment, hid in small towns in the urban areas or in the homelands, 
where there was no political activity taking place. Such areas were hardly suspected by the police 
as places which might habour student fugitives. Mziyafani Pholo’s political career corroborates 
this view.  Mziyafani was born in Zola, Soweto, in 1973. In 1982 he was taken to live in Leslie, 
Leandra (today’s part of Mpumalanga Province), with his grandmother, where he started his 
primary school. At this stage, the Leandra Action Committee (LAC), formed in 1981, was 
resisting efforts by the government to forcibly remove the residents of Leslie to KwaNdebele
1238
  
Pholo began to interact with Abel Nkabinde, who was at the time a member of the UDF. It was 
not long before Nkabinde started conscientising Pholo “about the political situation we as blacks 
were living under”.1239 In addition, Pholo developed himself by reading newspapers like the New 
Nation and Upbeat, and attended the UDF meetings. As the struggle intensified in Leslie, 
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Mziyafani became actively involved and this exposed him to the police. This forced him to leave 
Leandra. Pholo explains 
 
My other speciality was making a petrol bomb. I can’t remember who taught me.  
I would pour in the bottle sand, sticks of matches, petrol, spirit. I’ll mix them together. 
One day my grandmother discovered about 18 or 20 bottles of petrol bombs behind her 
house. After that I became open about my involvement. So, from time to time the police 
would come to my grandmother’s house looking for me. I think she became frightened 
and informed my father, Billy Pholo 
 
Billy Pholo, fearing for his son, took Mziyafani to his hometown, Tladistad, Bophuthatswana. 
Mziyafani Pholo continues 
 
My father felt that my life was in danger, so I had to go and stay with his family in 
Bophuthatswana at a place called Tladistad. That’s how I relocated from Leandra. I was 
enrolled at Seboaneng Middle School. At the time Lucas Mangope was the Prime 
Minister and there was no revolting. I still remember at some stage I recruited four guys, 
Nchaupe and his brother Mphalane, Willie – I can’t remember the other guys. We were 
six in all. The other people were scared and did not want to join us. I informed them that 
the system in Bophuthatswana was not right; we’re being oppressed by Mangope.”As 
such we need to start to organize and revolt”.  I remember we were … sitting in the street 
and singing revolutionary songs like Siyaya ePitoli, Angeke sizwe ngabo … we decided 
to go to Skhosana’s1240 cottage and pelted it with stones. Skhosana and his family came 
outside and ran away. We were now singing revolutionary songs
1241
  
 
This incident forced Mziyafani’s parents to move him from Tladistad to stay with him in 
Alexandra Township.   
In similar vein, the major political influence on most young people in Maokeng came from their 
interaction with student activists who were either on the run from police or “deployed” in 
Maokeng to agitate students there. For instance, Sekonyela’s contact with Khahliso Moeketsi 
solidified his political thinking and exposed him to new ideas. Moeketsi was born on 25 
February 1965 in Phomolong, Maokeng. After completing his higher primary schooling at 
Relebohile, he proceeded to Emadwaleni Secondary School in Orlando West, Soweto.
1242
 It was 
while at Emadwaleni that he became involved in student politics. Emadwaleni Secondary was 
one of the schools in Orlando West, and Soweto in general, in the early 1980s that was at the 
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forefront of student politics. Student activists from that school immersed themselves in reading 
political literature and debating political ideas. Shirley Thathi, former member of the Student 
Representative Council (SRC) at Matshidiso Secondary, in Mzimhlophe, Soweto, remembered 
how she was introduced to politics by the then president of the SRC at Emadwaleni, Fezi 
Shabalala. In her own words  
 
He was the chairperson of the SRC at Emadwaleni. But we did not call each other 
chairperson but president. So, he and his friends used to come to our home. He had  
a child with my older sister. They would come, maybe, six or seven of them, and they 
would be carrying some books about [Robert] Mugabe. And they would be talking in  
a strange language. But when everybody else had left, I would ask him alone what they 
meant about some of the issues. He would then explain to me how these leaders were 
ruling their countries; whether it was through iron fist or what. So, in that way I 
understood
1243
 
 
The prominent role played by students from Emadweleni in student politics, demanding an end 
to corporal punishment, the provision of free education, and many other demands, earned the 
school the nickname Nicaragua.
1244
 In my informal discussion with Thulo Machabe, former 
student activist in Maokeng in the mid-1980s, he told me that Moeketsi had arrived in Maokeng 
after the student protests had erupted in the township, running away from the police in Soweto 
because of his involvement in politics.
1245
 Sekonyela remembers differently. His memory place 
Moeketsi at the centre of the political discussions and planning before the 11
th
 of February 1985 
– the day the students took to the streets. Sekonyela remembers that after returning from 
Pietersburg, where his father had sent him for schooling in 1984, he made contacts with his old 
circle of friends and political discussions became part of their daily lives. He remarks  
 I went back home and told my father I wasn’t keen on going back there, because I  
had become deeply politicized then, though we hadn’t fully developed in terms of 
strategizing. But, of course, we were organized with some few comrades like Daniel 
S’phiwe George, the late Joseph Sankie, the late Khahliso Moeketsi, the late Robert 
Mokgathi, Charles Mthimkhulu, and the likes of [Niki] Matsepe …  Most of these  
guys I grew up with and we used to play football together in the location. People like 
Vincent who was going to school at Tsietsi, and he was my leader at Chiro. He is the  
one who came up with a musical play titled ‘Abortion’ . We used to watch plays by 
Gibson Kente and the likes, just to keep us motivated. We used to lock ourselves in the 
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house, together with comrade George and comrade Khahliso, and tune in to Radio 
Freedom and Radio Lesotho, and also listen to Miriam Makeba’s songs. Khahliso, who 
was from Orlando [Soweto], used to get all these stuff from the shebeens and he would 
then come and conscientize us. Each time there was a sound of a gun he would say to us 
“Listen to the Voice of Anger, the voice of reason”. And he could even tell if it was an 
AK47 sound or if it was any other gun. He actually played a very important role in my 
political activities, that’s comrade Khahliso1246 
 
It is also possible that Moeketsi played a role in creating a political network for his comrades in 
Maokeng by introducing them to political activists in other areas and to their political structures. 
It was not long before Sekonyela and others began to interact with Aubrey Mokoena, a leading 
figure in the Release Mandela Campaign (RMC), and activists from Johannesburg. Sekonyela 
remembers 
 
 … We had some influence from people such as the national co-ordinator of the  
Release Mandela Campaign, comrade Aubrey Mokoena and other people who were 
involved in the 1976 strikes. People like comrade Seth Mazibuko … It was a national 
network, you see. We also visited them in Johannesburg. We once stayed in 
Braamfontein Hotel … as well as Harrison Reef Hotel. He (Mokoena) would disguise  
as a priest and we would be the congregation. I remember one time when we were at 
Harrison Reef Hotel … By then he called himself Reverend Sathekge … They called us 
Orange Boys, because we were from Orange Free State
1247
 
 
Sekonyela’s testimony reveals two important issues: the role played by people from outside 
Kroonstad, or people who had links with Johannesburg, in conscientizing young people in 
Maokeng. And, secondly, the influence Radio Freedom had on young people in Maokeng. In the 
interview with Sobi “Slovo” Matli, he admitted that, amongst other things, was influenced by 
messages he heard from Radio Freedom. He reminisces  
 You see, parents are parents. They never understood the national liberation struggle. 
 They were saying it was a waste of time. They were saying convincing facts … But  
at the same time ‘till when were we going to wait before we fight for the liberation?’  
I heard that message later through Radio Freedom. My radio was not able to catch  
Radio Freedom. There were people who were able to catch Radio Freedom. I reme- 
mber one of them was this guy who went to the army, Lesala. He would give me all  
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the messages, conveyed through Radio Freedom. Radio Freedom was around 9 o’clock. 
We would converge there, at his place. You would listen to it in darkness. It was not for 
public
1248
  
 
Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi, in his paper on Radio Freedom, illustrates the significant role this 
media played in invoking people’s emotions to really want to be involved in the struggle for 
liberation. According to James Ngculu, a Radio Freedom listener from the Eastern Cape in the 
1970s, cited by Lekgoathi, “We also listened to the ANC’s Radio Freedom, broadcast from 
Lusaka, and the sound of the opening tune ‘Hamba Kahle Mkhonto’ followed by a burst of 
gunfire, excited us. We would imagine ourselves pulling that trigger”.1249 Just like in Ngculu’s 
case, Radio Freedom influenced some of the young people in Maokeng.   
Machabe Thulo was another student who was influenced by people from outside Kroonstad, or 
people who had outside connections. Thulo was born in 1968 in Kroonstad and started his high 
school at Bodibeng in 1985. But because of lack of classrooms to accommodate all the students, 
Thulo and some of the Form 2 students were accommodated at Boikemisetso Secondary School. 
Recalling this event, Matli, who was also in Form 2, remarks 
 … We were denied accommodation at Bodibeng in 1985. That was when I went  
for Standard Seven from Ntha Higher Primary. The school masters or principal, or  
teachers told us that it was full. So, we could not be accommodated. So, the  
question was what were we supposed to do? Were we supposed to be at home, 
not go to school at that age? Because I was around sixteen years
1250
 
 
Moses Masizane remembers that Bodibeng was densely overcrowded in 1985. He observes 
  
It was heavy, heavy overcrowding. More than the word overcrowding. The were close  
to 20 Standard 7 classes, because there were only two high schools: Kananelo and 
Bodibeng. And people preferred going to Bodibeng because Kananelo was known for its 
strictness and punishment. So, areas like Viljoenskroon, Koppies, etc., you would find 
their schools were only up to Standard 8 and for people who wanted their children to be 
educated the only option was going to Kroonstad to study at Bodibeng
1251
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To resolve the problem of accommodation, all the Standard 7 students were relocated to 
Boikemisetso. Matli described Boikemisetso as follows: “It was a combined school. From Sub A 
up to Standard 6 then. It was a newly-built school. So we took one part … Students of 
Boikemisetso ... only occupied the small part. So, there were only Bodibeng students doing 
Standard 7at Boikemisetso”.1252 
 
However, as soon as the problem of accommodation had been resolved, another problem 
surfaced. There was a delay in providing the free textbooks promised to students. Students at 
Boikemisetso became restive and began to demand the textbooks. It was during this turmoil that 
Thulo and other students were contacted by Sekgaphane, who was born in Maokeng but then 
based in Johannesburg. Thulo recalls 
  
Yes, those who were going to Form 2 now we had to go to Bodibeng to fetch text- 
books. There was this guy Sekgapane, I don’t remember his name.  He was not a  
student at Bodibeng.  He was based in Jo’burg but they were canvassing that the  
struggle must go on. We met at Moepeng Higher Primary to discuss this thing …  
that if you wanted to go to school, these were the only schools. And the fact that if  
you didn’t have school uniform you couldn’t attend school. Those were some of the 
things we were fighting against
1253
  
 
After this meeting, which was attended amongst others by Daniel George, Tommy Makau, 
Nicholas ‘Niki’ Matsepe, Khahliso Moeketsi, and many others, it was resolved that further 
meetings had to be held to plan the strategy to put forward the students’ demands to the schools’ 
authorities.
1254
  
 
Finally, Masizane, George and Makau all remember that they were also influenced by people 
from outside Kroonstad. Masizane, cited by Twala and Seekings, claimed that he was influenced 
by the level of political resistance he witnessed in the then Transvaal. He argued 
  
As students from Kroonstad we had relatives in the then Transvaal Province. I  
used to visit places like Sebokeng and Duduza during the school holidays. Those  
places were on fire during 1984 and I personally witnessed the level of political 
mobilization in those areas. I think my political consciousness started when I visited 
those places. When I came back to Maokeng, I was recruited into the AZAPO camp  
here in Kroonstad. It was in February 1984 …1255  
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Furthermore, Masizane recalls that students from Welkom were the ones who encouraged them 
to stand up and fight for their rights.
1256
 He remarks:  “In fact, the Maokeng uprisings were 
supposed to have started in 1984. There were guys from Welkom who frequented Kroonstad and 
would tell us that we Kroonstad guys have to stand up. We were willing to stand up, but we 
didn’t have this clear understanding of what we were going to fight for.”1257  But the other reason 
students at Bodibeng failed to ‘stand up and fight’ was because they were discouraged by senior 
students to delay this action. Masizane recalls 
 
 In1984 … I remember one time when we were attending night studies at a school  
called Reaitumela when a certain guy called - he ended up being a kwaito artist –  
called Toledo. I forgot his real name. That guy came to address us, telling us that  
there were people from Welkom who wanted us to riot, but the thing was we were  
about to write our examination and we couldn’t fight now. But better fight the follo- 
wing year in January or February … [Toledo] was a senior student, doing matric at  
that time. I only realized after that, “Oh! this Toledo was securing his position that  
we shouldn’t fight because, you know, the education that we did before was just to  
finish matric and go and serve the master, either by being a policeman or a teacher
1258
 
  
Matthew Chaskalson and Jeremy Seekings point out that by 1984 many students in Thabong, 
Welkom, were already conscientised or had experienced political protests. According to them, 
“Isolated school protests broke out in Thabong in November 1983 over the issues of forthcoming 
examinations and the proposed introduction of age limit.” “When some students were excluded 
in terms of the age limit in January 1984”, they continue “sporadic protests resumed”.1259 In 
March 1984 the Thabong Youth Congress was launched to organize the excluded students. As a 
result of all these actions in July 1984 violent confrontations erupted between students and 
authorities at all the high schools in Thabong.”1260 It is possible that some of the students, who 
were harassed by the police and, later by the parents who were forcing students to go back to 
school, ran away from Thabong and hid in Maokeng.  
Similarly George’s political understanding became fully developed after he had met with the 
COSAS organizer from the Vaal Triangle. He explains 
  
And it happened that at some stage I met a guy, Isaac, who was at some stage the 
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 organizer of COSAS from the Vaal Triangle. Then I got the constitution of COSAS. 
 I read it. In that constitution it was stated ‘Before I become a student, I’m first a  
 member of the community
1261
 
 
Indeed, the preamble of the COSAS’ constitution states: 
 
We the students in South Africa regarding ourselves first as members of society before we are 
students and believing that students have a responsibility to society, that students are morally 
and spiritually obliged to contribute constructively towards the welfare of society and that the 
unity of students is the vital key to the realization of our objectives.
1262
 
 
Finally, for Tommy Makau it was through his contact with his cousin in Daveyton, in the East 
Rand. Makau relates 
 
That because [students] leagues (i.e. organizations) were popular in the country  
from around the ‘80s, I remember during the Christmas holidays in ’84 I had  
visited my cousin’s place in Daveyton. I’ve got a cousin who was involved in  
COSAS, Lebohang Nthoane. So, he was sort of an organizer. I moved in with him  
when I was there - when they were harassing students. So, I started to pack COSAS’ 
 pamphlets and told myself I am taking them to Kroonstad. When I arrived here I did  
not struggle, fortunately, because many students were already into student politics
1263
 
 
In the early 1980s the government, through its security personnel, came down heavily on 
political activists.
1264
 This forced the latter to operate under difficult circumstances, thus 
compelling them to adopt extra precautionary measures. In areas such Lingelihle, in Cradock, 
Matthew Goniwe, a teacher and political activists, helped found street committees “… to 
facilitate efficient dissemination and gathering of information amongst community 
members”.1265 Possibly after learning of the security personnel’s heavy-handed reaction to 
political activism in other areas (and those from outside Kroonstad, having experienced it), 
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political activists in Maokeng in an effort to conceal their identities from the police and 
informers held clandestine meetings to discuss their plans. So when Dennis Bloem, Wilfred 
“Bizza” Makhathe, and other senior activists moved in to try and conscientise the young people 
in the township, they found that the ground was already prepared to some extent, although not 
fully fertile. Bloem recalls   
 
Kroonstad was a very, very, very conservative place. It was very difficult to  
organise. But we organised the students … We had a meeting. Myself and  
Terror [Lekota], with 10 students on a Saturday afternoon. These students  
were from Bodibeng. We spoke to them. The next Saturday they were now  
the organisers this time. And then they organised other students – 10, 10,  
10 from other schools. We had our first meeting at the Dutch Reformed Church  
Hall, there in Seeisoville. You see, we first started with this 10 around school  
issues: why must they pay school fees and their parents are unemployed? Around  
uniform, the teachers’ salaries. Ja, the teachers were involved. We then dwelt in  
now rent, electricity issues. These were township issues now. Eh, and the  
councillors. And then they went to other schools
1266
 
 
The initial 10 students continued as planned. They recruited other students. Makau remarks 
 
There were too many politics, because there were other secret meetings that  
were organized, especially by older people and we did not know about them.  
Because we only realized after the 11
th
 February ‘85 that there were so many  
of us, which was a blessing because at least we were not few. We were about  
10 when we arrived at George Tladi’s [place]. I will try and mention their  
names. It was me, Frank Mohapi, George Tladi, Daniel George, Thabo  
Qobokweleni, Prince Modise, Thulo Mokgoka … (pauses) and one lady Puleng  
Mphosi. Ja, she works somewhere in the North West [Province]. George  
Mokotane. I can’t remember the other one. There were 10 of us. But we thought  
that an organization cannot start with 10 people. So, what happened, we agreed  
that in the next meeting each member will bring one person so that there can be  
20 of us. Okay, we called the meeting after a week and there were 20 of us. Yes,  
same place. We were 20. So, as we were expanding, information was getting out  
onto the streets
1267
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Mamokhele Sebetoane was one of the first students to be recruited. Recalling how this happened, 
she remarked 
  
It was nothing political per ser. But we discussed issues of corporal punishment  
and the prefect system. We held them (meetings) at … a place in Phomolong. And  
to tell the truth it was as if people who used to hold those meetings before I joined,  
I am sure they discussed and decided about me that I would eventually join them  
because of my character. Because I joined those meetings when they were already  
far ahead. I remember one of the people who invited me was George Daniel
1268
  
 
Some of the more enlightened student activists used these meetings as a forum to educate the less 
enlightened students about the country’s political history. Sebetoane remembers 
 
I remember we had a big meeting … at Phomolong at 18h00, together with students  
from Mphohadi – enlightened people. As time went on, while listening it got to politics. 
Things crystallized. You could see how these things supported each other. They started 
teaching us about what the 1976 students were fighting for; how it happened. It became 
sort of political education
1269
 
 
Not all the students, however, were fortunate to attend these meetings. The reason was that they 
were kept secrete in order to conceal from police or any other person who might leak the 
information to the police. Matli explains 
  
On the 8
th
 (of February 1985) it was rumoured that there was going to be a meeting  
on Sunday at the Wesleyan Church – the white one in Seeisoville. But those rumours  
as you  know they were moving secretively and were told to people who could ensure … 
confidential information. And definitely we kept it. We never even told people who we 
didn’t know who they were. One comrade came to me and said ‘Hey, there’s a meeting 
on Sunday, the 10
th
 at Wesleyan Church at 10 o’clock. It’s a political meeting. Be there’. 
On Sunday I tried to get to the meeting. The church was empty. I went to the Roman 
Catholic Church. It was empty. I went to Moepeng Combined School. It was empty. Only 
to find out that the comrades were somewhere in Seeisoville in a house. So, I could not 
get there. So, I lost most of the information of what happened
1270
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There are two important factors about township politics in the 1980s. First, adults, especially 
parents, were difficult to mobilize. In the case of Maokeng, adult ratepayers were content with 
the services they were receiving from the council led by Koekoe. So, there was no pressing issue 
that could be used to mobilize them. Second, senior activists recruited and mobilized students. 
The latter were easy to mobilize because already they needed an outlet to vent out their anger as 
a result of the unsatisfactory conditions they were learning under in their schools (but also 
because of the various influences they had absorbed in their early lives). But most significantly, 
students, and young people in general, felt that they had nothing to lose compared to adults by 
engaging in the struggle for liberation. Makau aptly summed this view up as follows 
Many people were involved in politics during the times of SASO. Because every time  
we were together these people would tell us that they were members of SASO. But they 
were afraid once they had their own families, because they did not want to spoil their 
children’s future, ja1271  
 
The mixture of external influences, numerous clandestine meetings and family influences filled 
the students with courage to resolve to take on the authorities. And 1985 was a turning point for 
many of these students.  
 
Student Politics and Mobilisation               
After the 1976-77 student uprisings students returned to school, albeit reluctantly, and the 
situation seemed to return to normality. The government made some few changes to the 
education system for Africans, largely focusing on establishing technical schools. This was 
mainly encouraged by capitalist interests.
1272
 Before the 26
th
 of July the Afrikaans teaching 
medium ruling was dropped by the authorities.
1273
 In early 1979 the Minister of Education and 
Training introduced an Education and Training Bill, which was passed with minor amendments 
later that year. The Bill was designed to replace the Bantu Education Act of 1953.
1274
 Some of 
the essential provisions the Bill made were: 
 
1) That education should have a Christian character; 
2) That the principle of mother-tongue instruction be observed; 
3) That recognition be given to the Minister to establish of disestablish schools …; and 
4) That recognition be given to the active involvement of the parents and communities1275 
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Notwithstanding the introduction of the Department of Education and Training (DET), there was 
no substantial change to the education of Africans. Instead, the situation worsened. The DET, for 
example, failed to establish new schools and this caused problems in many African schools in the 
townships. This situation was further exacerbated by the hardships in the homelands, which 
caused rapid migration of people to the urban areas. Parents, after they had settled in townships, 
sought schools in which to enroll their children. This caused overcrowding in schools. Teachers, 
who were inadequately trained and with no teaching experience, resorted to corporal punishment 
to uphold discipline. According to Lekgoathi “… corporal punishment was used to mask 
teachers’ incompetence and to shore up their authority”.1276 Hosia Lengosana, who was a student 
at Tsakane Senior Secondary School in the 1980s, claims that some of the students dropped out 
of school “because they were always beaten”.1277  
 
At this stage, amidst, financial difficulties experienced by many of the parents as a result of the 
economic recession gripping the country, some of schools’ authorities demanded that students 
wear “proper” uniforms. And in some instances this had to be changed twice in a year. The cost 
of this “proper” uniform (together with high rent and service charges) was borne by the already 
impoverished parents. It was against this background that student politics were revived at the 
beginning of the 1980s. And these were led by COSAS, founded in 1979.  
 
In the first two years of its existence COSAS concerned itself with national politics rather local 
(or school-focused) politics. For example, Whitey Mohapi recalled that students in Bloemfontein 
high schools in 1980 boycotted demanding the ‘abolition of Bantu Education and other general 
demands’.1278  Furthermore, COSAS’s leadership at this stage worked closely with the ANC and 
MK. For example, Siphiwo Mtimkulu, chairman of the Loyiso High School SRC in Port 
Elizabeth, was also an underground member of the ANC. Mtimkulu was killed by poisoning by 
the security police in 1982.
1279
Not long after the formation of COSAS Eprhaim “Eph” Mogale, 
the first president of COSAS, was arrested and sentenced to five years on Robben Island for 
advancing the aims of a banned organization, the ANC.
1280
 Because of this COSAS failed to 
attract significant membership to its ranks. According to Seekings, [COSAS] “had few active 
branches before 1984 in the various black townships across the country”.1281  
 
In 1982 COSAS changed its position. It began to focus on student and education-based 
problems. Matona, the former national organiser of COSAS, wrote ‘[in 1982] COSAS’s re-
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orientation of strategy towards education-based issues took on renewed urgency’.1282 “COSAS 
leaders”, Matona added “identified schools as the main organisational centres and reiterated 
COSAS’s stated objectives, among which was to strive for “free, compulsory, dynamic 
education in a non-racial and democratic South Africa’”.1283  
 
To achieve this, COSAS, supported the Azanian Student Organisation (AZASO), a tertiary-level 
student organisation, campaigned for an Education Charter. Saleem Badat writes ‘Education 
Charter Campaign pledged non-racial, free and compulsory education for all in a united and 
democratic South Africa based on the will of the people’.1284 According to him, ‘by any measure, 
the Education Charter Campaign was both an ambitious and a massive undertaking’.1285 This and 
other factors like lack of organisational skills, resources and finances, and the state of 
emergency, contributed to its collapse. By 1985 the campaign had not been launched.
1286
  
 
In spite of this, COSAS was able to make inroads and recruited students, who in turn formed 
branches of COSAS in their schools. In 1984 COSAS’s president, Lulu Johnson, acknowledged 
that the organization grew from just groups of students in different areas to a mass-based student 
organisation”.1287  
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The Congress of South African Students declared 1984 ‘The Year of the Boycott’ 
(Source: SASPU Focus, Vol.3, No.2, 1984)
1288
 
 
Buoyed by the rapid expansion of branches across the country, COSAS started raising demands 
which were education-oriented. Bonner and Nieftagodien note “In the early 1980s COSAS began 
to organize campaigns against poor conditions in the schools, which had plummeted to new 
depths in the 1970s. Overcrowding, corporal punishment, sexual harassment and age restrictions 
were the focal points of student agitation in Alexandra and other townships”.1289 It was in 1984 
that COSAS tabled five key demands, which were later taken up by high school students in 
different areas. It demanded SRCs to replace the prefect system; the removal of the age limit 
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rule, an end to corporal punishment; that teachers stop sexually harassing female students, and 
that the police and South African Defence Force (SADF) be withdrawn from schools and 
townships.
1290
  It was against this backdrop that high school students in Maokeng mobilized and 
organized a march that ended disastrously; this nevertheless helped to shift Maokeng’s politics 
from quiescence to confrontation. Overt political resistance by students, and young people in 
general, became most visible from1985 in Maokeng.  
 
Much like students in other townships, students in Maokeng, particularly at Bodibeng High, were 
also affected by the conditions COSAS opposed and wanted to get rid off. They suffered at the 
hands of inconsiderate and power-hungry prefects; and at the hands of teachers who seemed to 
enjoy inflicting pain on them through corporal punishment. At the same time there was the issue 
of compulsory school uniform, which the school’s management changed anytime they felt like 
without consulting the students. Regarding this issue, students strongly felt that their parents 
could not afford to purchase school uniforms all the time.  
 
Prefects were appointed by the staff and, therefore, were accountable to the staff and not to the 
students. In certain instances, prefects became carried away to please their ‘masters’. It is 
suggested in SASPU: FOCUS that prefects were the ‘eyes and ears’ of the staffroom. Under the 
prefect system, SASPU: FOCUS argued, prefects’ role was to instruct, command and be 
strict.
1291
 It was for this reason that students at Bodibeng abhorred the system. Sebetoane 
explains 
 
       What made us hate the prefect system is that sometimes you would find that  
your name was listed down amongst those who did something wrong when  
you didn’t even know when you made the mistake. Even if you could go to the  
teachers and demand an explanation or ask what you did wrong, they would tell  
you to ask questions after they had punished you. Male prefects, also, if you  
refused to go out with them, you’d always find your name on the list. It was  
        difficult for some of us
1292
  
 
Furthermore, George recalls that prefects were unreasonable and always determined to prove 
they were in charge. In his words 
 
We would rally our students, mobilize them to say “Colleagues, the question  
of … the prefect system, it was an oppressive type of government to us”. In the  
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sense that when a prefect would say, ‘You have arrived late’. Maybe, like I could  
recall that the afternoon studies would start at 3 o’clock, when the school knocked 
off at 2:30. Personally, I would have to run from Bodibeng to Phomolong to have  
my food for lunch. Come back, only to be there at 3 o’clock. But when you arrive 5 
minutes [late], they would now be arguing with you for 30 minutes.  When you say  
“But, this is unfair, the time that you’re keeping me here it’s a bit unfair, because  
you’re wasting my time”, you see1293 
 
Just as in George’s case, Senatso, cited by Marks in her study of youth politics in Diepkloof, in 
Soweto, recalled the unfair treatment meted out to him by prefects in his school. He said 
                  When I started high school, there were these things of prefects. When we came 
                  late to school, they close the gates. When we try to explain to the prefect why I 
                  was late, they don’t understand. He takes me to the principal. They took, what do 
                  you call it, stick to punish me …1294  
 
Moses Masizane remembers that one of the chief prefects, William Mpembe, who is now part of 
management in the South African Police Services, used to take his responsibility very seriously 
to the extent that he would chase students who tried to sneak into the school to avoid punishment 
all around the township. If they outran him (and mistakenly dropped their books in the process) 
he would confiscate their books and return with them to school as evidence.
1295
   
 
It was for this reason that COSAS likened the prefect system as a police body.
1296
 COSAS called 
for the SRC to replace the prefect system. It set out the duties of the SRCs as follows: 
 
*to represent students at school 
*to articulate grievances and aspirations of students 
*to create a good working relationship between the students and the staff and parents 
*to help students understand and expand their knowledge of school affairs 
*to make students aware of the laws which protect their interests, for example, laws concerning 
corporal punishment, about uniforms not being compulsory 
*to have a say in matters affecting the students
1297
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Students demanding SRC’s (Source: SASPU Focus, Vo.3, No.2 1984)1298 
 
Another concern for students at Bodibeng was the directive from the school’s management that 
the school uniform was going to be changed. A new uniform was to be introduced. And it was 
compulsory for all the students to purchase it. The core group of students who had been 
attending student meetings felt that the school’s management was inconsiderate because it failed 
to take into account the fact that many of the students at Bodibeng came from working class 
background or from poor families. Their argument was that their parents would not be able to 
afford to purchase new uniforms. George recalls that this was one of the issues they had planned 
to oppose. He remembers 
  
At Bodibeng in 1984 they were saying we needed to change the uniform from black  
and grey trousers, white shirts for boys and then light blue shirts. And the dungarees 
which were supposed to be like navy blue for girls. This really affected the parents who 
could not afford to change the uniform twice in one year. We could not afford
1299
  
 
Students’ concerns were genuine. They experienced on a daily basis how their parents or 
guardians struggled to make ends to meet at home. Most of them lived with their grandparents, 
who were pensioners, or with single parents, who were employed as domestic labourers and 
earned little (as in the case of Mohapi). Matshidiso Paulina Rantie, who worked all her life as a 
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domestic labourer in Kroonstad, recalls that in the 1980s she earned R80 a week.
1300
 The 
students’ parents and guardians did not have sufficient money to sustain their households and 
also bear the financial burden of other unnecessary educational costs.
1301
  
 
Students failed to understand the rationale behind this decision, because there was nothing wrong 
with the uniform they were currently using.  All along, George adds   
 
Boys were wearing white shirts, with grey trousers. And on Mondays we were  
wearing those white shirts and grey trousers, with a tie. And then on Tuesdays,  
we wore our khaki shirts and khaki trousers. Yes, with black shoes. Well, that was  
compulsory - strictly
1302
 
 
What really agitated students was lack of consultation by the staff or school management. 
He concludes  
 
Well, as you would recall during those days there was nothing like consultation. There  
would just be an announcement that as from this month you would be wearing this type  
of uniform - as announced by the principal or a teacher
1303
 
 
Nthabiseng “Mama” Seheri, who started attending at Bodibeng in 1982, echoes George and 
further explains that proper school uniform was compulsory. Just like the others she also felt that 
the teachers were inconsiderate. In her own words  
 
We were expected to shave our hair; we had to wear proper uniform - shoes that  
were worn by children. What are they called? Buccaneers. Other children had no  
proper uniform. If you came to school with a navy blue jersey or any other colour  
other than black, they would take it from you. We were not from the same back- 
ground, financially
1304
 
 
The issue of school uniform was general. Elsewhere in Soweto, student activists also fought 
against the discrimination towards students who did not have “correct” uniform. They argued 
that they should be allowed to attend school irrespective of the uniform they wore.  Shirley 
Thathi, former general secretary of the SRC at Matshidiso Secondary, explains 
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The uniform was compulsory. Monday to Wednesday we put on a white shirt. And  
from Thursday to Friday it was a khaki shirt. And if you did not wear it, you had to  
explain why. So, that was one of our interventions as the SRC; that if a person does  
not have it, it is fine to wear black and white because it could be seen that they were  
students. If a person didn’t have a khaki shirt, they should understand that it was  
because the family could not afford to buy him one. That happened up until the  
uniform was changed to maroon and white
1305
 
 
Corporal punishment seemed to have been at the top of the priority list of students’ concerns. 
This was because it paralysed their confidence and, some times students felt that punishment was 
meted out to them for no concrete reasons, but because some teachers enjoyed doing it. Masizane 
recalls that they were punished for missing afternoon studies: 
 
You miss afternoon studies … Every Friday afternoon those who didn’t attend were  
punished by teacher so and so. We would be told to go to the lobby. We would be lashed.  
That thing of our punishment … it brought some hatred spirit towards these people (i.e. 
teachers). Although, during that time, eh, truly speaking, we didn’t have that much 
political understanding
1306
  
 
And Sebetoane remembers that, because of constant punishment, she finally got used to it even 
though she disliked it; and would not even oppose it. She remarks 
 
 When I got to Bodibeng I realized that there were teachers who were incompetent  
and those teachers also liked corporal punishment. I disliked corporal punishment  
but I ended up getting used to it. Sometimes you would deliberately misbehave  
because you knew that even if you behaved well, you might be counted amongst  
those who did wrong things
1307
 
 
For COSAS, corporal punishment was definitely not an effective educational tool. It argued “We 
can never learn from being beaten”.1308 
 
My interviewees (both male and female), who are former students at Bodibeng High, did not 
raise the issue about sexual harassment at school. In many of the high and secondary schools 
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elsewhere in the country, students complained about male teachers who were sexually harassing 
female students.
1309
  
 
Strike and Riot, 1985 
 
It was against this background that students at Bodibeng High finally decided to organize 
themselves. It is not exactly clear who made this decision, but it is possible that the idea was 
suggested by the core group of students (the initial 10 students) who were then politically 
conscientised. On Saturday the 9
th
 of February 1985 students from Bodibeng High, Kananelo 
Secondary schools and Mphohadi Teachers’ Training College met at Seeisoville to chart the way 
forward. George claims that he personally announced the meeting at Bodibeng “that there was 
going to be a very important meeting, but I never said what was going to be discussed”.1310 In 
that secretive meeting, also attended by students from Thabong, in Welkom, students discussed 
their grievances and elected a committee to give direction to the students. Other suggestions 
were made. Seheri remembers 
 
We had a meeting on Saturday. I think it was on the 9
th
 of February. But the police  
were not supposed to know about the meeting. The meeting was held I think it was  
in the hall at Seeisoville. There was this place called Seeisoville Hall. Some people  
were elected; some people were left out, because we were not supposed to tell all the 
 students. We agreed that on Monday we were not taking our books [to school]. We  
were going to riot. We would start in the morning during the school’s parade and we 
 would do things swiftly. Thereafter, we would go to Kananelo [Secondary School]. 
 During that time Kananelo and Bodibeng were the only high schools
1311
 
 
George remembers that a suggestion was made that they should paint graffiti on the walls around 
the township. According to him they agreed that “we must write on the walls at different schools: 
‘No to prefects. Yes to SRC’.1312 George claims that he stole his grandmother’s spray to 
undertake this task. He explains 
 
 It was difficult to say where we were going to get the spray. A spray or painting.  
I can recall my grandmother had a spray, which she was going to use to paint the  
kitchen units. So, I went home to steal that spray. And I went to Bodibeng. It was  
a yellow spray to spray the walls: “No to prefects, yes to SRC’s”. We went to  
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Kananelo. The same was done. All the tarred roads, especially where we knew  
that traffic was getting in and out. The message would go out
1313
 
 
Masizane remembers that their discussion went further than electing a committee or painting 
graffiti, but also focused on the whole issue of Bantu Education. He remarks 
 
In 1985 it happened that on the 9
th
 of February it was on Saturday there was a meeting  
which was held at Seeisoville. In that meeting there were guys from outside. Tommy 
Makau was also there, Frank Mohapi was there. All these guys I told you about were 
there. There was a briefing that there was a need that actually we as student have to 
stand up against the system that was implemented at school, the Bantu Education, 
corporal punishment, and all that stuff
1314
 
 
The students agreed to meet the following day to finalise their preparations. Frank Mohapi 
explains  
I had already left AZASM. Then there was a meeting that was set on the 10
th
 it  
was on Sunday. This is February. This meeting was basically to look at these, eh,  
student issues. And I remember on the 11
th
 Bodibeng was going to announce the  
new prefects for the year. And then we had to have a meeting on Sunday to strategise  
how we were going to disrupt this and demand SRC
1315
   
 
Makau adds 
 
You see, we called a meeting on the 10
th
 of February, which was a Sunday and held  
it at the Reformed Church premises in Seeisoville. This is because it would be Monday  
the next day. That was where the decision was taken
1316
 
 
Already some of the student activists at Bodibeng had contact with some of the ‘progressive’ 
teachers, who supported the UDF. One such teacher was Oupa Ntombela. Mohapi explains the 
role Ntombela played during this period, leading to the 11
th
. In his words  
Early 1985 - then I was approached by Oupa Ntombela. And Oupa then started talking  
to me and showing me some material relating to the UDF – it was after the UDF had  
been launched in Cape Town. And he managed to organize material and we started. I 
 remember we were sitting at a shop, I forgot the name of this shop, but it was in 
 Phomolong and we were eating fat cakes there and he said … He was already a teacher  
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at Bodibeng. He was taking us through, eh, the UDF structures … It was me, eh, Tommy 
 Makau, Nikki Matsepe, Thulo [Mokgoka] …1317 
 
Khotso Sesele, who was detained in 1976 following the student demonstration, was another 
teacher who played a significant role in shaping student politics. In 1982 Sesele was expelled 
from the Mabopane East Tecknikon, in Pretoria, for his involvement in the commemoration of 
the sixth anniversary of June 16 and for being among the students who raised their dissatisfaction 
against one racist teacher.
1318
 In the following year he was admitted at Mphohadi Teachers 
Training College, in Kroonstad, to further his studies. In spite of the warning by the principal, 
Sesele actively participated in student politics. He recalls 
 
 We arrived at Mphohadi in 1983. After we had been allocated classrooms, I think  
after two or three weeks, the Rector, Mr Priet, called us and asked us if we had  
attended school at Mabopane Technikon. And we replied “Yes”. And he also told  
us which subjects we were doing and that we were expelled. And he also warned  
us that we were being watched.  That was the time when I directly started engaging  
in meetings in different places, and when we started resisting the prefect system …  
which consisted both the head girl and head boy. We were trying to destabilize the  
school system. But I was lucky to finish my studies
1319
 
 
In 1985 Sesele joined the teaching staff of Bodibeng. He and the Ntombela brothers, Oupa and 
Pini, interacted with the students and helped them to formalize themselves into an organization. 
In his words 
 
So, we would do all those things with school children, helping them to establish  
some structures like COSAS, etc. Then there was the Maokeng Progressive Teacher’s 
Organisation. I think that’s when one would say I started to be very, very active in 
politics. I … joined structures like the Release Mandela Campaign, along with the 
Maokeng Advice Centre
1320
 
 
Teachers participated in political activities at great risk. Some were dismissed from their 
employment. Others were attacked and close to being killed. Aubrey Matshiqi, who joined the 
National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA) in 1984, recalls that after graduating from 
Soweto Teachers’ Training College he started teaching at Phafugang Secondary School in 
Rockville, Soweto, in 1985. Because of his involvement in NEUSA, he was summarily 
dismissed from teaching. He remarks 
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 In 1982 I matriculated and found myself doing teacher training in Soweto in 1983.  
I was there … until 1985. In 1984 Angie Motshekga started to make approaches  
towards us.
1321
 I can remember we were invited by NEUSA to a workshop at Funda 
Centre. … Linda Chisholm would invite us to Wits to give speeches on topics such as 
‘People’s Power’.  Our first task as the newly employed teachers was to form the first 
branch of NEUSA in Soweto ... [and] recruit teachers and it was extremely difficult. 
Teachers in those days had no appetite for politics.  I was a hothead then, doing 
interviews with the media. The Business Day (1986) did an interview with me. The 
following day I think there was a response from the Minister. I think then I should have 
known that there was no way I could continue as a teacher. My letter of termination was 
delivered by the Special Branch
1322
  
 
 In an attempt to disorganize the Progressive Teachers’ Organisation (PTO) in Maokeng, at the 
end of 1989 the DET, without warning, notified Bodibeng High that 12 of its teachers – all 
members of the PTO – were to be transferred to Petrusteyn, Tweeling, Lindley and Edenville.1323  
 
In spite of the extreme difficulties faced by ‘progressive’ teachers, the relationship between them 
and some of the students was productive. At Bodibeng this relationship benefitted student 
activists when they needed advise relating to strategies and first-hand information about the 
school’s management’s possible response to their actions.  
 
On the 11
th
 of February students woke up and prepared themselves for school as they normally 
would do. This was a precautionary measure against alerting the police or students who would 
unwittingly (or wittingly) reveal the plans to the teachers, or worse to the police.
1324
 But students 
were also afraid that should news of their plans reach their homes, they might be reprimanded or 
punished by their parents or legal guardians. Although students tried to pretend that everything 
was normal on that day, signs were visible for all to see that the situation was atypical. The 
school’s walls had been painted with the message denouncing the prefect system. Seheri recalls: 
“I was doing Standard Nine. When we arrived at school that day [11th Feb], we went to a parade 
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(assembly) as usual. But they had already sprayed the walls. Children were surprised: ‘Who had 
sprayed the walls?’ We kept quiet.”1325 
 
George, who lived with his grandmother pretended that there was nothing untoward about the 
day. In the morning he did everything as normal. He reflects 
  
On Monday morning, all the students came to my place - at my grandmother’s place –  
to ask me “Are we carrying our books to school?” I said “Yes”. Because I was afraid  
of my grandmother… I couldn’t say, no. Because as they were coming in my 
grandmother was busy ironing my white shirt, because it was Monday. I said “Yes, we 
carry our books, we go to school”. But my grandmother was very suspicious1326   
 
Masizane concurs 
 
On that particular date, the 11
th
, we attended the parade as normal. The assembly was  
held. There were announcements. After announcements, we sang school hymns. Then  
there came this teacher, Makhanya. He says that we are going to appoint the prefects.  
Wow! Then we looked at each other. All the people who were at the meeting were asking  
themselves who was going to start? And there was nobody who was willing to start. It  
looked as if the whole thing was going to be a “flop” (failure)1327 
 
Mohapi echoes both George and Masizane, but also adds that it was during the announcement of 
the prefects that some of the students decided to break their silence and shouted the principal 
down as he was announcing, demanding the SRC.
1328
 He explains 
  
On Monday we all went to school as normal. We went to the parade. The principal  
started announcing the prefects. We said “No! What we demand was the SRC. We  
were requesting the Students’ Representative Council. We don’t want the prefects,  
because the prefects were not democratically elected, and they were not actually repre- 
sentatives of us; and they don’t deal with our issues”. And it started being a squabble1329 
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Thulo Machabe, Masizane and Matli remember the incident differently. They all, although in 
different ways, agree that Bodibeng students accommodated at Boikemisetso were responsible 
for disrupting the parade and, in the process, causing mayhem at Bodibeng. Machabe remarks 
   
 On our way to Bodibeng we were singing Sikhokhele Tambo sibuyela emakhaya, 
 sizongena kanjani (lead us Tambo on our way back home. How are we going to  
enter?). I was leading the march … next to the tarred road … to Boitumelong  
Hospital. When we got to Bodibeng … We had received a command and it was  
given to me. It said when we get there and you don’t find textbooks, go to the  
second floor and you’ll find sjamboks. Instruct the students that they must support  
you, because you also want to be educated just like them. Dismiss them by force.  
Those who did not want to listen must be beaten. Some of them refused. We beat  
them with sjamboks. Cowards flew down from the second floor and ran away. There  
was this guy called Mpembe – he later became a cop – he was the chief of prefects at 
school. We beat him with sjamboks. The nurses even came to rescue him. We  
vandalized the place. And after that we left
1330
   
 
Masizane concurs. He recalls that after the parade and the appointment of the new prefects, 
students went into their classrooms. But when a group of students from Boikemisetso arrived at 
Bodibeng the situation changed. In his words 
 
 So, on that day, the 11
th
, there was this group of students who were going to the other  
school to do Standard 7. They came to take their books from Bodibeng and go back to the 
other school. We thought it was our group coming to support us in the fight. It happened  
that this guy, comrade Thulo, he was the first guy, if I remember well, to run to these 
guys shouting zwakala, zwakala (come on, come on). Then we went out of the classes, 
thinking that these Standard 7s came to support us. We started stoning the school “Away 
with the prefect system. Away!”1331 
 
Finally, Matli further claims    
 
That morning all students of Bodibeng who were doing Standard 7, accommodated at 
Boikemisetso were supposed to go and be part of the elections of the prefects at the main 
building. At the same time we were going to collect our books. Mr Gaborone, who was a 
sub-principal or whatever you call it, was based at Boikemisetso, said we are leaving for 
Bodibeng. We were walking in a line as if we were soldiers - four lines – on the outer 
part of Kroonstad, using the main road to [Boitumelo] Hospital. As we were walking 
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down, we could see that nothing was happening. Because we were not part of the 
meeting, we could not start something which we never planned. Mr Gaborone was saying 
‘Don’t go there, because something is not right’. I never listened to him. I went direct 
into the main yard. So I found people like Prince Modise, Thulo Makgoka engaging Mr 
Molefe. He was going to manage the process of the appointment of the prefects. Because 
then all classes had already handed their preferred names of the prefects. Mr Molefe was 
sjambokked by the students, but because he was almost the darling of the students not to 
the extent. But those whom we wanted were far away. Mr [Jacob] Ramotsoela was not 
even near. From there … we disrupted classes at Phuleng Primary. Others went to 
Kananelo
1332
   
 
Machabe Thulo in Maokeng, in the mid-1980s 
(Source: Machabe Thulo) 
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However, before the students could leave the school’s premises and march to Kananelo 
Secondary, the principal Mr Zanemvula Zothwana, himself a former activist while he was 
employed at Rhodes University
1333
, tried to reason with them, requesting them to meet with him 
so that they could resolve their concerns. When the students demanded to meet with him only if 
he agreed that they will have the SRC, he informed them that he had to consult with Sam de 
Beer, a senior official in the DET. George remembers 
  
Ntate Zothwana was the then principal at Bodibeng. He wanted to have a meeting with us  
and we said no. The only meeting that we could have was with the students, and yourself  
to allow us to have a meeting, where we were going to elect our SRC. He said to us he 
was going to consult with ntate De Beer - Sam De Beer - who was then the inspector. We 
refused
1334
   
 
The students left Bodibeg chanting and shouting “Viva Oliver Tambo”.1335 Together with a 
group from Boikemisetso, which had joined them they headed for Kananelo Secondary. 
Recalling this march, George explains – at length 
 
 When we arrived at Kananelo the gates were locked. The then principal ntate … I’ll  
tell you his name now … ntate [Douglas] Motsetse. They had already locked the gates. 
We kicked, we kicked. Myself, the late Thulo Mokgoka, Tommy Makau, Liphapang 
[Frank Mohapi], and a young lady, Mamokhele Sebetoane. The students were then 
fleeing out of their classes, trying to run away.
1336
 They were trying to run away to the 
side of Brentpark. But we were calling them, saying “Come and join us”. They returned 
when the gates were already wide open. After we had been joined by students from 
Kananelo, we marched past Phomolong Higher Primary School. We came towards the 
Phomolong shopping complex. There was a bottle store that used to be called Thabo 
Bottle Store. It was on Monday. There were bottles packed outside. Police were now 
already approaching us. We took those empty bottles. The war was already on. We were 
throwing them with those bottles and they were shooting at us. Then we moved down 
towards Constantia. They couldn’t control us when we were in Phomolong. We managed 
to move down. We marched towards Mphohadi. When we arrived at Mphohadi, it was 
the same story. The then Rector of Mphohadi had locked the students in. We managed to 
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get them out. They came out. But just immediately at the corner of the church, as we 
were turning there, the police starting to re-inforce, because the helicopter was already 
hovering over us. We then decided to hijack a bakery bakkie. Thulo Mokgoka was 
driving that bakkie - that big lorry.  We approached the security branch, because they 
were shooting with live ammunition. We chased them away with that truck. Things 
started to happen there. When we arrived at ntate Motsetse’s place, the then principal of 
Kananelo.
1337
 Because I was a leader I was told, I can’t just recall the name of the person 
who told me that Matete Machese
1338
 had been shot; he was dead - next to Bodibeng
1339
  
 
The idea was to disrupt schooling on that day, but the situation got out of hand and the disruption 
spilled into the township. Some of the students, joined by non-school-going youth in the 
township, attacked and damaged shops and properties belonging to the councillors. Matli 
explains 
 
 I was part and parcel of the people who went to the Phomolong shops. We were throwing 
 stones at cars, particularly police vans. They had to retreat. There was this, eh, we called 
them Matadiana (Italians) buses. I believe this man was an Italian. That’s why they 
called the buses Matadiana. So, those buses we burned – some of them. We smashed 
their windows. At first it was only students. But then there were people who were 
unemployed and those who were not schooling. I finally landed at the crossroads. That 
was when the police came. That was the first time I saw a police Jeep
1340
  
 
Similarly, Masizane remembers 
 
 There was a school next to our school, a lower primary school called Phuleng. We  
got there and dismissed the children. We attacked the delivery vans by stoning them  
and burning whatever we came across. I remember one delivery van belonging to a  
certain man called ntate Kuto - there is this township called Marabastad - that’s where  
we burned that delivery van
1341
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Sesomo Samuel Seakhela, a former councillor in the Maokeng Town Council, recalls that 
properties belonging to councillors were destroyed. “… Our shops were stoned and burned”, he 
remembers.
1342
 Other councillors whose property was damaged included Koekoe and Madlala 
Nkomonde.
1343
 
 
Some of the non-school going youth who joined the revolt did so to assist the students but others 
had ulterior motives. Abram Ditseki Moeketsi, who had returned to Maokeng in 1985 after he 
had passed his matric level in Bothaville, in the Orange Free State, remembers “being a youth of 
that time, I joined in protests”.1344 And Mamorena Florence Taje, who had long left school and 
was pregnant in 1985, recalls  
 
When these things (student riots) started on the 11
th
 (February) I was a pregnant  
woman who didn’t know anything. But you’ll find that as people were running … I 
would be also running as a pregnant woman. We’d come across [a truck carrying]  
maize-meal or whatever, I also looted. I’d go around the whole township because  
this thing was nice
1345
 
 
To halt the revolt, the local police, reinforced by the Riot Squad from Welkom, responded with 
great violence. The Friend reported “A strong contingent of Riot Squad policemen moved into 
the township and opened fire with rubber bullets. Batons and teargas were used to disperse the 
swelling mob”.1346 They detained, shot and killed some of the young people in the township.  
Machese was not the only person shot and killed on that day. Andrew Makoko was another 
victim.
1347
 Police actions angered the students, who had now been joined by non-school-going 
youth from the township. They continued attacking and destroying properties, including the 
house of the ambassador of Qwaqwa, Mr D.A. Thejane.
1348
 A newspaper report covering the 
riots in Maokeng led with the headline ‘Town of horror’, and reported that the home of the 
headmaster, the mayor’s house, and 27 shops in the township were gutted, while 12 more 
businesses were stoned and set alight. It estimated the damage to be more than R500 00.
1349
 
Dintsho Serotho, whose chain of stores in Maokeng were gutted, was reported to have lost 
property to the tune of R214 000.
1350
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Sebetoane blamed the “elements whom we did not know where they were coming from 1351.” 
And Masizane saw this as the work of criminals. He explains: “The situation was that we 
planned to bring down the apartheid system. Others were using the opportunity to further their 
own desires, you see. As I said, that even during the protests there were the criminal elements 
which targeted black owned shops, by burning and looting them.”1352 The opportunistic 
involvement of non-school-going youth during the riots in the townships was a widespread 
phenomenon. In some of the townships they were called ‘com-tsotsis’. According to Monique 
Marks, “… [these] were elements whose concerns was not solely the achievement of political 
justice. They were more interested in the personal gains they could make from joining political 
organizations.”1353 It is, however, important to note here that not all non-school going youth were 
‘com-tsotsis’. The latter were in minority and their objective was to cash in on the riots. Simon 
Mateza, a retired businessman, relates how his shop was constantly invaded by young people 
demanding goods or money long after the 11 February. This ended in a rather comical note when 
the young people and himself exchanged letters of demand. He explains 
  
I remember there was a time when I received a letter from a certain group, demanding  
some money from me. They told me to put R1000 in an envelope and to take it to …  
There is a school called Moepeng. They wanted me to leave it on the ground there. They  
didn’t say who they were. They just gave the letter to a child who came to buy. They 
instructed her to pass it to me. And when I opened it, I realized it was a letter of demand. 
I then took it to the police. The police did not tell me to hand in the money, but only told 
me they would handle the matter. I then decided to reply to the letter and told them they 
should come out so it would be easy for me to deal with people that I know, because I 
cannot just give my money away to people that I didn’t know. I took the letter to the 
place where they instructed me to leave some money. I left it on top of a rock. The 
following day they received my letter and replied again
1354
 
 
By the end of the day on 11 February, a number of students and non-school going youth had 
been detained. The Friend reported that in the afternoon of that day police had already arrested 
14 males and eight females, aged between 14 and 37 on charges of public violence.
1355
 This 
number included some of the student leaders. George and Makau were detained on the same day. 
Makau recalls that he was detained at his home: “Remember I had attended a rally that Sunday. 
So, I was very tired and decided to go and sleep only to find that the police were waiting for me 
at home. Yes, they were waiting at the back opposite as I entered through the front door. That 
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was my first 14 days detention.”1356 Mohapi, managed to evade the police for a few days, but ran 
out of luck and was finally arrested. He remembers 
  
When we started fighting the police other students were taking other roads, going to  
disrupt at Kananelo. And that’s how the whole thing started. And a couple of police  
houses were burned and shops were looted. It was havoc that lasted for a couple of  
days. Then, I remember, I was one of the people to be arrested - two nights later  
I got arrested. What happened  … I decided to go and stay at home. So I got arrested  
about, I think, three days later or so … charged with public violence. So, that was  
my first encounter with the police
1357
 
 
Students responded by boycotting classes and organized a march to the magistrate’s court to 
demand the release of Thulo Makgoka and others.  Masizane recalls that the idea of the march 
came from some of the ‘progressive’ teachers at Bodibeng. He explains  
 
We never attended classes. There were other students like the late comrade Thulo.  
They were arrested and other guys were also arrested. We couldn’t just make a  
decision of going back to classes. Our demand: we were now planning for a march  
that we were going to court on that particular court date of theirs, to demand the  
release of those comrades. The likes of Mr. Ntombela would, maybe, call one guy  
and ask if we talked about certain issues, you know. Then they would inform the  
students that we were supposed to talk about those issues. Even the idea of the march  
to demand the release of our comrades was from these teachers. I don’t remember the 
date of our march. All the guys from the other schools came and we started at Bodibeng 
… and went via Marabastad. And we joined the main road and went down. Before the 
end of Marabastad there was this blockade, casspirs (police vehicles) of the boers, 
soldiers and policemen
1358
 
 
In order to curtail the interference by ‘com-tsotsis’, Masizane recalls that student leaders had 
emphasized to all the students that no one would be allowed to participate in the march if they 
were not wearing their school uniform. He continues 
 
And we even stressed it. There was not even a single guy who would be allowed  
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to march without their white shirts on; that all of us must put on their uniform. We  
went to demand the release of Thulo and others. We marched. When we arrived  
there … here were the police demanding to see a student leader to come forward to  
address them. There was a certain lady called Mama Seheri. She marched forward.  
Mama Seheri, Tabs Motlogelwa, George and others. Other leaders were acting as 
marshals, you see. They went to address those people (police) and told them that we  
were going to court. And they told us that our march was illegal, and that they will  
give us five minutes to disperse
1359
 
 
Nthabiseng “Mama” Seheri concurs with Masizane, but remembers certain details differently. 
She explains – at length 
 
Thulo Mokgoka was … arrested. We stayed at home, without attending school. February passed. 
But we started attending in March. In March we stopped going to school again. … During that 
time we had elected the SRC. We used to have meetings on Wednesdays. We pointed out that 
“We were attending school even though there won’t be any lessons. What about those who got 
arrested because of what we did together?” They (students) asked what should be done so that 
they could be released? We told them that all the students should meet, including students from 
Kananelo. We agreed to set up a date to meet. Six students were detained. But only Thulo 
remained in custody, because the magistrate said he was stubborn and he talked too much. We 
had to organize a march so that Thulo could be released. 
 
Seheri claims that some of the students from Bodibeng went to see the magistrate (she could not 
remember the name of the magistrate) to demand the release of Thulo Makgoka. But the 
magistrate ordered them to draft a petition, with more than five thousand signatures from both 
students and non-students. “Any person in town could sign”, she contends.1360 However, none of 
the other former students at Bodibeng who were interviewed for this thesis remembered being 
instructed to petition the magistrate for the release of Makgoka. And there is no evidence that 
students attempted to collect the five thousand signatures. It is possible that the idea of a petition 
was raised by students themselves in one of their many meetings before the actual march to 
demonstrate to the authorities in the Justice department the massive support for Makgoka’s 
release.
1361
 They may have copied the idea from the UDF’s 1984 million signatures campaign 
against the introduction of the tri-cameral parliamentary system and support for the UDF.
1362
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Although the UDF was unable to collect million signatures, the campaign helped to popularize it 
within the black residential areas.    
  
Seheri recalls that the students held a meeting on Wednesday after school where she was chosen, 
together with someone, to go and inform students at Kananelo to come to Bodibeng the 
following day at seven in the morning. We inform[ed] them: “you should know that we would be 
marching from Bodibeng to the magistrate’s offices to hand over a petition. I don’t remember the 
date. On Thursday we went to Bodibeng with our books. We waited for students from Kananelo 
and they did come. We addressed them. We said “For us not to cause violence, we are going to 
walk nicely out of the township and there were students we had chosen to be marshals in order to 
prevent people from the township from joining us.  It was myself and Sonnyboy Maloka who 
would be able tell the police the reasons for our march so that they could not shoot at us? I 
volunteered. I would go and explain to them”.1363  
 
Despite the peaceful march arranged by the students, the police declared it illegal and ordered the 
students to disperse. Seheri adds 
 
We marched along, holding each other’s hands. And the SRC was walking in front. We marched 
until where Sasko (Bakeries) is. In front of Traido we saw the police. We didn’t know how they 
had found out. They had already blocked the subway. It was black and white police officials. As 
we got closer to the police, we told the students “Comrades, you know that we don’t want to 
cause any violence and we need to do everything in order”.1364 Myself and Sonnyboy approached 
them. They asked for our names. I told them my name and they also asked for Maloka’s name. 
They asked us if we were the leaders. They wanted us to tell them that we were the leaders, but 
we did not. We told them that we were students. Therefore, we were elected to represent all the 
students because we cannot all speak [at the same time]. They asked us what we wanted. We told 
them that we were taking the petition to court, the magistrate ordered us to draft a petition and 
here it was. We showed it to them and told them that we were not fighting: “We only want this 
person to be released and come back to school, so that schooling could resume”.1365 They told us 
that they shall take the petition. So we must ask the students to go back to school and they would 
bring the magistrate’s reply. It was ntate Manyatso - but he is late now. They were in front. And 
ntate Nthako Maponyane.
1366
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As expected the police did not keep their promise. Instead, not long after the dispersed march 
they invaded Bodibeng High and beat everyone in the school and threatened to arrest some of the 
students. Seheri remembers 
  
The Standards 9 and 10 classes were situated on the top floor. We heard doors of cars  
opening down there and the police came out wearing helmets to beat us up. We tried  
to run away. Because they were coming up the stairs, we had no chance but to run back  
into our classes. In the presence of teachers, we were beaten by the police
1367
  
 
Matli remembers this incident differently. According to him 
 
I am not sure when, but it was in March. But I remember clearly it was on Tuesday. 
Police came and sjambokked us. What happened on that day? Teachers were not there. 
But some comrades had information that something was going to happen. ‘Then 
comrades [said] let’s leave’. As we left we were in this soccer field at Bodibeng, behind 
the main block. There was a white … No, a blue Ford Sierra standing somewhere next to 
Phuleng Primary. It had closed us in. And make no mistake we wanted to leave but that 
police officer had a gun in his hand. It means he had drawn the line. Nobody was going to 
pass. As we were standing there, hardly forty five minutes, there came in cars – police 
Jeppes, tjha, tjha, tjha (sound of screeching wheels). They came in Mellow-Yellows 
(police casspirs). Ah, we were sjambokked
1368
 
 
To root-out student leaders, police invaded Bodibeng High School to arrest them. Mohapi recalls 
that the police came into his classroom with the intention of arresting him. But his quick thinking 
saved him. He explains 
  
I was sitting in the classroom. Tommy was there and Moses Masizane. Bodibeng was 
surrounded by police and they walked straight into my class and I thought [Jacob] 
Ramotsoela had called them … because he had a two-way radio. Fortunately, it was  
only white police officers who didn’t know me. The ones who knew me were standing 
outside, and those who knew Tommy and Moses. My classmate was Tommy. And they 
said “Frank Mohapi, staan op (Stand up). Tommy Makau staan op. In front of me there 
was one girl whose father was a police officer and I said [to her] “You turn your head, 
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I’m gonna strangle you”. And I responded and said Frank is nie hierso nie. Frank het 
weg gehardloop (Frank is not here. He ran away)
1369
  
 
Police harassment and funerals of victims of police brutality mobilized the residents of Maokeng, 
particularly the youth. According to Chabasiele Makume, who became active in student politics 
from 1985, “We attended the night vigils and that’s where we were told about a lot of things”.1370  
For example, Bloem, in his mitigation statement at the Delmas Treason Trial, wrote “The funeral 
of Matete Matches on the 18
th
 of February was attended by 20 000 people.”1371  In the absence of 
normal schooling, some of the students became engrossed in reading political materials and 
debating political issues to expand their political knowledge.  
 
 
 
‘Comrades’ carrying Matete Machese’s coffin (Source: SASPU National, Vol.4, 1985 
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‘Each One Teach One’ 
 
In the course of the demonstrations, protest marches and police harassment, students, particularly 
members of COSAS, began to engage with political literature to develop their political 
awareness. They read banned materials and discussed them. Matli recalls 
  
We were never taught seriously then. I think we only went to school most[ly] when 
 we were writing exams. There were some teachers who wanted to teach us, but one 
of the key issues was that it was when we were studying politics – very seriously. 
Vandalizing of property was over. We were learning politics. We were then arguing 
politics
1372
 
 
This had become a common practice within COSAS. Reading and engaging in socio-economic 
and political, and even cultural debates was encouraged. Carter’s study illustrates this trend. He 
notes that the ‘Mdakane’ and ‘Freedom Charter’ camps, largely made up of members of the 
Alexandra Student Congress (ASCO) held Sunday workshops “at which one member of the 
group would present a topic or paper, and this would be followed by general discussion”.1373 
 
Matli admits that before this he (and probably many of his comrades as well) had a rudimentary 
understanding of politics. He observes 
 
 One had this basic understanding of politics that whites [were] enemies. Whites 
 [were] oppressing us. That’s why we don’t have better education. By then I never  
had something tangible. Somebody was feeding me the information. But after the  
11
th
 [February] I wanted to learn those things. Why do you say we are being given 
inferior education? Politics were beginning to filter into us. That is when we were  
able to identify (distinguish) between the ANC, BCM and AZAPO
1374
 
 
Echoing Matli, Masizane recalls that he was made to develop a better understanding of politics 
by the activists from Welkom. In his words 
 
 We never attended classes. There were other students, like the late comrade Thulo,  
they were arrested … We couldn’t just make a decision of going back to classes. We  
had joined with other groups from outside. There was a house … called Ha MaModikoe. 
There was a certain guy from Welkom called Brand, who was related to those people. 
The comrades were housed there. During the meetings we were conscientised by them. 
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We would talk politics. That’s when all these political things became clearer to our minds 
and we started understanding … Because at the time we had been thinking PAC and 
AZAPO was one thing, because they were talking about our mother country, AZANIA. 
And the the ANC [was] the umbrella body of all these organizations. That was our 
thinking then. … These people were explaining the formation of the ANC, the eventual 
PAC split, you see. The era of the silence after the Rivonia Trial of comrade Nelson 
Mandela and them; the era of Steve Biko’s - the 1968 era. We saw that picture and 
realized that that’s how those things were working. I was lucky to have an understanding 
of those politics
1375
 
 
Members of COSAS were not aware where the political materials came from. When they 
received the materials they read them as quickly as possible and passed them on to the other 
members. Matli adds 
 
 I’m not sure where we got the materials.1376 But we were getting materials. You read.  
 You take it and give it to another person. Because we were supposed to make sure  
that the police didn’t get you with that material, you were reading it as quickly as 
possible and “dish” it out. It was on rare occasion when we were reading in a group. 
The only thing was that when we met we were debating and then, maybe, explaining 
to say ‘comrade, what do they mean by this particular concept?’ We read Mayibuye, 
New Nation. I forgot some of them. Black Theology written by Desmond Tutu and  
Allan Boesak
1377
  
 
Some of the members of COSAS became so engrossed in reading and engaging the political 
materials, that they became less vigilant. This was evident when Mamokhele Sebetoane was 
arrested and the police confiscated some of her materials – although these were not banned. In 
August 1985 the following were taken from Sebetoane:  
 
1 x File (these were probably notes) titled ‘Bodibeng Student Rep’ Council 
1 x File titled ‘Hand grenade stick’ 
1 x Learn and Teach, No. 2, 1985 
1 x Speak, Vol.3, No.1, March 1985 
1 x File titled ‘May day in South Africa’ 
2 x Files titled ‘Meeting at Bodibeng, 1985 May 221378 
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The police also confiscated Sebetoane’s handwritten notes, where she was complaining about the 
South African government’s use of force against the neighbouring states and blaming the Ronald 
Reagan government for not doing anything to stop it.
1379
 Furthermore, she accused [Mangosuthu] 
Buthelezi of working hand-in-hand with the boer government. She wrote “Every time a member 
of any organization is taken by police (I’ve experienced this) for questioning, they will try to 
convince him that Inkatha or Buthelezi is our real leader. Why only him?” In conclusion, she 
declared “My leader is [Nelson] Mandela. My defence force is Umkhonto we Sizwe. My school 
is COSAS. And my teacher is UDF”.1380  
 
From Sebotoane’s notes it is clear that students in Maokeng, although at the time there were no 
formal UDF structures and there was an absence of MK’s sabotage acts in the area as was the 
case in other places, students were however aware of the existence and roles of the UDF and 
MK.   
 
As the students’ resistance heightened country-wide, the state responded by banning COSAS on 
28 August 1985. Students countered by renaming their organizations. For example, in Alexandra 
Township COSAS was re-launched as Alexandra Student Congress (ASCO).
1381
 In Maokeng it 
was renamed Maokeng Students Congress (MASCO).
1382
 MASCO does not seem to have existed 
except in name. There is no evidence to suggest that MASCO embarked in any campaign during 
this period. This was because student activists, particularly the leaders, were in and out of 
detention after the state declared the partial State of Emergency on 21 August 1985. Although 
Maokeng was not on the list of the affected 36 magisterial districts, a number of political 
activists in the township were detained after they had organized a consumer boycott (see below). 
 
From educational issues to fighting apartheid 
 
It was during this period that political resistance in Maokeng shifted from educational matters 
and encompassed national politics. Students, who had by now reconstituted themselves, inter 
alia, as the defenders of the community and disciplinarians, especially against the tsotsis, 
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actively led the resistance. Political commentators have labeled these ‘comrades’. However, 
‘comrades’ have been defined in two different ways by various commentators. Ari Sitas notes 
“Sociologists have largely discussed ‘comrades’ (or amaqabane) within the parameters of two 
broad indicators: black youth unemployment and ‘anomic’ behavior”.1383 This view is grounded 
on the belief that ‘comrades’ were nothing but troublemakers. Seekings argues that this was one 
widespread stereotype view of the [politically-active] youth, who were portrayed as rebels 
against political and social order. He writes that these youth were seen as apocalyptic, associated 
with violence and destruction.
1384
 He also notes though that there was also the liberatory view, 
which perceived the youth as ‘young lions’, who were associated with ‘struggle for justice and 
liberation’.1385  
 
In Maokeng, just like in other townships, two kinds of ‘comrades’ also existed: defenders of the 
“community” and the com-tsotsis (or those who became involved in the struggle for personal 
gain). This thesis will, however, focus on the role played by former. As the defenders of the 
“community”, ‘comrades’ were also perceived (and they also saw themselves in the same way) 
as ‘disciplinarians’. They punished anyone who misbehaved or inflicted pain on others, 
especially members of the community. Matli remembers that in the mid-1980s the ‘comrades’ in 
Maokeng were revered even by the criminal elements. He explains 
 
 Eh, you see, people were afraid to fight the … the comrades because we were very  
brutal. We would engage you.  If you wanted to do it physically, we’d do it better.  
Because then in 1985, ’86, we would sjambok you. If you have raped, if you have  
pick-pocketed somebody, we would deal with you. So, tsotsis would know that there  
was this element of comrades. And they were respecting us
1386
 
 
Similarly, Monique Marks’ study on the youth politics in Diepkloof, Soweto, demonstrates that 
the ‘comrades’ fought gangsters who attacked students. She writes “youth leaders felt the need to 
protect the Diepkloof school students and to put an end to the Kabasa [gang] phenomenon”.1387 
But the ‘comrades’ did not mete out punishment indiscriminately. They made efforts to 
investigate whether the complainant was telling the truth or not. As a result members of the 
community preferred to take their cases to them and to the police. Matli adds 
 
Some people would go to the police. But because … of the long process they would 
immediately go to the comrades and we would deal with that particular person. [Did  
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you try to find out the truth behind the allegations?] Normally we did. To some extent  
we were fair … because we would say, “Hey chief, did you try to rape this woman?”  
And he would say, “No chief. I was sitting here and she was naked”. “But chief, did  
you try to rape her?” During that process of answering it would become very apparent 
that you were lying. Or the … the victim. Ja, we would find that that was not the truth. 
Maybe if few people and the kids were saying that this man has been drinking. He 
entered that house definitely, but he never took more that five minutes. Then we would 
say, “Haai (There’s no way that this person did this)1388    
 
In addition to defending the “community”, the ‘comrades’ also engaged the apartheid system 
directly. At the height of student revolt in Maokeng, some of the student leaders were no longer 
attending school but involved in acts of violence inside the township and in other areas. The 
protests which started with students’ grievances had now developed and were directed at 
dismantling the apartheid system. And where better to start than attacking the state’s first line of 
defence? Police in the townships. Mohapi recalls that they were now operating in cells, attacking 
houses belonging to police. In his words 
  
We operated only at night with different cells. We divided ourselves into different  
cells. But the attacks didn’t stop. So you have a situation where… it was a blanket  
attack on police. Where a situation was that “Okay, guys listen, this was what was  
 
 
going to happen. During the day everything gets normal. At night we had cells of  
about ten people. At least each cell can burn. If it goes and burn five houses, you  
go and sleep. That’s fine”1389 
 
Masizane concurs 
  
So, some of us we ran away. We were still around the township, but would only be seen  
during the night. We continued burning [houses]. This house that I’m staying in today,  
it was burned to ashes. It was ntate Msimang’s house. Mr. Msimang was a police  
Captain
1390
 
 
It is not clear where the idea of attacking and burning houses of the police in Maokeng emanated 
from. But what it apparent is that at this stage this had become a common practise in a number of 
townships across the country. In 1986 in Alexandra Township houses of members of the South 
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African Police (SAP) and municipal police were attacked and burned.
1391
 In the midst of all of 
this, some of the students from Bodibeng took the struggle to other areas. Masizane played a key 
role in such missions. He remembers 
  
I was involved in bombings in Viljoenskroon. And here in Kroonstad we blew up  
a house belonging to a certain policeman. Do you know these dynamites used at  
the mines? We got them from the NUM (National Union of Mine Workers)  
comrades, who worked at Orkney. And these things were not just supplied to any- 
one. I was identified as one of those people who were brave enough to do the job.  
So it happened that one day while we were in Viljoenskroon I saw a box of those  
dynamites, then comrade Thabo Mthimkhulu and other guys from Klerksdorp infor- 
med me that they brought the stuff. Then we went and tested one of them. We blew  
up a certain house belonging to a certain person in Viljoenskroon
1392
  
  
Ditseki Moeketsi recalls that even homeland leaders’ properties were attacked and vandalized. In 
his words: “I was accused of burning Mampoi [Mopeli’s] house, from Qwaqwa? She had a type 
of an embassy house here, which we petrol bombed. We called it Mampoi’s house. So we set it 
alight”.1393 
Additionally, some of the student leaders became involved in trade unionism. Sebetoane was 
such a leader and she explains  
 
        You know we ended up helping in organizing for trade unions, because they were  
really not alive by then … because people were afraid, assuming that they would  
lose their jobs. After the riots I went for training by Black Sash. [I trained] for  
advanced office work. And when I came back I met trade union people. We were  
brave. I remember we even recruited domestic workers
1394
 
 
It was in the mid-1980s when trade unions began to be formed in Kroonstad.
1395
 Ishmael “Satch” 
Sefatole, who was born in 1958 in Maokeng, was one of the people who were sent back inside 
the country by the leadership of Umkhonto we Sizwe to mobilize workers and form trade 
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unions.
1396
 Sefatole, after undergoing a brief military training in Mozambique in 1981, returned 
to Kroonstad to carry out this mission. He explains   
 
I was not in exile for long in Lesotho, because I then had to go for training. Chris  
[Hani] and … (pauses) Thenjiwe [Mtintso] came there and told us that they would  
take certain people to a particular [camp]. They sent us to Mozambique for training.  
They sent us back to Lesotho after six months after we had completed. It was in ’81  
when we arrived there. It was ‘November ’81. Chris had already selected people who  
would go to the army. He told us that we were young and could still help us by going  
back into the country: “You are going to organize the [trade] unions. You are going to  
organize the workers, to join the unions”. He chose us because we were about 25 or 30  
[years of age]. … Chris had already organized transport and how we were going to leave  
the country. And we returned to recruit workers to join the unions. That was when I  
arrived in ’831397  
 
Sefatole remembers that it took a while before the African workers in Kroonstad could accept 
trade unions. For him, this was because they were afraid of loosing their employment. He 
explains: 
 
When we returned I had to look for a job. A friend helped him find work in a flour factory. After 
working there for a while, he contacted the Food and Allied Workers’ Union (FAWU) in 
Johannesburg to help him organize workers in Kroonstad. This does not seem to have yielded 
any results. But seemingly these officials advised him to apply for a vacant security post in that 
company, which would enable him to have easy access to the workers. He did that and was 
successful. He recalls: “I thought it would be best if I applied for the vacant post of a security 
guard - same company, because it [the security work station] was on a central place. I thought 
that I would call all the people going to the taps and so forth to recruit them. It was 50c to join at 
the time”. After a three-week training course in Klerksdorp he returned to work. His initial 
attempts to recruit workers were unsuccessful. “Then I spoke to them [the trade union officials] 
and told them to give me forms and I started organizing. [How did the workers respond?] They 
were negative and were scared to join. They would say they don’t know what unions are, 
because they only see them in Gauteng.”  
 
Because of the riots taking place in the township, workers residing in the township reported late 
to work, including Sefatole. He was summarily dismissed. It was at this stage that he contacted 
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the FAWU office in Johannesburg and coincidentally he spoke to Jan Theron, who was visiting 
the office from Cape Town. After explaining the situation to Theron, the latter came to 
Kroonstad to assess the situation. Sefatole recalls 
  
Then there was a crisis that took place in Kroonstad and people were not able to report 
for work and so forth. I was also one of them. And as a security [guard] I was supposed 
to report at 06h00 but got there at 09h00. The white foreman fired me when I arrived. I 
… called the Jo’burg region. Luckily, I found the General Secretary, Mr Jan Theron … 
who was based in the Cape but only came to help out. Jan Theron went to my work place 
around 13h00 and enquired about my whereabouts. One of the workers volunteered to 
bring him over to my place in the location. I just saw him coming in with Kleinboy 
Mokoena in the car. He told me to get in the car and we left. He told me to ask my 
manager if I was really fired and they will phone him as I am talking to him. There was a 
call as I was talking and Jan Theron spoke to the manager. He told the manager that he 
would like to know why I was fired because he was my lawyer. The manager denied 
everything … He called the foreman, who only spoke Afrikaans, and told me to go back 
to work.
1398
  
 
This incident boosted the confidence of the African workers in Kroonstad. It was not long before 
they wanted to join the union. Sefatole explains 
 
They came in their multitudes, because they wanted to join Satch’s union. But I told  
them to come one-by-one to me. I only made them fill in the forms … We launched  
at the Trinity Church  
 
After launching FAWU, Sefatole and other office bearers of FAWU went on a recruitment drive. 
They targeted all the companies where African workers were dismissed without a hearing. 
Premier Milling Company was the first of such companies. Sefatole remembers 
 
It was Premier Milling. Two comrades were fired and there was a strike. They were 
accused of having stolen. But they denied this. I solved this case … We won it. I gave 
them recruitment forms. They recruited others and also launched. We went to the sweets 
factory, which was called Panorama. They had fired an employee who had worked for the 
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factory for 19 years for allegedly stealing sweets. Okay, the union [members] called me. I 
told them not to go to work … I asked them to have a sit-down. They had a sit-down. We 
won the case and that comrade returned to work. That is when they just launched. We 
moved forward. We went to another one that was called Union Steam Bakery. Union 
Steam Bakery informed us that there was a worker who had smoked in the bakery, but 
right at the door. The manager came and swore at him and he also swore him back. They 
called me and I went to listen to the case. I told the manager that he must apologize to 
him because he was the initiator instead of him. They were both wrong. I told them to 
forgive each other. But it was only the black one who was willing to make peace. The 
white one wanted this guy to be fired. And I said ‘never’. And we had to meet with 
management, while they were still on strike. I then met with their senior manager, Kraai, 
who then agreed that this worker should be reinstated. After this we gave them forms and 
launched them  
 
FAWU also launched at Pioneer – the seed factory. Buoyed up by this series successes, Sefatole 
and the FAWU in Kroonstad decided to organize outside Kroonstad. Sefatole explains    
 
We went to Viljoenskroon. We organized there.  We organized SASKO in 
Senekal. We came back to the SASKO in Kroonstad, organized it
1399
   
 
After FAWU many more trade unions followed, including the South African Municipal 
Workers’ Union (SAMWU). In 1989 the latter embarked on strike action demanding recognition 
(see chapter six). 
  
Realising that it was rapidly losing control of the state, the government declared the national 
state of emergency on 12 June 1986 - four days before the June 16 commemorations. In the early 
hours of the morning of the 12
th
 police raided townships and detained political activists. Gerhart 
and Glaser point out “the best-known monitoring group estimated that 25 000 people were 
detained in the first twelve months of the emergency that began in June 1986 … and most 
detainees belonged to the ANC-aligned UDF or other political organizations or trade unions”.1400  
 
In Maokeng, as elsewhere in the country, political activists were detained en masse. And a 
number of them spent long-term spells in detention.  George remembers that he was detained on 
13 June 1986 and only to be released on 10 June the following year. To make matters worse, he 
was banned from Kroonstad for two years (although he defied the banning order and returned to 
Maokeng).
1401
 And Mohapi spent 13 months in solitary confinement in Viljoenskroon Police 
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Station.
1402
 Similarly Bloem was detained and he (and his wife, Edith) spent a year in prison.
1403
 
Makau recalls that after detention he did not return to school.
1404
 And Masizane, after managing 
to evade police for some time, finally handed himself over (because of pressure from the family) 
to the police on 22 August [1986] and was released the following year on 10 June.
1405
    
 
Masizane’s testimony about his detention reveals the unbearable impact police harassment had 
on many activists’ families. To force Masizane to hand himself over, the police detained his 
mother. The family turned against Masizane and demanded that he give himself up. Masizane 
takes up the story 
 
One day that boer called Jappie Herbs slapped my mother and told her that if I’m  
not behind bars in two days’ time, they would arrest her. After two days she was taken  
to the police station. I was aware that it was just a threat in order to get me to surrender. 
There was pressure from my father, worried about his wife. My siblings also were 
worried that their mother was being harassed because of me. And my then girlfriend 
wanted nothing to do with me. You know our family structure. For blacks it is not only 
your father and mother and your siblings, even the uncles. We call them family. There 
was pressure from that side, too. They blamed me that their sister was being harassed 
because of me. Even my granny suggested that I surrender to the boers. And I asked them 
what if they were going to kill me. They replied by saying “What if they kill my 
mother?” So, there was this thing that Billy Chabalala got a beating from the boers at the 
police station, and ntate [Lewele] Modisenyane … I had this fear that they were going to 
kill me, because here were people who were arrested just for their involvement in the 
struggle. What about me because they knew that I was involved in bombings in 
Viljoenskroon … And here in Kroonstad we blew up a house belonging to a certain 
policeman
1406
 
 
Trade unions and trade unionists were not spared either. In Kroonstad, the South African 
Railway and Habours Workers’ Union (SARHU), an affiliate of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU),
1407
 offices were forced to close.
1408
 In Pietermaritzburg, two officials 
of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (T&GWU) were seriously injured after being 
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attacked allegedly by members of the United Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA)-
Inkatha backed union.
1409
 
 
The detention en masse of the leadership had unintended consequences. It left leadership vacuum 
which was filled by young and inexperienced leaders, who engaged in ill-advised campaigns and 
encouraged students to disrespect the teachers. This caused generational tensions between the 
students and teachers. 
 
Generational struggle and the decline of student politics in Maokeng 
 
In the 1980s inter-generational struggle was mainly caused by the introduction of young people 
to politics. But most importantly it was because of the leadership role the younger generation 
assumed in the violent street battles between their communities and the security forces, and their 
role as enforcers of alternative structures of authority in the townships. In most cases the older 
generation took exception to this. It was for this reason that in some of the townships the older 
generation took up arms against the younger generation with the intention of “disciplining” them. 
For instance, Josette Cole, in her study of Crossroads in the Western Cape, points out that prior 
to the introduction of the Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO) in Old Crossroads young people in 
the area were under the strict control of the older generation. Young people were organised into 
choirs and sport clubs. In fact, Cole goes further to note that the Executive Committee under 
Johnson Ngxobongwana controlled youth organisations in Old Crossroads.
1410
 
 
However, following the attempts to form a branch of CAYCO in Old Crossroads in 1985 by 
young people in the area sympathetic to CAYCO and the UDF, the situation changed. “Some of 
these youths”, writes Cole “who by now were highly critical of the reformist nature of the Old 
Crossroads leadership, actively sought allies to topple the power base of the Executive 
Committee”.1411 It was at this stage that Ngxobongwana and some of the elderly members of the 
Executive Committee (known as the Witdoeke) mobilised against the youth, then labelled as the 
‘comrades’.1412 Ngxobongwana’s leadership worked closely with the Western Cape 
Administration Board and the security police to “… get rid of the ‘comrades …”.1413 The 
struggle between the two came to be described as the “’fathers’ of Crossroads against the 
comrades”.1414 According to Nicholas Haysom   
  
In Crossroads the resentment was also founded on the way the youth chose  
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to enforce discipline in the community – notably the ‘people’s courts’ and the 
 floggings administered there – as well as the enforcement of the consumer 
 boycott of white shops. This included making returning residents eat their 
 purchases including detergents, soap, raw meat, etc
1415
 
 
In similar vein , in 1986 in Thabong Township, Welkom, older people turned against young 
people and forcefully drove pupils (or school-going students) back to school following a two-
year spell of political mobilisation against the councillors and the Phakathis (a vigilante group). 
This mobilisation was led mainly by a branch of the Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS).
1416
  Haysom writes “for the second half of 1985 Thabong was free of vigilante action, 
but fears of a revival were kindled in January1986 when sjambok-wielding parents and elders 
launched a violent attempt to get children back into school uniforms and behind their desks”.1417 
 
In other areas like Lingelihle, Cradock, inter-generational struggle was caused by the collapse of 
the long-established traditional institutions of controlling young people like social and cultural 
clubs initially founded by Canon James Arthur Calata. In the early 1980s this was exacerbated by 
the detention of leading political activists and the suppression of overt political mobilization in 
the township by police. Although there were incidents of ill-discipline displayed by young 
people, first, following the 1980 school boycott, when young people turned to crime, abused 
marijuana and disrespected the adult generation; and second when some of the young people in 
the township attacked Matthew Goniwe, an adult and leading political figure in the township, 
with rocks, rods and knives after he had sjambokked some of the ill-disciplined students for 
burning and looting the township’s liquor outlet,1418 unlike Thabong and Old Crossroads, the 
adult generation in Lingelihle did not organize itself into a vigilante group against the younger 
generation.
1419
 Instead, in order to bring young people under the control of adults once again in 
1983 Goniwe and Fort Calata formed the Cradock Youth Association (CRADOYA) to mobilize 
young people. Initially CRADOYA’s aims were apolitical, and its executive included elders such 
as the Reverend Phezi and Goniwe.
1420
  
 
Not long after its launch, local grievances such as rent issues forced CRADOYA to become 
involved in politics. Tetelman notes “by the end of 1983 the youth association had dropped its 
apolitical façade”.1421 CRADOYA’s involvement in protest against the increased rent caused 
some of its executive members to be detained, particularly Goniwe and Fort Calata. As a result, 
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some of the young people associated with CRADOYA became uncontrollable once again.
1422
 On 
the one hand, they attacked the local councillors and forced them to resign, on the other they also 
turned against adults in the community they perceived as collaborators. Some of these included 
older church women and other elderly members of the community.
1423
 The adults complained 
bitterly that “the cycle of resistance and repression exacerbated youthful crime and violence”.1424 
The situation was remedied by Goniwe – following his release. Younger residents formed their 
own street committees as well.
1425
 Order was once again restored in Lingelihle, and political 
mobilization revived. 
 
The mediating role played by experienced political activists such as Goniwe helped the 
community of Lingelihle evade the possibility of an outbreak of inter-generational conflict. In 
Kagiso Township, conversely, a similar role was assumed by an adult-led civic organization, 
with the assistance of the South African Communist Party (SACP). Lekgoathi, in his chapter on 
political resistance in the Vaal Triangle and the West Rand, demonstrates that even though inter-
generational tensions developed in Kagiso following the abuse of power by young people who 
were running some of the ‘people’s courts’ in the township, open disputes were intelligently 
managed by members of Krugersdorp Residents Organisation (KRO), who, with the help of the 
SACP, established the Community Dispute Resolution Trust (CDRT). The latter was aimed at 
training community members to understand the intricacies and mechanisms of administering 
justice in the form of dispute resolution.
1426
 
 
In Maokeng, in contrast, as will be shown below, inter-generational struggle was not between the 
younger generation and the older generation in the broader township. The struggle that emerged 
was between school-going students and the teachers in schools. This was evident when students 
disrespected and clashed, sometimes physically, with their teachers, and smoked marijuana 
openly, and refused to be punished. Some of the student leaders attempted to resolve this 
problem, but their efforts were thwarted by constant police harassment and detentions. In 
Maokeng, just as in Lingelihle, the tension between the older generation and younger generation 
did not cause an organised backlash by the former. But it caused irreparable damage to normal 
schooling in the township.  
Following the detention of student leaders, a new group of less-politically experienced students 
likewise assumed the leadership role. However, there was no proper co-ordination and everyone 
seems to have operated as they wished. Makume, one of the students who took over the 
leadership reigns, recalls 
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 It was not a question of assuming leadership. During the State of Emergency  
there was no opportunity to go to, say launch a branch or you were going to  
elect someone. It was just a task team.  All of us decided that we were a task  
team since we were all involved. We were members of COSAS and we were  
committed to the struggle. All of us were responsible. And all of us took the  
initiative. All of us took the leadership role. All of us were mobilising.  All of  
us had to make sure that every campaign that we came up with was successful,  
the main one was the release of all the detainees. Another one was for free  
education
1427
   
 
It was not long before the leadership started disrupting classes and calling for class boycotts. 
Makume continues 
 
In the morning when students gathered for the assembly we would sing  
freedom songs, Siyaya ePitoli (We are marching to Pretoria). Others were  
Come Guerella, Toyi-toyi. Or we would gather at short-break and decide  
that we would disrupt classes and no student would go back to class. There  
was this thing that every morning when we started singing inside the school’s  
premises the police would come and other students would get scared and   
would go back to classes.  So we would wait until short-break. We would go  
behind the toilets and decide that we would start disrupting classes
1428
 
 
Masizane believes the detentions and police harassment denied students its leadership and this 
had serious consequences for mobilization – and most importantly caused generational tensions. 
The ‘rank and file’ students, he argues, lost confidence in their leaders and they took matters into 
their own hands. They began to misbehave and do as they pleased. He observes 
 
           You’d find that now others [students] were uncontrollable and didn’t want to co-operate.           
And would just fight, you see, with teachers for no apparent reason. Others would come 
           and smoke dagga publicly. Others would come to school and go out on drinking spree. 
           There was a “watering hole” there. On Mondays students would flock there. That shebeen 
           was owned by a certain woman called Mankhi
1429
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At this stage abnormal schooling became a common practice. For example, from 23 May to 6 
June 1986, the principal of the school noted that “practically no teaching took place. Very few 
pupils (or students), about 20% reported and left at about 09h30”.1430 
 
Barbara Mazibuko, who started teaching at Bodibeng in 1987, like Masizane remembers students 
smoking dagga. She remarks 
 
 When I started teaching that’s when I started seeing boys smoking dagga. 
 It was just those who complained and left the classroom and went outside 
 of the class. And also that thing of going home after break, without permission 
was now a common practice. I don’t remember any problems we encountered  
with girls. The only problem with girls was pregnancy. It was a major problem
1431
  
 
Mazibuko concurs with Masizane 
 
… Something happened at some point. One of the teachers at that school fought  
with a student. He was beating a student. But they were fighting each other literally
1432
 
 
The situation deteriorated to the point where teachers had to carry guns to schools to protect 
themselves. For example, in 1992, although outside the scope of this chapter, Mr Clayton Ntloko 
was forced to draw his gun when a student, Petrus Ntema, attacked him with a knife.
1433
 The 
DET blamed students from outside Kroonstad for the ill-discipline displayed by students and 
lack of normal schooling at Bodibeng. The circuit inspector, Mr P.K. Moloi, forbade the school 
from admitting students from outside Kroonstad. During his visit to the school, he warned the 
staff and principal “under no circumstances should pupils from outside be admitted in the school. 
Only bona fide children of Kroonstad get preference”.1434  
 
The school’s logbook for 1987 is full of entries of complaints of students threatening to 
physically assault their teachers.
1435
In March of the same year, Makhetha, a student at Bodibeng, 
stabbed the deputy principal with a knife, because he did not want to accept corporal 
punishment.
1436
 Realizing that the situation was getting out of control, the staff at Bodibeng 
turned to the parents. A meeting as held between the teachers and parents, where a committee 
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was elected to help the teachers run the school effectively.
1437
 Amongst the resolution adopted in 
that meeting was that corporal punishment should be applied to pupils as a measure to correct 
pupils’ behavior and that the parents would assist in monitoring attendance and payment of 
school fees, and that expectant girls should be suspended from attending school.
1438
 
 
Furthermore parents embarked on a ‘back to school’ campaign. Lebone Holomo, former member 
of the Justice Office of the Catholic Church and secretary of the Ministers’ Fraternity in 
Maokeng, remembers that they organized the ‘Back to School Campaign’. He recalls 
 
 … That’s how we got to that [Maokeng] stadium. We would have an interim comm- 
ittee with the principals’ association, teachers’ association, parents’ association, and  
school committees, to say as parents we have to take responsibility. You have to talk  
to these kids: back to school. I remember one day as I was getting out of my car one  
child shouted and said “There’s ntate back to school campaign!” People like 
Modisenyane were pushing the back to school campaign. Everybody [attended].  
They [students] were singing revolutionary songs. And Terror [Lekota] was there as 
somebody to say “Look, when you say ‘Liberation First [and Education Later]’, we who 
were on Robben Island, arrested for this liberation, we were at school there. We were 
educating each other.  And you are fortunate because you have a desk, a pen and a paper. 
Unlike us we didn’t have desks”. Then they [students] shouted back “Go back to Robben 
Island to that school”. There were students who were saying we are going back to school 
and there were those who were saying no ways. And those who were saying they are not 
going back to school some were the people that were being used by these Boer boys, 
because they’re …tsotsi-comrade. They enjoyed it when there’s disorder, you know, 
burning houses, stealing things. Students went back to school; teachers went back to 
school
1439
  
 
Evidently the ‘back to school’ campaign was unsuccessful in convincing all the students to return 
to school. It was the re-admission to school of the politically experienced student activists who 
had been released from detention that seemed to help return the situation to normality – albeit 
briefly. In 1988 Masizane and Mohapi, after being refused re-admission at Bodibeng, were 
finally allowed entry. They re-established the SRC. Masizane remembers: “we sat down with the 
management of the school and presented our constitution; the one that I drew up with Frank 
[Mohapi]. We elected the SRC.  I was elected the president and Frank became the general 
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secretary; and each class had its own representative.
1440
 For a brief moment the relationship 
between teachers and students improved. The new SRC promised parents and teachers that it 
would help encourage other students to go back to school … The situation began to normalize 
once again at Bodibeng. “What I liked”, Masizane recalls, “whenever it was break, the guys 
(students) would go for break and when the bell rang they were the first to get back to class”.1441 
 
However, this normality did not last long. A group of students would leave school during school 
hours to attack and destroy delivery vans in the main road and when chased by the police they 
ran back into the school.
1442
 This not only disrupted lessons, but also landed the student leaders 
in trouble with the law. According to Masizane 
 
 You know, sometimes you would find that there were people who liked taking  
advantage of the situation. They would just go out of school and throw stones  
at the delivery vans and run back to school. And when the police came in they  
don’t say so and so threw stones; they would harass the whole student community.  
Then the problem started. Between 1988 and 1989 me and comrade Frank were  
arrested many times, because of those people
1443
 
 
It was not long before even some of the most committed student leaders gave up and gave in to 
the temptations of “good and exciting” life in the township. And this “good and exciting” life 
could be found in taverns. Although some of the young activists strongly believed that the 
taverns were the state’s strategy to undermine their efforts to liberate the country, they, 
nevertheless, also spent most of their time in them and having good times. Masizane recalls 
 
 When we were in detention, the police came in and called three of our comrades: 
 comrade Nomvula and others. We thought the guys were going to be interrogated,  
only to find that they took those guys for a trip around the township, to the taverns.  
They were told “you’re wasting your time in prison. Look how nice was the place.  
People are enjoying themselves here”. Then these guys came back to report to us  
how nice taverns were. We couldn’t wait to go and see that. … The South African 
Council of Churches used to take care of us. It would give younger guys something  
like R50 and older guys received something from R100 to R200 for sustenance. For  
us young guys when having R50 in the 1980s was good. You’d buy a pair of trousers  
for R20 and the rest – a beer was R1.50. Ja, we used to hang out in a group of, maybe,  
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six and buy six beers each. Most of us concentrated on this venture: we drank. Tomorrow 
we were tired. So, we couldn’t fight1444  
 
This disrupted student mobilization in Maokeng – and by extension political mobilization in the 
township. The matters were made worse when some of the politically experienced student 
activists were deployed to regional and national structures. Makau was elected treasurer of the 
Free State Youth Congress (FRYCO), an affiliate of the South African Youth Congress. FRYCO 
was launched in 1987 to coordinate youth activists in the OFS but “conduct[ed] much of its 
activity outside the OFS.”1445 White Mohapi, attendee at the launching of FRYCO, had the 
following to say about its formation 
 
 I think it was established in 1987 … It was during the height of the State of  
 Emergency, because many comrades by then had gone [into] hiding. I was also 
 hiding … in Johannesburg. On my arrival in Johannesburg I reported to Winnie 
 Mandela … she had left Brandfort in 1985. I used to go to Ishmael Ayob because 
 Ishmael and Associates [were] people responsible for our defence. I remember I 
 Met Rapu Molekane who said I must go and meet certain comrades who were 
 said to be at the Century Plaza. He told me the comrades were organizing a  
 conference. There was an explanation that the formation of FRYCO was going to 
 take place. Because of my availability I volunteered to assist … In the conference 
 I became one of the facilitators. I think FRYCO was more of a co-ordinator
1446
 
 
Makau recalls, after they had launched FRYCO, he spent time in Botshabelo opposing the 
Qwaqwa government’s decision to incorporate Botshabelo.1447 In his words: “I remember 
immediately after launching the Free State Youth Congress, there was this thing about TK 
Mopeli from Qwaqwa. He wanted to incorporate Botshabelo into Qwaqwa. So, we went to 
Botshabelo and mobilized people.  Fortunately, we won that war. He was unable to incorporate 
Botshabelo into Qwaqwa.”1448 Mohapi was also, initially, deployed in the region but later in the 
national structure. He remembers 
 
In 1987 I was the organizer of the UDF. Then in 1988 and 1989 I had to go to school  
and finish schooling. That’s when I became the secretary of COSAS in the province –  
the Free State Students Congress. And in the 1990s, after the unbanning of [political]  
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movements, I was called by Shell House, the then headquarters of the ANC. I was to  
re-launch COSAS nationally. That’s when I worked with the late Thami, who died at 
Turfloop (The University of Limpopo). That’s how we re-launched COSAS nationally1449 
 
Having sketched the rise and fall of students’ mobilization and protests in Maokeng in the mid-
1980s, the chapter will finally look at the confusion and division within the community of 
Maokeng caused by the split between the Activist Forum and Maokeng Democratic Crisis 
Committee.    
 
AF and MDCC 
The split between members of the ‘progressive’ structure in Maokeng, which led to the 
formation of the Activist Forum (AF) and Maokeng Democratic Crisis Committee (MDCC) 
caused tensions, confusion and divisions within the community, and this further affected political 
mobilization in the township. 
 
            They called themselves Activists Forum (AF). It was Bizza, [Holomo] Lebona,  
            and others.  … Somehow they couldn’t keep up with the pace … They sabotaged  
            us  (Maokeng Democratic Crisis Committee – MDCC)1450  
 
            Dennis (Bloem) mobilized a group of students and handed them petrol and tyres. 
            The following day it was chaos. What happened thereafter was that even innocent 
            people were affected
1451
 
 
The two quotations, drawn from interviews with former members of the MDCC and AF, 
respectively, demonstrate the extent of the division between the two factions in Maokeng in the 
late 1980s. This division was caused by disagreements over the appropriate strategy to adopt in 
the struggle for liberation. The AF opted for a moderate approach and the MDCC followed a 
militant line. The roots of this division can be traced back to the ANC’s call for 
‘ungovernability’.  
 
Luli Callinicos, in her biography of Oliver Tambo, writes “On 8 January 1985, Tambo summed 
up the ANC methodology of people’s insurrection: ‘Render South Africa Ungovernable!’” “The 
broadcast had an electric effect in townships”, she adds, “Young people in particular thrilled to 
his words. ‘When we heard OR’s voice that evening’, recalled one young man, … ‘Ey! – our 
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eyes were opened”.1452 “‘Ungovernability’, meant that a situation”, Marks observes, “should be 
brought about where the organs of civil government collapsed or were rendered inoperable by 
mass resistance and opposition”.1453 Tom Lodge, in his analysis of the decision by the ANC to 
‘turn-to-the-masses’, suggests that it was after the Nkomati Accord, signed by the South African 
and Mozambican governments, which “denied the ANC’s guerrillas transit through 
Mozambique”,1454 and the realization by the ANC that it had heavily relied on the MK to liberate 
the oppressed masses in South Africa and had neglected the masses themselves inside the 
country to take forward the struggle. As a result of the Accord, there was a pause in the MK’s 
sabotage between September and February (1984), and this led to the admission by Tambo 
reported in the International Herald Tribune in January 1985 that ‘we have had to be very 
careful over the past three months … Nkomati … affected our communications systems … We 
have got to be economic with our manpower.
1455
 It was, partly, because of these factors that the 
ANC looked to the masses inside the country to disrupt the regime’s organs of governance. 
 
As we have seen, at this point activists in Maokeng, particularly students and youth, had already 
been introduced to Radio Freedom and were also receiving ANC’s political literature when 
Tambo made the call to make the country ‘ungorvenable.’ Like the young man cited by 
Callinicos, activists in Maokeng welcomed the challenge and vowed to implement it. Ditseki 
Moeketsi, who became part of the MDCC, recalls “we decided to form an organization which 
would focus on challenges that people were facing, because our main call was to render the 
country “ungovernable”. And we then came up with the MDCC, which would deal with almost 
everything that was happening in the location”.1456 From the oral testimonies with former 
members of the AF, the latter also accepted Tambo’s call but, unlike the MDCC which followed 
a militant line, the AF strongly believed that this could be achieved using moderate means.  
 
In 1986 a group of activists led by Wilfred “Bizza” Makhathe, supported by the branch of 
AZAPO in Maokeng, organized a consumer boycott, protesting against the detention of 60 
students, 43 dismissed workers, and the death of a Viljoenskroon activist Meshack Letsabo.
1457
 
Joseph Litabe, who was in the group supporting Makhathe, which later constituted itself as the 
AF, remembers that the consumer boycott was well planned, and the residents were well 
informed. But most importantly it had a limited duration and no coercive measures were used to 
enforce compliance. He explains: “… Together with Bra Bizza, we organized a consumer 
boycott. It was peaceful and successful. It was for three days. We distributed pamphlets to 
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mobilize people not to buy in town. You know, even when we came across someone who had 
bought in town, we did not fight and intimidate them.”1458 Supporting Litabe, Khotso Sesele, also 
in the Makhathe group, remarks “… We would notify people in time. Like if today it’s Sunday, 
we would inform them ‘Next week Monday there will be a consumer boycott. Our programme 
will start next week on Sunday morning from 5 o’clock up until next week Saturday’. Before it 
starts, it was announced first”.1459   
 
But when Litabe was probed on how they sustained the boycott, he admitted that in the 
pamphlets they inserted a threatening warning to all who might not comply. The warning read: 
Lihlo le nchoncho le ho shebile. Oa tseba ho tla etsahalang (A vigilant eye is watching you. You 
know what will happen to you). 
1460
 Litabe and Lewele Modisenyane, another member of the 
Makhetha group, claim that the boycott was well supported, because the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) Local, youth and teachers’ organizations also participated. 
After three days, as stipulated in the pamphlets, the boycotted was called off. A point had been 
made, although it is not clear if the boycott yielded any desired results.  
 
Roland White writes “among the many forms of struggle which have characterized the upsurge 
of resistance among the oppressed classes in South Africa over the past year (1985), the 
consumer boycott has emerged as one of the most prominent.”1461 He notes that consumer 
boycott involved “the with-holding of purchasing power by black, particularly African people, 
from all white (and some Coloured and Indian) retail outlines in the affected towns and 
cities”.1462 He argues that the intention of the consumer boycott, particularly of the white 
retailers, was to adversely affect them in order to force them to apply pressure on the relevant 
authorities to address the expressed demands. “The assumption is that”, he adds, “given the racist 
and undemocratic nature of the apartheid political structure, whites will be able to use their 
exclusive access to political power and representation to pressurize the state into responding 
positively in this respect”.1463   
 
Not long after the consumer boycott called by the Makhetha’s group had ended, Bloem, Butana 
Khompela, currently the MEC for Police, Roads and Transport in the Free State, and their 
supporters countered and organized their own consumer boycott. Unlike the first boycott, Bloem 
and his supporters did not specify the duration of the boycott. It went on indefinitely. And when 
the residents ran out of patience and ignored the boycott, Bloem’s supporters intimidated people 
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and used violence to prolong the boycott.
1464
 Moeketsi explains “When we announced a 
consumer boycott we meant what we said.  Those who insisted on going to town to buy had their 
groceries destroyed”.1465 And Modisenyane, referring to the Bloem’s group, adds “[they were] 
hard core - the ones that would make people drink cooking oil during consumer boycotts”.1466  
 
The police responded by arresting all those suspected to having been involved in the consumer 
boycotts. Bloem, Litabe, Khompela, Makhathe, Modisenyane were all detained. However, before 
the arrests, an ugly incident occurred. In January 1986 Sowetan reported a failed attempt to 
assassinate Bloem. The latter informed the paper that at 6:30 on Friday he was shot at by four 
prominent community leaders in Seeisoville. They accused him of being a trouble maker.
1467
 
Although he did not specify, it was suspected that the attack was orchestrated by members of the 
opposing faction. But, again, it could have been some of the members of the Town Council of 
Maokeng, especially those whose properties had been damaged during the student riots. Litabe, 
on the other hand, relates the devastating story of Mitah, his neighbour, who was murdered 
allegedly by supporters of Bloem simply “because she had quarreled with the sister of the well-
known comrade within the group and had also befriended the alleged mistress of the mayor 
(Caswell Koekoe). Because of this, she was labeled an impimpi (sell-out). Mitah was burned 
inside her house”.1468 Although these allegations cannot be substantiated, it is however, clear that 
tensions between the two factions had spiralled out of control.  The leaders of the boycotts were 
released without being charged.
1469
 But their freedom did not last long. 
 
In June 1986 the police raided Moakeng and arrested a number of political activists. This was 
after the state had declared the national State of Emergency. The two factions: Bloem’s and 
Makhetha’s took their differences to prison with them. Litabe remembers: “This division was 
also visible in prison during the State of Emergency, where one group from Kroonstad deserted 
the other group in a cell called Lybia (occupied mainly by comrades from Kroonstad) and settled 
in another cell named Cuba”.1470 Fezile Dabi, an activist from Tumahole, Parys, tried to bring the 
two factions together but once outside of prison differences surfaced once again. Recalling 
Dabi’s attempt at promoting peace and unity between the two factions, Litabe remarks 
 
                   [Bizza] told us that he had a meeting with Fezile Dabi and that the latter told 
                   him that the people of Kroonstad should unite and have peace. So that when 
                   we leave we should work together. There shouldn’t be any divisions. And when 
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                   we got into action, we should do it together. So, we didn’t want to argue with                        
                   him, because we realized that he had already made an undertaking to 
                   Fezile Dabi
1471
 
 
From Litabe’s testimony it does not seem that activists in the Makhathe’s group were ready to 
work with Bloem’s group. But felt obliged to do so after Dabi’s intervention. Litabe claims that 
an attempt was made to bring peace and unity between the two factions, but this was thwarted by 
Bloem’s intransigence. According to him, “three days after they had been released, Bizza 
Makhathe, Modisenyane and Litabe himself met and agreed that Modisenyane and Makhathe 
should meet with Dennis [Bloem]. So, Dennis informed them that he was busy in his business 
and doesn’t want to get involved.”1472 For Litabe (and probably others in Makhetha’s group) the 
problem started when Bloem heard that Lekota and others were about to be released from prison 
(1989). “They were no longer going to serve the 12-year sentence”1473 following their conviction 
in the Delmas Treason Trial for their part in the township revolt.
1474
 
 
It is not clear why Bloem changed his mind after learning of the release of Lekota and other 
Delmas trialists. Rumours making rounds in the township was that he suddenly became involved 
in politics because he did not want to disappoint Lekota. In fact, some of the activists remember 
Bloem as Lekota’s political protégé: “Dennis Bloem is the protégé of “Terror” [Lekota]. That’s 
why when “Terror” le[ft] the ANC,  Bloem followed and joined COPE”.1475 As noted above, 
Bloem and Lekota’s close friendship started in 1982. Recalling how he met Lekota, Bloem 
narrates 
 
 In 1982 December, [Patrick Mosiuoa] Terror Lekota was released from Robben Island.  
I did not know this person. He asked one prison warder [who] was his friend at school. 
They both went to a school in Marrianhill (actually it was in Mariazell, in Matatiel). 
 ‘Can’t you organise transport for me? I’m having a lot of things.’ He spent … time on 
Robben Island so he had a lot of luggage there. They [had] transferred Terror from 
Robben Island to be nearer home a month before he was released. From Robben Island to 
Kroonstad. Because of my shop, people were coming to buy and then standing there and 
talking. As we were standing and talking he said ‘I’m having a friend of mine and this 
person needs transport and I have asked this one and that one, and these people are 
refusing.’ And he asked me. I said ‘Who’s this?’ He said ‘No, man, this friend of mine is 
from Robben Island and now they’ve brought him to be released on the 15th of 
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December.’ I said, ‘No, I’ll go and pick him up.’ I went to the Kroonstad Prison with his 
wife. Nine o’clock security police were there, and he was released. He went into my 
Kombi and we were talking. And since that day I was detained more than 18 times after I 
met Lekota
1476
  
                
Two years after the state had declared the national State of Emergency, on 24 February it banned 
the UDF and partially restricted COSATU.
1477
 The UDF responded by building a new broad 
alliance with COSATU, and in 1989 the two formalized their alliance through the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM). The MDM embarked on a defiance campaign, inter alia, calling 
on its supporters to organize consumer boycotts and defy laws discriminating against Africans to 
force the government to abandon apartheid policies. Most importantly, however, the MDM’s 
campaign blurred the community and worker struggles. It was at this point that Makhathe’s 
group, which by now included youth, students, women, and some members of COSATU, 
reconstituted itself as the AF, which Bloem’s group did the same as the MDCC. The leading 
figures in the AF included Lewele Modisenyane, Paseka Nceleni, Bushy Lakaje, Joseph Litabe, 
Ramoninki Makhoka, Khotso Sesele, and Wilfred Makhetha. The MDDC, on the other hand, 
was formed by Bloem and Thami Phaliso, a South African Railways Union (SARU) organizer. 
Some of its members included Stoffel Mofokeng, Thabo Maqeba, Jan Mohapi, and Solly 
Madiba.
1478
 Like the AF, the MDCC also had support from the youth, students, women 
organizations, and trade unionists. According to Bloem “We capitalized on organizing people 
around the ‘bread and butter’ issues.1479   
 
Moreover, in line with mobilizing people around ‘bread and butter’ issues such as rent, 
electricity, sewerage, and the bucket system,
1480
 the MDCC most significantly demanded the 
disbandment of the Town Council of Maokeng (TCM). However, when it failed to convince the 
residents to unseat the TCM, it resorted to violence (or ‘action’, as its members put it). This was 
what distinguished the MDCC from the AF. Sebetoane, who was part of the MDCC explains  
 
The MDCC was for people who believed in action and the Activists Forum was  
for the negotiators. It was for the learned people. You know, those people made  
us to develop an attitude towards them, because we viewed them as theorists and  
we saw that as a waste of time. We wanted to take action. In my view it was too  
much about that. Obviously, I was in the MDCC
1481
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Echoing Sebetoane, Matli remarks 
  
 What made the AF to fail, as I am saying, they were talking politics not applying  
politics. So, with us we were addressing … We were organising as the MDCC,  
rent boycotts, consumer boycotts. And what else? Stayaways
1482
 
 
Matshidiso Rantie, who was in the MDCC camp, recalls that the AF was largely comprised of 
the literate “people who did not want to fight”.1483 And just like the previous consumer boycotts, 
and stay-aways were violently enforced. Matli remembers that he was compelled to inform on 
his father who insisted on going to work during the stay-away. He recounts 
 
             He never liked whites, but he never joined the union. You see, the path leading to    
             freedom he was not participating in it. He was just talking from the sidewalks. He  
             would refuse not to go to work, like stay-away. Ja, he would go to work at the Shell  
             Depot. Even my mother. But there was a time I decided to report him to the comrades.  
             I was asleep then. Then he went out with the van. Comrades were waiting at the    
             Anglican Church. As he was there they threw stones at the van. Hey, he then   
             surrendered. He went back home and he was very cross. He was saying “This is shit.  
             They are dealing with me
1484
 
 
For Daniel George, the AF’s reluctance to engage in militant action was largely influenced by its 
leader, Bizza Makhathe. Describing him, he observes: “I don’t know how to put it. He was 
somehow one person who hated violence. When it comes he’ll try to calm us and say ‘hey, banna 
(men), this is not how it’s supposed to be done. And as youth, we said nobody had planned it but 
apartheid is coming to us. So, we are doing it our own way now, yes.”1485 Litabe, conversely, in 
trying to explain the pacifist approach adopted by the AF, he also stressed that it was a strategic 
approach because they wanted to win their ‘enemies’ support rather than alienate them. He 
remarks: “The AF’s approach said he (Koekoe) should be removed peacefully, together with his 
council. So, that he could join us.”1486  
 
The division deepened and spilled over to the students, youth and women’s organizations. This 
affected mobilization in the township. Chabasiele Makume, who in the late 1980s was a leading 
figure in student politics and in the AF faction, claims that the split between the student activists 
was caused by the supporters of the MDCC, who disrupted schools and disrespected activists 
belonging to other formations. He remarks   
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Members of MAYCO (Maokeng Youth Congress) an affiliate of SAYCO (South  
African Youth Congress) were disciplined cadres of the movement. Maokeng  
Democratic Crisis Committee (MDCC) comprised of six people. Their mandate was  
to resolve community issues. So when they were not elected to the leadership positions  
in SAYCO, youth organisations and other UDF-aligned structures, started to mobilise 
under the banner of the MDCC. So they would organise rent boycotts, consumer 
boycotts, class boycotts, and all those things. And they were not part of schools’ 
structures … When we asked them why they were doing all those things, they didn’t  
give us clear answers. They recruited children who didn’t want to go to school and  
others like them. That’s where the split started. The leadership was in disagreement. 
There was a meeting held at [Mzimase] Gozongo’s place - Pastor Gozongo - at the 
Presbyterian Church. There was a sign that factions were forming, because when one 
person was talking a group of people would start to sing. And when another person talks 
they would listen. It was such things. I remember one time it was Youth Day, June 16. It 
was in 1990, if I am not mistaken, at Seeisoville Stadium. We had organised a youth 
gathering there. Then they decided to meet at Constantia hall. From there they came to 
disrupt our gathering
1487
 
 
Similarly, women activists were divided into two factions: the AF and MDCC. Mamorena Taje, 
who was in the MDCC faction recalls an attempt made to promote unity between the two 
women’s factions. In her words 
  
I became an MDCC member and also its Women’s League. At that time there  
was this AF thing. I was elected the chairperson of the Women’s League. Masoka  
was the organiser of the MDCC.  Masoka said we should unite and become one thing, 
 because they didn’t want this thing of the AF and MDCC1488 
 
It seems at this stage some understanding was reached between the two women’s factions. This 
was evident when they all went to Bethlehem to elect the provincial leadership. This was 
probably in preparation for the re-launch of the ANC Women’s League after organisations had 
been unbanned. In that conference, Taje was elected the Provincial Secretary of the Women’s 
League and “Maureen was the chairperson”.1489 To cement the relationship, a delegation 
comprising women from the AF and MDCC was nominated to attend a conference in Durban. 
From the MDCC’s side Taje was nominated and Patty Mohapi from the AF.  However, Mohapi 
remained behind. Taje remembers “They chose me and Patty Mohapi. But when we were 
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supposed to leave for Durban, she refused to go. I didn’t think there were some disagreements 
that I didn’t know about”.1490 On her return from Durban, Taje was instructed to continue with 
the efforts to promote unity between the two women’s factions – but these were unsuccessful. 
She recalls 
  
After we had returned, because I was the Provincial Secretary I was supposed to unite 
the AF (and the MDCC) and they should no longer be on their own. At that time the 
chairperson of the AF was Ma-Hleli (Mrs Hleli). I went to Ma-Hleli and Ma-Monikadi … 
I met them and told them that I had been sent by my elders (i.e. leaders) that things 
should not be like this. They no longer wanted divisions. So, I think that thing hurt some 
people, because I was close to people like Mamokhele (Sebetoane), Ma-Paballa, Ma-
Rantie. I noticed that they have changed; they didn’t like it1491      
 
Following this attempt, there is no evidence that more efforts were made to promote peace and 
unity between these two factions. The situation soon changed when the fight against the Three 
Million Gang started, and Taje was marginalised because of her relationship (and possibly her 
involvement as well) with the leader of the gang, George “Diwithi” Ramasimong – who was her 
brother. 
  
At this stage it would seem that the AF enjoyed support among the adults in the “community”. 
Probably this was because of their members’ standing in the “community” and their moderate 
approach. To counter this and change the community’s perception, the MDCC decided to recruit 
respected adults in the community to leadership positions. Some of the older and respected 
leaders to be recruited to the MDCC included Itumeleng Lefafa, a former schools’ inspector. 
Isaac “Sakkie” Oliphant explains 
 
     I said to teacher Lefafa, die pa van Nanaile (Nanaile’s father), he used to be an  
     inspector of schools “Look here guys, we want you to join the committee – ons 
      soek groote mense (we want old people). You are going to do the fatherly kind  
     of thing. When people see you, you must be wearing ties. Forget about these young  
     people wearing t-shirts. We would marshal them and try to organize them that the  
     struggle must not be diverted into a tsotsi kind of thing. Because that was already     
     happening
1492
 
 
However, the MDCC leadership was quick to warn the older generation not to be conservative in 
their approach. Oliphant adds 
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        And this was when these old men took up the leadership. And in the evenings we 
        would come and tell them that when they were making decisions they should 
        consider these children’s feelings and ours, too. Julle moenie decisions vat  (You 
        mustn’t make decisions) which are so conservative and make concessions with the  
        boers. When the people call for consumer boycotts, they mean it
1493
  
 
Another elderly person who joined the MDCC was the Reverend Mzimase Gozongo, of the 
Presbytarian Church (more about his role in the next chapter).
1494
  
 
The reason for the MDCC turning to the elders it seems was also influenced by the growing 
perception that the majority of the residents of Maokeng distanced themselves from its activities. 
Mamorena Taje recalled her conversation with Stoffel Mofokeng after she joined the MDCC, 
where Mofokeng explained the reason for this. She remembers 
                      
You see, I talked too much and followed. But I didn’t know what was going 
 on. Then I asked Stoffel and said: ‘Tell me, I hear that there’s the Activists’  
Forum.  We are the MDCC’s members. But people are saying they don’t want  
the MDCC. They want the Activists’ Forum. Why? And he said ‘You know  
what, people don’t understand politics. You see, what the members of the  
Activists’ Forum are saying, they just wanted us to talk and talk. And talking  
doesn’t help. We in the MDCC fight so that things can change1495      
 
In a show of force, the MDCC organized the biggest march ever from Maokeng to town to 
demand an end to detentions and discriminatory use of force by the police. Oliphant explains:        
At one stage Walter Sisulu
1496
 was invited. The whole of Kroonstad, I’m counting easily 
 70 to 80 000 people were marching. This was towards the time when the ANC was to be 
unbanned. Unknown to the leadership of the MDCC, Sisulu had been invited to Maokeng to 
intervene (in the on-going faction fighting between the AF and MDCC). Oliphant believes that 
the rival faction had informed Sisulu that because of the MDCC’s supporters who misbehaved 
there was going to be a bloodbath in Maokeng.
1497
 When Sisulu arrived he asked “where are the 
people who are fighting?”1498  
                                                          
1493
 Ibid. 
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Differences between the two factions continued unabated. Two incidents happened which further 
deepened these differences. Firstly, the AF and MDCC disagreed on who should be funded by 
the UDF/MDM to attend the Harare Declaration Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1989. 
Litabe writes “Bloem wanted the UDF to finance his group and Bizza would not agree. 
However, in the end both groups were represented, with the AF sending 15 delegates and the 
MDCC 10.
1499
The Harare Declaration was adopted at a meeting of the Organisation of African 
Unity in Harare.
1500
 Seekings notes that it specified five preconditions for negotiations: lifting the 
State of Emergency, removing restrictions on political activity, releasing all political prisoners, 
legalizing banned organizations, and stopping all political executions.”1501 And secondly, a 
rumour made rounds in the township that the Three Million Gang (TMG) did not attack members 
of the AF but attacked members of the MDCC because they had confronted it. Rantie, whose 
son, Solomon, had been murdered by the TMG remembers that she physically confronted 
Modisenyane when he informed a meeting that it was indeed true that the TMG only attacked 
people who challenged it.
1502
   
 
Athough, after the unbanning of the ANC, the AF and MDCC disbanded and became part of the 
ANC, their differences were too embedded. They surfaced again within the ANC (see Chapter 
Seven). This situation made it possible for the Town Council of Maokeng to continue managing 
Maokeng until the introduction of the Transitional Local Council in the 1990s. It created 
confusion amongst the residents and divided them. But most significantly the split between the 
AF and MDCC disrupted mass political mobilization in Maokeng. 
 
The following chapter will look at the role of the Three Million Gang in diverting the attention of 
political activists from mobilizing the residents.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the early 1980s many black townships were organized and the residents were protesting, inter 
alia, against rent and service charges increases, the demolition of squatter settlements, and the 
tri-cameral parliamentary system and local black councils. At this stage, in some of these 
townships civic organisations, students, youth and women’s organizations had been established, 
and a significant number of these became the UDF affiliates. By 1985 most of the black 
townships across the country were already ‘ungovernable’ even before the ANC made that call. 
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Kroonstad’s black townships, conversely, were quiescent and tranquil until 1985. This chapter 
has tried to chart and examine the factors that caused this situation. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
that when the residents of these townships, particularly Maokeng, finally embarked in mass 
political mobilization and protests, they were gravely disrupted by constant police harassment, 
long-spells of leaders in detention, and later the deployment of experienced political activists 
outside, and finally the split within the ‘progressive’ structure that caused the formation of the 
AF and MDCC.  
 
First, the chapter illustrates that Kroonstad’s black townships lacked political events such as a 
funeral of a political activist (or political veteran), commemorations of historic days, and 
pressing socio-economic grievances which could be used to galvanize and mobilize the residents. 
Second, it shows the important role played by some family members and church-based youth 
groups in introducing young people to politics. But it argues that it was the individuals from 
outside Kroonstad who played a significant role in agitating young people in these townships to 
mobilize and protest. To a lesser degree, mobility between Kroonstad and townships in the Rand 
also played a similar role.  
 
Finally, the chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the introduction of students to politics and 
the constant police harassment and detention of the politically experienced student leaders 
created a leadership vacuum, which caused inter-generational tensions between the students and 
teachers. Students blatantly disrespected the authority of the teachers, and occasionally 
physically assaulted them. Unlike in other townships, in Maokeng, however, the adult generation 
did not mobilize itself and take up arms against the younger generation.   
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CHAPTER SIX  
From Gang Warfare to Political Violence, Maokeng Township, 1990 to 1992 
Introduction 
On the 25
th
 February 1992 Ramodikoe George “Diwiti” Ramasimong was shot and killed near 
the taxi rank, in Kroonstad. After learning of “Diwiti’s” death, women in town and in Maokeng 
ululated and danced in jubilation; taxi drivers blasted their hooters.
1503
 For many in Maokeng, 
this meant the end of a reign of terror by the notorious Three Million Gang (TMG), which had 
terrorized the community for almost two years.  
 
Violence in Maokeng was, in the initial stages, apolitical but gang related. It was, however, not 
long before it turned political following the TMG’s collaboration with the councillors, police and 
later Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
1504
. Various scholars have extensively and painstakingly 
researched political violence in South Africa, particularly in the 1990s.
1505
 However, a survey of 
the literature on political violence in the period under review has revealed that the relation 
between gangs and political violence has been largely ignored. The notable exceptions are 
Liezmarie Johannes’ honours essay and Gary Kynoch’s published paper.1506 Johannes’ case 
study in Wesselton, Ermelo (Mpumalanga Province), demonstrates the relation between the 
‘Black Cats’ gang, the police and the IFP.1507 Similarly, Kynock’s work, drawing largely from 
                                                          
1503
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1504
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University Press, 1992). This article can also be found in the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation’s 
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1506
 Johannes, L. ‘Do experience of political violence emanating from youth movements influence political culture? 
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Research Essay, 2009); Kynock, G. ‘Crime, Conflict and Politics in Transition-Era South Africa’, in African Affairs, 
104/416, 1995; See Sithole, J. ‘The ANC underground, armed actions and popular resistance in Pietermaritzburg 
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report, alludes to the roles played by the Khumalo 
gang in Thokoza, on the East Rand, and the Kheswa gang, in the Vaal Triangle, in the political 
violence that ravaged the Reef in the early 1990s, with the assistance of the police and IFP.
1508
 
 
A closer look at the factors that caused political violence in Maokeng demonstrates that this 
township was different compared to the other areas where political violence erupted. First, the 
political violence that engulfed other areas at the beginning of 1990 missed Maokeng. Violence 
in Maokeng only turned political after July 1991. Second, in Maokeng there were no hostels, 
which came to be generally perceived as bases for the IFP and AmaZulu-aligned to the IFP, and 
squatter camps seen as the UDF/ANC and AmaXhosa strong-holds. Relatedly, Maokeng was 
(and still is) predominantly a South Sotho-speaking township. AmaZulu and AmaXhosa are in 
the minority and many have been assimilated into the South Sotho culture.
1509
 Therefore, what 
started in other areas as a ‘war’ between AmaZulu and AmaXhosa, and later turned to the 
UDF/ANC and IFP ‘war’, was absent in Maokeng. Finally, what distinguished political violence 
in Maokeng was the active and combative role played by women. Again, existing literature on 
political violence in South Africa from the 1980s to the 1990s has tended to portray women as 
submissive and powerless victims. And most significantly, as people who only played auxiliary 
role in political violence.
1510
  
 
The cause of political violence in Maokeng in mid-1991 cannot be understood without 
comprehending the changing political situation from 1989. This was the year when Frederik 
Willem (F.W.) de Klerk, first replaced the obstinate Pieter Willem (P.W.) Botha as the leader of 
the National Party and, then in August of the same year, as the head of the government
1511
. 
Unlike Botha, De Klerk was open to negotiations with the ANC. But 1989 was also the year, as 
already shown, when the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was established and its structures 
countrywide embarked in a defiance campaign. In line with this, the ‘progressive’ structures in 
Maokeng began a vigorous offensive against the City Council of Maokeng (CCM) and its 
councillors, demanding the disbandment of the Council and the resignation of the councillors. In 
this chapter I will contend that it was at this stage that signs of vigilantism became visible in the 
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township. Elements within the CCM took advantage of a personal difference between 
‘comrades’ to foment political violence. They, initially, explicitly supported gangsters who later 
constituted themselves as the Three Million Gang (TMG), and later facilitated the collaboration 
between the TMG and the IFP, in their efforts to sow divisions and destabilize the ‘progressive’ 
structures in the township. Inevitably, this disrupted political mobilization and protests in the 
township. But most significantly it nearly cost the ANC support.
1512
      
 
In the forefront of political violence that engulfed Maokeng at the beginning of the 1990s were 
‘youth’. In line with Seekings, in this chapter I will use the term ‘youth’ descriptively rather than 
analytically.
1513
 However, before attempting to analyse the cause(s) of political violence in 
Maokeng, a brief review of the literature on ‘youth politics’ is necessary. 
 
‘Youth Politics’ 
 
According to Seekings “most accounts of South African resistance politics in the 1980s 
emphasise the importance of ‘youth’. Yet there is little agreement as to who or what this 
constitutes”.1514 He argues “this was due to the underlying conceptual confusion and 
ambiguity”.1515 For him, this was because “the category of youth in South Africa [was] a 
political rather than a sociological or demographic construct”.1516 Age, as it is applied the post-
apartheid South Africa
1517
, was not a determining factor for one to be classified youth. Any 
person active in resistance politics, particularly in the street battles with the security personnel 
and vigilante groups, was perceived as youth, irrespective of their age. Interviewees interviewed 
by Seekings in Tumahole, Parys, in 1990-1991 suggested that an active person remained a youth 
even when aged fifty, sixty or even seventy. Some even cited Nelson Mandela as an example of 
an elderly youth.
1518
  Furthermore, in the 1980s (and in the early 1990s) ‘youth’ was a term 
associated with blacks. David Everatt, cited by Seekings, observed “South Africa has white 
teenagers, but black youth”.1519  
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The conceptual confusion alluded to by Seekings, was also compounded by lack of clarity on the 
composition of the youth. In fact, Seekings writes “the composition of the youth in the period of 
township revolt (1984-1986) [was] either avoided or inadequately dealt with in … the 
literature”.1520 Both Seekings and Ari Sitas reject, for example, suggestions that ‘youth’, as 
described above (any ‘young’ person involved in resistance politics in townships), comprised 
only of unemployed young people, a ‘lost generation’, young people prone to violence.1521 Sitas, 
in his study on ‘youth comrades’ in Natal, explains 
 
 It is true that most ‘comrades’ … came from embattled working-class homesteads 
 and households; that most of their cultural codes emerge outside households and  
 kinship relations; and that many are unemployed. But among the phenomenon called 
 ‘comrades’ there are full wage-earners, informal sector vendors, university graduates, 
 political activists, school-children, shop-stewards, petty criminals and lumpenprole- 
 tarians
1522
   
 
In similar vein, Seekings notes “in reality, so-called youth in the mid-1980s included politically 
astute as well as violent individuals … with wide range of goals and motivations”.1523 And Peter 
Mokaba, president of the South African Youth Congress (1987-1991) and then of the ANC 
Youth League (1991-1994), argued in an interview that 
 
A youth can be a person who is married, who is working, a person who is still a student 
… There are women, there are workers, there are intellectuals … But there are characte- 
rustics which would always distinguish them from all other sectors of the community … 
The militancy is part of it. ... They have a critical approach to life. They are not afraid to 
confront new situations
1524
 
 
It was these youth, who, from the mid-1980s (the period when township politics shifted from 
quiescence to confrontation), took on the state and its agents in their efforts to eradicate the 
apartheid system. For example, Monique Marks, in her study of youth politics in Diepkloof, 
Soweto, writes “drawing from [Oliver] Tambo’s call for the people inside the country to take up 
arms against the state, Diepkloof youth who were part of the Charterist movement took this call 
seriously. They indentified ‘targets’ – primarily referring to the security forces: the police and 
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the military”.1525 The latter (and the corrupt and unsympathetic councillors) were attacked, and 
sometimes even killed. The youth, both in Diepkloof and elsewhere across the country’s 
townships, pursued this dangerous task, not because they “… wanted to be involved in 
violence,”1526 but because they felt obliged to engage in collective action, especially against 
police harassment.  
 
But most importantly, the youth embarked on such a perilous mission of confronting the state 
and its agents because they believed that they as the ‘young lions’ and ‘shook troops’ of the 
struggle it was their duty to protect their communities from police and vigilante harassment and 
similarly it was their responsibility to defend the ‘morality’ of the townships. Their role(s) 
contrasted with that of the gang youth, which robbed and terrorized members of communities.  
 
In 1983 youth organizations, affiliated to the Charterist movement, were formed.
1527
 These were 
established to cater for the needs of young people not at school, young workers and the 
unemployed youth.
1528
 In the initial stages, youth organisations failed to attract large numbers of 
youth to their ranks. Two factors help explain this. First, due to lack of clearly defined 
campaigns youth organizations found themselves becoming involved in campaigns waged by 
student and civic organizations. For example, according to Bonner and Nieftagodien, one of the 
first campaigns the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO), formed in 1983, engaged in was to 
mobilize a boycott of the BLA elections, and in 1984 AYCO formed an alliance with the 
Alexandra Action Committee, a civic organization, led by Mike Beea, and became involved in 
the bus boycott after PUTCO announced a 12.5 per cent increase in bus fares.
1529
  And second, 
state’s repression (in 1985 and 1986 the state declared two state of emergencies which resulted in 
mass arrests, particularly youth leaders), severely disrupted the activities of youth organizations.  
 
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to form a national youth organization, finally SAYCO 
was launched in 1987.
1530
 SAYCO attempted to focus the youth’s campaigns. Among its 
campaigns included: the ‘Save the 32’ (later renamed ‘Save the Patriots’), focused on the youth 
on death row; isolate the police, especially the kitskonstabels; and popularize the Freedom 
Charter campaigns.
1531
 Two years after SAYCO’s formation, the Maokeng Youth Congress 
(MAYCO) was launched. Just like other youth organizations, MAYCO’s membership included 
students, former students, young workers, who were also involved in trade unionism, and the 
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unemployed.
1532
 There is no evidence, however, to suggest that MAYCO became involved in 
any of the campaigns announced by SAYCO. There are two reasons for this. First, after the 
students’ leading role in the politics of resistance in Maokeng since 1985, to stamp its authority 
in the local politics MAYCO prioritized political education. It “educated” its members about the 
ANC and its leaders. Mamokhele Sebetoane explains 
 
 Here there was MAYCO. Yes, we had members, because it was that time when  
people were in high spirits. There was a time when I used to be its chairperson,  
and I was the only female chairperson at that time. I remember we recruited members  
and drafted a constitution. And there were meetings where ultimately the committee  
was elected. I still remember there was … Mustapha Mantsho. The other one was  
George Daniel. It was organizing the youth around issues affecting them, and politi- 
cizing them at that time. It was more about teaching them about the ANC: how it  
came about and about [Nelson] Mandela ... [Interrupted]
1533
 
 
Second, the ‘war’ that erupted in Maokeng between the ‘community’, led by members of 
MAYCO, and the TMG inevitably diverted MAYCO’s activities and its members solely focused 
their energies to fighting the TMG.   
 
Not long after the TMG had re-appeared in the local scene in 1990, SAYCO merged with the 
ANC Youth Section, and in October 1990 the ANCYL was launched.
1534
 According to Seekings, 
“different regions of the ANCYL were launched from mid-1991 onwards”1535 – and so were 
branches of the League. It was at this stage that MAYCO changed and became the ANCYL 
Maokeng branch. At the height of the fight against the TMG, supported by the IFP, the police 
and councillors, members of the ANCYL Maokeng branch were at the forefront (see below). 
Members of the ANCYL in Maokeng, as the ‘defenders of the community and the custodians of 
morality’ in the township, felt obliged to fight and defeat the TMG, because they viewed the 
TMG’s activities as obstructing their objective of achieving liberation. This view is aptly 
captured by Marks when she notes “The recipients of political violence carried out by the 
comrade youth could include anyone or anything regarded as obstacle to the goal of 
‘liberation’”.1536 
 
The ANCYL Maokeng branch’s violence was not only meted out to the TMG, but it was also 
directed to anyone who caused disunity and confusion in the ‘community. This included tsotsis 
and some of the members of the ANCYL Maokeng branch who contravened the constitution of 
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the organization and involved themselves in unbecoming behaviour. These were severely 
punished.  According to Marks, youth activists in Diepkloof used both the ‘revolutionary’ and 
‘mechanical’ methods to discipline their comrades. The ‘Revolutionary’ method involved 
speaking to comrades whose behavior was ‘out of line’, trying to show them the ‘right way’ of 
conducting themselves. However, if the comrades continued to conduct themselves in an 
unbecoming manner, upstanding youth activists resorted to ‘mechanical’ discipline, which 
referred to physical punishment. Thabo, one of Marks’ interviewees explained 
 
 We don’t encourage that but sometimes we are forced to use that. We tell ourselves 
 that we are fighting for liberation of the people … So if we feel that he or she is mis- 
 using their (people’s) trust or misusing the name of the organization, or discrediting 
 the name of the organization, we say that mechanical discipline must be used because 
 we are fighting for the people and not for ourselves
1537
 
   
Seemingly, members of the ANCYL Maokeng branch used both these disciplinary methods on 
their members. However, the reluctance by some of the members of the branch to discipline one 
of their own, because of his leadership position in the organization, after he had allegedly 
contravened the constitution of the ANCYL by causing disunity and confusion in the 
organization, became one of the contentious issues which caused the ‘war’ between the TMG 
and the ANCYL. 
 
Some insights on vigilantism 
“1985 saw an increase in the number of extra-legal groups (or vigilantes)”, writes Nicholas 
Haysom, “as well as their forceful emergence in the urban areas”.1538 Both Haysom and Craig 
Charney assert that the upsurge of vigilantes particularly in 1985 was caused by the “deepening 
political crisis in South Africa …”1539 From 1984 up to 1986 the National Party government was 
faced with countrywide protests led by civic associations and COSAS under the banner of the 
UDF.
1540
 These popular organizations, inter alia, opposed the government-created local councils 
and also demanded changes in the educational system. Consequently, in some areas government-
created governing structures were replaced by organs of ‘people’s power’, such as ‘people’s 
courts. In such cases, residents (or their organizations) took over the management of the 
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townships, and in the process marginalized local councillors’ and, sometimes even the police’s 
authority.
1541
  
Haysom, for instance, points out that the Huhudi Civic Association (HUCA), established in 1983 
to resist the forced removals of the residents of Huhudi next to Vryburg, in the Northern Cape, to 
Pudimoe, in Bophuthatswana – a homeland “… set up projects designed to help residents … 
make their homes habitable and to prove their urban residence rights”.1542  Immediately after 
Huhudi was reprieved, “The community council”, adds Haysom “was increasingly marginalized 
in the face of the energetic approach of HUCA activists”.1543 What followed were severe and 
unrestrained attacks on members of the HUCA and their supporters by vigilantes, assisted by the 
police.
1544
 The protests in black areas extended countrywide. This severely constrained the 
government’s ability to enforce law and order through its security personnel. Furthermore, 
according to Haysom “the South African Police and South African Defence Force [were] limited 
by potential publicity and hindered by legal considerations in their ability to perpetrate the 
deliberate terror and violence needed to combat popular organizations”.1545 It was against this 
backdrop that vigilantes emerged.  
Vigilantes were part of the apartheid ‘system’.1546 They were established to intimidate and attack 
political activists. In other words, their role was to maintain the status quo. There is evidence that 
in 1985 vigilantes worked closely with the embattled town (or village) councillors and the police 
to eradicate political activists opposing apartheid policies. In Thabong, Welkom, for example, 
the Phakathis
1547
 or ‘A-Team’ included township councillors in its ranks and “… made use of the 
property of the council”1548. Between February and June 1985 the Phakathis unleashed a reign of 
terror in Thabong, “…me[ting] out arbitrary assaults and severe floggings to residents”.1549 Their 
task “seemed to be to ‘clean up’ organized resistance to apartheid”.1550 Worryingly, the police 
colluded with the Phakathi group. This was evident in their attitude to the residents’ complaints 
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about this group. They refused, for example, to prosecute the group for any of the misdemeanors 
they committed.
1551
  
Another vigilante group, also called the ‘A-Team’1552, was established during this period in 
Tumahole, Parys. This was after the residents had decided to march against the Orange Vaal 
Development Board’s (OVDB) decision to increase rent. On 15 July 1984 the residents of 
Tumahole, led by the Tumahole Student Organisation, took to the streets.
1553
 Not long thereafter, 
the residents embarked on a consumer boycott.
1554
 A year later the ‘A-Team’, led by Sehlabako 
Masoge
1555
, was formed and, like other vigilante groups, also unleashed a reign of terror in 
Tumahole. It had strong associations with the police. In fact, Seekings cited in Now Everyone is 
Afraid, observed 
  
Three families make up most of the members of the ‘A-team’ … One family  
 includes a black policewoman … and her brothers. Two particularly brutal 
 vigilantes, alleged township residents, are the policewoman’s lover and his  
 brother, once a COSAS member. The second family are close friends of the  
 first. The brothers in the third family played in the same football team as  
 members of the first two families
1556
 
 
“In November … the ‘A-Team’”, writes Twala, “claimed the life of youth activist Lefu Rasego 
who was hacked with garden implements”.1557 The police were alleged to have turned a blind eye 
to vigilante violence. Members of the community responded by applying for a Supreme Court 
interdict against the vigilante group. This was granted in February 1986 – on a temporary basis. 
The ‘A-Team’ ignored the interdict and continued with its acts of violence. It specifically 
targeted political activists and anyone suspected of belonging to the UDF-affiliates in the 
township.
1558
 This undoubtedly affected the community’s political initiatives and “left the Board 
(OVDB) free to move ahead with its own plans”.1559 The ‘A-team’s’ reign of terror was finally 
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brought to an end by a combination of efforts, but most importantly through the group’s fierce 
fights with the ‘comrades’. Some of the group’s members were killed.1560  
In KwaZulu, Inkatha assumed the role of a vigilante group. After enjoying sole support in 
KwaZulu and parts of Natal since 1975, Inkatha felt threatened following the launching of the 
UDF. It therefore attacked everyone who threatened its support base. Muzi Sikhakhane’s oral 
testimony corroborates this view.  
 
Sikhakhane was born in eMangwaneni, in Bulwer. He grew up in an area under the absolute 
control of Inkatha. Failure to show support for Inkatha meant losing some of the basic but 
necessary benefits dispensed by the KwaZulu homeland government – effectively controlled by 
Inkatha.
1561
 Sikhakhane remembers 
Inkatha Ye Nkululeko ye Sizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement) had a  
presence where we lived [and] that forced our parents to be members. You see,  
Inkatha-controlled government had Ubuzwe Card (Citizenship Card). It was not a 
membership card of Inkatha, but it served the same purpose. It made it possible for  
our parents to receive pension and to receive services
1562
  
 
After matriculating, Sikhakhane enrolled at Indumiso College of Education, in Pietermaritzburg, 
in 1984. He immediately joined AZASO (Azanian Student Organisation), and in 1985 he was its 
leader.
1563
 In the same year, he was recruited by Reggie Hadebe into the underground structure 
of the ANC. Sikhakhane remarks “he informed me that this structure was a network for the 
ANC”.1564 Sikhakhane also joined the UDF in Midlands.  
After completing his teachers’ training course, he was employed as a teacher at Gala, in Bulwer.   
In his words: “In 1987 I started to teach at a secondary school in Bulwer called Mahlahla”. It was 
at Mahlaba Secondary that he came into direct confrontation with members of Inkatha, and this 
inspired some of his students. He recalls  
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Members of Inkatha would come on Wednesday and whether I was teaching my  
learners or not they would demand that the learners must assemble outside or in  
the hall.  I was critical of Inkatha, and I think the learners picked that up and  
they also became critical
1565
  
 
To dispel dissent, the Inkatha-controlled government expelled all the teachers who opposed 
Inkatha and its activities. Sikhakhane was in the group of teachers dismissed in October 1987. 
However, before this an attempt was made on his life. On November 12, Sikhakhane claims, a 
learner warned him that her father, a leader of Inkatha in the area, together with other members 
of Inkatha were on their way to the school in two busses to kill him. He takes up the story 
 
As I was leaving at the gate I saw a woman doing gardening opposite our school.  
She was waving her hand and I thought she was greeting me and I waved back. A  
few minutes later I realized that she was warning me to go back and run. When I  
turned I saw two buses carrying members of Inkatha. Before I knew it I was surrou- 
nded by more 100 people. Not far I saw a police van. I concluded that they had come 
with the police. I was attacked. They stabbed me with intshumentsho (i.e. a sharpened 
instrument made of steel) on my chest and shot me on my leg. I became a bit dizzy
1566
  
 
Luckily, he was able to escape. “For some time I hid in the forest, then I went to a house where 
one of my students lived”, Sikhakhane recalls.1567 When his comrades in Pietermaritzburg 
learned about his ordeal, they decided that he should leave the country. Sikhakhane remembers 
I went to Pietermaritzburg. Himnal Mthembu and Reggie Hadebe organized that I  
should leave the country and I was told to go to Johannesburg to meet with Steve 
Tshwete. But that plan fell through because arrangements were not properly done
1568
 
 
Sikhakhane stayed in Johannesburg and found employment as a teacher. He continued his 
political activism there as a member of the UDF and a Transvaal Unit of Umkhonto we 
Sizwe.
1569
 
 
Sikhakhane’s testimony illustrates two important factors, which were common in the 1990s. 
First, it is clear that Inkatha, as it was the case with vigilantes operating in Huhudi, Thabong and 
Tumahole, had the backing of the police. And second, vigilantes were determined to eradicate 
anyone challenging the status quo. 
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Maokeng, unlike other townships in the Free State and KwaZulu/Natal, did not experience the 
phenomenon of vigilantism in the mid-1980s, except for the sole attack on Dennis Bloem by 
three councillors.
1570
 “In the papers before the court”, writes Haysom, “the three councillors 
denied shooting at Mr Bloem but said they carried firearms to assist in the maintenance of law 
and order in the township”.1571 The reason for the absence of vigilantism in Maokeng would 
seem to have been because councillors were not violently threatened as was the case in other 
areas, where concerted efforts were made to attack and force them to resign. In fact, the 
Maokeng Town Council, as noted in chapter four, enjoyed a considerable support amongst some 
of the members of the community.   
 
Although the violent actions by vigilantes, ostensibly with support from the state, instilled fear 
amongst the local political activists (and the residents in general) and disorganized protests 
directed at the apartheid policies, they, nevertheless, were unable totally to prevent activists from 
mobilizing and organizing members of their communities to continue with the struggle. Perhaps 
it was for this reason that the government resolved to exert its powers to maintain law and order.        
 
In 1986 the government declared the national state of emergency and detained political activists 
en masse, sometimes for two or three years. Two years later, it restricted political structures in 
the country, including the UDF. This halted political protests in the townships. Only two 
organizations survived the crackdown, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), although the latter was warned to focus its 
efforts on labour issues and not politics.
1572
 During this period vigilantism subsided. But this was 
temporary. Vigilantism resurfaced again in 1990, leading Charney to write “the end of the 
political logjam unleashed an intense new outburst of vigilantism”.1573 
 
Revival of vigilantism, 1990s 
Despite the ‘unofficial war’ between Inkatha and the UDF that was ravaging parts of 
KwaZulu/Natal, 1990 began on a promising note.
1574
 On 2 February State President De Klerk 
announced in parliament the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP, and other political 
organizations. Moreover, he proclaimed that the government had taken a decision finally to 
release Nelson Mandela from prison. Five months after this historic announcement, a rapid 
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spread and escalation of political violence occurred in the country, especially in the Rand.
1575
 
There were two reasons for this. First, the National Party government, and its ally: the IFP, 
wanted to undermine the support base of the ANC and, second but relatedly, to cause confusion 
and sow divisions within the ANC, particularly between the ‘hardliners’ (i.e. those in favour of 
armed struggle) and moderates (i.e. those in support of the negotiations). This would boost the 
NP government’s position during the negotiations.  
At the beginning of 1990 the ANC and the government embarked on serious and open talks 
about the future of South Africa. For instance, in early May a high powered delegation of the 
ANC, including Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Thabo Mbeki, and others, met government delegation 
in Groote Schuur, Cape Town. “At the end of a three-day meeting”, Mandela recalled “we 
agreed on what became known as the Groote Schuur Minute, pledging both sides to a peaceful 
process of negotiations and committing the government to lifting the State of Emergency …”1576 
Such talks followed years of secrete talks between the ANC and government, which were 
initiated by Mandela and Kobie Coetsee, then minister of Justice and Prisons, in 1985.
1577
  
Although the National Party supported the negotiations for a ‘new’ South Africa, it was 
definitely not prepared to negotiate the end of the white rule. De Klerk, as the leader of the NP, 
was totally opposed to majority rule. According to Mandela “[De Klerk’s] goal was to create a 
system of power-sharing based on group rights”.1578 This strategy should be viewed as a way of 
preserving the electoral support the NP still enjoyed and to gain more support. At this stage the 
white electorate was split between the NP and the white right-wing parties such as the 
Conservative Party and the AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging). The ANC, in contrast, 
favoured a majority rule. This caused some consternation within the NP’s ranks. The latter feared 
that if the ANC, which undoubtedly had a large following through its alliance partners (UDF and 
COSATU), came to power, it would marginalize minority groups. Therefore, it sought allies who 
shared its Anti-ANC sentiments. These it found in the IFP.
1579
 
Inkatha (later renamed IFP) was formed in 1928 by King Solomon Dinizulu as a cultural 
movement “to arouse public enthusiasm for the Zulu monarchy”.1580 After a slump from the 
1930s, the organization was resuscitated in 1975 by Dinizulu’s nephew Mangosuthu Gatsha 
Buthelezi as the Inkatha Ye Nkululeko Ye Sizwe.
1581
 The relationship between Buthelezi and the 
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ANC was cordial until 1979. A souring of relations occurred, according to Lodge, after Buthelezi 
“… had publicized discussions with the organization’s leaders in London that the ANC had 
intended to be kept secrete”.1582 Their relationship further deteriorated when in 1976 Buthelezi 
criticized the student uprisings, and in the 1980s openly opposed the ANC’s armed struggle and 
campaigned against the sanctions.
1583
 An open violent clash between Inkatha and the ANC 
erupted in 1983 following the launching of the UDF, which Buthelezi accused of being the 
surrogates of the ANC.
1584
 COSATU, which was also seen in similar light as the UDF, was not 
spared after it was established late in 1985. But it was the IFP’s advocacy for “group rights” and 
federalism that intensified the violent clashes between the supporters of the IFP and ANC in the 
1990s. For Buthelezi “federalism was a logical adjunct to the regional nature of his power 
base”.1585 He was well aware that outside of KwaZulu/Natal region his organization lacked 
support. Like the NP, the IFP and Buthelezi were wary of the majority rule under the ANC.    
Matters reached boiling point when Inkatha attempted to expand its support base to other areas 
beyond KwaZulu/Natal. Its advances outside of its “natural” stronghold were strongly opposed 
by the UDF/MDM, and later the ANC. This set the ANC and IFP on a collision course which 
persisted until just before the 1994 national elections. It was for this reason that the NP, or some 
elements within its ranks, especially those within the security forces, found the IFP a natural ally 
to use to destabilise the ANC. It is to the violence between the ANC and IFP that many scholars 
writing about political violence in South Africa in the 1990s have tended to give special 
attention.     
Bonner and Nieftagodien, in their book Kathorus, for example, trace the origins of political 
violence that ravaged the three East Rand townships: Katlehong, Thokoza, and Vosloorus, in the 
1990s to taxi wars. They contend that the violent clashes were initially between the hostel-based 
taxi-operators and the township-based taxi operators, assisted by students (or the comrades, as 
they were known). Later the situation shifted from taxi-wars to political violence.
1586
 This was 
after a taxi belonging to a member of the hostel-dwellers’ taxi operators, Mr Ngobese, was 
burned, with passengers inside, on its way out of Thokoza to Nqutu, in the Free State Province. 
The reason for this gruesome act was that the passengers and the driver had ignored the stay-
away called by COSATU, and enforced by township youth. Hostel-dwellers interpreted this as 
an attack on all the Zulu-speaking people, residing in the hostel – and by extension members of 
Inkatha – by the “komblese” (comrades), who were associated with the ANC.1587 
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Furthermore, these authors, in their study of Alexandra Township, note that after a relatively 
tranquil period in Alexandra violent clashes erupted between the IFP supporters, based at Madala 
hostel, and the residents of the township – not staying in the hostel. These violent clashes, which 
caused loss of lives and immense damage to property, according to the authors, were precipitated 
by a fight over a girlfriend between a Zulu-speaking man and a Xhosa-speaking man. The latter 
killed the former, and the IFP members avenged his killing by attacking the residents of Freedom 
Park squatter settlement – associated with Xhosa-speaking group. And on 16 March 1991, after 
the IFP rally, violent clashes broke out between members of the IFP and the community, which 
resulted in the killing of 26 people in the first week.
1588
   
Graeme Simpson, Steve Mokwena and Lauren Segal, in their study focused in the then Transvaal 
(today’s part of the Gauteng Province), argue “One of the important factors explaining the 
outbreak of political violence in the Transvaal during 1990 was the context of negotiation”.1589 
According to them “… It was clear that the escalating violence was having an effect of 
disorganizing and disrupting the ANC”.1590 They conclude “It suited the government to face a 
weakened rather than well-organised adversary (ANC)”.1591 Most importantly, the authors 
demonstrate that the political violence of the 1990s benefited some organizations and 
disadvantaged others. For them, for example, the ANC was “badly bruised by the political 
violence”,1592 because its attention was forced to oscillate between the negotiations and 
monitoring and finding solutions to quell this violence. It also came under enormous pressure 
from its supporters, “who were faced with the daily battles for survival”, to reconsider 
negotiating with the National Party which was perceived as the orchestrator of this violence. 
Instead, the ANC supporters called for the return to the armed struggle.
1593
 The benefits that 
accrued to the National Party as a result of the political violence was a weakened and 
disorganized ANC. And for the Inkatha Freedom Party it was a public acknowledgment of the 
party as the necessary part of the resolution to the problem of township violence and a long-term 
success of multi-party negotiations.
1594
    
In spite of the illuminating reasons for the origins of political violence in different areas provided 
by the abovementioned authors, there is silence on the role of gangs in political violence. It is 
this matter that the chapter seeks to deal with. However, prior to doing this it is important to, 
first, gain some understanding what we mean by political violence. 
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Some views on understanding political violence 
 
At this point, perhaps, it is advisable to pause and ask the question: what is political violence? 
And how does it manifest itself? Andre du Toit argues that prevailing discourses on political 
violence tend to be problematic in a peculiarly elusive way. According to him, they tend to see 
violence (or political violence) as ‘obvious’ and uncontested discourse.1595 For him, the 
limitation of such discourse is that it is mainly a legitimist discourse. It tends to incorporate 
criteria for legitimate or illegitimate use of force into the very meaning of the crucial concept 
involved.
1596
 Similarly, Graeme Simpson and Janine Rauch assert that “it is evident that one of 
the central problems which plagues any analysis of political violence in South Africa is the 
competing ‘labels’ through which the violence is described.” “This problem”, they add, “of 
‘labelling’ is especially evident in the rhetoric of the various political interest groups themselves, 
as the political contest is waged in terms of who is responsible for the escalating political 
violence.”1597 
 
Taking a cue from these authors, it is not the intention of this chapter to exhaust discourses on 
political violence, nor does attempt to provide an all encompassing definition of political 
violence. What this chapter intends doing is to provide some understanding of political violence 
in South Africa in the 1990s. To achieve this, it will focus on the timing, scale, and opposing 
factions in the violence during this period. This, I believe will help us to comprehend the 
rationale for this violence (why did political violence flare up in Maokeng during this period?), 
the form it took and the character of the warring factions.     
Various authors have attempted to provide definitions of political violence or tried to explain 
what political violence is. For Robin M. Williams, a sociologist, cited in du Toit, there is 
individual violence (or violence perpetrated by individuals) and organized or collective violence. 
He asserts that the latter includes the most important forms of political violence, both violence 
against the state such as rebellions, revolutions, insurrections, and so on, as well as the many 
forms of violence organized and implemented by the state such as wars, purges, counter-
insurgency operations, political executions, and so on.
1598
 And Jacklyn Cock, also a sociologist, 
in a chapter titled ‘Political Violence’ uses this phrase to mean “acts of destruction that impact 
on power relations in society”.1599 Monique Marks, using Ted Gurr’s definition, writes “political 
                                                          
1595
 Du Toit, A. ‘Discourses on Political Violence’, in N. Chabani Manganyi and Andre du Toit (eds.) Political Violence 
and the Struggle in South Africa (London, Macmillan Academic, 1990), p.87 
1596
 Ibid., p.88 
1597
 Simpson. G. and Rauch, J. ‘Political Violence: 1991’. http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php?option_content 
Downloaded, 29 September 2009 
1598
 Du Toit ‘Discourses, p.97 
1599
 Cock, J. ‘Political Violence’, in Brian McKendrick and Wilma Hoffman (eds.) People and Violence in South Africa 
(Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1990), p.44 
340 
 
violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, 
its actors – including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies …”1600 
Other commentators like Innes, cited by Simpson, Mokwena and Segal, define political violence 
in terms of the number of people who had died either as a result of action by security police or as 
a result of ‘black-on-black’ violence.1601 Simpson, Mokwena and Segal argue that there are 
limitations with this definition, because “at best it only explains that violence was on the increase 
in 1990, at worst they mask thorough analysis by presenting description as explanation”.1602 For 
these authors a more workable definition could be that “violence which occurs between 
individuals or groups where the dominant motivation is based on political difference or the 
competing desire for political power”.1603Most significantly, they add “a directly political 
situation may develop a dynamic and momentum of its own and certain violence may thus be 
political in origin, although the original motives have become displaced”.1604 
Williams, Cock, Marks, and Simpson, Mokwena and Segal’s definitions highlight three 
important themes. First, for violence to be categorized political it has to be organized or 
collective violence, and secondly have an impact on power relations in society, and finally, be 
violence against the regime or its actors, or violence against the regime and its agents by their 
political opponents. These themes apply in the case of political violence that erupted in Maokeng 
in the early 1990s. Drawing from the above discussions I will define political violence in 
Maokeng as organized and directed against the state and its agents, with the intention of 
ameliorating the power-relations in society.  
My interviewees in Maokeng, particularly former political activists, strongly felt the Three 
Million Gang (TMG) was not the main problem, but was a tool used by the state and its agents 
(the local councillors, the SAP and IFP) to try and derail the progress to liberation. It was for this 
reason that they believed that in order for them to achieve their liberation, they had to organize 
themselves against the TMG and defeat it. This would in turn weaken the state and its agents. 
Therefore, the violence in Maokeng was organized and had serious power relations.  
It is against this background that the political violence that erupted in Maokeng and many other 
townships in the country should be understood. It was violence between organized factions for 
contrasting reasons. The TMG, councillors, SAP, and later, the IFP aimed to restore the status 
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quo and the ANCYL and the ANC opposed them with the sole aim of fighting and removing the 
unjust regime in power.   
Gangsters, gangs and political violence 
Literature on gangsters, gangs and their exploits in South Africa is in abundance.
1605
 Equally, 
there is considerable work on gangs and political organizations, particularly in the 1950s and 
1980s. For instance, Alfred Nzo, who had joined the ANC in 1945, claimed that all the gangs in 
Alexandra in the 1950s respected the ANC. They would even assist ANC members to distribute 
leaflets.
1606
 Similarly, Gail Gerhart, cited by Glaser, notes that gangsters and gangs were more 
comfortable with the PAC during its legal existence in South Africa. This was because the PAC 
was action-oriented compared to the ANC (see chapter two).
1607
 Furthermore, in the 1980s, the 
members of the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU) in Thembisa recruited tsotsis 
because of their enterprising character.
1608
 In an interview with Simon Mashishi, a founding 
member of the branch of AZANYU in Thembisa in 1985, observes 
 
Like I indicated before that we did not [recruit] everybody. We had a criterion  
that we used to judge people. [We recruited] intelligent people, argumentative  
people, brave people, and even thugs sometimes. We would know that this guy  
is a thug – he steals and hijacks. We would go to a particular thug and recruit  
him We would say to him ‘look, we want a car and this car is wanted at such a  
time. And that car would be available. [Some of the tsotsis that] we recruited  
[were] people like Shadrack Mapalakanye and Tom Baloyi. We recruited them  
for specific purposes
1609
 
 
Wilfried Scharf, on the other hand, in his study on gangs in Cape Town alludes to the 
relationship between gangs and the police. Scharf writes about the Ntsara gang, whose members 
named as their friend a policeman who had consistently exploited differences and precipitated 
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open conflict between sectors of the African community.
1610
 In addition, Scharf notes “it has also 
been alleged that the police …. use gangs to provide information about illegal or politically-
motivated activity in townships”.1611 
However, less known is the relationship between gangs and political violence.
1612
 Johannes’ 
study sheds some light about how gangs were drawn to political violence. Her findings illustrate 
that the ‘Black Cats’ gang which operated in Wesselton, Ermelo, about 250 kilometres from 
Johannesburg, was founded by Chris Ngwenya and Jwi Zwane after the two had a fall out with 
the community. In 1989 Ngwenya and Zwane led the Anti-Crime Campaign (ACC), a committee 
formed to fight crime and gangsterism in the township.
1613
 The ACC worked closely with the 
police and the local councillors. But it also enjoyed support from the community. It targeted 
criminals and gangsters in the township; patrolled and searched them. All the weapons it 
confiscated from the criminal elements in the township were handed over to the police. It was 
not long however before some of the members of the ACC themselves began engaging in 
criminal acts and terrorized the residents of Wesselton. The residents’ complaints fell on deaf 
ears. The police did not act against the ACC. A community meeting was called where it was 
resolved that the ACC should be dissolved. In the same meeting, the Wesselton Civic 
Association (WCA) was founded. This was a turning point in the politics of Wesselton.  
The WCA tried to call the ACC to order unsuccessfully. At this stage the members of the ACC 
had renamed themselves the ‘Black Cats’. During this period the WCA was also questioning the 
local councillors about the allegations of misappropriated funds in the council. The local 
councillors turned to the ‘Black Cats’ for protection. Mrs Dada, a member of the community, 
claimed “they used these children as their bodyguards”. It was at this stage that the police and 
local councillors explicitly supported the ‘Black Cats’ to ward off attacks on the councillors by 
the WCA, and possibly by members of the newly formed Action Committee (AC). The AC was 
formed in June 1990 by some of the members of the community who wanted to end the violence 
ravaging the township. The AC called a community meeting and invited the ‘Black Cats’ and 
other gangs to discuss measures to end this violence. In that meeting a clash broke out between 
the Karateka Gang and the AC. The Karateka, in turn, joined the ‘Black Cats’ and terrorized the 
community, particularly the members of the WCA and AC. John Mndebele, testifying before the 
TRC Hearings, recalled “a spate of attacks on people and property ensued … Wesselton was 
subject to a reign of terror and … people who aligned themselves with the ANC were prime 
targets”. The police failed to intervene and arrest the ‘Black Cats’. To protect themselves and the 
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community, the WCA and AC fought back, ostensibly with the assistance of the ANC. Soon the 
‘Black Cats’ felt cornered and “had no chance to survive in the township”. It was during this 
period that they joined the IFP. Steve Ngwenya, testifying at the TRC Hearings, had the 
following to say about this development: “… the ‘Black Cats’ became involved in (sic) the IFP 
upon the instruction from the SAP”.  
Some of the members of the ‘Black Cats’ were taken to Ulundi, the then capital of KwaZulu, for 
military training as members of the IFP. After receiving training they returned to Wesselton to 
continue their reign of terror. Members of the community, who had links with Chris Hani, the 
Chief of Staff of MK, formed a Special Committee and this Committee nominated Gushu, a 
member of the ANC (and possibly an MK cadre as well) to carry out the task of murdering Jwi 
Zwane, one of the leaders of the ‘Black Cats’. It was hoped that Zwane’s death would end the 
violence. However, this was not to be. Violence continued unabated even after his death. Again, 
Gushu was given the responsibility to assassinate Chris Ngwenya, the ‘Black Cats’ second-in-
command. Gushu executed his order in July 1991 and the violence ended.
1614
   
Johannes’ study demonstrates a clear collaboration between gangs, councillors, the SAP, and IFP 
in their objective to derail the struggle to eradicate apartheid and its agents. But it also illustrates 
how gangs took advantage of the political situation to advance their own personal interests. 
Kynock’s work, like Johannes’, shows the relationship between gangs, police and the IFP in 
fomenting political violence in Thokoza and Sebokeng in the early 1990s. He demonstrates how 
Mbhekiseni Khumalo, an Archbishop of the Light of Church of God in Zion and a member of the 
IFP since the 1970s, formed the Khumalo Gang to fight the supporters of the ANC in Thokoza 
during 1992 and 1993.
1615
 Khumalo, testifying before the TRC Hearings, pointed out that before 
1992 he was in good relations with the community of Thokoza, to the extent that they even 
nominated him to be part of a street committee.
1616
 He claims to have declined the nomination on 
religious grounds.
1617
The situation changed after his daughter was abducted and raped by a 
neighbourhood gang, the ‘Bad Boys’1618 – which Khumalo strongly believed were ANC 
members. 
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Khumalo and some of his family members and acquaintances – all supporters of the IFP – 
decided to take the law into their own hands and shot and killed members of the ‘Bad Boys’. It 
was at this stage that the residents of Thokoza turned against him because “… he vented his rage 
indiscriminately on male township youth”.1619 Khumalo and his followers turned to Inkatha for 
protection “and the Archbishop soon became a notorious Inkatha strongman and attracted 
additional followers to form what became known as the ‘Khumalo Gang’”.1620 The gang 
unleashed a reign of terror, maiming, killing the supporters of the ANC, and destroying property 
of his enemies, acts which Khumalo denied during the TRC Hearings. He even refuted 
allegations of his actual involvement in some of these acts made by former members of the gang, 
Themba Zimo and Nicholas Zweli Jamani.
1621
  
Residents’ suspicion of Khumalo’s collaboration with the police were confirmed when the police 
offered him and his family protection round the clock. When asked why the police protected 
him, Khumalo responded 
I also asked the police the same question. They said “We heard that you are being 
attacked and the law says we should come and guard you, protect you so that we  
should not find you dead”1622 
 
In addition to protecting Khumalo, the Murder and Robbery Squad in Benoni was alleged to 
have attended barbecues at different houses owned by members of the Khumalo Gang and 
supplied the names and car registration numbers of people they wanted killed to Archbishop, 
whose men would carry out the murders.
1623
 
In 1993 Khumalo’s wife, Sebeth Khumalo was murdered. Khumalo blamed the ANC’s 
comrades. According to Kynock, a former member of the Self-Defence Units (SDU) claimed this 
was the case. In retaliation, Khumalo and his gang attacked the Ngema tavern because “it was 
frequented by ANC supporters …”1624 Khumalo and his son were finally arrested for burning 
down their neighbour’s house, possibly in retaliation for his wife’s killing.1625 
Furthermore, Kynock notes that the Kheswa Gang in Sebokeng, in the Vaal Triangle, assumed 
similar role as the Khumalo Gang. It targeted ANC members and supporters, and enjoyed the full 
support of the police before Kheswa was murdered in 1993. This gang was formed by Victor 
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Khetisi Kheswa, a notorious gang leader who specialized in stealing cars.
1626
 In late 1990 
Kheswa clashed with the comrades over a shebeen brawl. “Kheswa resisted comrades’ attempt to 
disarm him”, writes Kynock, “and managed to escape, despite being shot”.1627 He sought 
protection from the IFP and moved in with them at the KwaMadala hostel. It was at this stage 
that Kheswa formed the Kheswa Gang, together with Vananda Mtwana Zulu. Ernest Sotsu, a 
leader of the ANC in Boipatong, claimed that after spending eight years in a prison in Umthatha, 
Transkei, for ANC’s activities he returned to Boipatong where he came into contact with Zulu. 
The latter informed him that he was being threatened by the youth league and requested Sotsu to 
intervene. Within a week, Sotsu claimed, the police arrived and took Zulu to KwaMadala 
hostel.
1628
 It is not clear why the police moved Zulu to KwaMadala hostel – the IFP’s stronghold. 
However, it is possible that they feared that if Sotsu managed to call off the youth threatening 
Zulu, Sotsu would gain the confidence of the latter. And this would disrupt their objectives, that 
of disorganizing the ANC in Sebokeng. As soon as Zulu was taken to the hostel, the Kheswa 
Gang and the IFP started fighting the comrades, and in January 1991 Kheswa murdered 
Christopher Nangalembe, a leader of the local ‘people’s court’.1629 On 12 January the Kheswa 
Gang attacked and killed people who had attended the night vigil held at Nangelembe’s home.  
The Kheswa Gang’s notoriety grew. It was linked to several high profile killings, including the 
murder of Sotsu’s wife, and the shooting incident at the Erik Tavern that resulted in five 
additional deaths.
1630
 The Kheswa Gang seemingly had carte blanche to unleash a reign of terror 
in the Vaal Triangle. The police stood idle and did not arrest the members of the gang, including 
Kheswa.  Sotsu, testifying before the TRC, alleged that Kheswa was in the payroll of the police. 
Kheswa was finally arrested for illegal possession of an AK47 in September 1991. He served 
four months and was released, pending an appeal. The residents of Sebokeng believed this was 
because of his close relationship with the authorities.
1631
 Kheswa was again arrested for the 
attack and killing of Sotsu’s wife. He was identified during the parade by Sotsu’s grandchildren, 
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who were also shot and wounded in the attack, as one of the attackers. While in police custody, 
he was murdered apparently by the police to cover their complicity on township killings.
1632
  
Continuous attacks on communities by the IFP, assisted by gangs, corroded the ANC’s support 
amongst its followers, and caused discomfort amongst some of the leading figures within the 
ANC. The ANC followers felt betrayed by the leadership of the ANC because it was continuing 
negotiating with the government that was killing them. Summing up the frustration of the people, 
Frene Ginwala, then head of research for the ANC, wrote 
 Having begun with the perception that the National Party was led by a man 
 of integrity and was genuinely seeking a negotiated solution, the feeling grew 
 that in fact the levers of state power were being manipulated in order to weaken 
 the ANC and hence to force it in whatever negotiations followed to make  
 compromises over the types of changes believed necessary in any political 
 dispensation. There was considerable anger at the grassroots and within the 
 ANC leadership
1633
 
 
There was also a growing disquiet amongst a certain section of the ANC’s supporters in the 
townships that the ANC did not care. Hence it did not want to give them weapons to protect 
themselves against their assailants. Mandela remembers that at a rally he was addressing days 
after the Boipatong massacre, he saw a sign that read: ‘Mandela give us guns’.1634 Lodge writes 
“on East Rand, members of locally assembled ‘defence units’ told journalists that they had asked 
the ANC to provide them with guns, expressing disappointment that no guns had as yet been 
delivered”.1635 
And Medupi “Professor” Maboe, a founding member of the SDU in Bekkersdal, in the West 
Rand, recalls that during their (ANC) fight with the members of AZAPO, who were assisted by 
the IFP, they sought guns from Mandela but he refused. Dramatically, Maboe explains 
 Comrade Nelson Mandela refused to give us guns. He said ‘Comrades, I’m not going  
to give you guns because you’ve killed too many people in Bekkersdaal. If I give  
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guns there would be no one left in Bekkersdaal’. We decided to ignore him and found 
other ways to get guns
1636
  
 
Mandela also notes that within the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC there were 
those who were beginning to question the wisdom of suspending the armed struggle.
1637
  
Although there were elements in Maokeng identical to the situation in other townships engulfed 
by political violence, there were also sharp differences. Maokeng Township had two distinctive 
features, which can help explain the different turn of events in the township. First, Maokeng, 
unlike other townships ravaged by political violence during this period, did not have hostels or 
squatter settlement(s).
1638
 Literature on political violence in the 1990s shows the significance of 
these places in the violent conflicts that swept the Rand, in particular. Hostels became the IFP 
camps (or bases) and squatter settlements, the UDF/ANC’s camps.1639  
Relatedly, during this period in the townships hostels were seen by non-hostel dwellers (and this 
view was also appropriated by members of the IFP) as places where only the Zulu-speaking 
ethnic group – and by extension members of the IFP - resided. Babylon Ka Xeketwane, in his 
study of the relation between hostels and political violence in Soweto, writes “There were many 
local reports of ‘Zulus being bussed in and taking over the migrant workers’ hostels, then using 
them as bases from which to launch attacks on residents’”.1640 This view is supported by one of 
the interviewees in the study by Lauren Segal when he said 
 I only started joining Inkatha last year (1990) because of the violence. Otherwise 
 I wasn’t interested. I joined because they said if you were Zulu, you were Inkatha. 
 All Zulus who live in the hostel were classified as Inkatha and were killed. … I 
 joined at Kwesine hostel in Natalspruit … 1641 
 
Interestingly, this interview reveals how some of the Zulu-speaking people were cajoled into 
joining Inkatha. Their ‘Zuluness’ was (mis)used to classify them automatically as members of 
Inkatha. This method was used by the leadership of Inkatha when recruiting new members. They 
took advantage of the fears and anxiety of the Zulu migrants living in urban areas during the 
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violent clashes. This was not a new phenomenon, though. Prince (then Chief) Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, leader of Inkatha, when discussing Inkatha for the first time in the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly in April 1975 shared similar sentiments: “… All members of the Zulu 
nation are automatically members of Inkatha if they are Zulus …”1642  Conversely, this 
classification was also used by the Xhosa-speaking people (and members of other ethnic groups) 
when justifying their violent actions against the IFP. They contended that all Zulu-speaking 
people, living in the hostels, were members of the IFP. It is important to note that this was 
incorrect. Not all members of the Zulu-speaking ethnic group were members of the IFP. Neither 
were all members of the Xhosa-speaking ethnic group supporters of the ANC.  A 1990 survey of 
political opinion in the black townships of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) by the 
McCann Advertising Agency found a staggering resentment of Inkatha by blacks outside Natal, 
including many Zulus, who seemed to consider it a greater danger than many radical white right-
wing movements.
1643
  
 
Beyond this, Maokeng was not divided on ethnic basis. Although there were Zulu-speaking and 
Xhosa-speaking ethnic groups in Maokeng, whose roots go back to the late 1930s, these were 
minority. Maokeng Township has always been dominated by the South Sotho-speaking ethnic 
group. This had a profound influence on the Zulu-speaking and Xhosa-speaking people to the 
extent that they ended adopting the South Sotho culture, like the language.
1644
 Therefore, ethnic 
cleansing was never a problem in Maokeng. Because of these two distinctive features, the IFP 
only appeared after the violent conflicts between the Three Million Gang and Maokeng Youth 
Congress (MAYCO) had already broken out in Maokeng. It is important to note though that 
Inkatha had a presence, or enjoyed the following of few supporters in Maokeng in the 1970s, and 
in the early 1990s. In the 1970s amongst the most notable members of Inkatha were Mr 
Serote,
1645
 who was once the chairman of the Maokeng Community Council, and in the 1990s 
Mr Lovers Petrus Lenkwane.
1646
   
 
The chapter will now turn to the cause(s) of political violence and how this violence played out 
in Maokeng. It is important to note here that this violence can be traced back to gang warfare in 
the mid-1980s between the original TMG and Canada (Ma-Canada) Gang, and later between the 
‘new’ TMG and MAYCO (an affiliate of SAYCO) – later renamed ANC Youth League 
(ANCYL) Maokeng branch.  The activities and role of these gangs are reconstructed through 
oral testimonies, especially from a family member of one of the former members of the original 
TMG and from former political activists who lined up against these gangs.  
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The original Three Million Gang 
Commentators on gangs and gangsterism in South Africa seem to be in agreement that the main 
factors that cause gangs (or young people to join gangs) are dysfunctional families, lack of 
schooling, and unemployment.
1647
 They attribute these to the crisis of capitalism and the 
apartheid system in general. A closer look at the Ramasimong family indicates elements of a 
dysfunctional family. This in turn will help us to understand the factors that may have forced 
Ramodikoe George “Diwiti” and his younger brother, Matsile, to the life in the streets and finally 
gangs.   
The Ramasimong nuclear family comprised of the mother, Thandiwe Martha, and her four 
children: Mamorena, who was born in 1956; Buti, 1959; Ramodikoe (“Diwiti”), 1963, and 
Matsile, 1966. The children grew up without their father, Essau Rudolf Manus.
1648
 Mamorena 
Taje recalls that their father was a Bishop at the St. John’s Church and used to move around 
praying and singing in Malay Kamp (Cairo). Thandiwe worked as a nurse at Boitumelo Hospital, 
in Maokeng. She single-handedly raised her children. Like most mothers she tried providing the 
best she could for her children. She did laundry for them and made sure they always looked 
clean. Taje remembers: “Our mother liked working. She washed our clothes in the evening. We 
were always clean. When we came back from school, obviously, you would wear clean things. 
So, people said we liked acting (i.e. behaving) like whites, such things”.1649 The situation was 
normal. Both Buti and “Diwiti” played football and were star players for their teams, which 
earned them nicknames ‘The Man’ and ‘M’jojana’, respectively. Taje claims that “Diwiti” was 
even invited for trials at Bloemfontein Celtic Football Club, a premiership team. 
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Mrs Thandiwe Ramasimong 
(Source: Mamorena Taje) 
 
But because of the odd working shifts at the hospital at times, Thandiwe could not always be 
with her children. It was in such instances that the older siblings had to assume responsibility for 
the younger ones. Sometimes this arrangement ended disastrously. Taje recalls an incident when 
“Diwiti” stabbed a young girl living in their neighbourhood and this attracted negative remarks 
from some of the residents. She remembers 
Matsile, the youngest one, fought with one of the children staying opposite our 
home. As he was fighting with this child … I think instead of intervening people 
from that house came out and wanted to attack my brother. Then “Diwiti” went  
out and wanted to whip them. They took the whip from him. You see, the 
mischievousness? I think he picked up a bottle and stabbed one of the children 
…  he stabbed the other girl on her breast. … They then called the police. He was 
young and already he was arrested. [You know people were saying] ‘Those children 
are thugs! They kill people. My mother works at the hospital. And these things 
happened when she wasn’t there1650 
 
After completing her junior schooling in Brentpark and Maokeng, Taje was sent to Aliwal North, 
in the Eastern Cape Province, to attend school at St. Joseph. The boys remained in Maokeng and 
continued with their schooling. While in Aliwal North Taje fell pregnant and had to discontinue 
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her schooling and returned home to raise her child. Lack of parental guidance also affected the 
boys, particularly “Diwiti” and Matsile. “Diwiti” had his second brush with the law when he was 
arrested on a rape charge. As a result he was found guilty and sentenced to 18 months in prison. 
Matsile, on the other hand, found a “home and comfort” in the streets. He founded, together with 
some of his age cohorts in the same neighbourhood, the “Three Million Gang”, which started as 
a loose group of boys dancing and hanging out together, but then later gravitated towards crime. 
 
Scharf trace the development of such groups in Cape Town back to the period of heightened 
political protests in the mid-1980s. Scharf argues “as the boycotts dragged on, more and more 
scholars dropped out of political organizations and sought other forms of entertainment”.1651 One 
form of entertainment that was not affected by ideological tensions”, he adds “was that of 
competitions for dance-groups known as mapantsula”.1652 Dance groups were created and held 
competitions. “Rivalry developed into animosity”, writes Scharf “when groups who thought they 
should have won, did not”.1653 According to Scharf, winning groups were accused of bribing the 
judges. It was not long before these groups, which usually composed of youths who resided in a 
particular geographic area, began engaging in skirmishes protecting their territories.
1654
 “As the 
cycle of attacks and counter-attacks developed”, notes Scharf “the dance-groups came to be seen 
as street gangs”.1655   
 
Without doubt it was against this background that the original Three Million Gang (TMG) was 
formed. It is not clear when this gang was formed. However, all of my interviewees are in 
agreement that it existed before the 1990s. It is possible that it was established in the mid-1980s. 
Originally, the TMG was made up of young males living in Seeisoville. Taje recalls  
  
` Let me say, Seeisoville - our Seeisoville - was at the top and there was another  
Seeisoville at the bottom. Those at the bottom called themselves Ma-Canada.  
And those at the top called themselves Three Million. So, at that time our sibling  
was friends with Toko Lefafa. Who else can I mention? Oh, batho ba Modimo  
(Oh, people of God!) Sebuti, and others who stayed in our street. They had this  
thing of liking the Americanoes look. They wore things that looked like bell-bottoms,  
going around with walking sticks, doing like this (demonstrating with hand: swaying  
their walking sticks), competing with the other group. This happened until they started  
fighting each other. I think they were jealous of each other or whatever. But they had  
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such a thing. “Diwiti” was in jail at that time1656 
 
Similarly, Antjie Krog writes “Expert witnesses describe the Three Million, formerly known as 
the Americanoes, as a group of men who first became known for wearing smart suits and 
parading in the streets. They quickly became popular, attracting more and more members, 
because they offered protection against criminality that is endemic to impoverished 
societies.”1657 
 
At this point the young friends from Seeisoville had christened themselves the ‘Three Million’ 
after a musical group with the same name.
1658
 Apparently, the latter enjoyed the song titled ‘I’ve 
been robbed’ by this musical group. Samuel “Bebeto” Taka, a former member of the ‘new’ 
TMG, explains 
 
Well, I heard there was another group of the Three Million that used to play a song  
called “I’ll be rocked” (Actually it’s ‘I’ve been robbed’). I‘ll be rocked … (singing).  
Yes, I hear they liked that track, so they decided to name themselves after it. I no  
longer hear it on radios. And whenever you see them sitting in the streets, you would  
hear the track. They were bras (friends). People like Machangani, Masusu, Buti Kraag,  
Teboho
1659
  
 
As Taje explains above, it was not long before tensions developed between the Three Million 
and the Canadians. Chabaseile Makume, a student activist during this period, remembers: “There 
was the Three Million and the other one was Canada. Actually, those were the people who used 
to fight for things like ‘which group rules Seeisoville?’ and over clothes, and such petty 
issues.”1660 Mamokhele Sebetoane and Bethuel Thekiswe provide a different view why these 
gangs fought each other. For Sebetoane, tension between the Three Million and the Canadians 
started during football matches and these developed to the extent that the Three Million began 
murdering some of the young people who were associated with the Canadians. She explains  
  
When this thing started apparently it was during soccer matches. So, there was another  
group here in Seeisoville called the Canada. Eh, clashes started between them (Three 
Million) and the Canada … and it spread throughout the entire community, especially 
now it also involved the activists. If you look at it carefully those guys, the Canada group, 
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as I say they were staying at the upper part of Seeisoville. They (Three Million) killed a 
lot of children from that area. When I say children, I mean, the youth of that area
1661
 
 
Thekiswe, who joined the South African Police (SAP) in 1982 and was stationed in Maokeng, 
contends that the two gangs clashed over territory and crime. Each gang felt challenged, and 
perhaps even insulted, when the other gang invaded their territory to commit crime. In his words 
  
1983, 1984, 1985 that was the time of the Canadians in Seeisoville and Phomolong, 
because those locations didn’t experience high crime rate … Before, crime was only 
 taking place in the Old Location. But the Canadians invaded these places; people started 
 experiencing crime … They would rob people at night and do housebreaking. It was 
 people like Bra Shakespear and others. It was only until the Three Million stepped in 
 and the two gangs would sometimes clash. You would find that the other gang had 
 committed crime in the area where the second gang was based. Therefore, this other 
 gang would want to do the same and go and rob in the other gang’s area. And they  
would end up clashing
1662
 
 
The fighting between the two gangs normally took place on weekends and in shebeens. 
Thekiswe explains: “They would only clash for that weekend. It wasn’t a regular thing”.1663 And 
when asked why did they clash specifically on weekends? He noted that it was “because they 
used to meet at shebeens on weekends”.1664 From the late 1970s shebeens had become preferred 
places for relaxing and drinking in the townships. These had also become places where political 
discussions took place.
1665
 In the early 1980s Maokeng Township, just like many other 
townships, was teeming with shebeens, albeit, illegal. Most of the shebeen owners did not have 
licenses legally permitting them to operate. And for this reason, Thekiswe recalls that they (SAP) 
had established a task team which patrolled the shebeens “… because that time they were not 
licensed. So the task team arrested the owners.”1666 Scharf contends that the rapid development 
of shebeens post-1976 was the state’s strategy to create a black middle-class, which could act as 
a buffer between the disgruntled black masses and the state. Scharf writes 
When Verwoerdian apartheid proved unworkable following the Soweto uprisings, 
political strategy occasioned the state to seek out a group of fledgling entrepreneurs 
who could for the backbone of the newly nurtured black middle class. The only sizeable 
group that possessed entrepreneurial skills were the shebeen owners, and the state, with 
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encouragement from liquor capital, thus focused on these shebeen owners and 
commenced a process of legalizing the distribution of liquor by Africans in townships
1667
 
 
From the mid-1980s, shebeens were upgraded to taverns. Taverns were licensed and did not sell 
mqombothi (homemade beer). Most importantly, they were patronised by young people. Some of 
the popular and mostly frequented taverns by the gangs in Maokeng were Selolo’s, Mametsi (or 
‘Sweet Waters’), Jimane, Ha-Stoko (Stock’s Place), and Ha-Manki (Manki’s Place).1668In an 
interview with Taje, together with Mametsi Moletsane (the former owner of ‘Sweet Waters’ 
tavern)
1669, both echoed Thekiswe’s sentiments about the clashes between the two gangs taking 
place in the taverns. They recalled an incident in 1990 when “Diwiti” was stabbed 26 times by 
the members of the Canadians at Mametsi’s tavern but did not die.1670 Mametsi, takes up the 
story: “after he was stabbed one of his friends came and took him to the hospital”. “Yes”, she 
adds, “he was taken by ‘Dozen’. When he got further up in my street at the corner he fell. We 
were scared to go, because there were too many thugs then.”1671 After this incident “Diwiti” 
moved in with his mother in Gelukwaarts (see below). 
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“Diwiti” (dark complexion and bearded man) enjoying himself in one of the taverns in Maokeng 
(Source: Matshidiso Rantie) 
 
In addition to fighting the Canadians, the TMG also targeted members of the ‘community’, 
particularly men who worked for the Premier Milling Company.  The reason for this is unclear. 
But it is possible that they wanted to rob them of their hard earned money to either purchase 
clothes or to finance their drinking sprees at the taverns. Recalling one incident, Taka remarks 
that the male labourers at the Premier Milling responded by forming themselves into a group in 
order to defend themselves. Taka remembers 
  
Then there was Premier [Milling Company] which also formed its group of workers  
as well. These ones [Three Million] were now abusing the Premier’s group, taking  
their belongings like clothes, money and furniture. … In terms of clothing they nearly 
looked (wore) alike. So, they would do such things; fight and stab one another
1672
  
 
Sobi “slove” Matli, who in the early 1990s was part of the self-defence structures in the 
township, concurred with Taka but went on to explain that the Premier Milling workers decided 
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to challenge the TMG because they felt that the police were ineffective in dealing with the gang. 
He explains 
 
There was the original TMG … somewhere in 1983 … Some of their members were 
‘Six-Nine’, Mahlomola, Toko Lefafa, and many others I have forgotten. In 1986 the 
Premier (Milling) workers engaged this TMG because it was terrorizing the community. 
They went to the police, I can still remember, to say ‘we’re tired of these tsotsis, can we 
handle them?’ The police said ‘go and get them but don’t harm them’1673  
 
Without evidence it is difficult to substantiate Matli’s claim that the police would allow the 
Premier workers to attack the TMG. However, it seems likely that the Premier workers reported 
the TMG to the police that this gang was terrorising them and when they realised that the police 
were not prepared to take proper action against this gang, they opted to defend themselves. Later 
the Premier workers’ actions provided the police with an excuse to deny the SAP’s involvement 
in the political violence ravaging Maokeng. Instead, the spokesperson of the SAP blamed the 
‘unrest’ on the fight between the TMG, Canadians and Premier workers.1674  
 
At this point it is clear that the TMG had gravitated towards crime. The reason for this, as in the 
case of the Zebra Force Gang, in Soweto, in Steve Mokwena’s study, was to “… deal with their 
daily circumstances and to survive economically”.1675 Mokwena, again, shows that the Zebra 
Force Gang, which first caught the public’s eye on 25 December 1990 after it had broken into the 
Salvation Army Girls Home in Killarney, Soweto, and abducted young girls to rape, began as “a 
loose group of boys who hung out in a house in Ngiba Street, smoking dagga (marijuana), 
slowly began to engage in criminal activities. First, by stealing bicycles …”1676  
 
Realising the seriousness of the problem of gangsterism in the township, the ‘comrade youth’, 
the Ministers’ Fraternal, and the South African Council of Churches (SACC) – Kroonstad branch 
- made attempts, first, to determine the reason for this problem and, then, to broker peace 
between the two gangs: TMG and the Canadians. The ‘comrade youth’ took the first step. Paseka 
Mpondo, a member of the Ditsekelekwas – a community self-defence structure comprising of 
young people under the age of 20 describes how they approached this issue 
 
It was two gangs.  The one was Canada and the other one was [Three Million]…You  
know with the gangs you will never know what they’re fighting for. They were just  
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being bossy. They just wanted to rule the township, do you understand? It’s things like 
that. Then we met as comrades and discussed the issue that there was something 
happening in our township, in Maokeng. There are gangs fighting each other and people 
were dying. So, what do we do since we are here to protect the people? We were fighting 
for the freedom of the country. We decided that we would try to resolve the issues 
between them. We were not going to side with any gang; we were just going to go 
between them so that we could stop what they were doing. So, we divided ourselves  
as comrades. There would be other comrades who would go to the Three Million’s  
base. They would stay there to prevent them from attacking the Canadians. We also  
did the same thing to the Canadians. Then we tried to engage them. We organised 
meetings so that they could talk and this thing must come to an end
1677
  
 
It was no surprise when the ‘comrade youth’ took this position. The latter saw themselves as the 
protectors of their communities, as Mpondo alludes in the interview; but they also perceived 
themselves as upholders of ‘morality’ in the township. Therefore, it was their responsibility to 
encourage peace and unity among the members of the ‘community’. As Marks observes  
  
Youth who engaged in the liberation struggle didn’t only believe they were defending 
 the community in a physical sense. They felt they were also defending the ‘morality’ of 
 the township, and in doing so, building unity or homogeneity. They wanted to preserve 
 what was good in the township. Being ‘moral’ meant not committing crimes against other 
 community members
1678
 
 
It was for this reason that whenever there were reports of misdemeanours committed against 
members of the community, the ‘comrade youth’ would discipline the culprit. Machabe Thulo, 
who was a leading figure in the ANCYL Maokeng branch and later the commander of the 
‘community’ self defence structures in Maokeng in the 1990s, explains: “Remember that time we 
were the people who disciplined criminals. If someone broke into someone else’s house, we 
would go and beat him up with sjamboks (whips).”1679 Matli, also a member of the ANCYL 
Maokeng branch, concurs 
 
 ’90, ’91,’92 ... the political programme was very active. So, there was no time for  
tsotsis to behave as tsotsis. And we were also vigilant, because we would say comrade  
so and so move from here to that particular place. We never thought about tsotsis. Make 
no mistake, if they get you, we would identify them. They are dead. I remember myself 
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dealing with few tsotsis. We dealt with them and they could not believe it. We sjamboked 
them
1680
  
 
On the other hand, the ‘comrade youth’ also punished ‘comrades’ who misbehaved. However, 
when the ‘comrade youth’ failed to discipline Daniel George for seriously violating his rights, 
“Diwiti” felt betrayed and this, partly, forced him to seek revenge (see below).   
 
The attempts by the ‘comrade youth’ to unite and bring between the two gangs do not seem to 
have been successful. Tensions and clashes continued unabated between the two gangs. Next, it 
was the Ministers Fraternal’s turn to intervene. Alfred Nthai Matube, who was a member of the 
Ministers’ Fraternal was born in Kroonstad in 1947, and was later ordained as a Minister in the 
Roman Catholic Church, reflects on their role in trying to end the clashes between the TMG and 
the Canadians. He explains 
  
The Three Million issue, it was a big thing in Kroonstad. There was nothing bigger  
than that ... In our street in the township, where I used to live ... the same street as 
Reverend Gozongo ... it is called Khumahadi Street, two young people died in that  
street because of that conflict [between the] ANC and the Three Million ... Not the  
ANC. There was this gang called Canada from Seeisoville. Now it was a battle that I  
can say it was Canada versus the Three Million ... Not long it was the ANC versus the 
Three Million. At that time this other boy from our street passed away in Khumahadi 
[Street] ... A child .... from the Malosi family, killed by the Three Million. And later the 
group of Canada ... came to this street and killed another boy called Josh Mofokeng. And 
that was bad, ntate. The other day they [TMG] were looking for a boy called George at 
his home. Immediately, they disappeared from the street they met him on their way and 
killed him. I saw his relatives running towards him. Others came back, saying we have 
found his teeth. They hit him with a stone. It was very bad. And as a result, truly 
speaking, the Ministers’ Fraternal played a very, very big role. We had these meetings ... 
in the Methodist Church, between Seeisoville and Phomolong. It was Father [Gabriel] 
Setiloane’s church at that time. So we held this meeting ... with the two groupings. Eh, I 
worked at the Correctional Services before, here in Kroonstad. And I knew this man, the 
leader of the Three Million very well. I knew him from prison. He was arrested most of 
the time – “Diwiti”. Among this group of Canada there was a person there called Victor 
Masizane. This Victor Masizane and “Diwiti” were people who got arrested a lot. Now 
another thing that helped us talk at that time was the fact that these people from Canada 
were led by Victor Masizane, although he wasn’t popular. And these other ones were led 
by “Diwiti”. And they were both able to talk together and say ‘Why did you send your 
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boys to look for me?’ And this one would say, ‘No, but...’ The two of them did not want 
to be enemies, because they knew how they both were. But then that thing carried on ... 
We tried to resolve and the fighting would decrease. But after a while you would hear 
that the same bad things were still happening
1681
 
 
Following the Ministers Fraternal’s important but unsuccessful attempt, finally the SACC joined 
and made similar attempts as the two organisations before it. The SACC was made up of many 
and different denominations.
1682
 From the onset the SACC was opposed to apartheid. This was 
exemplified in its stance against the NP government’s apartheid laws.  In the 1970s, in its 
correspondence with the then Prime Minister, John Vorster, the SACC wrote: “… we must 
assure you that as long as attempts are made to justify the policy of apartheid by appeal to God’s 
Word, we will persist in denying its validity…”1683  Moreover, it was led by staunch adversaries 
of apartheid like Desmond Tutu, Beyers Naude, and Frank Chikane.  
 
As one of the few organisations to have survived the government’s crackdown in 19881684, one 
of the SACC’s activities, according to Luli Callinicos, was to attend “… to the day-to-day 
problems of ordinary people, having regularly to provide shelter to men, women and children 
fleeing detention and violent harassment.”1685 In Kroonstad, the SACC’s branch also took up 
similar responsibilities. Eunice Seipati Tsoaeli, who in 1988 worked as the Secretary of the 
SACC in Kroonstad, remembers that, amongst its duties were to arrange visitation rights for the 
parents and next of kin of the detained youth, and also to ensure that the latter were permitted to 
study while in detention. Because of the special attention it gave to youth, the SACC in 
Kroonstad could not stand idle on the sides and allow the TMG and the Canadians to continue 
battling it out. Amidst confusion at the SACC’s offices in town, the SACC was able, finally, to 
broker peace between the two gangs. Tsoaeli recalls  
 
We had set-up a meeting for an hour with both gangs. But before the first group would 
come and then the next, the man that went to Seeisoville’s side wrote down the same time 
as the other man on the other side. It was Reverend Maobane. The SACC gave tasks to 
these priests to say you go this side and you go that side. So, there was confusion due to 
the time. We wanted to interview the first group alone. Then when we were done with 
them, we would call the other group, because we knew that they were fighting each other. 
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We could not put them in the same room. Then they both came. I stood at the door and 
told myself ‘I’m not going to stand for this’. They were not so many. I think about five or 
ten. Then they (my colleagues) quickly stopped the other group, the Three Million: 
‘Please leave right now. We will set a date for you’. They thought we deliberately invited 
them (Canadians), with the knowledge that they disliked each other. ... We spoke with the 
other group with relief: ‘What was happening? We want this to end. If you agree that you 
want to end it, too ... If you do, we, as the SACC, can help. We didn’t understand the 
cause but we didn’t want people to die. Then the SACC was mediating between them 
until they both made peace
1686
 
 
The Reverend Mzimase Humphrey Gozongo concurs  
 
… A fight began between a certain group from the Old Location and the Three Million 
Gang until we intervened. I remember the group’s name … Canada, yes. I went there 
[Old Location] and found them sitting outside a house, drinking beers. I went in to greet 
them. They were tired and wild, and they offered me some beer. Yes, I also drank beer. 
Remember it’s a public place where everyone knew that I was a Minister. I then asked 
them when will the fighting end? They told me they were also tired of fighting; that they 
couldn’t even sleep at night and they would appreciate it if I could convince the Three 
Million to make peace with them. I told them I was going to look for “Diwiti” and would 
then arrange a meeting in my church. I left. I was in the company of some of the youth in 
my church. They knew “Diwiti” very well. We found “Diwiti” and greeted him. I told 
him I had spoken to the Canadians and they said they wanted peace. He replied and told 
me they also wanted peace. We then set a day to meet. I involved some church ministers 
in the matter. And I went to meet with the Reverend Makhethi and the other minister 
from the African Presbyterian. We met at Makhethi’s church, the Seventh Adventist, and 
resolved the issue and the two groups made peace
1687
 
 
The Rev. Gozongo was born in Soweto, where he started his schooling at Sholomane before 
proceeding to Morris Isaacson High. After completing matric he found employment at the 
Carlton Hotel, in Johannesburg, where he joined the Commercial, Catering, and Allied Workers’ 
Union (CCAWUSA). Whilst working at the Carlton Hotel he was ordained to become a minister 
in the Presbyterian Church. In 1983 the church stationed him in Klerksdorp, West Rand. He 
established the branch of CCAWUSA there. Between 1986 and 1988 he was based in Qwaqwa, 
where he was employed as the Care Taker at Manthatisi High School, and later relocated to 
Bethlehem, where he continued his work as the minister. It was while in Bethlehem that he 
joined the Free State branch of the SACC. He arrived in Maokeng in May 1989.  Amidst 
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protestations from the elderly members of the church, Gozongo made the Presbyterian Church 
available to the different political formations in the township to use as a meeting place. This 
brought him closer to Dennis Bloem and others in the MDCC. It was not long before he joined 
the MDCC, and in 1990 he was the chairperson of the ANC branch in Kroonstad.
1688
  
 
It seems after the peace settlement had been reached between the TMG and Canadians, the TMG 
ceased to operate. There is no clear explanation for this. But what is clear is that some of its 
members were arrested and sentenced to prison terms for their criminal activities, and others like 
Matsile found employment. These were to resurface again with the formation of the ‘new’ TMG. 
 
The ‘new’ TMG and political violence 
 
In 1990 Kroonstad was a different place. It was no longer tranquil and quiescent. Despite the 
heavy-handed response by the police, the residents of Maokeng, led by the MDCC, protested 
rent increases, boycotted shops in town, and called for the dissolution of the City Council of 
Maokeng. Similarly, the residents of Brentpark, also took to the streets, protesting police 
aggression.  
 
The intensive defiance campaign in Kroonstad, particularly Maokeng, and the emergence of the 
“new” Three Million Gang can be traced back to the less spoken about but important South 
African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) strike. In 1989 SAMWU took on the City 
Council of Maokeng. The SAMWU web-page carries the profile of Mthandeki Nhlapo, the 
current General Secretary of SAMWU, and in it it is noted that in 1989 members of SAMWU, 
employed by the Maokeng Black Local Authority, “downed tools”.1689 Nhlapo had started 
working for the City Council of Maokeng in 1988, and immediately joined SAMWU.  The main 
reason for SAMWU’s action was to win recognition from the Council. This was important for 
SAMWU (and for all other unions), because it could then “negotiate and maintain an agreement 
that ensures workers’ rights ...”1690 In spite of SAMWU’s strike action, Nhlapo, in the same 
profile, asserts that by the end of 1989 “… we still had no recognition”.1691 Instead, the Council 
responded by dismissing all the members of SAMWU.
1692
 According to the SAMWU web-page, 
up to 1992 SAMWU had not been able to get the dismissed employees reinstated, in spite of the 
legal case instituted against the Council.
1693
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At the beginning of February 1990 the ‘community’ of Maokeng, led by the MDCC, had 
compiled a number of grievances against the Council. The Memorandum of Grievances put 
together by the Maokeng ‘community’ to the Council, read: 
  
We, the residents of the said community, would like to voice our concern about a lot of 
irregularities that are taking place in this place. These shall not go any longer without being 
challenged by ourselves. We wish to highlight that yours is a minority body and the damage it 
has caused to us is irreparable and our differences have reached a stage where they cannot be 
reconciled. As a result of this (sic) conditions we demand the following: 
 
1. The immediate and unconditional re-instatement of all dismissed workers 
2. An end to all exorbitant rents and electricity and an end to the coupon system 
3. An end to harassment of all people by your police 
4. An end to the lodger’s permit 
5. An end to bribery in the allocation of housing and business sites should be in areas 
that can be reached by the people 
6. The old-age people pay no more rent 
7. The unsuitability of the soil (sic) the present cemetery be looked into 
8. Your resignation with immediate effect1694 
 
The ‘community’ marched to the Council’s offices to hand over the memorandum of grievances. 
This demonstration caused the detention of some of the leaders of the MDCC on 8 February, 
under emergency regulations. The detained included Bloem, “Sakkie” Oliphant, Thami Phaliso, 
Daniel George, Thabo Modise and James Jani.
1695
 Recalling how he was detained, “Sakkie” 
Oliphant had this to say 
 
 Let me tell you, 12 o’clock at night I was in Brentpark, watching television and in  
the process falling asleep. I don’t know what made me to wake up and I saw a torch  
light through the window. And there were makhaukhau, as well. These were people  
who were brought from Lesotho to come and kill people in Kroonstad by the Council  
in Kroonstad.  I used to like body-building before I had an operation. I had my irons, 
which I lifted. I went to the door and had intended to open the door and smash one head, 
so that there could be blood. People would know that I wasn’t taken peacefully. Hey, I 
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held myself back … When I looked outside I realized they had come with many cars. 
There were hippos … They were surrounding my place just to arrest one person. When I 
went outside the whole neighbourhood was waiting outside. People said “You are not 
taking him anymore.” I said “It’s okay. So long as you’ve seen me, I’m safe”. I got to the 
police station, which is next to Pick ‘n Pay. When they brought me in I was alone, so I 
thought I was all alone. When I finally got into the cell I just sat without looking. Now 
‘Die Vos’ is blind. I sat next to him and touched him. He’s got this ability to immediately 
tell who was sitting next to him
1696
  
 
To force the authorities to release them, the MDCC leaders had planned that they were going to 
embarked on a hunger strike. “Sakkie” Oliphant remembers ‘De Vos’ telling him that it was 
agreed that they should refuse to eat. He continues 
 
 He went on e bile ha reje (We’re not going to eat their food). I couldn’t understand  
what he was saying. I asked him “What do you mean, Die Vos?” But I was careful that 
the police shouldn’t hear us. He said ee bare ha reje (Yes, they said we shouldn’t eat). I 
thought he was saying they were going to give us poisonous food. But the guy was saying 
they were going on hunger strike.  He started it. I mean, everyone who was arrested that 
night in Kroonstad knew that we were going on hunger strike. I was surprised that I was 
the only person who didn’t know about that plan. We ended up being there for three 
weeks. Then they took us to Bloemfontein, eh, at Grootvlei. Grootvlei is special in South 
Africa. Every hunger strike prisoner is taken there, because they have a special place 
where they treat prisoners who do not eat. We were there for five days
1697
  
 
Amidst the union’s legal battle with the Council, on 26 February 1990 SAMWU, in solidarity 
with the “community” of Maokeng, led by the MDCC, embarked on a protest march to the 
offices of the Council to demand, inter alia, the reinstatement of the dismissed workers, 
Koekoe’s resignation as the mayor of the township1698, and possibly the release of the detained 
leaders. The police shot and killed two youths.
1699
 Giving account of what transpired during this 
protest march, the Rev. Gozongo explains 
It [the march] started off one day, though I’m not sure of the dates … It was the very 
same march where people were shot. So the union mobilized municipal workers to 
organize a strike. On that fateful day I was on my way to town with Butana Khompela 
and as we drove past there were people at the … municipal offices, next to Mphohadi 
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[Teachers’ Training College]. I called Thami Phaliso and told him that the best thing was 
to go straight to the church, because the police were ready to take action any minute and 
would shoot them. Suddenly, there I was talking to Koekoe - I had a picture that we took 
together. Hey, my God! It was me, a certain Afrikaner guy, Phaliso standing right inside 
the yard with Koekoe. People demanded that he step down. He told them he wasn’t going 
anywhere. He refused to step down. There he was sniffing his snuff. I then told them to 
forget about Koekoe stepping down because he just wouldn’t. After Khompela and 
myself had left, because we advised Thami and the others to go to church, just as they 
were leaving the police started firing shots and about two of them died or got injured, I’m 
not sure...
1700
 
 
The police’s brutal response convinced Samuel Seakhela, a councillor, to resign his seat in the 
council. He argued that he was resigning because as a Christian he would not be party to the cold 
blooded killing of children in the township.
1701
  
 
In an effort to mount pressure against the Council, the Maokeng Civic Association (MCA), 
established after the merging of all the street committees in the township, led the residents in the 
call for the dissolution of the City Council of Maokeng (CCM). The MCA’s call was based on 
the Free State provincial administration’s investigation which found that the CCM was corrupt. 
The investigation concluded that: 
 
1. There was no proper financial administration; 
2. Strained relations existed among staff in the treasury department;  
3.  Records of expenditure were not kept; and  
4. There was rampant embezzlement of funds by councillors1702 
 
Koekeo dismissed these findings and the call for them to resign. He blamed outsiders and jealous 
elements. He argued “the trouble is not confined to Maokeng. Obviously there are elements from 
outside whose mission is to see us out of office. These elements hide behind political discontent 
when in fact they are plain jealous”.1703 In April the leaders of the MDCC were released1704and 
they wasted no time in organising 6 000 people to march to the mayor’s offices, and 1 500 of 
those to stage a sit-down outside the civic centre in Maokeng, demanding the resignation of 
mayor Koekoe and the council.
1705
 The police responded by firing teargas at the 
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demonstrators.
1706
 Pressure was mounting against the City Council of Maokeng and the 
councillors, particularly Koekoe. To quell the disturbances, on 10 May 1990 the police, hiding 
behind a truck belonging to a furniture shop, drove into the township and opened fire on the 
unsuspecting demonstrators killing two youths. This incident came to be known in the township 
and in the media as the ‘Trojan Horse’ killing.1707 However, this incident failed to cow black 
people in Kroonstad. Protests now spread to Brentpark. 
 
 
(Source: Weekly Mail, 18 to 24 May 1990) 
 
Brentpark had for a while been a ‘model’ township because of its tranquil and quiescence, but in 
August 1990 about 600 residents took to the streets protesting police heavy-handed response.
1708
 
The principal of Brentpark High School told the media that the residents of Brentpark were 
angry because the police had disrupted a sports meeting between the local high school and 
Botshabelo High School.
1709
 “Sakkie” Oliphant, the secretary of the ANC interim working 
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group, informed the media that the police disrupted the sports meeting between the two schools 
after a Kroonstad mother had reported to the police in Kroonstad that one of the students from 
Botshabelo had “hassled” her child on the bus to Kroonstad.1710 It is unlikely that the police 
really responded in a heavy-handed manner because of that minor incident. The reason for such a 
response could have been the presence of outsiders in Kroonstad who the police probably 
thought would agitate the locals in Brentpark to intensify the struggle already in the process in 
Maokeng.
1711
  
 
On the day the sports meeting was disrupted, the residents of Brentpark demanded that police 
should explain and apologise for their actions. The police agreed. But when the students arrived 
at the police station on 6 August for the apology they were met by heavily armed police. The 
latter dismissed the students and gave them five minutes to disperse.
1712
 The students responded 
by staying away from school. In the following week, about 100 residents of Brentpark marched 
to the Kroonstad police station in town to protest the police actions. The police, again, responded 
in a heavy-handed manner. They arrested four marchers, including House of Representatives 
Member for the Western Free State, Glen Rooskrans. In addition, they beat and chased the 
students away.
1713
 
   
It was at this stage when the City Council of Maokeng, for the first time after it had taken over 
the reins in 1984, felt directly challenged by certain members of the community or organizations 
within the community. It is possible that the Council or certain members of the Council sought 
protection from “Diwiti” and some of his friends. “Diwiti” had just been released from prison for 
his criminal activities. It would seem that during this period “Diwiti” was operating on his own.  
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George “Diwiti” Ramasimong (Source: Mrs Matshidiso Rantie) 
 
But because of his close relation with his younger sibling, Matsile, and some of the members of 
the defunct TMG, he was labelled a Three Million. The reason certain members of the 
‘community’ concluded that there was a connection between “Diwiti” in particular, and the 
Council was when the former (and his friends) abducted Mthandeki Nhlapo, a member of 
SAMWU, and interrogated him. Matube recounts 
  
Many people had lost their jobs in the municipality, because of Mr. Koekoe and his 
council. And now these people were fighting for their rights. And one of the people  
who helped Mr. Koekoe was “Diwiti's” sibling. His name is Buti. He helped him with 
protection from the Three Million; that the Three Million would instill fear in all the 
people that wanted to fight. People wanted to fight, that they should all go on strike. Now 
the Three Million would protect the workers there. And now there was this young man 
who worked at the municipality called Nhlapo. He was in the union, leading ... He was a 
Catholic. Yes, very strong. He told people at church what you are doing was right, fight 
for your rights. And he was leading the people who were on strike until such time 
“Diwiti” and his gang caught him, wanting to kill him. ... He told us, ‘Hey, man, it means 
the Lord is with me. I prayed all along after they had fetched me from my house and then 
they made sort of a circle and I was ... in the middle. They were saying 'Yes, we have 
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found the person that we have been looking for, you see. And, eh, at that time I was just 
quiet and praying. And “Diwiti” just looked at me and said 'Hey, man. Why do you do 
these things? And I replied and said 'I am a worker. I’m in that union because the 
municipality does not satisfy me. ... I’m not fighting your brother.  I’m not fighting 
anyone. I’m fighting with the one who hired me. I’m fighting with the municipality. I’m 
fighting for my rights!’  After that he kept quiet and they swore at him. Then “Diwiti” 
said ‘Let’s leave this dog. Go then’. He went away1714 
 
The suspicion that “Diwiti” and his friends were indeed protecting Koekoe and his Council was 
further fuelled when members of the ‘community’ saw “Diwiti” and his friends being transported 
by Koekoe’s kombis (mini-buses), which were taxis. Machabe Thulo testified during the TRC 
hearings in Kroonstad that the TMG and the Council collaborated on many occasions. He 
asserted “we would see that the mayor’s transport would be used by the TMG members to attack 
the ‘community’ of Maokeng.”1715 It is difficult to substantiate this claim without further 
evidence. However, the use of Council’s or councillors’ vehicles by members of gangs fighting 
‘progressive’ structures within communities was widespread.1716   
 
Another twist to this story is that it was also possible that “Diwiti” and his friends abducted 
Nhlapo for reasons other than intending to intimidate the opponents of the Council but because 
of personal reasons, especially on the part of “Diwiti”.  The latter could have seen Nhlapo as 
someone who wanted to cost his brothers their employment. Two of “Diwiti’s” siblings, Buti and 
Matsile, were employed by the Council at the time of the strike. When the strikers demanded that 
all the workers “down tools”, Buti reluctantly agreed and Matsile, who had been recently 
employed flatly refused. Mamorena Taje makes the following claim 
 
Matsile was working at the … municipality right here in Constantia. He was a  
clerk. Buti moved with it [the municipality office] from Seeisoville and came  
here [Constantia]. Buti was an [Assistant Town] manager then. So, there was  
that thing that they were having a strike … It was when our people (the  
community) had targeted Buti; that as soon as Buti participated in the strike, the  
office would collapse. And really they were able to talk to him. The thing is he’s  
too quiet. But I think he understood that thing. So, when we were shouting … he  
came outside … The whites would say ‘Ao, Ramasimong, even you, when we had  
so much trust in you? And the other one was in a ‘fix’ (dilemma). The youngest one, 
Matsile, didn’t want to strike because he had just started to work. They said, ntate,  
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there’s no other way. And he left. That was when they started the strike. Hey, I don’t 
remember this strike happened in 19 what. There were too many strikes
1717
 
 
Despite the appearance of “Diwiti” in the scene, at this stage there were no violent clashes 
reported in Maokeng. And similarly there is no evidence of retribution by the ‘comrade youth’ 
against “Diwiti” for his part in the abduction of Mthandeki.  This incident seems to have passed 
without making an impression on many activists. But the few who were aware of it would 
remember it later. To redeem himself, possibly in the eyes of those who suspected him, “Diwiti” 
joined SAYCO and participated in its activities.   
 
In 1990 the Regional Services Council (RCS) seemingly urged the Kroonstad Town Council 
(KTC) to grant the City Council of Maokeng access to more resources at its disposal.
1718
 These 
included electricity and water. But these came at a price. When the residents of Maokeng refused 
to pay the rent increase, the KTC switched off electricity and cut water supply to the township. 
The MDCC reacted by intensifying the consumer and rent boycotts in Maokeng. For instance, 
newspapers reported that the consumer boycott called after the withdrawal of services from 
Maokeng had hit white traders in Kroonstad: “Shops in the white town were deserted and no 
blacks have patronized them following the start of an indefinite boycott on Monday.”1719 
There were different reactions to this boycott. No doubt the majority of the residents of the 
township supported it, but after a while also felt its effect. The residents had to walk about four 
or five kilometers to the nearest garage to draw water.
1720
 Even though some of the members of 
the MDCC made efforts to provide members of the community with water, and reconnected the 
electricity illegally, the Council switched it off again.
1721
 This action inconvenienced many 
people.  
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Maokeng residents waiting for water (Source: City Press, 11 November 1990) 
The ‘community’ of Maokeng continued living without electricity until the Ministers’ Fraternal 
met and discussed the issue and a committee was appointed to negotiate with the Council to 
reinstate the services. Matube, who was part of the committee, recalls 
The committee was Father [Gabriel] Setiloane, Modisanyane Lewele and I, Alfred 
Matube, and Thebe Motshwedi, and Ms. Hleli. It was chosen at the MDCC and AF 
meeting. The MDCC walked out of the meeting, because it wanted to continue with  
this thing of fighting the councillors.  ... We met with Mr. Koekoe and the boers in town 
so that the people could have lights again and be able to pay. We called the people to the 
stadium and we spoke to them. And then people agreed that they would pay. And we 
showed Mr. Koekoe that right now it would not work that you were asking people to pay 
in that way. Let them pay a flat rate. At least, they would be paying. And we said to the 
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people ‘We would leave them to go and pay’. ... The people started paying, and got 
electricity and water
1722
  
 
White traders, on the other hand, reacted by threatening to boycott paying rent and services if the 
Kroonstad Town Council did not resolve the matter urgently. Greg Papapanos, shopkeepers’ 
representative, was quoted as saying “we feel the boycott is hitting the white traders very hard. 
We have had a heavy drop in sales ranging between 30 and 90 per cent. If a solution cannot be 
found soon and things continue at this rate we will have no option but to urge all white traders to 
stop paying for water and electricity.”1723 It is possible that this threat by the white traders 
contributed to the Kroonstad Town Council’s agreeing to the flat rate payment by the residents 
of Maokeng. 
 
The pressure exerted by the residents forced the City Council of Maokeng finally to seriously 
deal with the demands tabled by the MDCC earlier in the year. According to the Minutes of the 
City Council of Maokeng, almost all the demands by the residents, compiled in the memorandum 
by the MDCC sent to the Council earlier in the year, were met. For example, on the dismissal 
and reinstatement of municipality workers the Council agreed to the MDCC suggestion that the 
matter should be settled out of court; on the issue of electricity tariffs, the MDCC had 
complained about the discrepancies vis-a-vis the rates as published in the Government Gazette 
and also with the exorbitant amounts charged, and the Council agreed to redress the errors; on 
the issue of lodger’s permits, the Council’s response was that these charges were illegal; it gave a 
similar response to the issue of unfair allocation of business sites.
1724
 
 
It was during this period, in November 1990, that newspaper reports first appeared with the 
headline: ‘Gang’s bloody reign in OFS’, referring to the “new” TMG.1725 However, six months 
earlier violent clashes had erupted between AZAPO and the ANC in Maokeng. The ANC’s 
Stoffel Mofokeng was reported to have claimed that “the strife began on the 25 May when 
AZAPO supporters expressed anger at not being allowed to participate in a night vigil held for 
two students shot dead during unrests.”1726 The clash between AZAPO and the ANC left seven 
people injured from both sides and one AZAPO supporter dead, Michael Lekitlane.
1727
 Paseka 
Mpondo, Oupa Mokotla and Phankhe Mbona remember 
  
                                                          
1722
 Interview with Matube (Italics my emphasis) 
1723
 City Press, 18 November 1990 (Italics my emphasis) 
1724
 City Council of Maokeng, 75
th
 Ordinary Meeting Minutes, held in the Council Chambers, Maokeng, 27 
September 1990 
1725
 City Press, 11 November 1990 
1726
 The Cape Times, 29 May 1990 (Italics my emphasis) 
1727
 The Cape Times, 4 June 1990 
372 
 
Before the Three Million, we had a fight with AZAPO. But it was resolved by the 
leaders. Walter Sisulu came to Maokeng to resolve the conflict between us and AZAPO. 
The conflict started in this way. Our two comrades were shot. But at that time when a 
person was killed we never said he belonged to the ANC or that organisation. He 
belonged to the community. As the liberation movements in Maokeng, we worked  
hand-in-hand so that we could bury the comrade. Now, we had two funerals: one was 
next to Boiteko [School] and the other one was in the 16s… next to Kananelo [Secondary 
School]. Then AZAPO said …They used to call us ‘Mavarara’. They believed that they 
were Socialists and we were the ‘Vararas’. We were negotiating and they didn’t negotiate 
… Because if you remember 1990 -CODESA [Convention for Democratic South Africa] 
had started…So, this conflict became intense after they said that. They complained that 
we as ‘Mavarara’ wanted to take charge of every funeral in the community and that 
person who stayed in the 16s was a member of AZAPO. The conflict started in the 16s. 
We went to Boiteko so that we could reinforce our comrades. Then, Saturday morning, 
we went to the cemetery … When we came back from the cemetery, the other boys from 
AZAPO were hiding in the veld and some of our comrades were stabbed. I remember one 
of our comrades was stabbed by comrade Radu … Some of them carried shovels and 
other dangerous weapons to attack us
1728
 
 
Violent clashes between AZAPO (‘Zim-zims’) and the ANC (‘Mavarara’) were widespread.1729 
For example, in Bekkersdal Township, in the West Rand, clashes between the UDF and AZAPO 
began in the mid-1980s. At this stage Bekkersdal was already an AZAPO stronghold.
1730
 But this 
conflict intensified at the beginning of 1990 following the ANC’s decision to negotiate with the 
government. Members of AZAPO interpreted this as tantamount to ‘selling-out’. Mathole 
Maboe, who was part of the SDUs which fought against the ‘Zim-zims’, recalls  
 
The other thing that caused tension between BEYCO and AZASM was that  
AZASM said: ‘Amavarara aya negotiator’ (the Varara’s are negotiating). In  
fact, they sung a song that goes like that … They taunted us in that way1731 
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In Maokeng what caused the escalation of the conflict between the ANC and AZAPO was the 
allegation that AZAPO collaborated with the TMG. Molefe Papi Matie, the leader of the Azanian 
Student Movement (AZASM) at Kananelo Secondary in the early 1990s, refutes this allegation. 
According to him, this rumour started after the older members of AZAPO moved from the Old 
Location to Troubou. He explains     
 
Now if you can still remember some of the residents of the Old Location were paid 
money to vacate their homes and many of them relocated to sections like Gelukwaarts 
and Troubou. It so happened that some of the older members of AZAPO were now 
residing in Troubou where the TMG had established its base. So during the so-called 
‘black-on-black’ violence whenever a member of AZAPO or AZASM visited their 
relatives in Troubou they would be labeled the TMG
1732
  
In spite of this, Matie concedes that some of their ill-disciplined members joined the TMG. He 
observes  
 But there were those who had always been troublemakers within the organization  
who were happy for the continuation of this violence because as thugs they were 
benefitting. Those [we]re the people who were former members of AZASM
1733
 
  
As in the previous occasions, the Ministers’ Fraternal intervened to resolve the conflict between 
AZAPO and the ANC in Maokeng. Matube, a member of the Ministers’ Fraternal, felt 
particularly obliged to broker peace between the two organisations because the leading figures 
(or victims) in the clash were members of Roman Catholic Church. He explains 
  
It happened then that there was a battle between AZAPO ...  and the ANC ... Others  
got stabbed and went to hospitals. They were in the ANC: it was Koma, Tshepiso 
Moeketsi, and Seele. And only to find that the people that were in the forefront in this 
fighting ... were Catholics in AZAPO and in the ANC. Because in AZAPO it was ...  
Who is this boy? It was Ou Kop Seleke ...  You see, as the [Roman] Catholic Church,  
we also had to intervene between these children ... Most of the members of AZAPO  
when the fighting started, they had established a camp. We had to go to AZAPO to speak 
to them. I did that. Eh, I was representing the church by going to talk to Hector Matie, 
Seele, and some members of AZAPO. When I got to them I showed them that, truly 
                                                          
1732
 Interview with Molefe Papi Matie by Mpopetsi Dhlamini, for the SADET Oral History Project, Maokeng, 8 May 
2011 
1733
 Ibid.; see also interview with Molefe Mogorosi by Mpopetsi Dhlamini, for the SADET Oral History Project, 
Maokeng, 6 May 2011 
 
374 
 
speaking, we have all been fighting for our freedom – together. Now we identified, eh, 
what is this thing that made us not to be together; things that made us not to feel free and 
to be happy when I’m with you. But all this time we were able to be one, even though 
you secretly knew I’m AZAPO, I’m ANC.  This other group would identify it and this 
one would identify it, and say 'if we live these things as they are to go on, it would be the 
end result in the church, in our homes. We would kill each other and so on.  Do we want 
to kill each other?' No!  So, what should we do?  What could we do to end this? There 
were meetings and talks. And as a result, because we spoke to this grouping of Catholics 
who were there, we reported this to the Ministers’ Fraternal and the Ministers’ Fraternal 
then called [Pandelane] Nefolovhodwe and ... Mr. [Walter] Sisulu to come here
1734
  
 
Sisulu (ANC) and Nefholovhodwe (AZAPO) addressed the joint meeting of the two 
organizations held at Seeisoville stadium. Sisulu explained to the large crowd in attendance that 
the “… ANC’s one duty as a liberation movement was to create everlasting unity and build a 
nation.”1735 Echoing Sisulu’s remarks, Nefholovhodwe said “AZAPO and the BCM took 
cognizance of other liberation forces …”1736  
 
 
From L to R: Thabo Modise, Khahliso Moeketsi, Paseka Nceleni, Mamokhele Sebetoane, Stoffel 
Mofokeng and Thami Phaliso (Source: Mamokhele Sebetoane) 
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Towards the end of 1990, the “new” TMG had fully emerged. Almost all my interviewees 
contribute this to the affair between Daniel George and “Diwiti’s” wife, Alice Lesole. A few, 
however, viewed it differently. They argue that the affair was an excuse for the reign of terror by 
the “new” TMG. The latter, they contend, was used by the “system” to destabilize the 
progressive organizations in their opposition against the City Council of Maokeng and the 
apartheid regime in general.    
 
As we have seen, after he was released from prison, “Diwiti” was recruited by members of 
Maokeng Youth Congress (MAYCO), which later changed to SAYCO Maokeng branch. Just 
about the time he joined SAYCO he found employment at the JCI, a steel-manufacturing 
company in Kroonstad. Mamorena Taje claims that when “Diwiti” started working at the JCI he 
“recruited fellow workers at JCI to join trade unions. The JCI workers held meetings at 
“Diwiti’s” house in Seeisoville”.1737 Similarly, he opened his house to his ‘comrades’ in SAYCO 
to stay in and even to hide their weapons. Mpondo, Mokotla and Mbona, former members of 
Tsekelekwas (or Tsekele, in short) recall that “Diwiti” before he revived the TMG (although by 
association was believed to be a member of the original TMG) he was a member of the 
‘progressive’ organization. They explain  
  
... We got involved [in trying to resolve the fighting between the TMG and Canadians)  
to such an extent that some of their leaders, especially the Three Million, became close  
to us until were converted to be ‘comrades’, especially the leader of the Three Million, 
which was “Diwiti”. He worked at the JCI, and became the shop steward in that 
company. It was manufacturing steel. That’s where they used to make weapons for the 
Three Million. He became a ‘comrade’. Then their fight with the Canadians stopped for  
a while
1738
 
 
This view was supported by Thulo, when he added 
 After we took the Caterpillars that belonged to the municipality, the boers decided  
to punish me, because I was the one who led that campaign. I was sentenced to  
eighteen months in prison, subject to a fine. When some of the comrades were busy 
raising that money … comrades happened to kill a policeman. At the time buses used  
to transport people here. Within (Amongst) those comrades there was this guy named 
George “Diwiti”. That’s where the mess started. They killed a policeman at Last Stop in 
Phomolong. And after that they camped at “Diwiti’s” house. In fact, it was his parents’ 
house in Seeisoville.  His mother was working at the hospital and she bought a house in 
‘Selection Park’/Gelukwaarts. They left him in that house.  He had just come back from 
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prison, and his brother Buti Ramasimong asked us to incorporate him into the 
organisation so that he could be rehabilitated. But a thug will always be a thug, ntate
1739
 
 
It is not clear what prompted “Diwiti” to kill the two policemen and disarm them. It is possible, 
however, that he wanted the guns for protection against the remaining members of the 
Canadians, or even to use them for his personal gains.  
After “Diwiti” was stabbed at Mametsi’s tavern, he relocated to Gelukwaarts, where he 
recuperated under the care of his mother. Taje remembers: “After he had been stabbed with a 
knife, obviously, he couldn’t return to his house. His mother was supposed to come and take care 
of him. That’s how he came to live here at [Gelukwaarts].”1740 Gelukwaarts is opposite Troubou, 
which later became the “new” TMG’s stronghold. Troubou was turned into a ‘no-go zone’ for 
anyone perceived to be anti-TMG for over a year.  
 
 
Ramodikoe George “Diwiti” Ramasimong (Source: Mamorena Taje) 
 
In another interview with Mamorena Taje, she explained how Troubou
1741
 became the “new” 
TMG’s base. In her words  
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While staying at his mother’s place in Gelukwaarts, “Diwiti” would go to Troubou to 
drink at Pro’s or Bazooka’s taverns. It is possible that some of his friends also joined  
him. When the TMK (Tien Manne Kraag) and Tsekelekwas started attacking Troubou, 
the residents of Troubou, who were mostly elderly people, fled the area and “Diwiti” and 
his gang occupied the vacant houses. Troubou was from then on turned into the Three 
Million stronghold”1742 
 
It is not clear when “Diwiti” heard about the affair his wife was having with one of his 
‘comrades’, Daniel George. But after learning about it he attempted to have George charged and 
disciplined by SAYCO – because this was the norm.  Taje recalls that “Diwiti” forced her to 
accompany him to meet with the Rev. Gozongo, who was then the chairperson of the ANC 
branch in Kroonstad. “Diwiti” went to Gozongo to complain about blatant inconsistencies 
practised by the ‘comrades’. Taje explains  
 
He said I’m hurting reverend. These comrades … that we support. You’re also giving 
them church and I put them up in my home are having an affair with my wife. When I  
try talking to them they fight me, ntate moruti (Reverend). Do I have to be killed for her, 
ntate moruti? No! He said, listen, ntate moruti, they always go around disciplining (i.e. 
beating) people saying they have “taken” other people’s wives. It seems as if he had 
approached Makhanda [Ditseki Moeketsi] in the afternoon, saying they should go beat  
up George because they are always out beating people. They refused, saying he was a 
‘comrade’. He then asked why they were taking sides when they were supposed to go  
and … call George to order?  He asked ‘Am I not a human being? How many times have 
they left Kine [MDCC’s headquarters], running around beating people up1743  
 
Gozongo concurs, and went further to explain that he then suggested to “Diwiti” that a meeting 
should be called where all the affected parties would be present to discuss this issues and, 
possibly, also to try to resolve it. He remarks  
 He came to me first to report the matter about finding Daniel [George] with his woman 
 and that he had stabbed his woman … and he thought the woman was dead! I asked 
 him if he really killed a person and he said “Yes, I killed her ntate Moruti. I killed her”. 
 He then took out his knife to show me and I got such a fright. His eyes were scary and 
 wide open. He had the word monster written all over his face. He also brought with him  
a bottle of beer and offered me to drink. … I drank just a bit and gave it back to him. 
 After we had spoken, I asked him what he thought the resolution could be? He told me 
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 that the ANC youth also intervened. I promised him I would arrange a meeting with 
 Dennis and them. And we did
1744
 
 
The scheduled meeting was held on Monday evening at the Rev. Gozongo’s Presbyterian 
Church. The meeting failed to achieve its objective; it ended disastrously. Taje recalls    
… we went to that meeting on that Monday at Gozongo’s place ... You see, when we  
got inside the church, he went to meet with the priest first. I think when he met with  
the priest he said ‘Ntate moruti, please pray for me. Now what was happening inside  
the church, hey, people were carrying weapons … Dennis [Bloem] then came inside.  
The priest and “Diwiti” came in after Dennis … “Diwiti” really cried … I don’t  
like recalling that day. If that meeting had convened, there would have been nothing  
that had taken place in Kroonstad. So, they didn’t want to hold the meeting. The priest  
… tried to explain to us what was going on … Oh, Dennis started. … Makhanda jumped 
up and Papi Sechele … the one of COSATU, who works at Kine … When they jumped 
up, you wouldn’t believe the weapons I saw there. I saw too many weapons in that 
church. At that time “Diwiti” didn’t have any weapon. He came with me and Buti. And I 
think with four friends
1745
 
 
Mpondo, Mokotla and Mbona remember the meeting differently. They observe 
 
 That day we were practising cast (drama). We were not even aware that something  
had happened the previous night; people were stabbed. We saw a lot of comrades  
and we thought that there was going to be a meeting.  After that then came the Three 
Million. They came in a 1400 bakkie that belonged to “Diwiti’”s brother… Buti. After 
the cast we found those boys waiting for us. They were wearing their chiffons…They 
were red. So, when we got there comrade Bloem was there. Reverend Gozongo was also 
there, and other members of leadership at that time. Truly speaking, when our comrades 
got there the Three Million were already there. … Our comrades arrived later. So, there 
was disagreement in the hall to such an extent that our comrades decided to leave the 
hall, because the negotiations had reached a state where it was no longer possible to 
maintain order. The Three Million were fighting because they felt we were protecting 
George because he was one of our leaders….because he was one of our comrades1746 
 
And recalling this meeting, Bloem, testifying at the TRC hearing in Kroonstad, remarked 
 … “Diwiti” came to me and said that he wanted this thing to be resolved. He wanted to 
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 tell the ANCYL’s members what had happened and to sort it out. I convened a meeting 
 with Reverend Gozongo, with the Three Million and the Youth League. … We’d just 
 started with the meeting when some of the Youth League members said they … did not 
 want to talk to a murderer such as “Diwiti”. … I pleaded with them. I told them for the 
 sake of peace in Kroonstad we simply had to talk and I noticed that the situation was  
 becoming extremely tense and I said to “Diwiti” that we should rather move away from 
 the church, because I did not want to see any blood in a church. Reverend Gozongo also 
spoke to these people … I got into my car, “Diwiti” also got into my car, his sister 
Florence (Mamorena Taje) got into my car, and one other person, Stoffel Mofokeng also 
got into my car. We drove out of the church yard ... to Brentpark
1747
 
 
Former members of the ANCYL in Kroonstad I interviewed argued that the reason they strongly 
felt it was unnecessary to meet and discuss with “Diwiti” was because, before he attempted to 
resolve this issue through dialogue, he had taken law into his own hands and went on a rampage, 
together with some of his friends, killing and maiming everyone associated with the Youth 
League.
1748
 Mpondo, Mokotla and Mbona remembered the turn of events as follows 
Oupa Mokotla (OM): We had recruited “Diwiti”. He was now part of our organisation. While he 
was in our organisation, we had two deaths (referring to the two policemen), isn’t? You were in 
the same bus with “Diwiti”. You went to Steynsrus. 
Paseka Mpondo (PM): Yes, I went there with him. 
OM: We had split ourselves. I went to Parys. I was in Tumahole. After you came back, we heard 
that there was a clash, because one of our comrades had slept with… 
PM: With “Diwiti’s” wife. Eh, but that thing didn’t happen while we were still in Steynsrus. 
“Diwiti” discovered that after we came back from Steynsrus. What happened is that he went 
back to his gang so that he could attack comrade George. But the wrong thing he did was that he 
didn’t go straight to the relevant person; the person he said did that thing. Do you understand? 
Whenever he went to look for him, he vandalised and stabbed other comrades.  
OM: Let me add something. 
PM: Yes, you can add. 
OM: After we became aware of that thing, we approached one pastor… 
PM: Ya, but that’s what I was getting at comrade.  
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OM: Oho [okay]. 
PM: You were quick to rush me. I was still outlining the whole process, what exactly happened 
until the point we approached the ‘comrade’.  Remember this thing happened at night. We came 
back. Then in the morning we heard that “Diwiti” had attacked other people. He even stabbed 
comrade Tshepiso Mpotle, the one who is singing [gospel] today.  
OM: Sure. He fled after that, only to discover that he has talent [in Johannesburg]. 
PM: Then we questioned comrade “Diwiti” why was he stabbing innocent people, when he was 
fighting comrade George? Now, he was applying gang tactics. He stabbed every person he came 
across. Then the conflict started from that point. But now our leaders tried to resolve that.  That’s 
where comrade Gozongo became involved …1749 
Daniel George recalls that “Diwiti” (or his friends) went around the township looking for him. 
Finally, they found him in a tavern but left him unharmed. They, instead, went around the 
township attacking innocent people. George recalls  
It was around September in 1990, there was a rally of NEHAWU (National Education, 
Health and Allied Workers Union) … the organization of the health workers. It was held 
in Seeisoville. So after the rally the Three Million Gang … Well, I was not even aware of 
the Three Million Gang. I was the then Organizing Secretary of SAYCO. Then I was 
called outside but my conscience said to me ‘don’t go outside’. It’s a sheeben there. I  
was busy drinking my beer. I knew their leader … They left. Somewhere along the road 
they stabbed one of our comrades …  But then in Phomolong when the report came was 
that George has been killed, that’s myself. After some 45 minutes comrades came in 
rushing … and asking where’s George? I went out and said ‘hey, ke nna ona (here I am). 
They said ‘someone said you had just been killed’. I said ‘no, I am still alive’1750 
 
After the failed meeting at the Rev. Gozongo’s church, “Diwiti” is said to have canvassed the 
support of the taxi drivers in Maokeng. Mamorena claims that after spending a couple of days 
hiding at Bloem’s house, in Brentpark, “Diwiti” decided to return to Maokeng and approached 
the taxi drivers to clarify the situation between himself and the ‘comrades’. She explains 
We slept at Dennis’ place. I think on the fourth day “Diwiti” said ‘Dennis, no man,  
you said Peter Mokaba, you said so and so [were coming]. You’ve been going  
wherever and leaving us here. Hey monna (man), I am not a coward. You’ve put me  
here as though I’m a fugitive. Where’s my mother? And those people (comrades) are 
 just fighting people; people are dying. He left us scared there. Only to find that he  
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was going to call taxi drivers. Now this thing was taking another turn; it was becoming  
bad. Then I was back at my home. I was shocked to see so many people converging  
there at the [taxi rank]. What’s going on? People were commenting ‘Hey, you should  
see what “Diwiti” has done at the taxi rank. He had called the Kroonstad taxis  
and converged them at “Beirut”, because they (‘comrades’) were involving taxis to  
fight us. He summoned people and made them aware that when they say the  
Three Million, they mean me. And let me tell you what’s going on’. He told them.  
And that’s why you could see that those people (taxis drivers) were divided. Others  
sided with one group and the others with the other group. People said Haai (No), you’ve  
been saying this person is merciless, killing people, only to find that you have taken  
this person’s wife and you don’t want to listen to him’. That’s how that thing was1751 
 
It is not clear why “Diwiti” approached the taxi drivers, but it is possible it was because he had 
calculated that without winning, at least some of them over, his movement to and from work 
(and town generally) would be seriously restricted. Indeed, this strategy won him some support 
and sympathy from some of the taxi drivers.
1752
 Later the ‘comrades’ were faced with a 
mammoth task to convince some of the members of community to win them back to their side.  
 
Meshack, M. Khosa writes “the phenomenon of black taxis can be traced to the turn of the 
century”.1753 Although, it took a long time for the black taxi industry to take off, because of 
discriminatory policies implemented through, for example, the Motor Carrier Transport Act of 
1930,
1754
throughout the 1940s and 1950s African entrepreneurs were subject to a complex 
network of legal restrictions controlling the location, size and types of business they could 
undertake in urban areas.
1755
 According to Khosa, “a major turning point in the fortune of black 
taxi industry occurred in 1978 when, with the advent of the Kombi, taxis were allowed to carry 
up to eight passengers instead of the previous maximum of four”.1756 In the late-1980s the 
industry was fully in motion. More licenses were granted. In 1986/87, for example, the number 
of Kombi taxi licenses issued rose dramatically from 7 093 to 34 378.
1757
 Inevitably this situation 
led to vigorous competition between the taxi operators for routes, ranks, and most importantly 
passengers. In light of this, it is probable that some of the taxi operators in Maokeng felt that 
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siding with one of the warring factions would benefit them in terms of the volume of passengers 
that would use their taxis (but also their taxis would be protected). For instance, people living in 
the area which was later to be occupied by the TMG would use taxis exclusively belonging to the 
operators who supported the TMG and vice versa.
1758
     
  
“Diwiti’s” alleged erratic behavior, indiscriminate attacks on innocent people caused some of the 
‘comrade youth’ to believe that there was more to “Diwiti’s” sudden change of behavior than the 
affair between his wife and George. Their suspicions were further raised by “Diwiti’s” modus 
operandi. He (and his friends) were not attacking George but were attacking other ‘comrades’. 
George claims that he was instructed by the leadership to ‘keep a low profile’ and never to attend 
meetings.
1759
 Not long after he fled Maokeng. Antjie Krog, in her recently published book 
Begging to be Black, writing about the  incident involving George and “Diwiti”, notes that 
Mishack (Daniel George) pitched up at her front door one evening, disguised, and requested her 
to offer him a lift out of Kroonstad and R50. He was on the run because “The Wheetie wanted to 
kill him, because he caught him with his wife.
1760
 This probably explains why he was never 
attacked by “Diwiti” and his friends.  
 
Still “Diwiti’s” behavior concerned some of the ‘comrade youth’. They concluded that “Diwiti” 
was being used by the police, in particular (and the ‘system’ in general). Sebetoane explains    
Some of us were asking ourselves questions that: ‘He is not the first guy to be ‘dumped’ 
for another guy and does it mean that the whole world should die for that thing, because 
so and so took his girlfriend?’ You know, at that time we were trying to talk some sense 
into those people who strongly felt that the Three Million Gang was justified ... We had 
to convince people that this thing was larger than what they had thought it was. It was not 
about so and so took so and so’s girlfriend and, therefore, people should die. It’s not 
about that. No, no. The way we understood it, it involved the police
1761
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“Diwiti” and Alice on their wedding day, flanked by Mamorena and a family friend 
(Source: Mamorena Taje) 
 
Similarly, Thulo recalls that after his fine had been paid and he was released from prison, he questioned 
“Diwiti’s” actions. In his words 
I had one question for George, that’s “Diwiti”. I said ‘Chief, you can’t. I understand that 
it is painful to find out that someone is sleeping with your wife. But why didn’t you take 
George [Daniel] to the disciplinary hearing of the organisation so that the organisation 
could deal with this thing?  Then he responded “No, I don’t want to listen to what you are 
saying. I’m killing now.  I’m going to kill everyone and everything I come across, be a 
dog or cat”.  I told him that he won’t do it while I’m still here. And he said he would do 
it
1762
 
 
However, it was Tebello “Blakie” Tumisi who offered a more convincing argument for the 
‘comrade youth’s’ suspicions. He recalled that he was approached by one of “Diwiti’s” friends, 
who informed him that “Diwiti” was planning to form a gang that would harass and attack the 
‘comrades’. This, for him, was enough reason to conclude that “Diwiti” was working for the 
‘system’. He takes up the story 
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 I think it was around June in 1990. ‘Five’, who was a thug, came to me and told me that 
 “Diwiti” wanted to organize them so that they could fight the ‘comrades’. After that  
“Diwiti” joined the Youth League. After joining, the first thing they did was to kill two 
policemen. They stopped the bus and killed two policemen. They stabbed them and  
took their guns. … One day I was home, sick. These people had an argument with 
George [Daniel] on Saturday. Or was it Sunday? I can’t remember now. That week- 
end my car was used by my wife. When they fetched me on Monday, it was “Diwiti” 
and “Five”. They said they wanted George. I was rude to them. I said Voetsek (go away), 
you silly boys. Go away. “Diwiti” said ‘Simon told us to look for George here. You were 
driving around with him in your car, with your wife
1763
 
 
Tumisi’s rude attitude failed to deter “Diwiti” and his friends. They forced him into his car and 
drove with him around the township, searching for George. While driving around with “Diwiti” 
and his friends, Tumisi’s suspicion was confirmed when they met the police and the latter were 
unperturbed by “Diwiti’s” actions. Instead, they encouraged him and his friends to carry on with 
their task. Tumisi continues 
  
We left that place Troubou. When we approached Ramotsoela [Secondary School] 
there was a white kombi parked next to the T-junction. They told me I was going to  
stop there. When we got there, I found that it was Ranthololo, he was a Detective, and 
another guy. They asked me to stop the car, and I did. … “Diwiti” opened the window to 
talk to Ranthololo.  He told him that they couldn’t find Mohapi’s gun. He was one of the 
policemen that they had killed in the bus. The other one was Ndweng. And he said ‘I 
won’t give up until I find it today. Here is Blackie. I took him’. Ranthololo said “Hey, 
Blackie, where is the soft drink?” I said “Come, you will get it at the bottle store”. I was 
only trying to get protection. He was laughing. It was painful. We were all going to 
Bonki’s house. It was number 475, that side of the tarred road. ‘George was there’, 
“Diwiti” said. We stopped there. … They got off the car and rushed into the house with 
their knives. They were going to surround the house. Now, they told Bizza to bring me to 
the house. He had a bottle store around here. He told me to hurry up. I was so glad.  The 
time I realised I was in the middle of the yard I went back. I had planned to punch him 
[Bizza]. But he didn’t follow me. I went inside the car and he went to tell the others that I 
had ran away. As they were coming to me, I started the ignition of my car and drove 
away.  I didn’t even put my foot on anything, but the car was moving. The doors closed 
by themselves, and I told myself that they would never see me again (laughs). That’s 
when I met Dennis [Bloem] and others
1764
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Thulo concurs with Tumisi, but went on to claim that “Diwiti” and his friends were arrested for 
murdering the two policemen. However, “Diwiti” was not charged for this horrendous act. He 
was, instead, charged and sentenced for a minor offence – one not related to the murder. For 
Thulo, this was when the police won “Diwiti” over to their side and used him against the 
‘comrades’. He remembers the story as told to him 
  
After they were arrested for killing the policemen, they went to his house. There was 
dagga in his house.  It was now sort of a camp. ... They had pictures of naked people. 
And at that time, I don’t know now – I haven’t checked the law - it was a criminal 
offence to be in possession of pictures of naked people ... pornography. They were 
charged with the murder of the policemen. They put them in different cells so that they 
could get information from them.  I was not there. I was serving the eighteen months, 
while Dithebe and others were struggling to raise the money [for my fine].  When the 
comrades were charged with murder, “Diwiti” was bribed. They were telling him that in 
the entire country, the government was dealing with the political situation because the 
ANC was going to take over. In KwaZulu Natal, we’re using MaZulu (AmaZulu), in 
Gauteng and elsewhere there were not many Zulus, like here in the Free State. Normally 
we form gangs which are going to fight against activists, so that they could disturb the 
programme of the struggle. So, we’re not going to charge you, even though we know that 
you are a thug. In fact, we’re not going to charge you for the murder but we’d charge you 
for pornography and dagga’. They told him that he must identify the guys that were 
militant, who were implicated in that murder case. They were not going to be charged, 
but they had to join him in his gang. That’s how the Three Million started1765 
 
 
                                                          
1765
 Interview with Thulo 
 
 
386 
 
 
Back row L-R: Matsile Ramasimong (2
nd
), Lengoma (3
rd
), Monki (4
th
) and Ndade (7
th
) 
Mid-row L-R: Samuel Taka (2
nd
), Sengwangwa (3
rd
) Matheus (7
th
), Patrick “Pabo” Sethibe(8th),  
and Ramokgolo (9
th
) 
Front row L-R: Thabo “Matekwane” (1st), “Diwiti” Ramasimong (6th), and “Machangane” (8th)  
(Source: Bethuel Thekiswe) 
 
Even though it is difficult to substantiate Thulo’s claim, there is, however, enough evidence to 
prove that some of the members of the police force were involved in perpetuating political 
violence in many townships in the 1990s by colluding or assisting the opponents of the liberation 
movements, especially of the ANC. In a revealing account of how the police assisted the IFP, 
Daluxolo Luthuli, a former member of MK who had joined the IFP in the mid-1980s, narrates 
how after joining the IFP, he was given the responsibility of assisting with the training of the 
supporters of the IFP at the Caprivi Strip, in the northern part of the then South West Africa 
(today’s Namibia). Some of the trained supporters of Inkatha, on completion of their training, 
were integrated into the KwaZulu Police Force. The latter, according to Luthuli, took part (or 
aided) in attacks directed at the supporters of the UDF/ANC. He recalled an occasion when a 
trained Caprivian, who was also a member of the KwaZulu Police, was instructed to direct 
attacks against the ANC. According to him, “In 1991 … Caprivian, Gcina Brian Mkhizi, who 
was with the KwaZulu Police’s Esikhawini Riot Unit, was told, in a meeting, that the time has 
arrived to use the skills he had acquired at Caprivi. The plan was for him to work with the 
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Inkatha Youth Brigade and direct attacks on ANC-dominated areas. The meeting, Luthuli, 
asserts, was attended by various IFP notables.
1766
  
 
Similarly, Allister Sparks writes about Father Tim Smith, a Roman Catholic Church priest at a 
mission station in Natal Midlands, who witnessed blatant police collusion with the IFP on New 
Year’s Day, 1988. Relating the incident to Sparks, Father Smith said he personally called in the 
riot police to prevent a mob of Inkatha supporters from attacking a UDF settlement after a rally. 
“They did not”, he said, “instead they assisted the attackers in searching the UDF area, after 
which a young boy, Mkhithiza Ndlovu, was arrested and handed over to Inkatha for the night. 
His blood-stained body was found next to the road the following day.”1767  
Police involvement was not exclusive to the Natal and KwaZulu areas. In Boipatong, in the Vaal 
Triangle, residents alleged police involvement in political violence. They alleged that police 
stood by and watched while more than 300 armed attackers from the KwaMadala hostel attacked 
residents of Boipatong, leaving one man dead. More worryingly for the residents was when they 
witnessed the police, driving in three Hippos and a white minibus, and shining a spotlight on the 
attackers and drove behind them as they were marching and back to the hostel.
1768
 
In Kroonstad, the local branch of the ANC blamed the police for siding with the TMG.
1769
This 
view was supported in a letter to the editor by a concerned policeman from Kroonstad, who 
wrote, in part, “I am a member of the SAP, working in Kroonstad. I am really horrified by the 
Maokeng SAP associating themselves with thugs in the location.”1770 Another member of the 
SAP in Kroonstad, Mkhululekile Petros Mzosane, was dismissed from the SAP because he was 
suspected of being anti-TMG. Testifying before the TRC Hearing in Welkom, Mzosane related 
to the Commission how the members of the TMG were protected by the police. He said 
 When they had to attend court there would be specific instructions from the Station 
 Commander that they were … supposed to be transported in police vans and when- 
ever they came back from court. They were actually safeguarded by the police. And  
I did not collude with what they were doing. I was questioning the police behavior 
towards the Three Million Gang
1771
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Because of this tension developed between him and the Station Commander, Captain Ramosita, 
who asked him “whether he wanted to be a police officer or a community worker”. The Station 
Commander then threatened to have him expelled from the police force.
1772
 To executive 
this threat, a trumped up charge of absconding was laid against Mzosane and he was summarily 
dismissed.
1773
  
 
Furthermore, ANC activists’ suspicions that “Diwiti” was collaborating with the police were 
supported by the letter “Diwiti” showed to Bloem and Gozongo from Schilling, a Captain 
stationed at Kroonstad Police Station.  Bloem, testifying before the TRC, claimed that “Diwiti” 
handed Gozongo and himself a letter from Schilling with his telephone number – although 
Bloem did not provide the date.
1774
  
What particularly concerned the residents of Maokeng was the fact that members of the TMG 
would be arrested and charged, but they would always be acquitted in court. This further fuelled 
the suspicion that the TMG or its leader in particularly, “Diwiti”, had a suspicious relationship 
with the prosecutor, Mrs Pienaar. Remembering Mrs Pienaar’s suspicious role in the events 
taking place in Kroonstad, Mpondo remarked 
… There was this judge [Actually she was a prosecutor] named Ma-Pienaar (Mrs 
Pienaar). Their cases were heard in her court.  They were not heard anywhere else.  
There was a rumour that there was something going on between Ma-Pienaar and the 
leader of the Three Million, “Diwiti”. We were detained for months, but not even one  
of the Three Million went on trial.  They were arrested and given free bail. But we  
didn’t even get bail1775 
 
In trying to clarify why members of the TMG received bail or their cases were thrown out of 
court, Bethuel Thekiswe pointed out that this was because members of the community feared to 
testify against the TMG members. In his words 
One other problem that we experienced was that you would find that the Three Million  
Gang had killed someone, but the community wouldn’t give information because they  
were afraid to testify against them in court because of fear that they might be victimized.  
And you would find that we didn’t have a strong case against them, because of the fear.  
But everybody knew that the Three Million Gang was responsible for the deaths
1776
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The relationship between “Diwiti” and Mrs Pienaar was confirmed by Samuel “Bebeto” Taka 
during the TRC hearings in Kroonstad. But he equally hastened to note that the cases against 
them were remanded just like any other case that came before the court. Taka informed the TRC 
that at some point he and some of the members of the TMG were requested by Pienaar to paint 
her house. Furthermore, Pienaar, according to him, would sell her chickens in Troubou, in front 
of “Diwiti’s” house. “She used to stop at “Diwiti’s” place”, Taka confessed, “just in front of the 
yard and people would come there and buy the chickens.”1777  
For Mamorena Taje, the relationship between “Diwiti” and Pienaar was not peculiar. This was 
because “Diwiti” had developed good relations with other white lawyers and magistrates.  
According to her 
Hartman, [“Diwiti’s” lawyer], would take “Diwiti” over the weekend and stay with him  
in his home. Do you know what he did? He invited the magistrates to his place, so that 
when the case took place the next day, he could say here’s “Diwiti”. The next day when 
the case started and everybody was saying where’s “Diwiti”? The magistrate said ‘No, 
talk for yourselves and not for “Diwiti”. “Diwiti” is present’1778 
 
Numerous attempts were made by “Diwiti” to explain his actions and to try and reach a peaceful 
settlement. It is possible that “Diwiti” realized the pain his involvement in the Three Million 
Gang was causing his family, particularly his mother. After the eruption of the “war” between 
the TMG and the ‘community’, “Diwiti’s” mother was isolated by the ‘community’. Taje recalls 
that church ministers, including the Methodist Church minister in Kroonstad, where she was a 
full member were afraid to visit her when she was sick, let alone to bury her.
1779
 Amongst some 
of “Diwiti’s” attempts to initiate peace included approaching the Minister’s Fraternal and then 
writing a letter and distributing it in the whole township. This action was, however, dismissed by 
the ‘comrades’ as a ploy by the police (or the ‘system’) to set a trap for them. Taje recalls 
“Diwiti” was clever. He knew all these priests’ organizations. He approached them  
and spoke with them. What did he do again? He wrote letters and said ‘I’m not  
fighting against you. I’m fighting with George because of my wife. I’m not even  
fighting him. I’d like to talk to him’. And do you know what he did? He distributed  
them in the whole location. Then they (comrades) said the police had distributed  
the letters from an aeroplane. They didn’t read the message. He was making  
people aware: ‘Don’t find yourself in a mess. Then tomorrow you say I have killed  
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your children. I’m not fighting with you’.  My mother’s child distributed that letter1780   
 
The “new” TMG: Survival strategies 
Realising that his attempts were treated contemptuously, “Diwiti” and his friends, who at this 
stage had formed themselves into the “new” TMG, began their reign of terror. At the beginning 
the “new” TMG, led by “Diwiti”, John Buti “Kraag” Dinga, “Manguni” and Teboho Miya,1781 
used unsophisticated methods and it would seem their targets then were not clearly defined. At 
this stage they used knives to attack. Samuel “Bebe” Taka recalls 
 So, sometimes we would hear that, for example, ‘Thabo has been stabbed by so and  
so in town’. That night we would get into two taxis and we would raid all the taverns 
until we found the people responsible. If we couldn’t find them in the taverns, we would 
raid them in their homes or camps. We attacked a lot. At times you’d find that during the 
attacks you did something because of the situation you found yourself in. You’d find 
them stabbing somebody you didn’t even know the reason why, but you must join in and 
stab that person. The guys would tell you that if you don’t stab this person, the day they 
arrest us you’d also be arrested and hanged1782   
 
Taka also remembers that the gang’s activities were closely monitored by the leader, “Diwiti”. 
Anyone who did not perform their role as expected was ridiculed and sometimes even punished. 
He adds 
  
 Every time we returned from the ‘war’, say we’ve killed someone, we would all go  
to “Diwiti’s” house and wait for those who might come and avenge their members.  
So, we’d stand in a queue and “Diwiti” would walk past us asking Ere ke bone thipa  
ya hao (Let me see your knife) [If your knife didn’t have blood stains] he shouted E  
kare ha oa bolaya motho nyoa mao toe (It doesn’t look like you killed anyone, your 
mothers’ … (private parts). O tsamaisitse fela tjena hodima ha motho (You just swiped 
your knife on the blood of this person and now you want to fool me that you actually 
killed someone). Then he’d give you a hard slap on the face. That man knew how to 
slap
1783
 
 
Similar treatment was also applied to those who were suspected of working for the enemy (i.e. 
‘comrades’). In order to send a clear message to the rest of the gang, all those suspected were 
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publicly punished. Taka, who claims to have been suspected of working as a double-agent, 
recalls that punishment was so severe that finally the suspect would even concur. In his words 
 
There were meetings which were called by “Diwiti”, especially when there were 
suspects. I was one of the suspects myself. Yes, because I was still attending school  
at Relebohile. So, when going to school I’d walk past the areas of the people who were 
fighting the Three Million. They wanted to know why I continued attending school when 
other kids had stopped going to school. And when attacks were launched, the other group 
would use the “corners” (safe routes), which were only known and used by the Three 
Million. So, there were many of us who were suspects. They accused us of giving out 
information to the enemies. They would call you. There was a huge painted stone at 
“Diwiti’s” place; the kind of stones that are used to decorate the lawn. It was painted 
[white]. This is where the meetings were held. And you would find them waiting for you 
with sjamboks. They would beat you up like nobody’s business. In the end … you’d even 
support their allegations. You’d agree that, indeed, you did give out information to the 
enemies
1784
  
 
In the initial stages the “new” TMG survived by manufacturing their own weapons. According to 
Taka “Diwiti was working for JCI. This company deals with steel. Ntate, they manufactured very 
scary pangas (matchetes), and these were strong. All sorts of dangerous weapons were made 
there”.1785 When the fight intensified between the TMG and the ‘comrade youth’, the TMG 
robbed shops to get food. This was after their movement in the township and town was 
contained. Again Taka remarks 
  
There were people who were bringing us food. Others were forced. We sometimes  
robbed shop owners of their food. Sometimes during the day when we felt that we  
were hungry, we would go to the shops and take their food by force
1786
  
 
The TMG and IFP 
 
In May 1991 the Three Million Gang joined the Inkatha Freedom Party.
1787
 Mamorena Taje, 
“Diwiti’s” sister, claims that “Diwiti” finally joined the IFP because he wanted to force the ANC 
leadership in Maokeng to take him seriously and to start discussing the issue between him and 
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George. This was after had had observed that the IFP and the ANC national leadership were 
meeting to discuss peace initiatives.
1788
 She explains 
  
This is how the Inkatha issue gets in. He (“Diwiti”) finally joined Inkatha. Ntate 
 Lovers (Petrus Lenkwane – a councillor in Koekoe’s Council) came here … and  
 they met with ntate Khumalo (a member of Inkatha in Welkom). He wanted to join
 Inkatha, because he could see that the ANC and Inkatha could negotiate. So, 
 because they were always saying he’s a Three Million and a thug the ANC leaders 
 didn’t take him seriously … when he tried talking [to them]. So, he thought if he 
 could join Inkatha he’d be able to talk to these people. He’d be able to tell his story. 
 You could see he wanted to talk. He thought that it would be better if he was with 
Inkatha, because he could go with Inkatha there: ‘I can go to the ANC with them. I don’t 
know what’s happening with the ANC but it’s siding with those people (George and 
others)’, he’d say1789 
 
It may have been true that “Diwiti” conveniently entered into an alliance with the IFP to achieve 
his personal undertaking. But for the IFP an alliance with “Diwiti” and the TMG may have been 
an opportunity to expand its support base outside KwaZulu/Natal and parts of the PWV to the 
OFS. This would undoubtedly dispel the argument that it was a party for AmaZulu only. It was 
no surprise that the IFP decided to work with the TMG. Seemingly, this collaboration was 
developed by members of the City Council of Maokeng long before May1991. This was evident 
when in April the Council in its meeting granted the IFP the permission to use the Seeisoville 
Stadium for its meeting. And in the same meeting, it refused COSATU Kroonstad branch’s 
application to use the stadium on 1 May 1991.
1790
 It is possible that the members of the Council, 
who at the time felt pressured by the ANC in Kroonstad to resign, invited the IFP particularly the 
Welkom branch to Maokeng to study the area and the people, and to learn more about the TMG.  
After joining the IFP, the TMG’s modus operandi changed. It became sophisticated and the 
gang’s targets were well defined – political activists, particularly the leaders of the ANC. In fact, 
the New Nation published a story titled “Three Million Gang ‘operated like an army’”.1791 The 
newspaper, drawing from the information provided by a former gang member, reported “there is 
a line of command with the echelon manned by policemen, councillors and Inkatha officials who 
in turn liaised with ten commanders occupying the second tier”.1792 “The commanders”, the 
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newspaper added “in turn controlled 10 lieutenants who were each in charge of a platoon unit”. It 
concluded “Lieutenants met the units to inform them about attacks to be carried out during 
missions and about the strategies to be used”.1793  
 
In an interview with Mamorena Taje, she recalled at this stage the TMG removed fences 
surrounding the houses in Troubou to create easy escape routes, to create passages. They also 
used whistles to alert each other when they were being attacked.
1794
 Similarly, Taka remembers 
that younger members of the gang were used to spy. He remarks: “Myself and few others were 
still young and we were mostly used for spying on people. If there was someone they wanted, it 
was our job to spy on that person and bring information”.1795 The TMG also began using guns. 
Taka observes: “We had guns, too.  You wouldn’t know how you got hold of a gun, but when 
you look closely you would realize that these old men who brought food from Welkom were the 
ones who brought these things here. Probably some had been stolen”.1796 This escalated the level 
of violence and of the number of victims. It was at this stage that the TMG employed other 
methods to strengthen itself. First, it received assistance from “friends” living in other places. 
Taka recalls that an outside group arrived in Maokeng to assist them in their fight 
 
I can’t remember if it was from Parys or what. But there was a group which came  
in a taxi, wearing scorches … You know, the Ducks [of London] scorch. Iyo, you 
wouldn’t talk to them while looking them in their eyes. Hey, their eyes were red like 
blood. Then later I found out that they were “Diwiti’s” connection from prison when  
he was incarcerated
1797
 
 
And secondly, the TMG resorted to using muthi (African traditional medicine).
1798
 The use of 
muthi was widespread during political violence. Ari Sitas, in his study of ‘comrades’, illustrates 
this phenomenon. According to him, both the ‘comrades’ and otheleweni (those who aligned 
with the IFP and KwaZulu Administration) used muthi for protection. He notes that some of his 
interviewees, who were ‘comrades’, informed him that “They (theleweni) take muthi. They have 
wizards to weaken us. We take muthi. We sing kill the wizards”.1799 Just like the ‘comrades’ and 
otheleweni in Natal, the TMG also used muthi. Taka explains 
  
Yoh, it was bad. We were wearing T-shirts of Inkatha, together with those old men,  
who were members of Inkatha. Some of these old men you’d even think they were  
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crazy. … We were pierced with needles with muthi and ba rephatsa (our bodies were  
cut with razors and muthi inserted into the wounds). Speaking in Isizulu and Sesotho,  
these old men were saying Ikulu mayiza kanje ingena lapha, iphuma lapha (when a  
bullet is fired in your direction, it’ll go in your body and come out again). I was  
surprised to see that the bullet had killed “Diwiti”1800  
 
The use of muthi by the gang was confirmed by Daniel Tsholo, who had defected from the TMG. 
In an interview with The Natal Witness, Tsholo claimed he was involved in three murders 
committed by the Three Million Gang: “We mutilated private parts after killing the people which 
we then take to a witchdoctor in exchange for a portion to strengthen us against the attacks by 
comrades”.1801 As Taka and Tsholo explain, muthi was used for protection. But it created an 
unrealistic expectation: that it would prevent the user from dying especially from bullets fired by 
the enemy. 
 
 
 
Samuel “Bebeto” Taka, former member of the “new” TMG  
(Source: Tshepo Moloi) 
 
The TMG’s new strategy involved opposing boycotts and targeting the leadership of the 
ANC.
1802
 
Bloem, testifying before the TRC hearings, explained how the TMG opposed the boycott 
organized by the ANC in Maokeng. He remarks 
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 You see, what happened at the Kroonstad taxi rank is that many people were 
 intimidated and advised to go and shop in town, and that they should not heed 
 people telling them not to go and buy … in town … The manager of Pick ‘n Pay 
 it was known that “Diwiti” would go to him during these consumer boycotts … 
 [and] assure the managing director that people would come and shop there
1803
 
 
Bloem’s view was supported by Machabe Thulo when he explained at the same TRC hearings 
that 
  
 there was a time when a consumer boycott was conducted, and we have been 
 preaching to the people the importance of consumer boycott. Those who had 
 businesses in the township, we wanted them to benefit … We made door-to- 
 door campaign. And those people (TMG) … got into the streets and our members 
 were threatened. They couldn’t continue with the … campaign. They were told to 
 stop
1804
 
 
It is not clear what the TMG intended to achieve by opposing the consumer boycott organized by 
the ANC. But what is certain is that it was able to scare the residents of Maokeng, some of whom 
supported the ANC. Thulo adds 
 … Because the community of Maokeng was threatened … if you went into a house 
 to explain what was happening. They would say to you it doesn’t help for you to come 
 here and tell us about the boycott. We know that we have to be part of this, but 
 tomorrow when we come back the Three Million Gang is going to kill us, saying that 
 we have been involved … together with the members of the ANC1805 
 
This cost the ANC support in Maokeng. However, the situation changed in 1992 following the 
intervention by the ANC national leadership and MK (see below). 
 
Feeling uneasy about the collaboration between the TMG and IFP, which in many other areas 
was complicated by the allegations of the SAP’s partiality, in May 1991 the ANC Kroonstad 
branch wrote a heated letter directed to the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, 
complaining about the SAP’s ineffectiveness, but also questioning whether he was in control of 
the police and, if not, the letter suggested, he should quit.
1806
 This prompted the Minister to take 
decisive action against the TMG. In June 35 members of the gang were arrested, and the police 
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were reported to be investigating at least eight cases of murder.
1807
 The arrests came after the 
special unit under Lieutanant J.J. de Ru was sent from outside of Kroonstad.
1808
 Recalling how 
they were arrested, Taka remarks: 
In order for the attacks to stop, there were certain boers who came here in Kroonstad. 
They were called Murder and Robbery Squad, led by Captain Derey (De Ru). They were 
from Brixton. Those boers arrived here on Thursday morning, at six. They were driving 
an Escort and went straight to “Diwiti’s” house – he was alone. They took him with them. 
They came back at eleven, in those 7/10 huge cars, and we heard the blowing of whistles. 
Then we came closer and gathered there – fifty something of us - to hear what was the 
reason for the whistles. So, by then every gang member had their own membership card, 
red in colour, of Inkatha. We were told that we were going to meet Themba Khoza, who 
was the commander of the Inkatha then. Yoh! We all flocked into those big cars, 
beautiful ones. Ntate, we were shocked when we got to the gate that we were actually 
being taken to court. We had no chance to do anything. We were put there in a box 
[witness stand] and told that the case has been remanded for next month. But we would 
stay in there. We didn’t understand why we were arrested. Each and every day the  
police officers would come to beat us up. They took the underage to the one in town 
[police station], and the older ones were here in Kroonstad [prison]. They had all the 
information about us, our names, and we did not know them. They’d say ‘Hey, is your 
name “Bebeto” Samuel Taka? I’d stand there thinking where does this police know me 
from? And he’d bang on the table, shouting ‘Hey, man, I’m talking to you’. And they had 
huge hands. Then they’d read out all the crimes we’ve committed: ‘On such and such a 
day in such and such an area you stabbed so many people’. I’d try to deny it: ‘Haai, 
ntate, nna ha ketsebe (No, sir, I don’t know). And he’d retort ‘Hey, man, I can’t have 
your name and you then tell me that you don’t know anything’1809 
 
Taka’s testimony suggests that the police, particularly those outside Kroonstad, had been 
investigating the activities of the TMG, trying to build a case against its members. Maokeng 
residents’ jubilation was, however, short-lived when in October the arrested gang members were 
released “on their own recognizance.1810 Violence flared up once more when the TMG started 
terrorizing the residents again. In November the owner of Twapa General Dealers, Paulus 
Ramoji, alleged to have witnessed the murder of Mothobi Frans Nkate, who was stabbed by a 
member of the gang. Furthermore, three members of the gang were alleged to have entered the 
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shop and demanded money at gunpoint.
1811
 Although, the members of the TMG appeared in 
court in December, the residents of Maokeng, particularly some of the activists had had enough 
and decided that in order to stop the gang’s reign of terror “Diwiti” had to be murdered.   
 
Tien Manne Kraag – ‘Ten Man Power’: Community ‘Defence Unit’ 
To counter attacks by the TMG, which had by then turned Troubou into its stronghold, the local 
activists, particularly those formerly aligned to the MDCC established a community defence 
structure, which was based at ‘Cuito Carnavale’ camp, in Phomolong.1812 According to Bloem, 
“the defence units were established by the ‘community’ and … it was because of all the various 
attempts which had been made to protect the ‘community’ from various attacks had failed. … 
The youth and the older residents decided to defend themselves from the attacks.”1813  Leading 
figures in this defence structure recalled that they named themselves Tien Mane Kraag – or 
TMK (‘Ten Men Power’), because they believed that ten men can defeat hundred men.1814 
Machabe Thulo, who became the ‘General’ or the ‘Commander’ of the unit, recalls that they 
boastfully called themselves ‘The Talented Members of Umkhonto we Sizwe’. TMK was made 
up of ten ‘commanders’, who were responsible for establishing and commanding other camps. 
These were Thulo himself, Joseph “Slovo” Matli, Seele Sekonyela, Johannes Lengoabala, 
commonly known as ‘Oom Joe’, Pini Sethibe, also known as ‘Scotch’, ‘Pupu’ (or ‘Mkhaya’) 
Mahase, whose real name is Sekitla Moses Mahase. Malebo Ezekiel Manotshi, Papi Edwin 
Khambule, Abednigo Khumbi, and Makgabane Malebo.
1815
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Machabe Thulo standing in front of the ‘Cuito Carnavale’ camp (Sources: Tshepo Moloi) 
 
Sekonyela observes it was not difficult to recruit members. He remembers that some of the 
people joined because they wanted to avenge their next of kin’s suffering at the hands of the 
TMG. In his words  
 
You see, during that time people would just volunteer their services as our members  
because in some cases you would find that some did it specifically for revenge, because  
you would find that they lost a member of the family or a close friend, or maybe a girl- 
friend who was “married” forcefully by the TMG. So they would join forces1816 
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Machabe Thulo and Seele Sekonyela, former members of ‘TMK’, standing in front of one of 
their hideouts. (Source: Tshepo Moloi) 
 
Unlike the TMG, the TMK was well structured, with commanders responsible for the various 
camps.
1817
 Machabe Thulo, who was the chief commander, remembers, inter alia, that the 
commanders’ tasks were “checking whether these guys (members of the camps) have food, have 
ammunition, have places to sleep.
1818
 They would come to me and tell me. So, I would get the 
resources and address the problems in the camps”.1819 Members of the ‘community’ played an 
important role by contributing money and sometimes cooking for the members of the defence 
units. Matshidiso Rantie, at the time of the civil war in Maokeng she was a member of the 
MDCC, claims that she would move around the township requesting food and meat from the 
owners of butcheries in the township to prepare food for the defence units.
1820
  
 
Just like the TMG, the TMK also relied on muthi to protect and strengthen them. Thulo, again, 
explains 
  
                                                          
1817
 Camps were established in Thabadiatjha (at the three rooms), in Gelukwaarts, Phomolong, Tjhorising, and 
Marabastad. See interview with Thulo 
1818
 As the fighting between the TMG and TMK intensified some times members of the TMK were forced to flee 
their camps and sleep either in other people’s houses or in the veld 
1819
 Interview with Thulo. Thulo claims that some of the resources they received from the UDF.  
1820
 Interview with Rantie 
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My grandmother was a traditional doctor. She was one of the strongest. She was also 
assisting us with muthi. All the members of these camps and SDU’s were using that 
 muthi. They took you to the veld and dug a hole, and everyone dug his hole. You went  
inside the hole. They mixed the muthi and water and poured it inside the hole. They  
gave you sticks, which we used to talk to the ancestors. And you were given instructions 
that you must “mourn” (abstain from having sex). If you don’t “mourn”, when you’re 
going to have sex, you must stop using it [muthi]. And before you use it again, you had to 
bath so that it doesn’t turn against you, that muthi1821 
 
Defence structures, particularly the Self-Defence Units (SDUs) are typically associated with 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). In the initial stages, the Maokeng’s self-defence structure did not 
have formal links with MK.
1822
 However, its members received rudimentary military training 
from a certain Belushe. According to Thulo, Belushe was a former member of MK from exile, in 
Lusaka.
1823
 Giving evidence before the TRC hearings, Thulo recalled that the Tien Mane Kraag 
was formed between October and November 1990, and it had no connections with MK.
1824
 It 
was not surprising that MK was not involved in SDU’s at this stage. In August 1990 the ANC 
had made an undertaking to the government to suspend the armed struggle to allow the process 
of negotiations to continue. SDUs established before 1991 were usually financially constrained 
and lacked viable networks.
1825
 As a result they were unable to obtain guns and bullets. They, 
instead, relied on self-made guns. In the interview with members of the SDUs in Sebokeng Zone 
7, these members noted that they used self-made guns and bullets were supplied by friendly 
policemen.
1826
 In Maokeng, in contrast, the TMK disarmed the police. Thulo recalls 
  
We used to disarm the police. I want to be open with you. You see, someone would, for  
example, come here from other provinces, like Gauteng or North West. They’d be 
carrying a gun to protect themselves in case violence broke out. They’d be happy to see 
me, ‘Hey Chabes (short for Machabe)’. We’d go somewhere to drink and then we’d 
disarm him, telling ourselves that case or no case, it’s not an issue. We’d stand if we have 
to. But the important thing was that we needed that gun to use to defend the community. 
                                                          
1821
 Interview with Thulo 
1822
 For a discussion on the differences between SDUs with links with the ANC/MK and those without, see Bonner 
and Nieftagodien Alex, pp.370-4 
1823
 Telephone conversation with Thulo, 16 August 2010; see interview with Sekonyela 
1824
 Thulo’s testimony, TRC Amnesty Hearings. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/kroon/kroon.htm 
1825 Pakiso Rakgoadi, a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) observes MK-
aligned SDUs were formed in 1991 by the ANC at the height of township violence between the ANC and IFP 
supporters. The main reason for their creation was because the police were “…perceived as part and parcel of the 
problem, and were reluctant to apprehend known vigilantes. Rakgoadi, P.S. ‘The Role of the Self-Defence Units 
(SDUs) in an Changing Political Context’. Research report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, January 1995.  http://www.csvr.org./index.php? Downloaded, 29 September 2009 
1826
 UWL HLP AG2115 (K10) Peace Action – SDUs, 1992: ‘Interview with SDUs in Zone 7, Sebokeng’ 
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We would say that the gun is “on a tree … like a peach’. And we wouldn’t hurt him. We 
would ask him for it politely and tell him that we need it. And we would say “You can go 
and report to the police. You mustn’t be afraid.  We are not robbing you, but we need 
it”1827 
 
Moreover, some of the adult activists close to the TMK bought guns illegally. These it would 
seem were shared with the members of the TMK, or those associated with them. Tebello 
“Blakie” Tumisi recalls that he bought a gun, but because of lack of training they could not use 
it. He explains 
  
Yes … I bought it for R300. It was called Pere (Horse). It was the most powerful…  
(laughs). We nearly died. When Mustapha [Mantso] was supposed to shoot a man,  
he shot the other way.  They didn’t know how to use a gun. We were nearly killed  
that day. He tried to shoot them, but he missed. And he eventually ran away with the  
gun in his hand
1828
 
 
As the conflict intensified between the TMG and TMK, the latter established other units, which 
were located in different sections in the location. One of these was the ‘Witdoeke’1829, based at 
Tjhorising, in Maokeng. Recalling how this unit was established, Mokotla remarks 
Where do I start, when we moved from Phomolong … when they told us to go back to 
our sections? When we got to Tjhorising I took this comrade (Phankhe), because he lived 
closer to where I lived. I took another comrade who is now a councillor in Mabopane 
[Pretoria]. He lived closer to where I lived. I took another comrade. His name is 
Mahlomola. He also lived closer to where I lived. I took the pastor. His name was Pastor 
Matsile - he passed away. Ja, I took Ntate Matsile. We also took comrade Jeff 
Mohlabula. At that time he was a shop steward at the railway. He worked at Spoornet. I 
knew that I had taken relevant people. We didn’t go to the people of Tjhorising, first. We 
sat down and discussed the importance of establishing a camp in Tjhorising. Some of us 
were intelligent. We discussed it. When the pastor understood, everything was fine with 
us. We agreed. And the following day we embarked on a door-to-door campaign. We 
went to their homes. We recruited the father and the son, but we didn’t recruit seven-year  
                                                          
1827
 Interview with Thulo; also see interview with Mpondo, Mokotla and Phankhe; some of the members of the 
SDUs in Maokeng found guns outside of Kroonstad. At the TRC Hearings held in Kimberley, 1997, Sekitla Moses 
Mohasa, a former member of the SDU, confessed to receiving his gun from a comrade in Daveyton, in the East 
Rand, Gauteng Province.  http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/kim/mohase.htm 
1828
 Interview with Tumisi 
1829
 It is unlikely that members of this camp decided on this name because of their admiration of the Witdoeke 
which operated in Crossroads in the 1980s. However, just like the Crossroads’ witdoeke, they, too wore white 
cloths to easily identify each other. For more on the witdoeke in Crossroads, see Cole Crossroads 
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olds because there is nothing we could discuss with them. There was a church that we 
used for our gatherings in Tjhorising. It was Holy Pentacosta (Pentacostal). We went to 
Holy Pentecosta to convince them, because it was us who came up with that idea. We 
convinced them until they accepted it. If I still remember well, comrade Phankhe, the 
time we invited all the people it was on Saturday afternoon. Because, I remember, that 
meeting was not held at Holy. It was held at Jeff Mohlabula’s house. We decided that the 
camp will start operating on Monday. We started camping
1830
 
 
Phankhe Mbona, who was in the same unit with Mokotla, recalls that, in addition to defending 
the ‘community’ against the TMG, some of the unit’s activities were to enforce stay-aways and 
to render the township ‘ungovernable’. He remembers 
It didn’t only focus on fighting the Three Million. There were other activities. Like we 
said that we were hitting two birds with one stone. On the one hand, we were busy 
making the country ungovernable and at the same time we were busy organising stay-
aways. We had to organise stay-aways and stop people and cars from [leaving] 
Tjhorising, just like they were stopped in Senzela (Phomolong) and Seeisoville. And 
when the Three Million was attacking us, we had to be able to cope
1831
 
 
It possible that here Mbona is referring to the time when the MDCC had embarked on rent and 
consumer boycotts.  
 
Tsekelekwas and Women’s role in political violence 
 
The other unit/camp which was established during this period was made up of young people 
below the age of twenty. This unit was known as Tsekelekwas (or Tsekele). It comprised both 
male and female activists. Mpondo explains how the unit got its name 
 
What happened is that … Tsekelekwa was not a name of a group. There was a comrade 
… Force.  He was from Viljoenskroon. He is the one who came up with the name 
Tsekelekwa. We used to say tsekele, tsekele, tsekelekwa (I’m still…I’m still … I’m still 
here) when we greeted the comrades. Then we adopted that. We made it our style. Then 
people labelled us the Tsekelekwas
1832
  
 
                                                          
1830
 Interview with Mpondo, Mokotla and Mbona 
1831
 Ibid. 
1832
 Ibid. 
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Phankhe Mbona, Paseka Mpondo and Oupa Mokotla, former members of ‘Tsekelekwas’ 
(Source: Tshepo Moloi) 
 
It was in this unit that women played a combative role. As already pointed above that most work 
on political violence generally depicts women as powerless victims; as people who neither took                               
action nor made any attempt to curb political violence. These are women who were abused at 
will by the men involved in political violence. Babylon Ka Xeketwane, for example, in his study 
on the relation between political violence and hostels in Soweto, demonstrates how the IFP 
supporters who resided in the hostels abducted (or forced) township women to live in the hostels. 
They demanded sexual favours from them.
1833
 Similarly, Matthew Kentridge in his book An 
Unofficial War, focusing on political violence in Pietermaritzburg, Natal, using the story of 
Helmina Shange, also shows how the ‘war’ turned some women into powerless victims. He 
writes “Shange is an old woman whose body is covered with burn scars”. According to Shange, 
she was set alight, together with some of her belongings like her house, car, and TV set, by 
amaqabane (i.e. comrades/UDF supporters). And when asked whether she planned to seek legal 
assistance, and whether she would move to a different area when she came out of hospital, she 
simply said “There’s not much point.” “Shange’s story”, Kentridge concludes, “demonstrates a 
woman who feel powerless and who had accepted her fate in whatever form.”1834  
However, Deborah Bonnin, in her Ph.D thesis, shows that when political violence moved into the 
‘women’s spatiality’, that is their homes, the latter began to play active roles. In spite of this, 
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 See Babylon KaXeketwane’s work on violence in the Reef hostels, for example. Ka Xeketwane ‘The relation’,  on 
women’s role in the hostel during political violence, see pp.166-67  
1834
 Kentridge  An Unofficial War, pp41-7 
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Bonnin depicts women as only capable of playing auxiliary roles. She writes “by August 1987 
political violence (between the UDF and Inkatha-supporters) in Mpumalanga Township, 
KwaZulu, moved into new spatiality. “The targets of the violence”, according to her, “were no 
longer only the UDF youth … family members of these youth were also attacked and their 
houses burnt”. For her, this was the reason women became actively involved in the violence. She 
points out that “women supported men in [their] activities by providing food, resources for 
weapons and … surveillance.”1835 Indeed, this was no minor role, and some of the women in 
Maokeng also played these roles in their contribution in the political violence.  
Mamokhele Sebetoane remembers that she used to hide weapons and was also responsible for 
liaising with local business people to collect donations. She explains 
 I don’t know if I told you previously that the “materials” were brought to me  
(whispering). We had a garage and the “materials” were stored there. It was  
because they trusted me. Even if the police could show up, I wouldn’t have  
revealed where the “materials” were 
  
I was also a ‘go-between’, she continues 
  
I was a ‘go-between’ when it came to me receiving the “materials”, going  
to business people which we knew were supporting our cause, even if  
they didn’t come out publicly that they supported our initiatives. I was  
one of those who knew who those were. I used to go to them and collect  
donations from them. It was like that
1836
  
 
Similarly, Thulo adds 
  
Women played a very important role, which I respected. When we were arrested, 
 they were given lists to collect money from the community, so that we could be  
 bailed out. .. They would move from one business to another in the township, asking 
 for bread, sweet-aid … and they would bring them to us in jail1837 
 
And Oupa Mokotla, the Commander of the Tjhorising’s SDU camp, remembers that some of 
these women provided them with safe accommodation  
 
There was a time when I lived in the ‘bush’. I was a wanted man here in Maokeng.  
… Police came to where I lived. Do you understand? Ausi (Sister) Mamotjhato …  
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 Bonnin, D. ‘Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu, 1987-93’ 
(University of the Witwatersrand, Ph.D Thesis, 2007), pp.232-249 
1836
 Interview with Sebetoane 
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 Interview with Thulo 
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was one of those women whom we knew her doors were never locked. You would get  
in on one door at three o’clock in the morning and get out through another. They had 
accepted that this was a ‘war’ and we were fighting1838 
 
In similar vein, the only woman active in the TMG solely played an auxiliary role. Mamorena 
Taje claims that her role was to represent the under-aged members of the TMG in court, arrange 
funerals, arrange food, pay bail for those detained, and to visit them in prison.
1839
                            
 
During the course of political violence in Maokeng, however, a new group of women emerged. 
These were younger and, in addition to being involved in the ‘traditional’ roles of women 
discussed above, they also participated in combat. The age group of this group ranged between 
14 and 16 years.
1840
 The latter had been groomed in the politics of the ANC. One of these is 
Dikeledi Mary-Jane Tlali. Tlali’s combatant role distinguishes her from other women in 
Maokeng.  It is worth studying her career in detail.
1841
 
Tlali was born on 10 October 1974 in Phomolong, Maokeng. She started her school at Moepeng 
Combined until Standard Six (today’s Grade 8). In 1990 she went to Reginald Cingo Secondary 
School to start her Standard Seven (today’s Grade 9). She claims that her first introduction to 
politics was when she was in Standard Two (today’s Grade 4) at Moepeng in 1985 – the 
beginning of the student demonstrations in Maokeng.  
 
In her first year at Cingo she joined the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). 
According to her “it was the time when I became interested in politics, of which I had always 
been interested in but I wanted a role model to politicize me”. It was not long that she met 
Dennis Bloem, Machabe Thulo and Pini Sethibe. The latter introduced her to the ANC’s political 
school to gain more knowledge up until 1991-92. Tlali and some of her female friends like Miki, 
Pinki attended the ANC’s political classes in Brentpark. According to her “We would walk from 
Phomolong to Brentpark every Thursday afternoon and the classes started at 4 or 5 o’clock. The 
classes were conducted by different “lecturers”. I remember comrade Bloem, Thami [Phaliso], 
Mustafa [Mantsu], Daniel George, Khahliso [Moeketsi]”. Political lectures varied. Sometimes 
they were taught about the ANC’s leaders, 1976 student uprisings, Bantu Education. Tlali 
explains “I learnt about the 1976 uprisings, Bantu Education from comrade Machabe [Thulo]. I 
read ‘Through the eye of the needle’ (i.e. The eye of the needle: an essay in participatory 
democracy),
1842
 about the likes of Nelson Mandela. We were taught many things, especially 
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 Interview with Mpondo, Mokotla and Mbona 
1839
 Telephonic interview with Taje 
1840
 Marks also writes about young women in Diepkloof, Soweto, who in 1990 were involved in combative violence. 
See Mark Young Warriors, pp.104-5 
1841
 This information is drawn from the interview with Dikeledi Mary-Jane Tlali (LHPR), Phomolong, 24 September 
2009 
1842
 This book was written by Richard Turner (Johannesburg, SPRO-CAS, 1972) 
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about discipline: that a comrade should be disciplined and to respect our commanders, and 
respect each other as comrades”.  
 
 
Likeledi “Molefe” Tladi, former member of ‘Tsekelekwas’ 
(Source: Tshepo Moloi) 
 
However, the ANC’s political lectures went beyond theoretical teaching, but also involved 
practical matters. Tlali and her friends were also offered military skills. She recalls: “Most of the 
time we were taught by Dennis Bloem. Sometimes it was a certain priest called moruti 
(Reverend) Gozongo. … We were doing many things in his house. Things like making petrol 
bombs.” These lessons seem to have motivated Tlali to want to change the situation. “Then I had 
this strange feeling”, she remembers “of wanting to bring some change to the situation that we, 
as students, faced. And I developed love for COSAS and started recruiting too”.  
 
Soon her active participation in politics drew the attention of the police and that of the Three 
Million Gang (TMG). Tlali claims: “Then I became disturbed and would bunk school, and would 
sometimes not sleep at home because I was running away from the police. And, on the other 
side, the Three Million Gang was hunting for me, because I was associated with the comrades.”  
She had to drop out of school in Standard Nine (today’s Grade 11). She then dedicated her life to 
fighting the TMG and the apartheid regime. She became involved in the activities of the 
Tsekelekwas (or Tsekele). “We called ourselves ‘Tsekele’, which was the name also used by 
men. It was Pinky (also known as “Six Nine”), then Hadifele. And there were two Nonos. And 
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one of the Nonos was a twin. Others have died: people like Poppy, Segametsi and Dipuo. I was 
called “Molefe”, because I’m left-handed. I was named so, again, because we didn’t call each 
other by our real names in order to prevent the police knowing who we were.”  
 
Like other women, they, too, participated in acts of surveillance. Jacklyn Cock points out that 
some of the white women in the SAP’s Special Branch were also used to infiltrate the ANC, with 
the aim of spying and gathering valuable information about its activities. Olivia Forsyth, a 
former SAP agent, played such a role.
1843
 It was easy for women to engage in such roles, because 
unlike men they were not suspected.  
 
Gradually Tlali and her female comrades began to participate in military actions. They were used 
to target those who collaborated with the state and the TMG. In her words: “I remember one day 
we threw a petrol bomb at ntate Caswell Koekoe’s house. What surprised me was that it didn’t 
explode”. She concluded that Koekoe was using muthi to protect himself. In addition, they 
targeted government vehicles. Recalling the time when she was involved in the burning of the 
vehicle belonging to the Department of Education, she said: “… We used to be very angry then. 
You know, during that time government cars weren’t allowed into the townships. We once 
burned a car belonging to the Department of Education and Training, myself and comrade City 
(Sefatsa), who had disguised as a cherry (a woman) and myself as auty (a man). The police were 
hunting us.”1844 Such acts seem to have been common among some of the young female 
comrades in other areas. For example, Marks writes that two young women in Diepkloof 
informed her that they had been involved in setting fire to the home of a man believed to be an 
Inkatha supporter.
1845
 
 
Although Tlali and her female comrades had been lectured about the ANC’s politics and taught 
to make petrol bombs, they were, however, never allowed to have or keep guns. They only 
carried them when going out to attack. “I used to carry along a ‘sun-sack’, with petrol bombs and 
guns inside it. But I didn’t mind at that time, because I enjoyed what I was doing and felt I 
wasn’t only doing that for myself but for the people of South Africa, or Maokeng as a whole”. 
“Girls didn’t own guns”, she continues “we only carried them in sacks in the company of male 
comrades. They always knew what was inside Dikeledi’s sack. Then they would take them away 
from us after action. We were never allowed to have them”. This displayed the level of distrust 
male ‘comrades’ had for women when it came to ‘war’ and that it was their ‘natural’ 
responsibility to engage in political violence.
1846
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1846
 See also Marks Young Warriors, pp.102-5 
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Before long, Tlali was detained. A tinge of emotion and, probably, fatigue from the on-going 
fight with the TMG and the police seems to have clouded her judgement. On learning that one of 
the girls in the township had informed the police about one of her male comrades, she confronted 
the girl and disclosed vital information about herself. She remembers: “During the time when 
comrade City and others slept somewhere in Constantia, there was this girl from the same street 
who knew where they slept. That girl alerted the police and we heard about that  … We went to 
school to confront her and asked her if she knew what she was doing was wrong and whether she 
was aware of what could end up happening to City? I told this girl to tell the police that I wasn’t 
afraid of them and I mentioned to the girl my house number, which was 2091. She gave the 
police my address. They came at night and found me sleeping, and arrested me”. Together with 
her female comrade Hadifele, they were tortured. The police put them inside a sack and 
suffocated them. And they were later released.   
 
Feeling overwhelmed and tired of the fighting, Tlali finally decided to leave Maokeng for a 
while. She recalls “I even ran away at some point and went to Bothaville for about six to seven 
months because I couldn’t take it anymore. I wanted some rest … I couldn’t even think straight, 
niks, niks (nothing, nothing). Let alone sleep, because I witnessed a lot of terrible things – 
killings. People were stabbed; people were shot in front of me. So, I thought it was better for me 
to go away and take a break”.  
 
Although the male comrades were cautious not to allow the young women to carry guns, they 
nevertheless demonstrated commitment and determination in fighting the TMG. It was through 
their contribution that the TMG was finally defeated. 
 
The demise of the Three Million Gang 
 
The Tien Mane Kraag and its units continued to operate without the assistance of MK until the 
ANC leadership intervened – and arms became readily available. For Tumisi, change came after 
Steve Tshwete, a former deputy commander and commissar of MK in exile
1847
 and in 1990 a 
member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC), had rejected the idea of 
negotiating peace with the TMG “because he felt that the Three Million Gang were thugs”.1848  It 
would seem that attempts were being made by certain individuals to broker peace between the 
TMG and the ‘comrades’, but these were dismissed by both “Diwiti” and Leepile Phume, the 
chairperson of the Maokeng Interim Civic Association.
1849
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When Chris Hani, ex-MK Chief of Staff and in the early 1990s General Secretary of the South 
African Communist Party, came to Kroonstad, the proposal to fully arm the SDUs was set in 
motion. At this stage, some of the people who had left the country to go into exile were 
returning. Amongst these were members of MK. One such person was Ditsietsi Mmei. Mmei, 
was born in Maokeng, and had left the country to go into exile at the age of 22 in 1978. He 
returned to South Africa at the beginning of 1992. In exile he joined MK.
1850Through Mmei’s 
discussion with Hani, a formal structure of the SDUs, linked to MK, was established, and arms 
were made available. Mmei remembers 
  
There was a time Chris [Hani] came to Kroonstad. There was a rally at Seeisoville  
Stadium. I said ‘You know … I’m staying here and I have to fight these Three  
Million people but I don’t have anything. So, luckily Chris is coming, let me utilize  
the coming of Chris. But we had formed the Military Command. And at that time  
we had already written to the HQ (Head Quarters) and S’phiwe Nyanda had  
already confirmed that you’ve got a recognized structure, go on with your work.  
Now, the structure is there and everything, but there’s no weaponry … So, when we  
were at the stadium I spoke to Chris: ‘Chris, the Three Million people are armed,1851 so  
we need some ammunition. Chris then said ‘We’ll talk. Fine, that will be addressed’. 
 Fine, then it was addressed. We got our weapons and everything is fine. Then, I formed  
a strong structure. I went to Welkom and met with the comrades I knew in Welkom. Eh, 
 Viljoenskroon there was a comrade called Sombo. I think he has passed on now. 
 Approached people like Sonny. We met at one place. These were former MK members. 
 Then we formed a structure
1852
 
 
The Maokeng Military Command (MMC) set itself four key objectives in its attempt to quell the 
TMG. First, it wrote a letter, requesting a meeting with the police to inform them of the presence 
of MK in Maokeng.  
 
In the same letter, the MMC warned the police that it intended to stop the TMG and demanded 
the police’s co-operation. Mmei explains  
Our target number one … we wrote a letter to the police officials like Schilling.  
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 Interview with Ditsietsi Mmei (LHPR), Naledi, Soweto, 18 September 2009 
1851 It would seem that at this stage the TMG were receiving guns from the members of the IFP from Welkom; 
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 Interview with Mmei 
410 
 
We sat down with them. We introduced ourselves: that we are here to protect  
the ANC. And if you want to use force, then that’s too bad. You use force,  
then we use force. Schilling stood up and said ‘Hey, you cannot come and say  
this in my country. This is my country’. I said he e monna (No, man), we don’t  
recognize you in this country. Let me tell you, we are the future government.  
You are the outgoing government. We fought in that building of theirs … next  
to Pick ‘n Pay. They were no longer in Adami House1853 
 
Secondly, the MMC recruited and trained all those who were interested in joining the SDUs. 
Mmei remembers that the Maokeng Military Command drafted a form (it is possible that this 
was the Code of Conduct), which they expected the recruits to fill in before joining. “So, we 
developed a form”, Mmei explains, “that whoever is interested to join the self defence unit, come 
and fill in this form, and we’ll train you. So, they came to fill in those forms.”1854 According to 
Pakiso Rakgoadi “the need to make the SDUs accountable and transparent led to the drawing up 
of a code of conduct. This was to become a yardstick by which the activities of the SDUs were to 
be monitored.”1855 It has proven difficult to substantiate if members of the SDUs in Maokeng 
filled in the forms, because Rakgoadi notes that “the code of conduct did not get the approval of 
the SDU members because it stipulated that anyone under eighteen years of age should not carry 
firearms”.1856 This could have caused some discomfort amongst some of the young people 
already involved in the fight against heavily armed members of the TMG. 
Thirdly, the Maokeng Military Command established a camp where it could monitor the 
movement of the TMG. This helps explain the shift of the TMG’s attacks from Maokeng to 
town. After being offered accommodation in Gelukwaarts by Dimo, a former teacher, the 
Maokeng Military Command established the office of MK. Not long after it established a base in 
the same area, where it trained its recruitees. The base came to be known as Cuba. Mmei remarks  
 So, we had our outpost there in Cuba, where we stayed. Cuba was next to Troubou. 
 There were mekhukhu (shacks) somewhere there. The TMG raped mothers there and  
 all sorts. … The owners had left. They ran away. So, we used the area as our outpost.  
We enclosed that place and camped there. So, they couldn’t come to that place. You  
see, just across the street it was Cuba and on the other side it was Troubou
1857
 
 
Mmei recalls that training took place during the day. He continues 
So, when I was forming these units, I got into Cuba … trained them during  
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the day ... while Schilling and his police were standing and watching. We  
didn’t train at night. Running in the trenches, showing them how to crawl,  
how to handle a weapon … So, that’s how we recruited these self defence  
units. And our command was responsible for the northern Free State
1858
  
 
Thulo concurs, and believes the intervention by MK helped them to win the ‘war’ against the 
TMG. He explains: “We received it (training) later. They just complemented what we had 
already started. It was Ditsietsi Mmei and others.  They were the first people to arrive. We were 
trained by them. We trained in the veld. We did steep crawling, crocodile crawling, and others. 
We were taught about guns. Ditsietsi taught us. They taught us a lot of things. That was the 
reason we won the fight quicker.”1859  
Having achieved some of its objectives, the Maokeng Military Command embarked on its fourth 
and final objective: to warn the black policemen against attacking the SDUs “because they were 
not fighting them”.1860 Furthermore, the Maokeng Military Command aimed to recruit black 
warders and members of the TMG, including “Diwiti”.1861 Mmei recalls: I said what about 
mobilizing “Diwiti”? Others said let’s write a letter to Troubou. We wrote a letter wanting to 
meet with “Diwiti”. Ishmael “Satch” Sefatole took the letter”.1862 “Diwiti” responded by taking 
the letter to the police. Mmei remembers that when they arrived at the SB’s head quarters – the 
venue chosen by “Diwiti” – the latter was not present. Instead, Mmei adds “the boers spoke on 
his behalf, asking why we wanted to see “Diwiti”? Finally, they said we should make a treaty 
and not fight”1863 Feeling disillusioned, the Maokeng Military Command and its SDUs attacked 
and killed members of the TMG. Those who were able to escape, left Kroonstad. In the process 
others were won over and sent out of Kroonstad.
1864
 Mmei recalls: “Some of them we won over. 
We’d tell them that ‘Look, if you agree to work with us, we’ll help you escape. Then we took 
them and send them to Shell House. At Shell House they’d dispatch them and find places for 
them somewhere.”1865  
This worked in the ANC’s favour, because some of these gangsters confessed their involvement 
in the gang, and also freely spoke about the involvement of the police and other state officials. 
For example, an ex-TMG member, Elias Marumu, revealed the collusion between the police, the 
prosecutor and the TMG, strengthening the long held ANC activists’ suspicions. He claimed, 
inter alia, to have participated in the murder of at least three people and to have robbed several 
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others. But for all these crimes he was never convicted by a court of law. He claimed that police 
would arrest them but would advise them during interrogation not to answer questions in court in 
a manner that would lead them to their conviction.
1866
  
The Maokeng Military Command made its final attempt to win “Diwiti” over before he was 
murdered, but this was, again, unsuccessful. As on the previous occasion, the Maokeng Military 
Command wrote a letter to be delivered to “Diwiti”. Only this time “Diwiti” was given an 
ultimatum to change his ways or face the consequences. Tumisi, who was part of the delegation 
that delivered the letter at “Diwiti’s” place, remembers 
... Sunday, Ditsietsi Mmei came to me. He said he came to fetch us. He said we must 
deliver a letter to “Diwiti’s” house. We didn’t know what was written in that letter. Now 
when we arrived at “Diwiti’s” house, I got off the car with him. We were looking for 
“Diwiti” and we couldn’t find him. We found his little brother and gave him the letter to 
give it to “Diwiti”. That letter made the police to be suspicious. It said ‘If he does not 
mend his ways before Thursday, he is going to die’1867 
 
What confirmed police suspicion was that “Diwiti” received a threatening letter on Sunday and 
on Tuesday he was murdered. And for them no one but MK was to be blamed for this act. In fact 
was not the case (see below).   
In 1992 MK decided to use the death of one of its cadres to demonstrate its (and the ANC’s) 
strength and popularity. This, in turn, won the ANC support. Mmei observes - dramatically 
Now the turning point is that one of our youngest MK guy passed away. What was  
that ntwana’s (boy’s) name? … We felt to show that MK exists and show off our  
power. Now during the week I was selecting soldiers that were brave from all over  
the Free State for that occasion. That weekend we met at the Seeisoville Stadium; 
the funeral was there. It was packed. We divided our guys into three. There were  
those who were supposed to wear plain clothes … those who were supposed to wear  
MK uniform. Then … those who were supposed to walk amongst the people. The  
whole Kroonstad had come out, because they wanted to see MK. We said today the  
army should know that MK exists and the community should know that it’s us who  
are governing now. There was a certain lady from Welkom called Ouma. I said Ouma, 
you lead the grenade squad. Then I’ll wait here in front of these … Welkom police. I’ll 
command from here. So, their hippos were waiting there. The police went to reinforce 
further up. The thing they didn’t understand was that where they were waiting … were 
MK members who were wearing civilian clothes. So, we left the cemetery. Immediately, 
when we reached the corner we found Schilling waiting. Now, they were closing in as we 
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were coming. … Our guys in the civilian clothes took them off and remained with T-
shirts written MK army and they pulled out their guns and cocked them, and said ‘you are 
surrounded’. They surrendered unconditionally. Schilling said ‘wait, wait’. For the first 
time the people of Kroonstad saw a policeman running away …going to get inside the 
hippo. After that there was no one who was scared of wearing an ANC T-shirt and to 
canvass. There was no intimidation
1868
 
 
In spite of the MK’s show of force some of the local activists were still bent on murdering 
“Diwiti”, with the hope that will bring an end to the ongoing violence in the township. Tumisi, 
who was privileged to information to carry out the murder of “Diwiti”, admits that they had 
planned to murder “Diwiti” but their plan failed. He recalls 
 We had planned something else on our side. And Ditsietsi also came with his plan. Now,  
when we went to town on Monday 24 (1992), we were together with the other guys ...  
There were six of us in the car.  When we moved towards the court, we were supposed  
to pass Pick ‘n Pay … We were going to leave those boys at Pick ‘n Pay. Now, we disco- 
vered that the police were behind us - the detectives were behind us. It was two cars. The  
one was right next to us, while the other one was further back. I saw them in the mirror 
… Then Bra Robert Ntoampe was [panicking]. I said Bra Robert, wait the police are 
behind us. We parked the car at Pick ‘n Pay … the police drove past. We were no longer 
going in the direction of the court; we were now at Pick ‘n Pay. We were surprised to see 
that there were lots of police around. So, we left them, and quickly drove with Dennis. 
We found that the town was full of people. We were surrounded. We parked next to 
ABSA bank. While we were still there, we saw the other guy who worked at Maberies. I 
think his surname is Molotsi.  I ran to him. He works for a newspaper company. I said to 
him “Go and check the guys and take them to the township”. That guy drives the 
company car. He took them to the township.  We came back, because our mission had 
failed 
1869
  
 
It is possible that someone privy to the discussion about the plot to murder “Diwiti” leaked the 
information to the police, hence Tumisi and his ‘comrades’ were under police surveillance.  
But before this day Tumisi, Bloem and [Robert] Ntoampe had travelled to Johannesburg, where 
they met Bloem’s relative, Petrus Roland. Roland insisted he wanted to come to Kroonstad with 
them to stop “Diwiti”, who, with his gang, had allegedly killed his relative in Brentpark. Tumisi 
remembers 
 As the clash continued, there was another boy. He came from the Bloem’s family. He  
                                                          
1868
 Interview with Mmei (Italics my emphasis) 
1869
 Interview with Tumisi 
414 
 
was Dennis Bloem’s relative. He was in Gauteng. While we were still in Gauteng …  
he wanted to come with us here. He wanted to come here to stop “Diwiti”. He lived in  
a Coloured township.  His name is Petrus. It was me, Dennis and Bra Robert [Ntoampe]. 
We said “Just wait” 1870 
 
In spite of the advice that he should “just wait”, Roland left for Kroonstad. The latter’s hatred for 
“Diwiti” and the TMG was both political and personal. He was born in Eldorado Park, South of 
Johannesburg, in 1969, but then moved to Ennerdale. His family roots were in Kroonstad. 
Testifying before the TRC Hearings he explained: “My father, Mr Philip Petrus, was born in 
Kroonstad.”1871 As a result he spent most of his time in Kroonstad. He even joined SAYCO and 
later ANCYL in Kroonstad. On the 14 February 1992 his relative, Simon Bloem, was murdered 
at the taxi rank in town allegedly by the TMG. He claimed that this incident and the decision 
taken at the ANCYL meeting that “Diwiti” had to be killed strengthened his resolve to murder 
“Diwiti”. On Tuesday 25 February 1992 he acted on his resolve. Recalling how he carried out 
this act, he explained 
 I walked up to … George Ramasimong. He was with his gang. I think there were about 
 12 or 15 of them, I can’t remember exactly. Because they knew me I wore a balaclava so 
they wouldn’t identify me, because if they had … they would have attacked me and not 
the other way round. He walked to the taxi rank and walked through a passage. He 
entered through the gate to the taxi rank. I was walking amongst the members of the 
TMG. I walked up to him, I took out the firearm. … And a couple of gang members 
behind me shouted at him. He turned around. He looked in my direction. He saw me 
approaching with a firearm and he tried to run away. I shot at him. And he ran around the 
kombis … and the fence is quite too high on the other side, so he couldn’t run away. So, 
he actually cornered himself there. He turned around and ran towards me. I ran towards 
him. I … kicked him on his chest. He tried to get up whilst I was standing. I knocked his 
feet out from under him, so he fell down again. I then put my foot on his head and while 
he was lying on the ground I shot him in the head. I turned around … I was alone. … I .. 
ran away in the direction of the cars
1872
  
 
As soon as the news of “Diwiti’s” death began making rounds, people in town ran around in 
jubilation, taxis sounding their hooters. Tumisi, who was on his way to meet with his lawyer in 
town recalls 
 … I had an appointment with the lawyer, Du Plessis and the SANCO (South African  
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National Civic Organisation) Committee. ... When we were on the way to see the lawyer,  
then came a lot of cars making noise with their horns (hooters). I had just collected some  
people. So, I also sounded the horn of my car … (Laughs), because I knew the mission. It  
was hectic. The streets were full of people, tjo, tjo, tjo! It were the taxi drivers who 
started the commotion. Yes, after that they (police) came to me and Dennis. We were 
beaten the whole night. They came here around 21:30 and took me away. They beat me 
until 03:30 in the morning. After that they brought me here (home). They released me
1873
 
 
Eunice Tsoaeli, former Secretary of the SACC in Kroonstad, who had just arrived in Maokeng 
from work in town, concurs: 
 It was during the week. Oh! I had just got back from work then I heard ‘hey! let's go  
back to town.  Everyone in the township was ululating. It was just ululation 'The boss  
is dead'. Oh! my God what is it? What's going on? As we went outside, there were even  
free rides to town, to go and see the corpse as it laid there. It was the first time I 
experienced such a thing in my entire life. It was like a president had died. And I had 
never seen people so happy
1874
 
 
The residents’ rejoicing was short-lived, because fears of counter-attack by the remaining, and 
equally angry, members of the TMG, persisted. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
remaining members continued to terrorise the community. Instead, newspaper headlines 
appeared declaring that the gang was disintegrating. This was after the detention of “Diwiti’s” 
younger brother, Matsile, in connection with some of the deaths.
1875
  Calm descended on 
Maokeng once again. Some of the members of the SDUs were also arrested and sentenced to 
long spells in prison. For example, Thulo was sentenced to 10 years in 1991 for the murder of 
Masusu Ntema;
1876
 Mpondo received eight years for the murder of Tsietsi Leboko. Roland, for 
his role in the murder of “Diwiti”, was sentenced to 14 years.1877 The three were subsequently 
given amnesty by the TRC.
1878
 TRC found that the conflict that ravaged Maokeng towards the 
end of 1990 to the beginning of 1992 resulted in 104 deaths of community members while about 
25 gang members were killed.
1879
  
The final chapter will deal with the transition period, leading to the first non-racial and 
democratic local government elections.  
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Conclusion 
 
The political violence which erupted in the early 1980s between the IFP and UDF in 
KwaZulu/Natal and rapidly spread to the Rand and other areas did not affect Maokeng until mid-
1991. This was because Maokeng did not have hostels and squatter camps (or informal 
settlements), which became breeding grounds for political violence that engulfed the Rand in the 
1990s. Similarly, in Maoekeng the conflict between the IsiZulu-speaking and IsiXhosa-speaking 
ethnic groups was absent, which inevitably turned into a clash between the ANC and IFP. 
 
The cause of political violence in Maokeng differed from other areas. In Maokeng, a gang-
related warfare was the main impetus. Local councillors and some elements within the South 
African Police took advantage of this and identified certain members of a particular gang to lead 
a vigilante group that attacked and terrorized ANC activists. Later this vigilante group 
collaborated with the IFP. In this chapter I have contended that this was not coincidental, but it 
was a deliberate strategy by the National Party government to destabilize the ANC and cause 
confusion amongst its supporters. This, the government, hoped would boost its position during 
the negotiations with the ANC. 
 
At the local level, the vigilante group in the form of the Three Million Gang (TMG) attacked, 
maimed and killed supporters of the ANC. As a result, it became difficult to mobilize and 
organize members of the ANC to force the local council to disband and the councillors to resign, 
as it was the case in other areas. Moreover, the TMG’s reign of terror instilled fear in the 
residents of Maokeng to the extent that some avoided becoming involved in politics or being 
associated with the ANC. This cost the ANC support. The situation was reversed after the 
intervention of Umkhonto we Sizwe.  
 
The ‘youth’ of Maokeng, particularly those who were aligned to the Charterist movement, were 
at the forefront of the political violence that erupted in Maokeng. The ‘youth’, as was the case in 
many townships across the country engulfed by political violence, perceived themselves as the 
defenders of their communities against anyone or any organization, or grouping that terrorized 
their ‘community. Such were seen as festering disunity within the ‘community’ and obstructing 
the ‘people’s goal to achieving liberation. It was against this backdrop that the ‘youth’ of 
Maokeng risk their lives running street battles with the TMG, supported by the police, 
councillors and the IFP.  
 
Finally, in Maokeng, in contrast to other areas experiencing political violence, female activists 
played an active role. They were not subjected to auxiliary roles. Some of the younger and 
politically conscientised female activists became involved in combative roles alongside their 
male counter-parts. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Civics and the ANC: Contestations and the local government elections, 1993 – 1995 
Introduction 
 They said: “We just wanted you to support the list that included [Caswell] 
 Koekoe … We couldn’t accept that …”1880  
 
The principal concern of this chapter is to attempt to explain the poor performance of the ANC in 
Kroonstad in the first democratic local government elections. It will contend that the ANC’s 
unimpressive performance was caused by the tensions between its Free State provincial 
leadership and the ANC Kroonstad branch. Some of the senior members of the ANC Kroonstad 
branch accused the ANC’s provincial leadership of total disregard after it failed to adequately 
consult it when compiling the election list for the local government elections in November 1995. 
These members contested the imposition of the name of Caswell Koekoe on the local ANC 
branch and its alliance partner, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) 
Kroonstad branch. Locally, Koekoe was perceived by many as “the enemy of the people” and, 
therefore, the inclusion of his name in the election list was vehemently disapproved by a certain 
section of the “community”. Consequently, some of the members of SANCO, who were also 
active members of the ANC in Kroonstad, established the Maokeng Civic Association (MCA) to 
contest the elections independently of the ANC.    
The decision by some of the members of SANCO to contest the local government elections as 
independents was not peculiar to Maokeng. In North West Province, for example, SANCO 
branches fielded their own independent candidates in the 1995 local government elections.
1881
 
Similarly, in Cape Town, “some SANCO and ex-SANCO activists stood against the official 
ANC candidates in the elections”.1882 The difference between the SANCO Kroonstad branch and 
other SANCO branches elsewhere in the country was that the SANCO Kroonstad branch did not 
explicitly challenge the directives from the SANCO national leadership unequivocally to support 
the ANC in the coming local government elections.
1883
 Instead, some of the members of SANCO 
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in Kroonstad directly opposed the decision by the ANC provincial leadership to support 
Koekoe’s nomination.  
It is important to note here that the relationship between the ANC and SANCO, particularly at 
the local level, was not always antagonistic. It was generally cordial. This was until the ANC 
upstaged SANCO and took the lead in the final negotiations to transform the local 
government.
1884
 To underline this point, Seekings writes “The ANC’s overshadowing of SANCO 
in the final negotiations over the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA, 1993) was soon 
followed by the eclipse of civics by ANC branches at the local level”.1885  
Like other studies of civic organizations in South Africa, this chapter will also demonstrate that 
the period of political transition had a negative impact on ‘radical’1886 civics. From 1990 to 1992 
civics continued to play a central role in township politics.
1887
 They engaged in negotiations with 
the local authorities over rent and development issues
1888
 and the SANCO national leadership 
encouraged local civics actively to champion issues of development in the townships.
1889
 
However, “from 1993 civics declined in importance”, notes Seekings.1890  It was at this stage that 
civics were forced to redefine their role. It was clear that their ‘traditional’ role of protesting and 
boycotting payment of services, for instance, would no longer be tolerated. It is possible to 
surmise that they were being prepared for the ‘new’ South Africa. After the 1994 national 
elections the ANC, as a leading governing party in the Government of National Unity (GNU), 
insisted on the resumption of payment of services through ‘Operation Self-Reliance’, later 
renamed ‘Masakhane’ (‘Let us build together’)1891.  
Although, rent boycotts continued in some areas and SANCO defended this decision
1892
, this was 
perceived by the ANC as irresponsible behavior and tantamount to opposing the ANC-led 
government. As a result in 1994 in other areas like Maokeng, SANCO abandoned its most potent 
weapon: rent boycotts, and agreed to encourage the residents to pay a flat rate. Civics were 
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further emasculated when they lost influential members to government and the private sector.
1893
 
Worse, funding from international donors dried up after 1994, and this made it impossible for 
civics to function optimally. These factors paralysed civics’ activities but, more importantly, they 
caused fierce tensions between civics and the ANC.     
To understand the impact of political transition on civics, it is important to, first, look at the 
origins of civic organizations in South Africa.    
Civic organizations in the 1980s  
As mentioned in chapter four, the first civic organizations were established in 1979: the Soweto 
Civic Association (SCA) and Port Elizabeth Civic Organisation (PEBCO)
1894
, mainly in 
opposition to rent increases. Between 1979 and 1983 civics’ role was to act as ‘watchdogs’ over 
councils and contest the councils’ claim to represent the ‘community’.1895 At this stage they 
concerned themselves solely with local issues rather than with national politics. However, 
between 1983 and 1985 their role changed and became more militant. According to Seekings, 
this was because the UDF linked them to national politics.
1896
 Civics began to mobilize 
communities against the BLA’s elections in November 1983. A year later they mobilized 
communities against rent increases, lack of service delivery, and called for the dissolution of the 
town (and village) councils and the resignation of councillors (see chapter four). This illustrated 
a significant shift from quiescence to confrontational politics. By 1986 civics, together with other 
‘progressive’ structures like the students and youth organizations, were able to force many of the 
councillors to resign. Civics became the de factor ‘managers’ of the townships. Residents 
brought their problems to the civics to be solved, leaving state’s institutions such as the police 
and courts moribund. However, the civics’ power was soon eclipsed. 
Between 1986 and 1989 the government, through its states of emergency, clamped down very 
heavily on activists, including members of civic organizations, countrywide. Many of the civic 
leaders were detained and others went into hiding. Amongst those who were detained, some were 
charged for treason. One of the most notable treason trials involved civic leaders from Alexandra 
Township: Moses and Mzwanele Mayekiso, Sipho Kubheka, Obed Bapela, Richard Mdakane 
and Paul Tshabalala.
1897
 These were acquitted at the end of 1988. Although the state did not 
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succeed in its attempt to make an example of these civic activists, it was however able not only 
to disorganize civics, but also to intimidate people from participating in civics’ activities. As a 
last resort to crush civics, the government banned some of the most active civics in the country. 
According to Seekings, five civics – in Soweto, Port Elizabeth, Cradock, the Vaal Triangle and 
Western Cape – were among the organizations which the state effectively banned in February 
1988.
1898
 
The beginning of the 1990s ushered in a new phase for civics. At the regional and national 
levels, plans were well developed for the formation of regional and national structures, which 
finally became SANCO. These, particularly the national structure, focused more on policy 
matters and its alliance with the ANC. It was at the local level that civics re-emerged and 
continued in their traditional roles of the 1980s. This was largely caused by the MDM’s defiance 
campaign. For example, in Maokeng, as mentioned in chapter six, when the Kroonstad Town 
Council cut off the electricity and water supply to the township because the City Council of 
Maokeng could not pay for these services following the rent boycott by the residents,
1899
 the 
Maokeng Civic Association (formerly street committees), together with the MDCC, responded 
by organizing a consumer boycott and later engaged in negotiations with the local authorities to 
resolve the problem. As a result an intimate bond was created between the civics and the 
communities they served (and vice versa). It was for this reason that local civic activists 
challenged decisions imposed on their communities by regional and national civic structures, 
including the ANC. 
Civics and other community structures, early 1990s   
When the ANC was unbanned in February 1990 community structures representing residents 
were already in existence in various townships. In some areas these were the recently established 
or revived civic organizations
1900
, and in others like in Maokeng these were street committees. 
Just like civics in the 1980s, these structures continued to exert pressure on local authorities, 
particularly the administrators which had been appointed to manage the townships after the 
collapse of most of the BLA councils. They were against the rent increases and lack of 
development, especially lack of housing. To compel the local authorities to attend to their 
demands, civics and street committees embarked on stay-aways and consumer boycotts.
1901
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As noted in chapter one, no civic organization existed in Maokeng until 1990. Prior to the 
establishment of the Seeisoville Civic Association, street committees operated. Matshidiso 
Paulina Rantie, a founding member of the street committees in Maokeng, observes that street 
committees were established to counter the police’s restrictions on mass gatherings in the 
townships. She explains 
I used to support the struggle from a distance. But then one day there was a  
community meeting. One of the organizers of that meeting was Thami Phaliso  
of the MDCC. We met at the community hall. In that meeting I complained about  
the rent issue; that instead of the rent money we were paying being deducted it  
was added. This was the year when we embarked on a rent boycott. In that meeting  
it was suggested that people should be nominated into street committees. Then you  
were not supposed to refuse to be nominated. I was one of those who were nominated. 
That’s how I became involved in the street committees1902  
 
Street Committees were first established in Cradock, Eastern Cape, by Matthew Goniwe. 
Tetelman argues that Goniwe’s initial intention was to restore the authority over younger 
activists and to incorporate disaffected elders.
1903
  He writes 
 
 In 1984 Goniwe organized CRADORA into a set of structures known as street  
 committees. Organisers divided Lingelihle into seven zones, each containing 
 about forty leading activists. Organisers held public meetings in these zones, 
 where each house voted for a street committee representative
1904
  
 
Goniwe and his comrades later used the street committees, first, to conceal the identity of leaders 
from the police, second, to handle the residents’ problems, and finally, to gather and disseminate 
information within the community without calling mass meetings.
1905
 This undoubtedly boosted 
the committees influence. It was for this reason that many residents bypassed state institutions 
and used street committees to handle their grievances.
1906
  
 
Similarly, street committees in Maokeng attended to the residents’ problems. Ranties recalls 
 
My responsibility was to be aware of the needs and problems of the residents of 
Seeisoville. The residents would inform me about these and I would then take them  
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to the committee. Remember that during this period the whites dictated how many  
people could attend a meeting. So, open meetings were impossible to hold. Through  
street committees we were able to meet with people and get to know about their 
grievances
1907
  
  
One of the problems the street committees handled was the burial of members of the community 
whose families were financially deprived. Rantie continues 
 In a case where there was someone in the community who had died and his/her  
family could not afford to bury that person because they did not have money, as  
street committees we used to request donations from members of the community  
to fund their burial. We also dealt with rent and consumer boycotts
1908
 
 
It was not long before the Maokeng street committees were reconstituted as a civic association. It 
is not clear what prompted this shift. But it is possible that it was because activists in Maokeng 
believed that a civic association would unify the township and allow the residents to report their 
grievances to a central structure compared to the street committees which operated loosely in 
different sections. It is also plausible that activists felt that it was no longer necessary for them to 
operate clandestinely after the government had lifted the state of emergency in June 1990.  
The first civic in Maokeng was called the Seeisoville Civic Association (SCA). It was led by 
Mosiuoa “Terror” Lekota1909, Jacob Tebello “Blackie” Tumisi, Matshidiso (Tshidi) Paulina 
Rantie, Itumeleng Prince Lefafa and Mr. Rajwili.
1910
 The name was hastily changed to Maokeng 
Civic Association (MCA)
1911
 “to represent all the sections in the township”, contends Tumisi.1912 
However, before this, the SCA organized donations in the community to pay fines for some of 
the young activists arrested for their involvement in acts of violence in the township.
1913
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Seeisoville Civic Association 
 
 
SCA’s pamphlet.  
(Source: Matshidiso Rantie) 
 
The residents of Maokeng heeded the requests and donated the little they could afford. See the 
list below 
 
(Source: Matshidiso Rantie) 
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When the MCA emerged it played the role of a watchdog. Indeed, Tumisi describes the MCA as 
the ‘eye of the community’. Both Rantie and Tumisi agree that the MCA continued to handle 
residents’ grievances. Rantie remembers a family case brought to her attention that she had to 
resolve 
 We continued looking into the residents’ grievances. These still included the rent  
issue. But we also dealt with disputes. Say, people had fought we would inform them  
not to report the matter to the police station. They must bring it to us, the civic, at our 
office ...  we would try to find a solution. People stopped going to the police station. 
People brought all their problems to the civic. I can remember there was a certain teacher 
who had fought with his wife and she decided to divorce him. He came to us to help him. 
This woman wanted to sue him for breach of marriage. I wrote a letter summoning this 
woman and her mother to come to our office. When they arrived I informed them that 
they didn’t have a case; they would loose. Indeed, when they met in court their case was 
dismissed, because she was the one who was wrong for the breach of marriage
1914
  
 
The other reason why the residents opted to not report their complaints to the police was because 
the latter were despised because they were suspected of supporting the Three Million Gang 
which was terrorizing the “community”. The MCA’s influence went well beyond the township. 
White residents of Kroonstad experienced it as well. Rantie claims that whites acknowledged the 
MCA’s role and would comply with its demands. In her words 
  
I mean, we had so much influence that when we wanted to see someone who was  
working for a white person, we would inform the white person that we wanted to  
meet with his employee in our office. The white person would not ignore us. Instead,  
he would bring his employee to our office
1915
 
 
As a result of its growing influence, the MCA was able to attract many people to its meetings. 
Tumisi claims that about 200 to 300 people attended meetings the MCA called in the community 
hall, or in some of the churches in the township.
1916
 Buoyed by this, the MCA entered into 
negotiations with local authorities over the rent issue. According to Rantie, for a very long time 
in Maokeng a particular system was used for paying rent. Every year residents received a rental 
statement with the amount the residents had to pay for that financial year. Every month a resident 
paid his/her rent, the amount on the statement would be deducted. At the end of the financial 
year in March the following year, the residents would have finished paying the rent for that year 
and would receive a new statement for the new financial year. The MCA’s main contention was 
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that the system had changed. Instead of the rent amount being deducted every month, more 
money was added
1917
. Rantie remembers their meeting with the administrator as follows 
 
 Thami Phaliso, “Blackie”, myself and the other person, who I have forgotten, met with  
the Administrator … Oh, Daniel George. I was the only woman. We informed the 
Administrator that the practice was that every time we paid our rent our balance would be 
deducted until end of March when the balance would be zero. But now we were paying 
and more money was added to our debt. For example, if you paid R15 this month, next 
month your statement would be saying you owe R30. Then the Administrator suggested 
that all the residents who are affected by this should not pay rent for a year or two years. 
We refused. We argued that they should be refunded, because they’ve paid in cash 
already. He then said we should allow him to go back to the region to discuss this issue 
with the authorities there and he would return the following Wednesday with a response. 
The following Wednesday just when we were about to leave to go and meet with the 
Administrator, George came running and told us that the Three Million Gang wanted to 
kill him
1918
  
 
Although it is not clear whether this issue was ever resolved, but what is apparent is the central 
role the MCA played in local politics.  
 
The MCA was also involved in developmental issues. Lack of housing seems to have been the 
main problem. Dennis Bloem remarks 
 
No, there were no houses there. People were staying in backyards. Ja, there was a 
problem with housing; and it was a serious problem. There was no development in 
Kroonstad. And, you know, you are married and you are staying with your parents.  
And people were really looking forward to having their own places
1919
  
 
The MCA decided to tackle this matter directly. In November 1991 it mobilized the residents of 
Maokeng, especially the tenants, to erect shacks in an open space between Brentpark and 
Kananelo Secondary School.
1920
 Recalling this event, Tumisi, who was at its forefront, had this 
to say 
  
                                                          
1917
 This was confirmed by Frank Mabitle, the Kroonstad ANC branch secretary when he argued “households, which 
were on average paying electricity bills of R37 a month, had recently been receiving accounts demanding 
payments of up to R194”. http://newsbrief/1993/news9308, Johannesburg, 12 August 1993. SAPA 
1918
 Interview with Rantie; Daniel George remembers that he first heard that the Three Million Gang was looking 
for him in September 1990. Interview with George (LHPR), 18 August 2009; see also Sunday Times, 28 July 1996 
1919
 Interview with Bloem  
1920
 Business Day, 20 November 1991 
426 
 
Ja … in 1992 (actually it was 1991) I was at the forefront of that. And Dennis [Bloem]. 
We were allocating stands to people next to Kananelo [Secondary School], in that open 
space (laughs). Police used to come and harass us. They took photos while we were still 
demarcating the stands ... for the people living in the location, those who were renting to 
demarcate those stands … they told us it was 12 what, what. We used our feet to count.  
One person came with a tape but we had already measured with our feet. People were 
ready. They built shacks immediately after we finished demarcating the stands. They 
built a lot of shacks. So, we were arrested and detained. They later released me. I was 
helped by my lawyer Du Plessis. I went back to that place again. I was arrested again, 
with Dennis. After arresting us they went back to remove the people. They demolished 
their shacks
1921
 
 
Media reported that about 40 shacks had been built in the area that came to be known as Z.R. 
Mahabane squatter camp when the police brought the shacks down.
1922
 The City Council of 
Maokeng was against people erecting shacks in the vacant space between Brentpark and 
Kananelo Secondary because, it argued, that “area was used as a dumping site and posed a health 
hazard”.1923 When the MCA and the residents ignored the Council, police were called to forcibly 
remove the shacks. A scuffle broke out between the police and the residents. Two people were 
reported to have been shot and injured when the police fired rubber bullets and teargas.
1924
 To 
pacify the people, the Council promised to move the “homeless” to the 700-vacant plots at 
“Koekoe Village”, at a cost of R1000 per plot, including water and electricity connections.1925 
The “homeless” abandoned the MCA and moved to the Council’s promised land. The MCA felt 
betrayed and labeled these dinoha (snakes). Moeketsi Ditseki recalls 
 
They were people from the location. Then a lot of police came and destroyed the  
shacks. And ntate Koekoe told those people to go to the office so that he could  
allocate them some stands. On hearing this, the people went to the municipal office  
and were allocated those stands. That’s when the name dinoheng (a place of snakes) 
came. We called them snakes because despite our agreement of not accepting anything 
from the municipality, they did so
1926
  
 
The central role played by the civics in local politics soon changed after the ANC became 
involved in local politics. To understand this change, it is important to look at the role of 
SANCO. But before doing this, the chapter will first outline the debates which ensued after the 
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unbanning of the ANC focusing on whether the civics should continue functioning or not. This 
will help explain the future relations between the ANC and the civic association in Kroonstad. 
     
Debating the civics’ future 
Not long after the unbanning of the liberation movements, activists and academics began to 
engage in a heated debate about the future role of the civics. Writing about this phase in the life 
of civics, Mzwanele Mayekiso, a leading figure in the Alexandra Civic Organisation, noted  
 The unbanning of political organizations at the beginning of 1990 posed a 
serious challenge for civics. The question was: what role should they play  
now that the ANC had been unbanned? A debate ensued between those in  
favour of the civics to continue functioning  and even be strengthened; others  
believed that there was no need for the civics to operate on their own, or as in- 
dependent, instead they should be blended into the ANC; and yet some felt  
that in a united and democratic state, civics will cause disunity
1927
  
 
According to Khehla Shubane and Pumla Madiba, “there [were] three basic characteristics of 
civics in this debate”. First, civics [were] seen as part of the “liberation” movement, which 
usually meant the ANC, second, civics were perceived as important formations in “civil society” 
… and their role [was] to address the development needs of the marginalized sections of the 
population, and finally, civics were expected to play a “watch dog” role”.1928  In a similar vein, 
Pat Lephunya, a Soweto civic leader, described three options available to the civics. The first 
option was for civics to fold, or to become ANC branches, or ANC residents’ association. 
Second, local civics could enter local government by effectively taking over the administration 
of their communities. Third, the civics could define themselves as an autonomous, non-party 
political movement in civil society.
1929
 
 
Civic activists like Mzwanele Mayekiso favoured the third option. They argued for the 
independence of civics. They emphasised that civics’ responsibility should be to its 
constituencies, all the residents in various communities across political lines. They believed that 
for civics to achieve their developmental objectives they should be non-partisan.
1930
 For 
Mzwanele Mayekiso, civics’ status as structures closer to the people placed them at an 
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advantageous position to know (and be able to attend to) the needs of their communities. He 
warned  
 
… Simply because nationalist organizations like the ANC are apparently progressive 
today does not mean they will remain so. The fact that there are, within the ANC, 
numerous class forces is a reason in itself for strengthening independent organs of 
working class civil society. If the movement within the ANC toward meeting basic  
needs began to falter, it would be logical to expect that civics would continue to press  
for programs that met those needs 
1931
   
 
In contrast, there were many other civic leaders who “… saw the achievement of a democratic 
political system as the conclusion of civics’ primary function”, writes Seekings.1932 These leaders 
argued that civics, from their inception, had fought for the eradication of apartheid and now that 
the ANC was unbanned there was no need for the civics (similar argument was applied to the 
UDF)
1933. The latter should instead operate within the ANC. According to Seekings, “some civic 
activists had aspired to have the opportunity to organize openly within the ANC, or to represent 
the interests of the people in their area as a democratically-elected ANC councillor or member of 
parliament”.1934 “For these activists”, concludes Seekings “the need for civic organization was 
greatly diminished in the new political context”.1935 Underscoring this view, political 
commentators Shubane and Madiba observed, “If civic bodies are merely the local ‘shock 
troops’ of the liberation struggle, or of a particular movement within it, their task now would 
presumably be restricted to seeing their cause to its successful conclusion, with no role to play 
beyond that”.1936 This view was supported by academics from Natal, particularly Blade 
Nzimande and Mpumelelo Sikhosana They argued that political parties should take up civic 
issues, individually or in alliance, and that the efforts put into civic organization would weaken 
parties, especially the ANC.
1937
  
  
At this stage (beginning of the 1990s) the ANC treaded carefully in voicing its opinion on this 
issue. It acknowledged the importance of civics at the local level and their contribution in the 
liberation struggle.
1938
 But it did not rule out the need for the ANC to be involved in local 
politics. This view was summed up by the ANC’s Jakie Selebe when he said  
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 We think that the civic association and some such structures dealing with local 
 matters – water, electricity … must remain. Some members of the ANC will also 
 be members of civic associations because they live in a particular township. So 
 there will certainly be some sort of relationship between different civic associations 
 and members of the ANC on the ground … in the ANC they will deal with broader 
 political issues, but when it comes to local issues like drainage and water, that will be 
 left to the civic association. Of course, with the ANC making its contribution through 
 its members who are part and parcel of the civic
1939
 
 
Perhaps influenced by the fact that it still lacked capacity to assume a leadership role at the local 
level, the ANC between 1990 and 1993 allowed the civics space to continue representing the 
“community” over developmental and other local issues.1940 It did not interfere with the civics’ 
activities. According to Seekings, “The ANC and civics formulated a general division of labour, 
with the former taking responsibility for constitutional and national political issues, while civics 
took the lead in struggles around urban development and, by default, urban local 
government”.1941 Undoubtedly, the view that the ANC should, at least, in the future play a 
leading role at the local level was gaining momentum and as a result it was clear that the view 
held by Mayekiso and others was rapidly losing ground. The situation worsened when some of 
the civic activists were elected into leadership positions in the ANC branches. This had the effect 
of blurring the clear distinction and role between the ANC and the civic. The leadership of civics 
were seen building the political structures of the ANC and not the civic.
1942
 In Maokeng, for 
example, the whole leadership of MCA also held leadership positions in the ANC. Rantie 
remembers 
 We were one. Remember that we were also leaders in the ANC. Gozongo was  
the chairperson, Bloem his deputy, I was the treasurer
1943
 
 
Similarly, Tumisi recalls that in 1992 he was the organizer and Bloem, the chairperson.
1944
 This 
invariably made it extremely difficult for the civic leaders to challenge the ANC, by extension 
themselves, when feeling aggrieved. Later a regional leader of SANCO was to ask: “how will a 
SANCO leader, who also holds the position of councillor, conduct himself if he is called on to 
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lead a march of residents against the local authority? Who will he lead the march against – 
himself?”1945     
 
It took the ANC some time after it was unbanned to command a significant membership within 
the townships. Up until then it had supporters and not members. To reverse this situation it 
therefore relied on activists in the civics to recruit members on its behalf. After all these were 
closer to the people in their “communities” and were aware of the local political dynamics that 
could obstruct “outsiders” (i.e. former exiled members of the ANC). In many places across the 
country civic activists recruited members and established ANC branches. In the initial stages this 
proved to be a difficult task. There are various reasons that can help to explain this situation, 
which included political violence which had erupted in many areas across the country. In 
Maokeng, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, violence erupted between the Three Million 
Gang (TMG), assisted by some of the state’s institutions and Inkatha Freedom Party (Party), and 
members of the community aligned to the ANC. Consequently, many people were terrified of 
being associated with political organizations, particularly with the ANC. Because of this they did 
not demonstrate enthusiasm in joining the ANC. As a result in some of the areas, including those 
like Alexandra Township, with long-traditions of political resistance, the ANC was only able to 
register about 1 400 members towards the end of 1990.
1946
 However, before long the situation 
improved. Tom Lodge estimates that in 1992 “… The ANC had acquired 900 branches …”1947 In 
the case of Maokeng, as already noted in chapter six, following the MK’s intervention in the 
fight against the TMG, the ANC’s support grew in the township and this was also turned into 
membership. Isaac “Sakkie” Oliphant remarks  
Then we started transferring our membership into the ANC. And at that time we  
were filling up the stadium with ANC supporters … At one stage Walter Sisulu  
was called. The whole of Kroonstad, I’m counting easily 70 to 80 000 people were 
marching
1948
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ANC’s march in Kroonstad, 1990s (Source: Matshidiso Rantie) 
 
The ANC’s rapidly expanding membership in Maokeng cannot only be attributed to the 
intervention by MK and the involvement of civic activists. The ANC itself embarked on an 
intensive recruitment drive to garner the support of as many people as possible.
1949
 However, this 
had unintended consequences, which caused problems for the ANC at a later stage. Everyone 
was welcome to join the ANC – even the residents who were locally perceived as “enemies of 
the people” (by extension the ANC). To achieve its objective the ANC cautioned: 
  
The ANC is an organization of all the people of South Africa. As such we must  
ensure that every person over the age of eighteen feels welcome in the ANC. We  
must not discriminate on the basis of age or sex, colour or creed. The qualities of  
an individual must count above all else
1950
 
 
In Maokeng some of the people who joined the ANC at this stage, apart from Koekoe, were the 
former councillors in the City Council of Maokeng – an apartheid-created structure. Mokhele 
Letsabo, a former member of the executive committee of the Council recalls that he joined the 
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ANC, but because of mistreatment by some of the ANC Youth League members he resigned and 
joined the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). He explains 
 
Ja, I remember that when people went for the national elections in ’94 we were  
running around as we were ANC members. They said we should join the ANC  
because Matla a Sechaba and Ea lla Koto won’t be able to contest … because  
they were not registered. I remember that I stayed in Constantia and we were  
starting our Constantia branch. But later I took these ANC cards from all the  
councillors and the Deputies. I put them in an envelope and posted them to Shell  
House. I joined PAC. ANC youth locally … used to tell me that I am an opportunist  
and they do not want me as I come from the apartheid regime, and now I want to be  
there
1951
 
 
Besides feeling disrespected by young people he once taught at school, Letsabo also felt that it 
would be difficult for him to work well within the ANC. But most importantly he believed that 
the PAC was strong enough to challenge the ANC.
1952
 Sesomo Samuel Seakhela was another 
member of the Council who joined the ANC but he, too, like Letsabo was forced to resign and 
finally joined the PAC.
1953
  
 
In Maokeng, it is possible that the apartheid-era councillors were recruited by some of the local 
activists to join the ANC, because the latter strongly believed that these councillors, particularly 
the mayor, would help the ANC gain more membership in the township, because of their 
previous record as councillors. These councillors, unlike other councillors elsewhere in the 
country, enjoyed considerable support in the township, especially amongst the elders or 
homeowners. This was because of their record of providing a satisfactory service to the 
“community” over the years since they took over the management of the township in 1984. It is 
likely that these activists felt that in order for the “community” to move on (and most probably 
with the hope that this will be advantageous for the ANC) they needed to reconcile with those 
they once perceived as the “enemies of the people”. Moeketsi Ditseki observes 
  
 In the ultimate end ntate Koekoe became one of us, even though there were some 
 who still didn’t approve of him. We understood we had to move fast to normalise 
  the situation and seek a way forward. So, we had to sit down with him to discuss.  
Then there was a civic association, which didn’t like the idea of reconciliation …1954 
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Clearly some of the members of the ANC were against the idea of welcoming those who 
previously collaborated with the ‘system’ into the ANC. But this also points to lack of adequate 
consultation within the ANC in Kroonstad. Seemingly the information that Koekoe had joined 
the ANC was privy to selective members of the organization. This caused tensions between 
members of the ANC in Maokeng. This was evident at the ANC northern Free State region’s 
elective conference at Makabelane Technical High School, in Qwaqwa, in 1993. Some of the 
delegates from Maokeng were infuriated by the presence of Koekoe who attended it without their 
knowledge. Rantie, who attended the conference, remembers 
 
 I can still remember the last ANC regional conference we held under apartheid. This  
was an elective conference. It was held in Qwaqwa. When we got there we were made  
to sit on one side together with activists from Qwaqwa. We realized during the course  
of the conference that we were not part of the delegation, but we had been allowed in  
as observers. I can still remember that every time our members raised their hands to  
make a point they were ignored. When I went outside I saw Koekoe there. I went back 
inside and wrote a small note and passed it around notifying our members that Koekoe 
was in attendance. The Welkom branch heard about this and wanted to know why we  
had brought Koekoe to the ANC conference. Lekota arrived late, but Koekoe had already 
disappeared. I don’t know how he got the ANC’s membership1955   
 
It is obvious from this testimony that not every member of the ANC in Kroonstad was consulted 
about the delegation to represent the ANC Kroonstad branch at the conference. And the apparent 
hastened elevation of Koekoe within the ANC caused discomfort amongst some of the members 
of Kroonstad’s ANC. It was this group that would at a later stage vehemently question and 
oppose Koekoe’s imposition into the leadership position in the ANC. The situation deteriorated 
further after the launch of SANCO. 
Civics, the ANC and political transition 
 
SANCO was launched at Uitenhage, in the Eastern Cape, in March 1992 to unite into a national 
civic organization all ‘radical’ civic organizations.1956 Although it defined itself “as a tiered, 
unitary civic organization, comprised of national, provincial, regional and local branches”,1957 
SANCO’s structures, particularly the local branches, continued to operate independently of 
SANCO national and regional (after the 1994 elections these were renamed provincial branches) 
levels. Writing about SANCO branches during this period, Patrick Heller notes “… local civics – 
that is, branches – ha[d] less to do with the formal unitary structures and the chain of command 
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laid in SANCO’s constitution than with local dynamics and configurations”.1958  Local civics 
built their own organizations and fundraised on their own to sustain themselves. This was despite 
SANCO national’s undertaking that it would be responsible for such activities, particularly 
fundraising. In fact, the SANCO constitution demanded that: ‘All local branches dissolve their 
constitution, refrain from any negotiations with municipal authorities, and cease all 
fundraising’.1959 Tumisi, former deputy chairperson of the SANCO Kroonstad branch, recalls 
that his branch did not receive any funding from the national and/or regional offices. As a result 
his branch and the ANC Kroonstad branch shared an office (formerly a store) donated to the 
organizations by Dithebe Tau. To raise funds, Tumisi (and Rantie, the treasurer of the SANCO 
Kroonstad branch) claim that they requested donations from business people in the community 
and other members of the community. Consequently, at times they functioned without a 
telephone in the office, because it had been suspended following the civic’s failure to make 
payment.
1960
. 
 
Lack of funding not only restricted the SANCO branches activities, but it also caused local civic 
leaders to disregard SANCO’s higher tiers. Seekings notes that branches and provinces had 
widely failed to dispense revenues to higher levels.
1961
 Moreover, SANCO branches, like the 
Kroonstad branch, continued to engage the white local municipalities on issues relating to the 
transformation of the local government – this was despite the constraining clause in the 
SANCO’s constitution. This caused a discord between SANCO national and its branches, and 
this came to a head in 1995 (see below). 
 
SANCO at its founding conference adopted two important resolutions: to adopt a unitary 
structure and to function independently of political parties. Firstly, SANCO opted for a unitary 
structure amidst vehement opposition, especially from the Soweto Civic Association and 
Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO). The two favoured a federal structure. Local civic leaders 
from the two structures were mainly concerned about losing their autonomy, especially when it 
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came to funding.
1962
 In contrast, local civic leaders from financially weak organizations favoured 
a unitary structure.
1963
 The debate was finally won by those who argued for a unitary structure.  
 
In protest, some civics chose not to join SANCO. “… CAST (Civic Associations of the Southern 
Transvaal) and other independent civic organizations”, writes Mthambeleni “did not join 
SANCO at its launching conference, because they remained opposed to the unitary structure of 
the new national organization and favoured a federal structure”.1964 For Zuern, cited by 
Mthambeleni, SANCO’s adoption of the unitary structure meant all resolutions taken by SANCO 
leadership at the national level would be binding to all SANCO branches.
1965
 But in practice this 
was not always the case. Branches or, at least some of the members within the branches, did not 
always follow the decisions taken by the SANCO higher tiers. This was evident when some 
branches ignored SANCO when it supported the ANC’s insistence on the resumption of payment 
of services. In some areas branches continued supporting rent boycotts.
1966
 
 
Secondly, SANCO, during Moses Mayekiso’s presidency, 1992 to 1993, “… insisted that civics 
must remain independent of government and political organizations, and refrain from pledging 
loyalty to any political party since civics represent residence, irrespective of political 
affiliation”.1967 To underscore this view, Moses Mayekiso said “SANCO should be closer to the 
trade union movement than political organizations: we must remain watchdogs for the 
community and remain unaffiliated to any political party”.1968 Ideally this option suited civics, 
but in practice it would have been difficult for the majority of civic activists to uphold. Many 
members of SANCO at all levels had close links with the ANC. In 1993 this relationship was 
formalized (see below). And for some of the civic activists entering into an alliance with a 
organization was SANCO’s undoing. For example, Mzwanele Mayekiso, brother to Moses 
Mayekiso, argued that this relationship introduced “… a corporate culture into the civic 
movement, meaning … the imposition of  top-down instructions instead of bottom-up approach 
associated with the participatory democratic culture of the civic movement …”1969 It was at this  
stage in SANCOs’ life that civics’ independence was eroded and their traditional role 
undermined. After 1994 SANCO, particularly at the local level, shared its activities with 
government institutions like the police. For example, they became part of the Community Police 
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Forums (CPFs).
1970
 Zeurn points out that even though this was an excellent vehicle to, first, 
improve relations with the police and, second, to fight crime in the townships. But it undermined 
civics’ watchdog role. “Civic attempts to improve policing”, writes Zeurn “proved to be 
extremely difficult due to lack of properly trained and paid officers, … police stations, and in 
some cases, police corruption”.1971 “This served as a central example”, Zeurn concludes “to 
many civic activists of the limitations of a narrow understanding of civil society engagement as a 
‘watchdog’ in which local civics only worked through existing government institutions, rather 
than either challenging them from outside or seeking change through active participation in 
political parties”.1972  
 
Due to the popular support civics enjoyed at this stage – pre-1994 - SANCO was able to enter 
into negotiations with the government and local authorities, together with the ANC, on equal 
basis. Mzwanele Mayekiso writes “In mid-1992 SANCO delegation, led by president Moss 
(Moses) Mayekiso, held a meeting with Local Government Minister Leon Wessels … The 
meeting was also attended by other ANC alliance partners … It stitched together the principles 
for the eventual establishment of non-racial, democratic local government. This was ratified in a 
deal by the multiparty constitutional negotiations … toward the end of the process in December 
1993”.1973 Furthermore, SANCO was also instrumental in the drafting of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) document, notably the chapter on housing.
1974
 The RDP 
document was adopted by the ANC as its election manifesto in the 1994 national elections.
1975
 
Civics were moreover central players in the negotiations at the local level. This led to Chris 
Heymans, cited by Seekings, suggesting that in 1993 “… it was ‘well-nigh impossible to discuss, 
plan or implement development in South Africa without engaging with, or at least having to take 
account of, civic associations’”.1976  
Towards the end of 1993 the situation changed. In November of that year Moses Mayekiso left 
SANCO (he later joined parliament in 1994) and was replaced by Lechesa Tsenoli as president 
of SANCO. Tsenoli had been active in the UDF in the 1980s.
1977
 SANCO during Tsenoli’s 
presidency unequivocally supported the ANC.
1978
 According to Mthambeleni “SANCO 
established a closer relationship with the ANC with a view that this would provide the national 
civic body a vantage position to influence the government directly”.1979 This was not to be, as the 
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later events would demonstrate. SANCO’s decision drew heavy criticism from within its ranks. 
Mzwanele Mayekiso described this decision “… as the first step in moving from the position of 
powerful watchdog to becoming a lapdog”.1980 Tsenoli defended SANCO’s decision, declaring 
“… there was no reason for SANCO to change its decision to support the ANC”.1981 It was not 
long before Mzwanele Mayekiso’s prediction was realised. Gradually SANCO was marginalized 
in the negotiations and policy-making directly affecting its constituencies at the local level. The 
ANC assumed the central role. SANCO trailed behind, and this caused it to be reactive. This was 
the source of tension between the two organizations, particularly at the local level. 
 
In Maokeng this tension was not more evident than in the negotiations for the local government 
models as stipulated in the Local Government Transitional Act (LGTA). The ANC, possibly 
with the full knowledge of the SANCO provincial leadership, without consultation “imposed” its 
representatives to re-negotiate the model to be applied in Kroonstad. It is important to study this 
incident in detail. 
 
The LGTA of 1993 was finally promulgated in February 1994, after painstaking negotiations at 
the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF), in which SANCO played a central role.
1982
 
The LGTA, according to Lanegram, “outline[d] a transformation process comprised of three 
phases: the pre-interim, interim, and final phase”.1983 The major function of LGNF, established 
in March 1993, was to negotiate: 
 
a) Which transitional model was to be applied and its function; 
b) The number of seats on the new transitional council, taking the existing number of seats 
as a departure point; and 
c) Which councillors were to be nominated to the new transitional council …1984 
 
Tumisi recalls that he, as the deputy chairperson of the SANCO branch in Kroonstad, had 
attended a SANCO national meeting in Olifantsfontein, in the then PWV area (now Gauteng 
Province), where these issues were discussed,
1985
 and all the resolutions taken there were 
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submitted to the LGNF which then submitted them to the government. At the LGNF SANCO, 
according to Tumisi, agreed on three options: A, B, and C.
1986
 The LGTA delineated these as 
follows: 
 
1. “Option A” (or a Transitional Local Council/TLC) - an appointed body divided equally 
between representatives of ‘statutory’ and ‘non-statutory’ members1987; 
2. “Option B” (or a Transitional Metropolitan Council/TMC) – it added an additional tier of 
government so that an area is governed by one Metropolitan Council and a series of 
Transitional Metropolitan Sub-structures composed like TLCs; and  
3. “Option C” (a Transitional Coordinating Committee/TCM) – the existing racially-based 
local authorities institutionalize their cooperation
1988
 
 
In terms of these models, “Option C” (or TCM), Tumisi contends, was erroneously opted for 
Kroonstad instead of “Option A”, which Tumisi and others in SANCO Kroonstad branch 
envisaged.
1989
 Tumisi blames this on the interference of the ANC, and partly SANCO provincial 
leadership. Tumisi and his group had hoped that the existing municipalities managing Kroonstad 
and Brentpark, and Maokeng would be dissolved and a new body comprised of representatives 
from the two municipalities, on an equal basis, would be appointed to manage Kroonstad, 
Brentpark and Maokeng during the pre-interim phase. It is possible that this was based on the 
view that the TLC would be better empowered to draw some of the resources from the Kroonstad 
municipality, the better resourced municipality compared to Maokeng (which had been badly 
affected by non-payment of rent and service charges), and distribute them equally between the 
three residential areas. The leadership of SANCO in Kroonstad felt that the ANC provincial 
leadership failed to consult them and was unnecessarily imposing its will on it regarding local 
matters, of which, regrettably, it had little, if any understanding. It seems the Free State ANC 
provincial leadership did not consult with the leadership of the SANCO branch in Kroonstad and 
mandated their own representatives to negotiate with the local authorities in Kroonstad on behalf 
of the “community” of Maokeng.1990 As it turned out this decision was disastrous. Tumisi 
explains 
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When it came to negotiations we had representatives from SANCO … They  
agreed on three options ... A, B and C. Now, we were supposed to take option A. It  
was stated that if … the town was a Grade 9 and the township was a Grade 7, you were 
supposed to choose the higher grade, which was Grade 9. All the municipalities that  
were below Grade 9 formed the Coordinating Committee. That’s where the existing 
councillors were left intact. If they were Grade 9, they were disbanded and formed part  
of the TLC. It was 50-50. Now, we were supposed to have done those things. Now, 
during the negotiations we realised that the province had chosen people who didn’t know 
anything about the negotiations; whereas, we knew about the negotiations. … We 
realised that there were two representatives from the ANC but we didn’t know who chose 
them. We were all members of the ANC. How did they choose [Butana] Khompela and 
[Vax] Mayekiso? We didn’t know the criteria that were used. There were also two 
representatives from SANCO, Seun Mohlatsi and Sammy Moletsane – we also didn’t 
know who chose them. As the negotiations progressed, we realised that ... these people 
didn’t understand anything. Vax was not aware … the way the structure was constituted. 
We were not supposed to form a coordinating committee. When he tried to explain what 
was going on, the whites … said to him “It was stated that if the local had agreed on the 
model, the upper structure cannot change anything”. They said to him “Shut up, we  
are the ones who were negotiating. That’s what the rules state”.  So, Vax had to keep  
quiet
1991
  
 
According to Belinda Havenga  
 
 Forums were obliged to notify the Administrator or provincial committee of the results 
 of the negotiation for the pre-interim model within 90 days after the activation of the  
 LGTA. If agreement was not reached within this time (or an allowed extension), the 
 Administrator or provincial committee could, within 30 days, institute a process of  
 independent mediation in order to reach an agreement. If this did not provide an 
 agreement, the Administrator had to appoint … in non-metro forums … in cases which 
 were constituted Grade 9 or higher level authorities, either a TLC or Local Government 
 Coordinating Committee (LGCC)
1992
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In line with these regulations, in December 1994 Ouma Motsumi, the Free State MEC for Local 
Government, proclaimed the LGCC in Kroonstad.
1993
 Butana Khompela was appointed as the 
first chairperson of the Local Government of Greater Kroonstad. He was followed by Mr 
Corry.
1994
 Additional members from the ‘non-statutory’ body included Vax Mayekiso, Sammy 
Molotsane, Seun Mohlatsi and Maggie Petersen.
1995
 In protest some of the disgruntled members 
of SANCO in Kroonstad decided to stage a sit-in at the council’s offices – and this lasted for a 
week. Remembering this incident, Rantie had this to say 
 
 I can still remember that at some point we embarked on a sit-in. This was the time  
when there was an interim committee managing the Council, which included Sammy 
Moletsane, Seun Mohlatsi, Koekoe, and others. We asked who elected these people? 
Nobody could give us an answer. We went there and had a sit-in. During this time 
members of the AF attended an ANC meeting in Welkom. It was in that meeting when 
Lekota heard about our sit-in. He asked the delegates: ‘Is Kroonstad present?’ And they 
said yes. But he then said ‘How come because I heard that members of the ANC in 
Kroonstad are having a sit-in’. They were chased away from that meeting. And when 
they arrived they threatened to attack us. We said come. The “comrades” were there to 
protect us. We continued with our sit-in. It lasted for a week. No one could enter the 
offices. Lekota came. We informed him about our problem. We told him that we’ve just 
heard that there were people who had been elected as an interim committee but we do not 
know who elected them. He promised to disband that interim committee
1996
  
 
Although Tumisi concurs with Rantie, he recalls the incident differently. According to him, the 
sit-in was organized by some of the members of SANCO Kroonstad branch, who referred to 
themselves as members of the Maokeng Civic Association (this should not be confused with the 
earlier MCA). They demanded that the LGCC be replaced with a TLC.
1997
 Unlike Rantie, Tumisi 
blames their attack, which Rantie claims was led by the members of the AF, on both members of 
the ANC and SANCO who supported the LGCC. He claims that during the attack Moferejane, 
who was part of the sit-in, was beaten and when he (Tumisi) tried to help him, he was stabbed in 
the back.
1998
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Conversely, Ditseki, a member of the ANC at the time, agrees that as members of the ANC they 
forced their comrades who were staging a sit-in to disperse, because their action was an 
embarrassment to the ANC government. He explains 
  
Eh, people like Blakie Tumisi, they went to do a sit-in at the council’s offices and  
Terror [Lekota] was during that time already a premier in 1994. So we had to go  
there and remove them. We had to explain that we were in government and shouldn’t  
be doings things like that. But Terror did come to speak to them and they dispersed
1999
 
 
After the disgruntled members of the ANC explained their problem to Lekota, the latter 
promised to disband the LGCC. But this never happened. After learning that the interim 
committee delegated to the LGCC was elected at the ANC meeting, which some of the members 
of the ANC in Kroonstad had decided to abandon, Lekota decided not to continue with his 
decision to disband the LGCC. Rantie recalls 
  
But the mistake was committed by our own comrades such as Blackie Tumisi,  
who attended a meeting. You see, the ANC’s constitution states that if you have  
received a letter inviting you to an elective conference and you decide not to  
attend, or you attend but then later decide to leave, whatever decision is taken in  
that meeting you have to abide by it. It looks like some of our comrades attended  
that meeting but later decided to leave. The meeting continued and the interim  
committee was elected. So, when Lekota made enquiries about this interim committee  
he was shown a register of all the people who attended the meeting and our comrades’ 
names were there and they had signed that they were present. So, there was no legal base 
to challenge the election of the interim committee. Lekota could not disband the 
committee. But then it was agreed that it would be in power for six months and thereafter 
we would be going to the local government elections, where we would elect new 
people
2000
  
  
It is difficult to substantiate this claim without supporting evidence. But what is clear is that the 
LGCC in Kroonstad was not disbanded. Thus in its final attempt to force the provincial 
government (by extension the ANC) to disband it, the disgruntled members of SANCO 
Kroonstad branch led a campaign to request the residents to suspend registering for the local 
government elections to be held in November.
2001
 This laid the foundation for the establishment 
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of the “new” Maokeng Civic Association (MCA), which attempted to contest the local 
government elections independently of the ANC towards the end of 1995. 
Another contentious issue between SANCO branches and the ANC was the resumption of the 
payment of services. Seekings notes “the closer the ANC got to public office, the more worried 
its leaders became about the effects of boycotts on public finance and hence housing and 
infrastructural development”.2002 Although in January 1994 SANCO, together with the ANC and 
the government, signed a formal agreement on rents and services that provided for arrears to be 
written off and end boycotts, SANCO failed to convince its branches to call off the rent boycott. 
This infuriated the ANC’s leadership. In November 1994 the ANC-led government announced 
‘Masakhane’ campaign and insisted that residents would have to pay for the services to enable 
the government to implement the RDP.
2003
 SANCO national leadership reacted indecisively. On 
the one hand, it supported the continued rent boycott and, on the other hand, it supported the 
campaign (later SANCO leaders came out strongly warning members that ‘SANCO was no 
longer a movement of boycotters’).2004  
The ANC and government officials described SANCO’s response as irresponsible.2005 This 
widened the tensions between the ANC and SANCO. This was evident when in 1995 the ANC 
criticized SANCO’s Port Elizabeth’s branch for marching to the city centre to protest against the 
service charges levied by the ANC-dominated Transitional Local Council.
2006
 Janet Cherry, cited 
by Mthambeleni, contends “the ANC’s criticism of the march indicated the beginning of a 
reluctance to tolerate dissent from any organization not playing the party political game”.2007 It is 
important to note that it was not all SANCO branches which opposed the ANC’s insistence on 
the resumption of payment of services. Some endorsed this position. A few months before the 
announcement of the ‘Masakhane’ campaign, Mr Slabbert, Head of Community Development 
reported to the Council meeting that he received a telephone call from Senator Dennis Bloem, 
informing him that residents would be marching to the offices to pay the proposed R20 flat-rate 
on service fees on Mon 3 Oct 1994.
2008
  
Recognizing the potential threat the tension might cause in the upcoming local government 
elections, the ANC and SANCO attempted to close the rift between them. They organized a 
summit in 1995 to discuss their differences. “A three-a-side committee”, writes Seekings “was 
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set up to deal with problems as they arose”.2009 But the tensions had simmered to the extent that 
“the committee was clearly ineffective”.2010 In the run up to the local government elections these 
tensions were explicitly displayed in public. 
 
The MCA and ANC: The battle for the heart and soul of Kroonstad 
 
Just as it did in the 1994 national elections
2011
, SANCO agreed to support the ANC in the local 
government elections. Pro-ANC civic leaders campaigned for the ANC and helped build ANC 
branch organization.
2012
 But most importantly, SANCO had agreed to help the ANC in the 
elections on the basis that it would participate in the selection of ANC candidates, and support 
them fully.
2013
 But when the ANC overlooked some of the candidates selected by SANCO 
branches, or when the ANC imposed candidates not approved by the branches, squabbles arose 
in some areas. Some of the members of SANCO contested the elections as independent 
candidates.
2014
  
 
In Maokeng, the situation turned out differently. The SANCO Kroonstad branch did not seek to 
oppose the ANC in the local government elections. Instead some of the disgruntled members of 
SANCO decided to establish a civic structure to contest the elections independent of the ANC. 
This was after these members felt that the ANC provincial (and national) leadership had imposed 
its decisions on them rather than engaged them in proper consultation. Their main contention 
was the inclusion of Caswell Koekoe, the former mayor of Maokeng under the apartheid regime, 
in the election list. This was despite arguments against this decision. To fully understand this 
development, it is important to, first, look at the differences between the ANC leadership in the 
northern Free State province. 
 
Tom Lodge dates these differences back to 1993 after Elias Ace Magashule had been asked by 
the national leadership to step down as premier-candidate to make room for Lekota.
2015
 Chitja 
Twala argues “this was despite the fact that the majority of members of the ANC in the Free 
State had nominated Magashule as the premier candidate at the expense of Lekota”.2016 The 
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reason the ANC national leadership wanted Lekota to become the premier of the Free State it 
was because he was the chairperson of the northern region and one of the senior politicians 
within the ANC before the April 1994 elections.
2017
 But this view ignored Magashule’s role and 
popularity within the Free State, particularly within the northern region where in the early 1980s 
he operated as an organizer for the UDF, and later in the 1980s as an ANC underground 
operative.
2018
 Without doubt this must have caused Magashule to develop some resentment for 
Lekota. What perhaps really aggravated Magashule was that Lekota was perceived by his 
supporters in the Free State political circles as a relative ‘outsider’ imposed upon them by 
national leadership.
2019
 Lekota had spent most of his political career outside the Orange Free 
State, mainly in Natal and the Transvaal.
2020
 The tension further deepened when the Magashule 
supporters viewed the Lekota premiership as spending more time focusing on reconciliation with 
whites, particularly the Afrikaans-speaking whites. For Lodge, this was the main ground for the 
rift between Lekota and Magashule. The latter and his supporters argued that Lekota “had taken 
reconciliation with conservative whites too far”.2021  According to Lodge 
 
 It is true that since the 1994 election Lekota had developed good relations with  
 members of the old regime, in particular Dr. L. van der Walt, former Free State 
 administrator, whom he appointed to his cabinet over the heads of the National 
 Party hierarchy. Freedom Front leaders were also well disposed to Lekota …2022 
 
The differences between the two leaders finally caused splits within the ANC in the Free State. 
On the one hand, it was the Magashule-Pat Matosa (Magashule’s right-hand man and later the 
provincial chairperson of the ANC in the Free State) faction and, on the other hand, it was the 
Lekota (supported by Papi Kganare) group. These splits had a deep impact on the local politics 
of Kroonstad. This was evident after Lekota was ousted as the chairperson of the ANC in the 
Free State by Matosa (by extension by the Magashule/Matosa faction).   
 
The Magashule-Matosa faction led a division within the ANC in the Free State and the Lekota-
Papi Kganare split led another group.
2023
 This was confirmed in the interview with Mahlomola 
Majake, Sthembiso Mthombeni and Neo Muhao. In this interview Majake recalled an incident 
when the two groups held meetings in different places:  
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Terror Lekota had just emerged as the provincial chairperson (1994) of the ANC   
… He organized Basotho all over the country and they came [sic] to Clocolan to 
celebrate his victory. As Terror was celebrating in Clocolan, the leadership of the  
ANC led by Ace Magashule visited [Ivy] Matsepe-Cassaburri, but they met at T.V. 
[Tsiu Vincent] Matsepe’s house, in Welkom. Now there was talk that Terror was in 
Clocolan and had made a ‘Clocolan Accord’. And others also said the leadership of  
the ANC also met at T.V. Matsepe’s house and that is how the other group came to  
be known as T.V. In the politics of the Free State we in Qwaqwa have always sided  
with Magashule. But other people sided with Terror
2024
  
 
However, it was the ousting of Lekota by Matosa as the chairperson of the ANC in the Free State 
that was to have a direct effect on the local politics in Kroonstad. Die Volksblad reported in 
November of 1994 that President Nelson Mandela was asked to intervene in the election of the 
chairperson of the ANC in the Free State. Following the election of Pat Matosa, as the 
chairperson, defeating the Free State premier Mosiuoa Patrick “Terror” Lekota by 244 votes2025, 
the Maokeng ANC branch led by [Dennis] Bloem and Oupa Ramasia (also a leader in the 
SANCO branch) refuted the outcome, claiming that the elections “were not free and fair”.2026 
Writing about this elective conference Mathata Tsedu, editor of the Sowetan, observed 
 
 The delegates’ mood at this first unified provincial conference held in Qwaqwa 
 became ugly when the leadership results were announced. Lekota’s supporters 
 accused Matosa and Magashule of having rigged the voting results, accused the 
 northerners of packing in the delegates and inflating their delegation numbers 
 for the purpose of winning the contest … The northerners accused Lekota of  
 being a ‘bad loser’2027 
 
It can be speculated that following this incident, an acrimonious relationship between the 
provincial leadership of the ANC and some members in the leadership of the ANC Kroonstad 
branch developed.
2028
 The first signs of public disagreements between the two groups emerged 
when the ANC Orange Free State regional leadership attempted, through Mandela, to impose 
Koekoe on the ANC in Kroonstad. Ditseki Moeketsi, a member of the ANC in Kroonstad in 
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favour of Koekoe’s acceptance in the ANC, claims that the issue to endorse Koekoe’s 
membership in the ANC was raised by Nelson Mandela in an ANC meeting held in Parys. 
Lekota was also in attendance.
2029
 Mandela revisited this issue when he visited Kroonstad. 
 
In February 1994 Mandela, in his election campaign in the Orange Free State, visited 
Kroonstad.
2030
 He tried in vain to convince the “community” of Maokeng to accept Koekoe in 
their ranks. Reporting about this visit the City Press wrote 
 
After an enthusiastic welcome by supporters at Maokeng Stadium, Mandela was  
jeered when he pleaded with residents to accept in their ranks local mayor Caswell 
Koekoe
2031
 
 
Similarly, Tumisi recalls that Mandela tried to convince the masses at the stadium using the 
analogy of a witch. He explains 
  
Ntate Mandela ... was visiting the towns of the Free State. When Mandela was here,  
the way the province had explained the situation to him, Mandela tried to motivate  
that people should welcome him (Koekoe) back. But the community rejected him. It  
was that time when it was said that Mandela was howled ... He was at the stadium. The 
people went there. Mandela was addressing other issues, and the people who were asking 
questions raised that issue and the stadium erupted. He said ‘If someone is a witch, we 
must get him on our side so that he could teach us how to bewitch’. Angry people 
wouldn’t listen to that; people who struggled because of that person; those who suffered; 
those who lost their children, because of him ... Yes, they refused
2032
 
 
The relationship between the ANC Free State provincial leadership and some of the members of 
the ANC in Kroonstad deteriorated further after the ANC provincial leadership endorsed the 
candidacy of Koekoe. The disgruntled members of the ANC (and SANCO) in Kroonstad 
vigorously disapproved this decision. It is not clear where the suggestion that Koekoe’s name 
should be included in the ANC’s election list came from. A plausible explanation was offered by 
Rantie, who was both in the executive committees of the ANC and SANCO in Kroonstad. She 
believes that the problem relating to Koekoe’s candidacy was made public after the provincial 
leadership had delegated Papi Kganare to Kroonstad to revive the ANC branches in anticipation 
of the upcoming elections. She remembers 
 
Papi Kganare, who was the MEC for Education in the Free State, was deployed  
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to come to Kroonstad to revitalize the ANC’s branches. It so happened that when  
the Phomolong branch was supposed to launch most of the members of the ANC  
there decided to abstain and sat at the clinic. This meeting was postponed. The  
second meeting was called. I went to the office and said to the comrades we must 
 mobilize the residents to attend that meeting, because if they nominate Koekoe there  
we won’t be able to reverse the decision. Kganare had warned us that this was a final 
 meeting. The residents refused to budge. Koekoe was nominated to be a councillor. I  
was nominated in Seeisoville. That’s how his name was included in the ANC’s election 
 list. The next step was that members of the ANC in Kroonstad had to vote for the names 
 on the list. There was a meeting held at Mphohadi Teachers’ Training College. When we 
 got there we realized that Koekoe’s name was now in the top four amongst those who 
 were earmarked for the mayoralship. This really hurt me. I asked that my name should be 
 removed from  the list. I won’t serve in the same council with Koekoe.  Many people 
 were really hurt, and we were crying
2033
  
 
Mamokhele Sebetoane, who had attended this meeting, concurs with Rantie. Recalling the pain 
that the inclusion of Koekoe’s name in the election list of ANC caused, Sebetoane remarked  
 
It caused a lot of trouble. I remember … (pauses for a while) Oh, it caused a lot  
of trouble, especially by that time. There were kids that were shot and killed by  
him. So, you know, some people won’t forgive and forget. I remember we  
were at Mphohadi [Teachers’ Training College] it was during the elections  
of the councillors and his name was on the list of the candidates. It was so chaotic  
that people were crying, especially those that had lost their kids because they felt  
that even though he didn’t personally shoot their kids, but he was responsible for  
their murder. I can’t remember exactly what happened, but it was not resolved  
very easily. Because I remember there were continuous discussions about the issue  
of him being a councillor. Now there was a time when he was asked to voluntarily  
step down, because some of us we felt that the ANC constitution says if botho ba  
hao, kapa ho thongwa ha hao mo mokgahlong ho baka moferefere (if your standing  
or election in the organization causes problems), if you really do care, you must  
step down. But he never did that2034 
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Despite the vociferous disapproval of Koekoe’s candidacy, the ANC leaders in the province and 
nationally chose to ignore the community of Maokeng. Could this have been because the new 
leadership of the ANC in the province intended to demonstrate to the ANC branches in 
Kroonstad who was now in charge of the ANC in the province?  
 
It was at this stage that some of the members of the ANC and SANCO in Kroonstad decided to 
establish the Maokeng Civic Organisation (MCA) to prepare to contest the local government 
elections. According to Rantie 
That’s when the idea of forming the MCA arose. Dennis Bloem came to see me  
at home and told me that I should stand for the elections, because the residents  
of Maokeng do not want Koekoe. I refused and said ‘Dennis, you told the residents  
of Phomolong not to attend the meeting where Koekoe’s name was nominated.  
What you’re trying to do won’t succeed’. He then said we’re going to do it as MCA2035  
 
“Blakie” Tumisi, a founding member of the MCA, explains the reason for forming the MCA 
              
            MCA was led by me. They said Dennis (Bloem) was supporting us. But he was  
            already in Parliament. There were a handful of people. There were nineteen people.                     
            Frank Mabitle, Patala, Ramasia. It was a number of us. The main reason for estab- 
            lishing the MCA was to contest the elections. But we didn’t plan to break-away from 
            the ANC. We had planned that if we win the seats, we would go back to the ANC 
with those seats … You must remember we were closer to the people. We understood    
the situation. We were aware that the people were complaining that they were not going    
to vote for the ANC if Koekoe was on the list. It was this thing of imposing leaders on   
the people …2036  
 
In spite of Tumisi’s claim of being unaware of Bloem’s role in the establishment of the MCA, 
there is evidence to suggest that indeed Bloem played a role. Bloem first raised the issue of 
establishing the MCA in September 1995. Addressing a ‘Masakhane’ meeting, attended by the 
Speaker of the Free State Legislature Motlalepula Chabaku, Bloem said “Many residents are 
unhappy about the names in the ANC's list … There is an organization that will contest the local 
elections against the ANC in the forthcoming local elections.”2037    
 
Joseph “Slovo” Matli supports the view that Bloem manipulated some of the members of 
SANCO to establish the MCA. He explains 
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            Dennis Bloem manipulated these people … Most of the members of the MDCC were   
            then talking “correct” politics, because we were no longer pushing a particular agenda.  
            That’s when Dennis formed the MCA.  MCA definitely came as a result of the MDCC  
            activities. But they were haywire. They wanted to replicate what the MDCC did, but  
            the timing was wrong. Like now you can’t be throwing petrol bombs. You’ll be arrested.       
            They wanted to be radical. They wanted to be known. They never understood that there is  
            this compromise …The ANC put in a list of candidates for leadership in government.   
            Then the MCA also put in a list of their own, because they never liked people who were        
            on the list. One of the people on the list was Caswell Koekoe
2038
 
 
Tumisi refutes the argument that they were manipulated. For him, the establishment of the MCA 
was a strategic move. He argues that they, as the representatives of the “community”, were aware 
that the people would not vote for the ANC as long as Koekoe’s name was in the list. Therefore, 
to save the ANC they would use the MCA to contest the elections on behalf of the ANC. He 
observes 
 
 But what happened was that we couldn’t contest the elections as SANCO because we 
 were in an alliance with the ANC. And we couldn’t contest as members of the ANC,  
 because the ANC rejected us for other people. You must understand that the ANC – 
 the province had more power … to send names and decide which list could be adopted. 
 So, it was very difficult for the province to understand. There were two ANC factions 
 that didn’t agree. But when they were supposed to come and sit down with us so that 
 we could show them our reasons … they didn’t. Actually, there was a lack of intervention 
 … There was a deadlock. But how do we solve this thing? So, there was no way around 
 that. But because we wanted to save the ANC, we decided to contest the elections via the 
 civic. After winning the elections, we would go back to [the ANC]. It would still have 
 been the ANC that had won. That’s how we saw it. The comrades didn’t understand. It 
 was a misunderstanding among the comrades
2039
 
 
Despite this explanation, the ANC provincial leadership remained intransigent. The MCA 
compiled its own list of candidates and planned to register with the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) as a contesting party. The Free State ANC applied to the Bloemfontein 
Supreme Court to have the MCA barred from taking part in the election.
2040
 The Court agreed 
with the ANC and barred the MCA from participating in the elections. Paul Mahlatsi, the Free 
State elections co-ordinator explained this process as follows 
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 Last night the court had barred the association from the elections and had struck 
 nine of its 10 candidates from the elections
2041
 
 
After losing the case at the Bloemfontein Supreme Court, the MCA was instructed to pay the 
costs of the court proceedings. But it responded by lodging an appeal and was successful. 
However, more damaging was that the MCA was disqualified from contesting the elections.
2042
 
At this stage the ANC had relented and removed Koekoe’s name from the election list. 
According to Rantie, “Koekoe’s name was removed from the list a day before the elections”.2043 
The MCA, which had by then reinvented itself as the ‘Concerned Group’, continued in its 
defiance position, and now included in its demands a call for the removal of 12 Maokeng 
candidates from the list and a review of the selection process. This Group drew up a petition of 
5000 signatures and sent it to premier Lekota.
2044
 The ‘Group’s’ main concern was the equal 
representation of the alliance partners in the election list. Tumisi, a spokesman for the Group, 
was reported having said “As we understand it, according to the guidelines of the national list 
committee, each member of the electoral alliance should have equal representation at the list 
conference”.2045 He went further to note this discrepancy: “The Maokeng list committee had 
allocated 60 delegates to the ANC, 40 to the ANC Women’s League, 10 to the ANC Youth 
League and 10 to COSATU”.2046  
The SANCO and ANC provincial leadership dismissed the Concerned Group’s concerns. 
Johannes Melani, SANCO provincial co-ordinator argued: “The guidelines of the national list 
committee were open for interpretation and the situation differed from town to town”.2047 The 
SANCO provincial leadership’s uncompromising response seemingly was influenced by the 
threat of disciplinary measures, issued by the president of SANCO national, Mlungisi 
Hlongwane, against SANCO members who contravened the code of conduct.
2048
 And the ANC’s 
provincial spokesman Joe Khambule, on the other hand, admitted that the “call by the Concerned 
Group was a serious cause for concern”, and went on to appeal to the Group to “accept the 
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verdict of democracy”.2049 SANCO’s position was not surprising. After all it had forged an 
alliance with the ANC.  It “… ruled out protest action against the representative of the 
government” – by extension the ANC.2050  
On the day of the elections supporters of the MCA/Concerned Group went on a rampage; 
disrupting the elections. The South African Press Association (SAPA) reported that “Angry 
supporters of disqualified candidates in Maokeng, Kroonstad, on Wednesday morning stoned the 
community centre, disrupting voting there”.2051 The SAPA went further to note that “1000 
people were demonstrating against a Free State Supreme Court decision to disqualify 19 of 20 
candidates from the MCA”.2052 Rantie recalls this day as follows 
Koekoe’s name was removed from the list a day before the elections. And MCA’s  
names were also removed. The MCA started to fight people who went to the polling 
stations. They were trying to stop people from voting. But people went to vote, especially 
at night just before the stations closed
2053
  
 
In a meeting organized by the Concerned Group/MCA, the residents of Maokeng resolved to 
embark on rent boycott, and later a consumer boycott, protesting the disqualification of civic 
association candidates in the local government elections.
2054
 
Not surprisingly, under the prevailing political climate, Kroonstad experienced a very low voter 
turnout. This cost the ANC Kroonstad branch valuable votes. As a result it did not perform well 
as expected in the elections. The National Party and other organizations gave it a stiff 
competition. The NP won the local government elections by 3 843 votes to the ANC’s 3 427 
votes, out of the 30.81 percent total votes.
2055
 This was in contrast to the large voter turnout 
during the 1994 national elections, where in the Orange Free State 1,059,313 registered voters 
made their mark.
2056
 It is possible that Kroonstad contributed a sizeable number of these. Tumisi 
claimed that over 80 per cent of the registered voters abstained.
2057
 The Council’s seats were 
divided as follows: the National Party had 10 members (four as proportional representatives), the 
African National Congress 13 members (five proportionally elected
2058
) and the Kroonstad 
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Residents Association won five seats (three proportionally elected). And the two independent 
candidates made up the 30 seat Council.
2059
  
Perhaps feeling indignant after the elections, the ANC Free State provincial leadership 
suspended all the members of the MCA from the ANC. But the suspension was later lifted by the 
ANC national. Tumisi recalls 
               There was no official letter of suspension. When people are in power, they use  
               ways and means that you won’t understand. They said we were independent.  
               That’s all. That we contested the elections in another organization. We only heard 
               from the radio that we were given a certain time to be back in the ANC 
2060
 
 
The leadership of the ANC in the Free State then turned on Bloem. He was instructed to disband 
the MCA in public and vow to co-oporate with the leaders of the ANC branch in Brentpark, 
Kroonstad and the party’s executive committee in the Kroonstad district and the provincial 
executive committee.
2061
 In addition he was ordered to appear before the ANC disciplinary 
committee chaired by Kader Asmal to account “… for the blank ANC membership cards found 
in his possession?”2062The MCA was finally disbanded and Tumisi returned to the ANC. 
 
Conclusion 
The ANC Kroonstad branch did not perform well in the first democratic local government 
elections in November 1995. This was caused by the tension between the ANC provincial 
leadership and some of the members of the SANCO and ANC Kroonstad branches. This was 
mainly due to the ANC provincial leadership’s lack of consultation and its tendency to impose 
decisions on the local ‘progressive’ structures. In other areas, the ANC was able to defeat its 
members (and former members) who contested the elections as independent candidates, 
especially in the Western Cape and Natal.
2063
 But in Kroonstad the ANC was forced to seek a 
court interdict to stop the Maokeng Civic Association (MCA) from contesting the elections. 
Evidence suggests that had the MCA contested the elections it would have won – and thus 
embarrassed the provincial leadership. There are two important lessons that can be drawn from 
the incident that took place in Kroonstad.  
First, Maokeng, in Kroonstad, provides an interesting case study. In contrast to other places, 
Maokeng did not have a civic organization until 1990. Its establishment coincided with the 
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unbanning of the ANC. Inevitably, civic activists, who in the 1980s supported the UDF/ANC in 
Maokeng, became members of the ANC and helped form branches of the ANC in Kroonstad. 
Some of them were even elected into leadership positions in these branches. It was against this 
background that when the ANC wanted to begin to stamp its authority in the local politics in 
various townships, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) Kroonstad branch 
(and avoidably the ANC Kroonstad branch) was split into two between those who agreed to ‘toe 
the ANC’s line’ and those who challenged some of the decisions imposed by the ANC, 
particularly the Free State provincial leadership on the local politics in Kroonstad.  Finally, this 
caused some of the disgruntled members of SANCO and ANC Kroonstad branches to establish 
the ‘new’ Maokeng Civic Association (MCA) to contest the first local government elections 
independent of the ANC in 1995. This group did not terminate their membership in the ANC. 
They argued that the establishment of the MCA was a strategic move to win the ANC votes. In 
other areas such as the Western Cape and Natal, disgruntled members of SANCO and ANC 
branches left the ANC and stood as independents in the local government elections.  
And second, in spite of the close working relationship between the ANC and SANCO, which 
after 1993 restricted the civics from openly challenging the ANC, and also marginalized the 
civics’ traditional role of embarking in rent and services charges boycott, the MCA, in contrast, 
used the civics’ traditional role when it opposed the decision to impose the name of Caswell 
Koekoe in the ANC election list. It mobilized members of the “community” to voice their 
disapproval. This was reminiscent of the 1980s civics. This paid off because Koekoe’s name was 
removed from the list of candidates, and the ANC underperformed in the elections, because the 
majority of the members of the community rallied behind the MCA and boycotted the elections.  
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OVERALL CONCLUSION 
 
The central concern of this thesis has been to explore and examine political mobilisation and 
protests in Kroonstad’s black residential areas from 1976 to 1995. In doing this, the thesis 
attempted to explain the reasons why political mobilisation and protests lagged behind in these 
areas (compared to other areas), and why when local political activists finally managed to 
mobilise their communities, they could not sustain the political momentum. It is the contention 
of this thesis that these two factors distinguished the politics of Kroonstad’s black townships 
from other townships across the country. 
Kroonstad’s black politics have largely been shaped and influenced by ‘conservative’ bodies or 
individuals, except for brief moments in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. Because of this 
Kroonstad’s black residential areas remained quiescent and tranquil until 1985. The role played 
by bodies such the Native Advisory Board (NAB) and the Joint Europeans and Natives Council 
(JENC) after the demise of the radical and confrontationist Industrial and Commercial Workers’ 
Union (ICU), severely restricted radical and confrontationist politics in Kroonstad which were 
being experienced elsewhere in the country. Although African women trading illegally in home-
brewed beer in Kroonstad experienced constant harassment by the police and discriminatory 
laws in much the same manner as African women in areas like KwaZulu and Durban in the late 
1920s, they never organised and openly challenged the municipal laws prohibiting them from 
brewing and selling liquor. Instead, it was the JENC that challenged the government on behalf of 
the African women in Kroonstad. The NAB and JENC adopted a moderate approach to raise 
issues and to challenge the government and/or white local municipalities. When these bodies 
failed to meet the black residents’ needs, the latter lost hope in them and stopped supporting 
them. Racial tensions within the JENC further affected its activities to the extent that in the late 
1940s it finally ceased to function.     
In contrast, the Orange Free State African Teachers’ Association (OFSATA) and the Society of 
Young Africa (SOYA), although radical, concentrated their energies in organising and 
mobilising a particular constituency, teachers. This precluded them from attracting large 
numbers of people to their organisations. The teachers’ interests and needs varied from that of 
the larger community, especially the working class in the community. Furthermore, the existence 
of these two bodies helped to divide the community between the ‘elites’ and the other members. 
Phyllis Ntantala admits in her book that when she arrived in Kroonstad to take up a teaching 
position at Bantu High School (in 1967 it was renamed Bodibeng High) she, as a member of the 
elite, did not associate with all and sundry, even at social gatherings. “We (teachers) felt that, as 
the elite”, she writes “we simply could not mix and dance with anybody”.2064   
The election of Alfred Bitini Xuma to the presidency of the African National Congress (ANC) in 
1940 ushered in new radical developments in the organisation. First, the ANC leadership in 1941 
                                                          
2064
 Ntantala Life’s Mosaic, p.87 
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agreed to revive the women’s section within the organization. Two years later the ANC 
Women’s League was formed, but it was inaugurated in 1948. In 1944 the ANC Youth League 
was formed. Five years after its formation the ANC adopted the ANCYL’s ‘Programme of 
Action’, which convinced the ANC’s leadership to abandon petitioning and pleading with the 
British government to intervene on behalf of the African masses, and to adopt a defiance line. 
The Congress Movement’s Defiance Campaign in 1952, protesting the National Party 
government’s discriminatory laws, and women’s resistance against pass laws revived radical 
politics in Kroonstad. African women in Kroonstad, led by Majoro Matseki, marched and 
demonstrated against the government’s imposition of passes on African women. Although the 
police were able swiftly to curtail the women’s resistance in Kroonstad, radical ideas had been 
planted.  
In 1960, following the shooting of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) demonstrators in 
Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, a number of PAC supporters in Kroonstad established a cell 
to recruit more members. At this stage the PAC in exile in Basotholand was preparing for war 
with the government. Just as in the case with the ANCWL, however the PAC’s activities were 
quickly halted. This was after the leader of the cell was arrested and sentenced to three years on 
Robben Island.         
The combination of state heightened suppression and economic boom of the 1960s cowed people 
and shifted their attention to eking out a living. During this period Kroonstad’s black residential 
areas, particularly Maokeng, like many other townships across the country underwent a phase 
some commentators describes as a period of ‘political lull’. However, unlike other townships in 
Bloemfontein and parts of the Eastern Cape, Maokeng lacked active underground structures, 
particularly those linked with Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in places like Basotholand (in 1966 
renamed Lesotho after gaining independence). Chitja Twala and Jeremy Seekings, and Janet 
Cherry in their studies, in the Free State and Eastern Cape, respectively, demonstrate the role 
played by individuals in these areas who were members of MK or who had returned from 
Robben Island in helping politicise some of the young people in their areas, who in turn joined 
MK and carried out military attacks on state apparatuses. Because of this Maokeng (and 
Brentpark) remained quiet for the remainder of the 1960s and early 1970s.  
In 1959 the government enacted the Bantu Universities Act, which established separate 
universities and colleges for blacks. The government had intended that these institutions would 
produce graduates who would service their homelands. It was in these institutions where many 
blacks were introduced to politics and the Black Consciousness philosophy, after joining the 
South African Student Movement (SASO). In 1972 more than a thousand students were expelled 
from the University of the North (also known as Turfloop) after they had embarked on a strike, 
protesting the dismissal of Abram Onkgopotse Tiro, who had attacked the university’s 
administration, Bantu Education and the apartheid system. A significant number of these 
students returned to their home towns to take up teaching posts in the local schools.  
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Bodibeg High School in Maokeng employed some of these young and politically conscientised 
teachers. When they started to teach, they influenced their students. For example, as a result of 
this some of the students formed the branch of the South African Student Movement (SASM), a 
BC-inspired student organisation. Others established the Maokeng Student Art Club (MASAC), 
where they did not only engage in art lessons but in political discussions as well. The BC-
influence radicalised the students at Bodibeng High. They started questioning the blatant 
discriminatory laws practiced in Kroonstad. For example, they demanded to know why black 
people were not allowed in town after 9 o’clock at night and why blacks used a separate entrance 
points in shops in town. On 24 August 1976 students at Bodibeng High took to the streets 
demonstrating, in solidarity with their counterparts in Soweto, where the student uprising erupted 
on 16 June 1976. Again, this attempt was swiftly curtailed after the police arrested the student 
leaders and the teacher who was accused of having agitated the students.  
The last attempt at mobilizing in the 1970s was through church activities, particularly the Roman 
Catholic Church. Young people in this church formed the Young Christian Workers (YCW), 
which initially focused its attention solely on recruiting and conscientising young workers. Some 
of the members of the YCW attempted to spread the group’s activities to include the larger 
community. For example, they built shelters at the bus stop to protect the commuters. It was not 
long before the activities of the YCW could be detected by the police. The latter began to harass 
the members of the YCW. Because of police brutality the group was forced to change tactics and 
decided to engage the government militarily. Although this was an ambitious task, because none 
among the members of the YCW in Kroonstad had received military training, their actions as 
discussed during their trial, developed an interest among some of the people in Kroonstad in the 
politics of resistance. The YCW ceased to exist after two of their members were found guilty of 
plotting to use military means against the state. They were sentenced to prison terms. The rest of 
the members of YCW either left Kroonstad or stop participating in the activities of the YCW.  
 
In the post-1976 period the government introduced reforms to discourage demonstrations akin to 
the student uprisings of 1976/77. Among the reforms the government introduced was the 
establishment of the community councils, which functioned between 1977 and 1983. The 
community councils were to be run by members of the community elected by the residents. 
However, they had limited powers to govern the townships, and under the supervision of white 
officials. For example, the Kroonstad Community Council (KCC) was supervised by white 
officials in the Northern Orange Free State Bantu Administration Board (NOFBAB), who 
imposed unpopular decisions on it to implement. The most important duty of the KCC was to 
mediate in domestic disputes. The government stipulated that the community council should 
have to source funding on their own to finance the maintenance of the townships under their 
management. Because of the unavailability of sources of funding in the townships, particularly 
after the municipalities had privatized municipal beerhalls, the community councils across the 
country resorted to increasing rent and service charges. In many townships this prompted the 
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establishment of civic associations which mobilized and organized the residents to resist this. 
Maokeng, by contrast, remained unorganized and calm. Instead, the opposition party within the 
KCC challenged, sometimes successfully, the governing party whenever it introduced unpopular 
decisions. This made the residents complacent and they remained unorganized.  
 
When the government realized that the community councils were no longer implementing their 
mandate, as signaled by their inability to provide infrastructural development, pervasive 
allegations of corruption against councillors, and the persistence in raising rents, it introduced the 
Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. The Act upgraded the community councils to town (and 
village) councils. These, unlike the community councils, were given more powers, which 
included building infrastructure like houses and schools, allocating business sites, and 
maintaining roads. But, just like the community councils before them, they were not supported 
financially. They had to devise ways of sourcing funding. They, too, resorted to increasing rent 
and service charges. The town councils took over when South Africa was undergoing economic 
meltdown, which caused a significant number of people to loose their jobs. The increase in rent 
and service charges incensed many people in the townships. Their indignation was further 
compounded by the allegations of corruption on the part of the councillors. Township residents 
complained that they were paying rent and services charges but there was no evidence of what 
their monies were used for, because townships continued to lack development. Instead, town 
councillors became richer, owning chains of stores and bottle-stores, some of which they had 
bought from the municipalities after the latter had privatized them.    
 
It was at this stage that local politics in many townships across the country shifted from 
quiescence to confrontation, led by civic associations. The latter, assisted by students and youth 
organizations, resisted increased rent and service charges. They mobilized the communities to 
boycott paying rent and services charges, in the hope that the town councils would reconsider 
and decrease them. When the town councils remained intransigent, the residents under the 
leadership of civic associations confronted the councillors, demanding that they should resign. 
When the latter refused they were attacked, and some were even killed. By the mid-1980s many 
town (and village) councils across the country had been forced to dissolve. 
 
Unlike other townships, in Maokeng and Brentpark no civic association and no action was taken 
against the Town Council of Maokeng (TCM) and the Brentpark Management Committee 
(Manco). This was because the local authorities in these areas, particularly Maokeng, were in a 
position to provide the residents with services and not resort to charging the residents exorbitant 
rental and services charges. The TCM was distinct from other town councils because it was led 
by a charismatic mayor Caswell Koekoe. Koekoe mediated on behalf of the residents of the 
township with white authorities and helped find employment for some of them. Under his 
leadership the TCM made concerted efforts to provide the necessary social services in the 
township. For example, houses, schools, holiday resort, pensioners’ residential area were built. 
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The township’s roads were maintained. This earned the TCM and Koekoe support within the 
community. It was for this reason that ‘progressive’ structures, aligned to the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), in the township could not force the TCM and its councillors to resign.   
 
At the height of the struggle in the mid-1980s students, led by the Congress of South African 
Students (COSAS), were at the forefront of resistance in various townships. By 1983 students in 
many townships were already protesting against conditions not conducive to learning at their 
school. In 1984 COSAS tabled five key demands, which were later taken up by high school 
students in different areas. It demanded Student Representative Council’s (SRC) to replace the 
prefect system, the removal of the age limit rule, an end to corporal punishment, that teachers 
should stop sexually harassing female students, and that the police and South African Defence 
Force (SADF) be withdrawn from schools and townships. In some of the townships student 
radicalization was made possible by the presence of political veterans who helped to disseminate 
information about the role of the banned African political organizations such as the ANC and 
PAC, or veterans who created links between local activists and the banned organizations in exile, 
and in the process encouraged political mobilization and organisation. Maokeng lacked such 
political veterans. It was for this reason that students at Maokeng lagged behind in mobilizing 
and protesting.  
 
The situation changed, however, after students and young people in the townships had been 
introduced to politics via various routes. Some of the students learned politics at home. Others 
from church groups like Chiro. A few experienced student politics when they visited relatives in 
places like the Vaal Triangle. However, it was the interaction between the students at Bodibeng 
High and political activists who came to hid in Kroonstad running away from the police in places 
like Soweto that finally give the students at Bodibeng the confidence to mobilize and riot in 
1985. The students at Bodibeng demanded similar changes as their counter-parts elsewhere. This 
was a turning point in the political history of Maokeng. Not long students shifted their attention 
from educational issues to fighting apartheid in general. It was at this period that some of the 
students became used military tactics to wage the war against the state, particularly its agents like 
the police. Police’s houses were identified and bombed.  
 
However, the politicisation of students also had unintended consequences. At Bodibeng High 
generational tensions developed between the students and teachers. Students began to disrespect 
the teachers. They left school premises whenever they felt like, smoked marijuana inside the 
premises of the school, and even fought with teachers physically. The teachers retaliated by 
fighting back. 
 
The government responded to the escalating of resistance by declaring a partial state of 
emergency in 1985 and detained a number of student leaders. Realising that its attempt did not 
achieve their desired outcome, in 1986 it declared a national state of emergency, in which 
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thousands of activists, including students were detained for long spells in prison. This affected 
mobilization in many townships, including Maokeng, but this also contributed to the formation 
of gangs in various townships. In Maokeng, the Three Million Gang and Canadians Gang were 
formed, initially as loose groupings involved in dance competitions. Not long after the two gangs 
became rivals and began to fight each other. Worse, they shifted their activities to robbing and 
terrorizing members of the community who were employed by the Premier Milling Company. 
The ‘comrade youth’ attempt to intervene and stop the war between the two gangs. It was only 
after the intervention by Minister’s Fraternal that the two gangs ceased to function.      
 
In defiance of the State of Emergency, the UDF and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) formalized their alliance and formed in 1989 formed the Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM). This changed the situation and helped to revive political activism in 
townships. At this stage the ‘progressive’ structure in Maokeng energetically organized and 
mobilized the community to oppose the TCM (renamed the City Council of Maokeng after the 
1988 local government elections). It organized consumer and rent boycotts to force the CCM to 
resign. The CCM refused to resign and stayed in the Council. The ‘progressive’ structure’s 
attempts at forcing the CCM to dissolve were disrupted by two factors. 
 
First, it was the split within the ‘progressive’ structure, resulting in the formation of the Maokeng 
Democratic Crisis Committee (MDCC) and the Activists’ Forum (AF). The two formations 
differed in their approach: the MDCC favoured a militant line and the AF a moderate approach. 
Although both the MDCC and AF aimed to achieve the same goal: to remove the CCM, but the 
MDCC was not in favour of negotiating the removal from office of the CCM. They wanted the 
Council dissolved. The AF, on the other, believed that it was important to negotiate with the 
CCM to dissolve, because the members of the AF believed that some of the Councillors, 
particularly Koekoe, could be rehabilitated and brought to wok for the organization, the ANC. 
These differences split the community of Maokeng between the two organizations. This 
hampered political mobilization in Maokeng.  
 
The second factor was the re-emergence of the Three Million Gang (TMG), a vigilante group 
formed to protect the councillors against attacks by the activists. The TMG terrorized the 
community particularly members of the ‘progressive’ structures, which had by then reconstituted 
themselves as the ANC branches, who opposed Koekoe and his Council. The TMG’s reign of 
terror lasted for two years, 1990-1992. In mid-1991 the TMG joined Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) and the violence in Maokeng turned into political violence. Political activists focused their 
energies to fighting the TMG and allies. Attempts at organizing and mobilizing the masses were 
hindered. After the murder of the leader of the TMG, Ramodikoe George “Diwiti” Ramasimong, 
in early 1992 violence stopped.  
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At this point, the ANC, which had been unbanned in 1990, was attempting to stamp its authority 
in many townships. This was not easy for it because of the existence of the South African 
National Civic Organisation branches in various areas, including Kroonstad where a SANCO 
branch was formed. SANCO was formed amidst heated debate about whether civic associations 
should be left to continue functioning or not. Those who were in favour of their continuation 
argued that they were closer to the people and were aware of the communities’ needs. The others 
who were against the civic associations’ existence contended that they were formed to fight the 
struggle on behalf of the ANC which was banned in exile. Now that the ANC had been unbanned 
they felt that there was no need for the civic associations to continue existing. Instead, their role 
would be taken over by the ANC branches. The situation was aggrevated by the leadership of 
SANCO when it entered into an alliance with the ANC, which implied that SANCO national and 
its branches were prohibited from criticising the ANC.    
 
The situation came to a head in the period leading to the first democratic local government 
elections. In Kroonstad, as was the case in other areas like Western Cape and Eastern Cape, 
members of SANCO at branch level were angred by lack of consultation by the ANC, both at 
provincial and national levels. They felt that ANC had developed a tendency to impose its 
decisions on local community politics. For example, the Free State provincial leadership of the 
ANC, backed by the national leadership, attempted to impose Caswell Koekoe’s name in the 
ANC’s candidates’ list for the local government elections in Kroonstad. After numerous attempts 
to resolve this issue without success, some of the members of SANCO Kroonstad branch decided 
to form the Maokeng Civic Association (MCA) to contests the elections as independents. The 
ANC responded by applying to the Supreme Court to oppose the MCA. The latter was barred 
from contesting the elections, after 19 out of 20 members were disqualified by the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC). In response the MCA mobilized members of the ‘community’ to 
abstain from voting. The overwhelming majority acceded to the call and did not cast their vote. 
This cost the ANC vital votes. The National Party won the elections.    
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